HMLA Aircraft: Present To 2010 AUTHOR Major Robert G. Davis, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010 THESIS STATEMENT: The need exists for a multi-mission aircraft to perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack (HMLA) and Marine Fixed Wing Observation (VMO) communities. This aircraft must be compatible with Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) tactics and concepts of operation in conjunction with the development of the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP). The aircraft selected must be a major step forward in technology and performance in order to counter a wide variety of future threats. ISSUE: The Marine Corps was the service to create the impetus for the V-22 (Osprey). Coupled with this tiltrotor technology, the Marine Corps is also attempting to apply technology from XV-15 Tiltrotor Demonstrator to meet the anticipated requirements of the next generation of tactical air assets. This techno- logical advanced aircraft will suit the future needs of the HMLA and VMO communities well beyond the year 2010. This paper briefly examines the current aircraft of the HMLA squadron; the AH-lW and UH-lN, stating their capabilities and future. Most of the upgraded systems in each type aircraft will reach their growth capacity and age limit before the end of the century. The aircraft will soon become extremely limited in supporting a MAGTF with its expanding capabilities. The Marine Corps has scheduled an aircraft reduction program to consolidate several type, model, series, aircraft in a "Neckdown Program" to replace three aircraft (AH-l, UH-l and OV-l0) with a single advanced Marine Attack Observation tactical tiltrotor (VMAO). This aircraft will be configured and equipped to perform the attack, utility and observation missions in support of a rapidly changing MAGTF. En route to funding an advanced tactical tiltrotor gunship, the political and funding obstacles the Marine Corps must overcome are varied and have no clear solutions. The current Defense Budget is facing zero or negative growth. The Marine Corps must develop a strategy to obtain its fair share in order to continue to modernize the Corps aging fleet. Additional tiltrotor and tiltwing concepts are being developed by other nations at a rapid rate. Despite tremendous technological advancements, the Marine Corps may be forced to use rotary wing technology well beyond the year 2000. CONCLUSION: The conclusion provides my own long-term prediction of which type of technology the Marine Corps will utilize to support the MAGTF in the year 2010. Based on my research of this subject, the issues discussed, as well as the most current conflict the U.S. has been engaged in (Operation Desert Storm) should raise additional questions which suggest that many tech- nological and budgetary variables will influence the final outcome. HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010 Outline THESIS: The need exists for a multi-mission aircraft to perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HMLA) and Marine Observation (VMO) communities. This aircraft must be compatible with MAGTF tactics and concepts of operation in conjunction with the development of the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP). The aircraft selected must be a major step forward in technology and performance in order to counter a wide variety of future threats I. HMLA Aircraft A. AH-lW l. Capabilities 2. Future B. UH-lN l. Capabilities 2. Future II. MAGTF Aviation Master Plan A. Neck Down Program B. VMAO l. Locust Tactical Tiltrotor (TTR) 2. Future III. DoD Budget A. Funding B. Future Funding IV. Future Outlook A. Tiltrotor/Tiltwing Concept B. Helicopter Concept INTRODUCTION The United States Marine Corps has never been afraid of innovation, especially when the circumstances established the need for a fast, flexible and hard hitting force. The Corps has exhibited a capacity for forward thinking with the acquisition and deployment of the AV-8A and AV-8B (Harriers), at a time when the benefits of Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft were even more controversial than they are today. (8:1) The capability to conduct successful tactical air operations is essential to the execution of an amphibious operation. This requires a flexible, responsive Aviation Combat Element (ACE) specifically tailored to meet the anticipated tactical situation. To this end, the Marine Corps has pioneered an effective aviation combat arm capable of meeting those requirements. By the year 2000, the global security environment is expected to include increased Third World population, urbanization and debt. Both drug trafficking and political terrorism are likely to continue to be significant threats to the United States. As it has since World War II, the Third World will remain the location of nearly all future conflicts. The U.S. military service components are faced with diminishing defense resources and reduced access to overseas bases. These circumstances will put a premium on strategic naval power projection forces. Combining the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) establishes the operational foundation for the manning, equipping, training, developing of doctrine and operational techniques for MAGTFs through the year 2000. The Master Plan helps to bridge the gap between planning and programming, by providing an integral set of actions to obtain prioritized MAGTF capabilities. (13:2) As the MCMP continues to be developed, the need for a multi-mission aircraft to perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HMLA) and Fixed Wing Observation (VMO) missions still exists. The final product must