Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment Of The Maritime Prepositioned Force: Truimph Or Mixed Success? AUTHOR Major Stephen P. Dodd, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT OF THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE: TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS? I. Theme: To review the concept and real-world employment of the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) in the arrival and assembly area during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. II. Thesis: Initial results of the strategic employment of the MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans and procedures. III. Discussion: On August 2, 1990, an Iraqi ground, air, and naval force of some 140,000 men launched a blitzkrieg-type attack against Kuwait. This unprovoked invasion, occupation and annexation, and threat posed to global energy supplies, shattered the fragile stability in the region and created a worldwide crisis. The response was an impressive diplomatic, economic, and military reaction by the world community against Iraq. The initial stages of Operation Desert Shield provided the opportunity to validate the MPF concept with the rapid deployment of MPF ships containing equipment and supplies for sustaining 30 days of combat supply for 30,000 Marines. With the concept, doctrine, and planning of the arrival and assembly area (AAA) established for the employment of the MPF during a crisis, a critical look at events and observations that transpired during the offload of MPF equipment and supplies in the AAA for Operation Desert Shield is presented. IV. Summary: The MPF doctrine had always planned on a specific flow of personnel and equipment into a theater of operations. In Desert Shield, the threat, and subsequent haste to get combat units in-theater, caused the priority of flow to change resulting in increased logistical demand earlier than expected or planned for. Events that transpired during this critical phase offer some lessons for future MPF employment. V. Conclusion: Employment of the MPF for Operation Desert Shield was heralded as an amazing success. However, once MPF ships arrived in the AAA, offload and operations did not follow the prescribed plans and procedures. Problems were encountered in the AAA that can be attributed to non-compliance of activities and functions deemed necessary for required throughput, orderly offload, marriage of units and equipment, and assembly. Lessons learned from this first real-world use of the MPF will stimulate doctrinal and procedural change where necessary to further enhance employment of the MPF. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT OF THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE: TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS? OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Initial results of the strategic employment of the MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans and procedures. I. MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE CONCEPT II. MPF PHASES A. Planning B. Marshalling C. Movement D. Arrival and Assembly III. ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY AREA ORGANIZATION A. Offload Preparation Party B. Arrival and Assembly Support Party C. Port Operations Group D. Beach Operations Group E. Arrival Airfield Control Group IV. RECEPTION IN THE AAA A. Initial Preparation Subphase B. Advance Party Subphase C. Offload and Marriage Subphase V. MPF EMPLOYMENT IN DESERT SHIELD A. Offload Preparation Party B. Containerized Cargo C. Equipment Issue D. Supply Issues E. AACG Operations F. Repair Parts G. Training VI. LESSONS LEARNED DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EXPLOYMENT OF THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE: TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS? MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE CONCEPT On August 2, 1990, an Iraqi ground, air, and naval force of some 140,000 men launched a blitzkrieg-type attack against Kuwait. This unprovoked invasion, occupation and annexation, and threat posed to global energy supplies, shattered the fragile stability in the region and created a worldwide crisis. The response was an impressive diplomatic, economic, and military reaction by the world community against Iraq. In response to this unprovoked aggression and blatant violation of the United Nations Charter, and at the invitation of the government of Saudia Arabia, the United Sates commenced Operation Desert Shield. The initial stages of Operation Desert Shield provided the opportunity to validate the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) concept with the rapid deployment of MPF ships containing equipment and supplies for sustaining 30 days of combat supply for 30,000 Marines.1 The maritime prepositioning concept was conceived in 1979 by the Secretary of Defense in response to the seizure of American citizens in Iran. The basic plan called for the prepositioning of equipment and supplies to permit a rapid response to a crisis around the world with firepower, tactical mobility, and sustainability. The MPF concept was designed to be a strategic deployment option exercised by the National Command Authority. The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) ashore, marryup with equipment and supplies, and conduct subsequent combat operations. After a decade of planning, experimentation, and practice, the first MPF strategic employment was ordered by the National Command Authority for Operation Desert Shield. The employment of the MPF was hailed as a success by the Marine Corps in its first real- world test.2 Initial results of the strategic employment of the MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans,and procedures. MPF PHASES There are four phases to an MPF operation: planning, marshalling, movement, and arrival and assembly. Each phase is a building block for the next phase and provides not only a foundation, but also a framework for planning and execution. Planning. MPF operations can be characterized by contingency and execution planning. The planning phase begins with the issue of a warning order and is continuous throughout the operation. Contingency planning prepares for potential crisis and military operations which may occur around the world. Execution planning is conducted in preparation for actual commitment of the MPF in a specific crisis, when deployment is imminent. Marshalling. During this phase, units complete their final preparations for movement to aerial ports of embarkation (APOE) and board aircraft for the transit to the crisis theater of operations. The marshalling phase begins with the arrival of the first element at some predetermined marshalling place and ends when the last unit has departed. Movement. This phase consists of the actual movement of forces by sea and air to a designated arrival and assembly area (AAA) in the theater of operations. The movement phase begins upon departure of the first aircraft or when the first MPF ship begins transit to the AAA. This phase is completed when the last fly-in echelon (FIE) aircraft arrives in the AAA and the last MPF ship has arrived for offloading. Arrival and Assembly. Arrival and assembly is the most crucial phase of an MPF operation. This phase begins upon arrival of the first MPF ship or the first aircraft in the designated AAA. This phase is completed when adequate equipment and supplies have been offloaded and issued to awaiting units; command and control communications have been established; and the MPF MEB Commander reports that all essential elements of the MEB have achieved combat readiness.3 During this phase, the AAA will be organized and prepared to receive offloaded equipment and supplies. Units will marry together with their equipment and planning for subsequent operations will be completed. ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY AREA ORGANIZATION Once the NCA has decided to employ the MPF in response to a crisis situation, the MPF orders are executed and the program transitions through the planned phases of execution. The final and most crucial phase of employment of the MPF, is operations in the arrival and assembly area of prepositioned equipment and supplies. Arrival and assembly organizations are provided by the MEB and the Navy Support Element (NSE) to conduct operations in the AAA. An arrival and assembly operations group (AAOG) is formed which plans, coordinates, and provides control for the offload and subsequent association of equipment and supplies with arriving units designated to marry-up with maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies (MPE/S) .4 Figure l depicts a notional AAA organization. Click here to view image During the arrival and assembly phase, the following tasks are performed:5 Initial preparation of the AAA. Coordinated arrival and offload of equipment and supplies (in port, across the beach, or a combination of both). Issue of maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies to arriving units. Preparation for the operational missions for which the forces were deployed. This phase ends when adequate equipment and supplies have been offloaded and issued to awaiting units. The concept for arrival and assembly is dictated by the mission, geography, topography, facilities available, and the tactical concept for MPF MEB operations ashore. This concept consists of the basic sequence for arrival and assembly, selection of offload sites, and procedures for command and control. Included is a concept for the offload of equipment and supplies 6 The area required for arrival, offload, MPE/S distribution, and preparation for employment is named the AAA. This area must be sufficiently secure to permit arrival and assembly, and must contain facilities for the complex tasks of arrival, off-load, distribution, assembly, and preparation for employment. Fortunately, the AAA in Saudia Arabia for operation Desert Shield offered these capabilities which allowed for the rapid offloading and assembly of the MPE/S. Figure 2 depicts the general organization of an AAA. Offload Preparation Party. The offload preparation party (OPP) is a temporary task organization consisting of maintenance, embarkation personnel, and equipment operators. Upon activation the OPP is transported to the MPF ships prior to deployment, during transit, or when it arrives in the AAA. The OPP is responsible for preparing the ships offload systems, lighterage (barges), and embarked MPE/S.7 Arrival and Assembly Support