be a major step forward in technology and performance. In order to counteract a wide variety of future threats, this aircraft must be compatible with MAGTF tactics and operations. A single advanced tactical tiltrotor aircraft configured and equipped to perform the attack, utility and observation missions has been scheduled to replace three aircraft in a "Neckdown Program". This aircraft has been referred to as the Marine Attack and Observation Aircraft (VMAO) or Advanced Tactical Tiltrotor Gunship (ATTG). However, the political and funding obstacles that must be overcome by the Marine Corps en route to fielding an ATTG are real and many have no clear solutions. Other tiltrotor and tiltwing concepts are being developed by foreign nations at a rapid rate. Despite tremendous technological advancements, the helicopter may still be the airframe of choice beyond the year 2000. The current defense budget is facing zero of negative growth. It's fair to say that depending on what the current administration does, we might possibly expect a further reduction in defense spending. (14:4) This paper will briefly examine the current aircraft of the HMLA squadron with their capabilities and future posture. Each machine's future will be looked at as well as the existing systems that are being updated, to keep pace with threat developments and technological advances. Most of these systems will reach their growth capacity and age limits before the end of this century, as well as their ability to support new and expanding MAGTF capabilities. In the conclusion, I will provide my own long term prediction of how and why the events will unfold the way they have. Based on my research of this subject, the issues discussed in this paper should raise additional questions which suggest that many technical variables will influence the final outcome. Aviation is still so much of an infant that only those who possess that brand of imagination commonly generated by a pipe and a pill are competent to prophesy its final development. (4) A. A. Cunningham HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010 AH-1W The primary attack helicopter of the Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron is the AH-l Cobra. The AH-lW (Super Cobra), the latest version of the attack helicopter, provides 63% more lift capability over the rapidly aging and underpowered AH-1T (Tow Cobra). The new re-engined aircraft features a new gross weight of 15,000 pounds which is a 1,000 pound increase over the AH-lT and a 5,000 pound increase over the original AH-1J (Twin Sea Cobra). This additional gross weight capacity allows for increased payload, utilizing more fuel, ordnance or a combination of both. An increase in fuel extends the aircraft's range, while increased ordnance increases the aircraft's capability to support the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The Rockwell laser-guided "Hellfire" missile system is another major step forward in making the a AH-lW one of the best anti-tank weapons on the modern battlefield. The AH-lW's increased speed, maneuverability, larger payload capacity and night targeting system puts the aircraft in a class of its own within the current confines of modern helicopter technology. AH-l Cobra helicopters have provided superb Close-In- Fire-Suppression (CIFS) in numerous armed conflicts for more than twenty years. Nevertheless, since their inception helicopters have always been vulnerable targets on the battlefield. Today, with the introduction of techno- logically advanced Soviet attack helicopters like the Hokum and Havoc, the Cobras' vulnerability has increased. The AH-lW lacks the capability for precision navigation and is not self-deployable. The aircraft has limited range with no aerial refueling capability. In addition, it will also require its own separate logistics and personnel channels to support the missions required by an expanding MAGTF.(10:14) Existing systems have been updated to keep pace with threat developments and advances in technology. They will reach their growth capacity and age limits before the end of this century. (10:15) Aircraft and system specifications will be driven by projected capabilities of the MAGTF and the threat it faces during the 21st century. (10:16) To counter this increasing threat, the rotary wing communities throughout the Marine Corps will have to continually examine measures necessary to make Marine helicopters survivable on future battlefields. A major emphasis will be given to improved reliability, supportability and maintainability. (9:3) The Cobra airframe, as an attack helicopter, has provided the Marines on the ground superb support for over two decades, but will fall short in supporting future MAGTF capabilities. UH-IN The UH-l Huey helicopter has also been serving the Marine Corps faithfully for over twenty years. The latest version, the UH-lN, has been in service since 1972. The UH-lN brought a marked improvement over the earlier models but has reached the point where it can no longer accomplish its assigned tasks. This is due to several factors. While CH-46, CH-53 and AH-lW aircraft have all undergone several upgrades and new models in recent years, nothing has been done to modernize or incorporate new technology in the UH-lN. All other assault support helicopters are capable of airspeeds in excess of 140 knots at maximum gross weight. The UH-lN at its maximum gross weight can only achieve 110 knots. As more mission essential equipment has been added over the years, the weight of the aircraft steadily increased, yet the maximum gross weight of the aircraft did not change. The result was a loss in useful payload capacity. This also means that the aircraft has flown at or near maximum gross weights with the attendant loss of airspeed. The result of these limitations is an aircraft that cannot be fully integrated into tactical assault formations with other assault support helicopters. This is a serious shortcoming in light of the Huey's primary tasks of Command and Control (C&C) and Supporting Arms Coordination (SAC). The ability to keep the Helicopterborne Unit Commander (HUC) and the Airborne Helicopter Coordinator (HC(A)) in direct contact with their respective assault elements can directly influence the outcome of MAGTF missions. (3:48) The missions assigned to the Huey are still viable and important on today's battlefield. Unfortunately, the UH-IN has reached its performance limits. The need for an improved upgraded model or new aircraft design to perform its missions are clearly apparent. Developing a new UH-lN variant is the cheapest alternative in terms of Research and Development (R&D) costs, avoiding acquisition of additional airframes, and other associated costs. A replacement aircraft could be quickly procured at a low technological risk. This concept maximizes the use of existing assets. There are some disadvantages to this concept: Developing technologies are not taken advantage of and existing airframes provide a limited growth capability. Some fielding delays can be expected due to problems normally associated with a new or modified aircraft. In a time where budget constraints appear to be the dominant factor in selecting a viable cost effective course of action, upgrading the UH-lN becomes the most attractive option. The Marine Corps has had considerable success with such an approach in the past. (3:46) The current fleet of CH-53, CH-46 and AH-lW aircraft are all success stories. The methods used in the AH-lW program could be applied to a UH-IN program with equally impressive results. (3:50) Improvements incorporated in a program to produce a new UH-lN variant would provide the Marine Corps with a first rate combat utility helicopter at a very reasonable cost. Many contest there is no need for a replacement for the UH-lN when such a simple, sensible cost effective program would enable the aircraft to continue its proud service for another twenty years. MAGTF Aviation Master Plan Over the last few years the MAGTF Aviation Master Plan and most recently, the newly named MAGTF Aviation Combat Plan (AVPLAN) have depicted a plan to reduce the numbers of different types, models and series of aircraft. To accomplish this objective, one plausible concept is to replace the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 with a Marine Attack and Observation (VMAO) aircraft called Locust. Locust is an ATTG planned for fleet introduction near the turn of the century. A new era in Marine Corps assault support capabilities begins with the "Over-The-Horizon" (0TH) concept. In the 1992 time frame, the V-22 was to begin replacing the aging CH-46 helicopter as the primary assault transport aircraft. The combat radius of the V-22 would provide Marines an 0TH capability across the entire spectrum of conflict. Clearly, the V-22 offers an unprecedented capability for conducting wider and deeper amphibious assaults. However, the 250 knot cruise speed and extended range of the V-22 will far exceed the speed and range capabilities of other Marine rotary wing assault support aircraft. As the V-22 is employed close to its maximum capability, en route airborne protection and immediate assault support for the GCE in the landing zone (LZ) become difficult challenges. Mission capabilities such as anti-tank, anti-helicopter operations, close-in-fire-suppression (CIFS), C&C, medevac and SAC (A) and additional follow-on support for the GCE will be as vital following fleet introduction of the V-22 as they are today. Some have argued AV-8 Harriers and F/A-18 Hornets will escort the V-22 and provide subsequent support to the GCE ashore. It would be prudent to admit these aircraft may not be available because they are otherwise committed for close air support (CAS) and combat air patrol (CAP) missions. These aircraft also will be severely limited in escorting a tiltrotor type aircraft which is capable of very low and slow flight much like a helicopter. Once in the LZ, the capability to immediately suppress enemy fire in close proximity to friendly troops will be required to gain the initiative to ensure success in the assault. It is doubtful aircraft flying in excess of 400 knots can effectively locate and maneuver to engage enemy positions to provide immediate close-in-fire- suppression. (9:17) Today the Soviets and many Third World countries have extremely capable attack helicopters; specifically the new advanced Hokum and Havoc. The firepower and flexibility offered by these helicopters represent a serious threat to future amphibious assault operations. A capability in anti-helicopter operations in support of the tiltrotorborne GCE will be imperative. (12:3) Future assault support requirements encompasses all mission capabilities currently provided by three aircraft (AH-l, UH-l and OV-10) must maintain parity with future threat capabilities. (9:9) Until established ashore, assault support aircraft will operate from amphibious ships which may still be 0TH. In fact, the requirements for the type assault support provided by the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 will clearly place growing demands on these aircraft and eventually will require increasingly more sophisticated and capable aircraft. The current AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 do not have the speed, range, night systems and avionics capabilities to do the job in the year 2000. A possible solution is to replace these assault support aircraft with a single advanced aircraft configured and equipped to perform the attack, utility and observation missions. (10:1) At present this follow-on aircraft is a tiltrotor variant. The political and funding obstacles that must be overcome by the Marine Corps are enormous en route to fielding the VMAO.