Party. The arrival and assembly support party (AASP) is also a task organized unit composed of units from the Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) to control the throughput of personnel and MPE/S at the port, beach, and airfield. There are three principal throughput groups within the AASP: l. Port Operations Group 2. Beach Operations Group 3. Arrival Airfield Control Group Port Operations Group. The Port Operations Group (POG) is task organized around a nucleus beach and terminal operations company of the BSSG. The POG is responsible for preparation of the port prior to arrival of the MPF ships and the throughput of supplies and equipment as they are offloaded from the ships. The POG is responsible for the following tasks:8 Establish overflow areas for supplies and equipment adjacent to piers. Clear piers and overflow areas of material. Establish liaison with host nation port authorities for employment of cargo and material handling equipment operators. Operate cargo/material handling equipment, including shore-based cranes, forklifts, tractors, dollies, etc. Provide direction to MEB drivers detailed to move vehicles from the port to assembly areas. Establish bulk fuel/water reception and transfer facilities using local facilities. Click here to view image Beach Operations Group. The second organization under the AASP is the Beach Operations Group (BOG). The BOG is task organized around a landing support company of the BSSG. The functions of the BOG are:9 Providing the beach area command and control necessary to control and coordinate the throughput of the MPE/S, to include designation and establishment of overflow areas. Coordinating the initial bulk fluid transfer. Off-loading lighterage at the beach. Providing direction to MEB drivers to move vehicles from the lighterage. Preparing to continue beach operations for continuous resupply or reinforcement. Arrival Airfield Control Group. The third organization under the AASP is the arrival airfield control group (AACG). The AACG is responsible for the control and coordination of the offload of airlifted units and equipment. The AACG is task organized around a nucleus provided by the landing support company of the BSSG. The AACG will normally deploy as an element of the advance party and will initiate operations at the arrival airfield. The AACG reports the arrival of air movement serials which track the MEB's air movement to the AASP, which can then coordinate and control the arrival of all units and equipment at the port, beach, and airfield.10 RECEPTION IN THE AAA Reception in the arrival and assembly area is the most important event during the employment of the MPF. The following principles must be considered during reception:11 A MAGTF operational posture must be attained within 10 days. Beach and port congestion must be held to a minimum by expediting throughput of material. Unit distribution of all classes of supplies will be effected to the maximum extent possible. Munitions will require special handling and expeditious movement to ammunition dumps. Security and safety are paramount considerations during offload, marriage, and assembly operations. The myriad of activities that occur during the assembly and arrival phase have to start before the MPF ships arrive in the theater of operations. These activities can be divided into three subphases:12 I. Initial Preparation Subphase II. Advance Party Arrival Subphase III. Offload and Marriage Subphase Initial Preparation Subphase. During the initial preparation subphase, the MEB to be employed will designate the G-4 staff section to collect and report information regarding the suitability of port, beach, airfield, and road networks to support reception of the MEB. The OPP is associated with this subphase and will ideally be transported to the MPF ships to ready the prepositioned equipment for offload. The OPP is responsible to prepare the ships' offload systems, prepare embarked equipment and supplies for offload, and if possible predesignate vehicles and equipment for issue to units.13 Advance Party Subphase. The advance party arrives in the objective area to begin making decisions and taking actions necessary for the general offload. They initiate development and utilization of staging facilities/areas and initiate issue of the prepositioned equipment and supplies. The advance party builds upon the functions and capabilities of the OPP and is then absorbed into the main body of the MEB upon completion of the assembly and arrival phase.14 Offload and Marriage Subphase. The offload and marriage subphase begins when the first increment of the MEB's main body arrives in-theater. One of the critical tasks during this subphase pertains to the ability of the MEB commander and his staff to assess the readiness of the equipment as it is being offloaded and distributed. From this information, the MEB will be able to determine the reception status of each element, logistical buildup, and material readiness of the MEB. Activities during reception and offload of the MPF in the AAA are arranged by function and organization. Standing operating procedures for each major event in the AAA should have established according to doctrine for the course of events that would transpire if the NCA issued