(14:4) The current defense budget is facing a period of zero or negative growth. It might even be fair to say that, depending on what the administration does, we might possibly expect a further reduction in defense spending. How would this affect VMAO? If this type of aircraft is to be fielded soon after the year 2000, the acquisition process will have to commence with funding in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 92 or 94 at the latest. At present, and into at least Fiscal Year 92, a number of expensive R&D efforts are underway in the other services to develop follow-on aircraft. (14:5) Unfortunately, these efforts focus to build the B-2 Stealth Bomber, advanced fighter and the Army's Experimental Light Attack Helicopter Program, (LHX) but do not include the V-22 or the follow-on VMAO aircraft. Fortunately, like many things in America, the political winds may shift. Once demonstrated, the V-22's capabilities may change the thinking of our political and military leadership. Helicopters, as we know them today, may become obsolete as war machines. (14:7) To achieve the maximum warfighting capabilities from our limited funds and manpower, the Marine Corps may be forced to abandon the concept of multiple airframes and concentrate on a single concept. DoD Budget No defense program in recent years has been more challenged, scrutinized, abused, evaluated, debated, abused, analyzed, cost benefitted, test flown, prototyped and abused again than the tiltrotor concept. (7:27) It all started in December 1981, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, formally established a Joint Rotorcraft Project called the JVX Program. The Army became the first executive service for the program in early 1982 and assumed the lead in formulating the Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR). A Marine Colonel, Jimmie Creech, became the first program manager. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding in June 1982 that established the JVX project as a priority program and defined the individual funding requirements. Not long afterward, the Army began to have second thoughts. First, planners sought a two year delay in the program, but this proved unaccept- able for the other services. Further distancing itself from the program, the Army relinquished its executive status to the Navy. Nevertheless, the Army continued to express official support for the JVX program. (6:40) A December 1982 memorandum from Deputy Secretary Carlucci, stated in part, "I am pleased to note that the services have agreed to a joint development strategy for the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft.. "(6:42) In January 1983 the Navy released the original request for proposals to industry, and the team of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Vertol responded with its concept. In order to meet the specifications of the Army's original JSOR and a subsequent Navy revision, the Bell Boeing candidate had to provide a wide range of capabilities, far beyond those of any system in existence at the time. The corporate team proposed an advanced concept based on a tiltrotor propulsion system and received the go-ahead in April, 1983. (6:41) The Army failed to include the JVX Program in its 1985 POM, which it was then developing. The Army's failure to fund the program in the subsequent years was a de facto cancellation of its portion of the project and subsequently, the Army driven design requirements were removed. In 1986, the Air Force dropped its requirements from 80 aircraft to 55 in response to a Secretary of Defense agreement reducing the number of aircraft needed for its Special Operations Forces. This event brought the total buy down to 657 aircraft: 552 for the Marine Corps which include 11 VH-22s intended for presidential support as a replacement for the aging VH-3D helicopters. The Air Force would buy 55 and the Navy would buy 50. As the procurement numbers came down, the cost per airframe went up. The cost of an individual aircraft might seem easy to compute, only those involved in the procurement process realize that there are many viables. For the layman, the cost of the V-22 is often stated at 32 million dollars per aircraft. This figure is misleading, since the figure actually represents the procurement unit cost, which includes the aircraft, initial spares and advanced procure- ment over the life of the entire program. When Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney cancelled the V-22 program in April 1989, he acted largely on the advice of his Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Dr. David S. Chu. Dr. Chu recommended that the Marines substitute a mix of 950 CH-53E and UH-60B helicopters instead of the 552 V-22 tiltrotor aircraft. When the Marine Corps pointed out that such a strategy would be more expensive, Dr. Chu revised his estimate downward to a mix of 650 CH-53 and UH-60 aircraft. This adjustment brought the cost below the V-22 package cost, but did not meet the goal of replacing the aging CH-46 with a more capable aircraft. Dr. Chu finally recommended a one year slip in the program during deliberations on the Fiscal Year 1990 budget. Secretary Cheney made the final decision to cancel the program. The research and development effort to date has validated the tiltrotor concept. Four V-22 development aircraft are flying, and two more aircraft are nearing completion at the Bell Plant in Fort Worth, Texas. The Department of the Navy and the U.S. Government have already invested 2.5 billion in the V-22 tiltrotor concept and are on the verge of reaping the benefits. (6:42) Secretary of Defense Cheney has made it quite clear that his interest in the majority of future military programs favors the Air Force with the modernization of ICBMs and bomber forces. He recently stated, "We expect both standoff and penetrating bombers to continue to serve crucial roles. A bomber force (alluding to the B-2 Stealth bomber), capable of penetrating Soviet airspace, deprives the Soviets of the opportunity to focus on far-forward air defense against cruise missile carriers."(6:10) If production funding of the V-22 is not secured within the next two years, the follow-on development of a VMAO aircraft to suit the HMLA missions could be delayed up to 20 years. Technology is the key to keeping casualties low. There is a direct link to the number of lives we lose in combat and how much money we spend before the war starts on our capabilities and the quality of equipment. (6:10) Richard B. Cheney Secretary of Defense We are clearly at the high end of technology in a conflict with a so called Third World nation. We require sufficient capability to move substantial quantities of men, material, and equipment through the air and over the sea. The success of Operation Desert Storm has proved this beyond a shadow of a doubt. (6:10) General Colin Powell Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Future Outlook Many studies continually compare tiltrotor technology to helicopter technology. This section will introduce additional Japanese technology that is being tested and eventually marketed from the United States. Some differences will be identified and compared with both tiltrotor and helicopter concepts. A new tiltwing transport aircraft is being developed in the United States by the Ishida Group of Nagoya, Japan. The Japanese Conglomerate, through its use of a U.S. subsidiary, has plans to build an initial order of about 100 aircraft to serve a network of planned short-takeoff and landing (STOL) and vertiports in Japan. The aircraft, designated the Tiltwing-68 (TW-68), is based largely on technology developed in the U.S. and Canada in the 1960s. The aircraft is currently designed as a twin-turboprop passenger and light cargo transport designed for city center operation and such specialized uses as long range offshore oil rig support. Construction on the first flight prototype is scheduled for mid-1993 and the first production aircraft is planned for mid-1996. The design itself will also have military applications, although Japanese law prohibits Japanese companies from taking part in the development of any weaponry. This is the reason for a U.S. subsidiary company to introduce this aircraft. The TW-68 is superficially similar to current tiltrotor aircraft. Tiltrotor aircraft are essentially helicopters with all of the advantages and disadvantages of a helicopter. They have helicopter like rotors, helicopter controls and similar vibrations. The TW-68 is a turboprop aircraft with Beta (reverse pitch) controls on the propellers and a wing tilt system. It can hover like a helicopter but not as efficiently and with slightly less controllability. Once the aircraft transitions into forward flight and with its wing tilted like a normal airplane, the aircraft will be able to fly like a turboprop. In this profile the TW-68 is much more efficient than a tiltrotor in forward flight. In addition to the tiltwing system, the TW-68 will require a small horizontal ducted fan in the tail section to provide pitch stability augmentation while hovering. Previous tiltwing aircraft required complicated gearing and shifting from the engines to drive this fan. The TW-68 will not need either gears or a drive shaft to the tail. The basic design concept of the TW-68 is aimed at producing a reliable, conventional, and cost effective aircraft that will be able to meet civil transport economic requirements. It does not incorporate a nonmetallic structure, high-cost avionics and embodies proven vertical lift flight technology that is both simpler than that of a true helicopter and more efficient at forward flight speeds. The initial cost of the tiltwing aircraft will be more than twice that of a pure helicopter of the same size and more than one half the cost of a comparably sized tiltrotor. (2:83) In the helicopter arena, ten years of research and more than 600 hours of in-flight testing has produced one of the most significant technological advancements in rotor craft history. This recent innovation is called the Bell Textron/McDonnell Douglas 680 main rotor for the Army's experimental Light Attack Helicopter (LHX) program. The rotor's bearingless, hingeless, all composite design contains just half the parts of advanced conventional designs. This means very low vibration along with faster and simpler maintenance. The rotor system has also demon- strated excellent ballistic tolerance and low acoustic signature. Bell Helicopter Textron Company and Boeing Aircraft Company have teamed up to produce the V-22 Osprey for the Marine Corps. Oddly enough, in the LHX arena, McDonnell Douglas and Bell Helicopter, have teamed together while Sikorsky and Boeing Aircraft Company have joined together as a team in an effort to produce a Light Attack Helicopter (LH) for the Army. For years the Army has been committed in the development of pure helicopter technology as opposed to the Marine Corps' advanced tiltrotor concept. At stake with the LHX program is nearly 40 billion dollars in helicopter development and production work. This Spring the Army plans to select one team of U.S. helicopter manufacturers to produce the LH aircraft. The Army plans to produce a total of 1,292 futuristic helicopters between 1997 and 2005. The team that loses may be forced out of the helicopter business in the 1990s.