an order to employ the MPF. Training and exercises should have tested portions of these plans and procedures, but no real-world situation could test total employment of the MPF prior to Operation Desert Shield. How doctrine, plans and procedures would actually unfold would be put to the ultimate test starting in August, 1990. MPF ENPLOYNENT IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD With the concept, doctrine, and planning of the AAA established for the employment of the MPF during a crisis, a critical look at events and observations that transpired during the offload of MPF MPE/S in the AAA, Saudia Arabia, for Operation Desert Shield is presented. The MPF doctrine had always planned on a specific flow of personnel and equipment into a theater of operations, which has generally been a security unit, and force service support units having priority of deployment. In Desert Shield, the threat, and subsequent haste to get combat units in-theater, caused the priority of flow to change. In one case, personnel assigned for the offload arrived after some of the ships had already been offloaded.15 Additionally, the early introduction of combat forces into the theater increased the logistical demand earlier than expected or planned for. In this regard, Desert Shield should not be considered unique, as the early introduction of combat forces into a crisis area will probably always be the preferred method of initial employment. Offload Preparation Party. The OPP is designated to inspect and prepare rolling stock on the ships before offload begins. In Desert Shield, the OPP was directed to identify any equipment for shortages, required repair parts, and any problems that could be rectified prior to the arrival of the follow-on forces. However, once this was accomplished on the MPF ships, the OPP could not communicate with its parent unit to pass on information about the status of equipment readiness. This caused a shortfall of parts and operable equipment once the MPE/S was offloaded in the AAA.16 Additionally, not all OPP functions were performed on all the MPF ships. Some ships arrived in port before the OPP could marry-up with them. This delayed the preparation, separation, and offload of equipment in the AAA and subsequent issue to awaiting units. Containerized Cargo. During the offload in the AAA of containerized cargo, delay, storage, and obsolescence were encountered which caused chaotic situations. When Marines went to the AASP to draw their equipment and supplies, the BSSG was able to determine which containerized cargo box the equipment was in, but they could not determine the location of the cargo box due to the lack of a conex box locator. No map sheet was available to show the location of boxes in the AAA. Additionally, there were delays issuing containerized equipment because of the lack of manpower at the supply issue points. This created a need for units to send large working parties to unpack containers, sort through supplies, and repack containers. This put an increased burden on the already strained transportation assets, moving personnel from their units to the supply issue points within the AAA. Some containerized ammunition was found to be outdated and although it could be used, it did not deliver the maximum range capable in the newer weapon systems transported to the theater of operations.17 Equipment Issue. Each ship in the MPF has a fixed set of equipment and supplies embarked for issue to follow-on forces. This set contains sufficient quantities of all items of supply to last for thirty (30) days. Each set is generally consistent, although there are adjustments made periodically. The load plan of the MPE/S on each ship provides limited, if any, capability for selective offload. The load plans facilitate rapid offload of the entire set of MPE/S. Any effort to selectively offload will increase the offload time, with marginal success in acquiring the "selected" equipment or supplies. In Desert Shield, the offload of equipment and supplies became an issue as load plans did not provide for unit integrity. Vehicles aboard the MPF ships are mobile loaded with a variety of items. Items on each vehicle were not necessarily designated for the same unit drawing the vehicle. This caused a delay in issuing equipment and supplies as many hours were spent unloading, staging, and reloading mobile loaded vehicles before the vehicles could be driven to the storage/distribution area in the AAA for issue to their respective units. Another problem with equipment issue in Desert Shield was that deploying units did not deploy with the requisite amount of equipment. The Unit Equipment Report (UER) is a listing of each unit's table of equipment quantities, the amount of assets each unit had aboard MPF ships, the distribution of these assets, and the quantity and type of assets that needed to be flown in with each unit. In numerous cases, the units did not arrive with the assets identified to be flown in. This caused some units to send personnel back to the United states to pick-up additional equipment, especially weapons. One of the factors that contributed to this problem was that some units did not receive a copy of their UER's in order to identify MPF assets in advance. 18 Once equipment and supplies were issued to units, there were numerous comments and recommendations about the mix of the MPF equipment assigned to units. In some instances, the equipment was perceived as not required. In other instances, units commented on the lack of equipment. This problem can be directly related to the UER, the timeliness it was received by a unit, and the amount of attention given to it by each unit. Supply Issues. The accounting procedures used during the offload in the AAA, did not comply with standard Marine Corps supply procedures. During Desert Shield shipping offload, equipment was issued on first-come, first-served basis, vice issuing a block of equipment to a specified unit. Equipment was issued without the standard Department of Defense supply accounting forms, DD 1348. The only apparent record of issue was a lined-out entry on the ship's manifest. Customer service units could not tell whether equipment was issued to a unit or if it was still located in a storage area in the AAA. Supply accounting procedures could not identify if an item was issued or stored, even though an item was offloaded. Equally important, was the method by which vehicles were distributed to units. Some units were given 110% of their UER allowance, causing other units to receive less than their requirement. There was a demand for vehicles and equipment as soon as they were offloaded by units arriving in the theater of operations. Doctrinally, the equipment and vehicle distribution is supposed to take place after the correct offload policies and procedures have been conducted.19 AACG Operations. As discussed earlier, the AACG operates in the AAA under the Arrival/Assembly Support party and is responsible for the control and coordination of the offload of airfield units and equipment. In Desert Shield, there was virtually no way to control and coordinate any planned policies and procedures as units and cargo arrived in theater. Once aircraft landed, personnel were sent to warehouses to draw their equipment and supplies. Cargo pallets arrived at either Jubail or Daharan airports without the owning units receiving notification that their equipment had arrived. These pallets of cargo then sat at the airfields without any priority of movement being established. Cargo was placed at a mixed lot on the port where units had to hope to find their cargo pal lets before some other unit claimed them. One of the contributing factors to the lack of coordination and control during the offloading of MPF ships was the MPF Decision Support System (MDSS). This computer system was designed to coordinate and control equipment as it was offloaded; there was total reliance on this automated system with no manual back-up. Confusion and chaos resulted when the MDSS did not work as advertised and there was no other back-up. Containers did not have inventory sheets attached to them and equipment could only be identified by a bar scanner code, with no other markings present for identification. Repair Parts. The class IX repair parts and secondary repairables were not inventoried or organized for issue in order to support the early issue of MPF equipment. The repair parts block onboard the ships, was not inventoried and segregated before units began to draw parts from the BSSG. This made it difficult to locate and issue parts stored in the containers. There was a manual locator deck which indicated the serial numbers of the containers storing the part(s) needed. However, once the container was located, warehousemen had to search through numerous wooden crates within the containers. Additionally, part quantities were not indicated on the manual locator deck, which meant that many containers had to be searched to locate the sufficient quantity of parts needed to fill a requisition. Secondary repairables were treated as repair parts, as no maintenance float was established to exchange these parts. This situation raised questions as to whether or not a secondary repairable parts block even existed on MPF shipping. Poor accounting and control of these critical parts created a situation where there was initially poor support for the maintenance of vehicles and equipment after assets had been issued to forces arriving in theater.20 Training. In operation Desert Shield, many personnel were unfamiliar with MPF plans, procedures, and operations. Two basic problems were encountered. First, Desert Shield occurred at the peak of the summer rotation of personnel. This allowed for units to have many new personnel aboard who had not been involved with any MPF exercise or had any familiarity with MPF plans. Secondly, the BSSG designated to support the MPF, is only a nucleus staff. Many of the key billets are only staffed upon activation of the BSSG. This allowed for personnel being assigned without any knowledge or familiarity of MPF plans and operations 21 LESSONS LEARNED This paper has presented the concept and doctrine of the MPF and employment in Operation Desert Shield. Operations in the AAA phase of MPF employment laid out what seemed to be logical, well- planned, and methodical policies and procedures. On the surface it appeared that when the NCA issued an order to employ the MPF, plans and procedures were in-place to effectively execute all phases of an