(l:3) The losing team will say good-bye to nearly 15 years of research and development effort and investment. The winners will advance in one of the U.S. military's highest of high tech helicopter undertakings. CONCLUSION The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has initiated a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of future assault support requirements. Results of this study will establish the basis for assault support capability requirements for a follow-on aircraft to replace the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10. In conjunction with this study, Marines in the Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch, Department of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps have written the first draft of a Tentative Operational Requirement (TOR) for the VMAO. Coupled with the findings of the MAA, this document will be refined this summer and forwarded to the force commanders for review and feedback. The refined TOR will be the basis for the Marine Corps' stated requirements and request for funding. At this point, the real process begins. The Marine Corps must clearly define its position with regard to the issues and commit to a strategy for obtaining what is required to execute the mission. (10:7) The previous success enjoyed by the Marine Corps in obtaining Congressional support and funding is attributed to a straight forward approach in stating the Corps' require- ments. Currently, the production money for the V-22 has not been put into the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 91 Budget. The V-22 program has two more years to be funded before the program is entirely scrapped. The program has experienced many setbacks, however, the procurement strategy of this aircraft has been nothing but superb. Recently, a "win" for the Marine Corps occurred as appropriations were approved to include 82.5 million for procurement of long lead items. (7:30) This strategic victory will continue to keep the door open at least for the next two years. Once the aircraft is finally produced, the V-22's expeditionary capability will provide strong impetus for fielding a complementary attack, utility and observation aircraft for the GCE. Comprehensive future requirements studies as well as the MCMP must clearly define a qualified statement of future requirements. At some point in the near future, when a statement does become public, all Marines must work toward Congressional and public support. Issues discussed in this paper and the technological disclosure of U.S. capabilities during Operation Desert Storm should raise additional questions. The U.S. must continue to stay one step ahead of foreign technology. Based on this assumption, new and advanced technologies will eventually be selected. However, to ensure the Marine Corps maintains its expeditionary capability in assault support, the Marine Corps must continue to have a backup plan quietly working in the budget process. As the Marine Corps approaches the hurdles to procure the VMAO and assess their magnitude, the Corps must continue to fight for funding to enhance capabilities of existing aircraft. The current fleet of aircraft may have to remain in service five to ten years beyond the year 2000, depending on commencement of start-up funding for VMAO or a decision to procure the Army's LH aircraft. Based on my research, I believe the GCE will eventually be flown into battle by the V-22 escorted by the VMAO. As the V-22 pilots look out their side window they will see the VMAO escorting them to the landing zone ready to support the Marines on the ground and perform any task currently provided by the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 aircraft. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Baker, Caleb, "U.S. Army Puts Restraints on LH Bidders," Defense News, Vol. 6, No. 5, 4 February 1991, p. 3. 2. Brown, David A. "Japans Ishida Group May Build Tiltwing Transport in U.S.," Aviation Week and Space Technology, l January 1990, p. 83. 3. Craig, Constant P., Captain, U.S. Marine Corps, "Requiem for a Lightweight," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1916. 4. Cunningham, A.A., Statement from Marine Corps Gazette, December 1916. 5. Finnegan, Phillip, "War Emphasizes Stealth Need, Says Cheney," Defense News, Vol. 6, No. 6, 11 February 1990, p. 10. 6. Flanagan, Robert M., LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps, "The V-22 Is Slipping Away," Proceedings, August 1990, pp. 39-42. 7. Harvey, David S., "U.S. Defense Helicopters: The Pictures Not All Black." Rotor & Wing International, February 1991, p. 27. 8. Magee, John P., "Tactical Tiltrotor," Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Ft Worth, Texas, pp. 1-12. 9. MAGTF Aviation Combat Plan (MACP), U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Vol. IV, p. 3. 10. Marine Attack Observation Aircraft (VMAO), Tentative Operational Requirement TOR Mission Area, #33, pp. 1-14. 11. Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP) Service Plan, Department of the Navy. 12. Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP) Service Plan, Department of the Navy. 13. Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) Service Plan, Department of the Navy. 14. "VMAO A Possibility," APN-53 VMAO ART-2, 4 February 1989, p. 4.