operation. When actually employed for Operation Desert Shield, the MPF concept was validated and heralded as an amazing success. However, once MPF ships arrived in the AAA, offload and operations did not follow the prescribed plans and procedures. Problems were encountered in the AAA that can be attributed to non-compliance of activities and functions deemed necessary for required throughput, orderly offload, marriage of units and equipment, and assembly. The first critical function to be performed for employment of the MPF was the job of the OPP. Arriving after some MPF ships had offloaded was a basic doctrinal principle, upon which offload was dependent. Containerized cargo problems, equipment issue, supply procedures, AACG operations, repair parts issue, and training were all critical functions that had to be executed well in order for the MEB to be reconstituted and become combat ready. Fortunately, time was an ally and allowed for the correction of problems in the AAA. The subsequent logistics build-up and employment was definitely a major factor in the success of Operation Desert Storm. Lessons learned from this first real- world use of the MPF will stimulate doctrinal and procedural change where necessary to further enhance employment of the MPF. Continued refinement will ensure that the MPF remains valid, functional, and flexible, allowing the United States to react quickly and forcefully in response to world crisis situations. The employment of the MPF in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm can be summarily characterized as a phenomenal success. Future use and success of this national asset will depend on forethought and lessons learned. ENDNOTES l.Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the ConGress, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991), pp. 13-15. 2.Elizabeth P. Donovan, "It Worked! Prepositioned Practiced in Theory Deemed Success in Fact," NavY Times, October 15, 1990, p. 29. 3.MCCDC, USMC, Maritime PrePositioning Force (MPF) Operations, (Quantico, August 1990), pp. 1-6 to 1-7. 4.Ibid., p. ES-2. 5.Ibid., p. 1-7. 6.Ibid., p. 3-6. 7.Ibid., p. 8-4. 8.Ibid., p. 8-9. 9.Ibid., pp. 8-10 to 8-11. 10.Ibid., pp. 8-10 to 8-11. 11.LtCol David B. Brown, USMC (Ret.), "MPS: Combat Capability in the Objective Area," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1985, p. 76. 12.Ibid., pp. 76-77. 13.1st MEB, USMC, Maritime Prepositioning Operations Standard Operating Procedures, (Kaneohe Bay, 1988), p. D-5. 14.Ibid., p. 5-19. 15.1st MarDiv, AAR For Operation Desert Shield, dtd 21 Sep 90, (MCLLS, Quantico), pp. 2-3. 16.Ibid., pp. 2-3. 17.Ibid., p. 5. 18.Ibid., pp. 4-8. 19.Ibid., pp. 3-4. 20.Ibid., pp. 14-19. 21.Ibid., pp. 5-9. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (ret). "MPS: An Evolving Entity." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1985, pp. 34-39. Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (ret). "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1985, pp. 64-67. Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (ret). "MPS: The Navy's Crucial Role." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1985, pp. 71-75. Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC (ret). "MPS: Combat Capability in the Objective Area." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1985, pp. 75-83. Danant, P.M. "Improving U.S. Capability to Deploy Ground Forces to Southwest Asia in the 1990s." The Rand Corporation, February 1983. Donovan, Elizabeth P. "It Worked! Prepositioned Practiced in Theory Deemed Success in Fact." Navy Times, October 15, 1990, p.29. Gerlaugh, Robert E., Major USMC. "Doctrine and Roles for MPF: What have we Learned?" Naval War College, June 1989. Hoffman, F.G., Major USMCR. "First Impressions About the Persian Gulf Crisis: An Example of Enduring Realities." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1991, pp. 28-30. Huddleston, Craig S., Major USMC. "Commentary on Desert Shield." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1991, pp. 32-33. Kelly, P.X., General USMC, and O'Donnell, Hugh K., Major USMC. "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy." US Naval Institute Proceedings (Supplement), January 1896, pp. 66-67. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations, Quantico, 1990. Nance, John F. "Strategic Airlift Aircraft Needed for Deployment of USMC Prepositioned Forces." Center for Naval Analyses, May 1988. Nance, John F. "MPF Exercise Summary." Center for Naval Analyses." February 1990. Pankey, Paul A., LtCol USMC. "MPS Logistics Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1985, pp. 59-65. Peoples, William C., LtCol USMC. "MPF: What is it; What it does; How it works." Naval War College, June 1986. Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, January 1991. Strock, James N., Major USMC. "The MPS Reception - An Analysis." Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, April 1985. U.S. Marine Corps. "Prepositioning Automated Information Systems Guidebook." Washington, 1987. 1st MEB, I MEF, FMF. "Maritime Prepositioning Operations Standard Operating Procedures." Kaneohe, February 1988. 1st MarDiv, I MEF, FMF. "After Action Report for Operation Desert Shield." Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Quantico, September 1990.
