Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation: First To Fight? AUTHOR Major Michael F. Dolan, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The historical employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation in amphibious assault operations has been limited. Although Marine Corps doctrine for the employment of fixed-wing air acknowledges the necessity for carrier based aircraft and for the early seizure of airfields in close proximity to the amphibious objective area, the actual record substantiates a limited involvement in the initial stages of amphibious operations. Throughout the history of Marine fixed-wing aviation only a small percentage of Marine squadrons have deployed aboard Navy carriers, and neither has any reguirement or agreement between the services been implemented for routine employment of Marines aboard carriers. Combined with few overseas bases, Marines have been limited in their attempts to conduct initial amphibious operations without first establishing a land base in or near the objective area. The present Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) force structure achieves only limited success in the employment of Marine fixed-wing air. In the initial stages of amphibious operations only the AV8 Harrier is routinely employed aboard amphibious shipping and capable of meeting the initial fixed-wing needs of the Marine Corps. With the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the imperative for joint operations, the Marine Corps' air-ground team faces stiff competition in fixed-wing employment from both the Navy in the amphibious role and the Air Force in sustained land operations ashore. In both these areas of employment Marine aviation does not have a prominent position. With the current streamlining of Marine fixed-wing air almost complete, only the Fl8 Hornet and the EA6B Prowler will remain as carrier capable aircraft within the Marine inventory. As the Marine Corps pursues strategy and technology for an Advanced Vertical Takeoff and Landing (AVSTOL) aircraft to meet its fixed-wing needs aboard amphibious shipping, the current trend of limited fixed-wing involvement in the amphibious role remains and will continue for the foreseeable future. MARINE FIXED-WING AVIATION: FIRST TO FIGHT? Outline THESIS STATEMENT. The combination of historical and doctrinal employment as well as the current employment and deployment of aviation assets will severely limit the use of Marine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assault operations. I. Historical Employment of Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation A. Amphibious operations in WWII B. The Inchon invasion C. Vietnam -- fixed-base operations D. Southwest Asia II. Doctrinal Employment of Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation A. Expeditionary concept of Marine aviation doctrine B. Carrier based employment C. Land-based employment III. Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation Deployment A. Fixed-base operations l. Conus bases 2. Overseas bases B. Operations afloat IV. Fixed-wing aviation operations A. Fixed-wing aviation in the MAGTF force structure B. MAGTF aviation in joint operations C. Fixed-wing force reduction "Send the Marines" is a common response to the continuous crises in today's turbulent worldwide environment. Since the Marine Corps' creation in 1775 it has honored that call with blood, sacrifice, and unmatched determination. "First to fight" has become a Marine Corps trademark gallantly embodied in the amphibious operations of the Pacific campaign during World War II. However, this record has not been sustained by the Corps' fixed-wing aviation component. Repeatedly, since World War II and continuing through the recent conflict in Southwest Asia, the deployment and employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation has been severely limited in the initial stages of amphibious assault operations. Although doctrine has remained intact since World War II, recent legislation has strained the Corps' ability to employ its fixed-wing air arm as an active part in a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in the amphibious role. With the combi- nation of continued reduction in deployment aboard aircraft carri- ers and the necessity for implementation of joint operations in current and future conflicts, the Corps' ability to employ its fixed-wing assets in the initial stages of amphibious assaults will remain limited. Marines achieved their high-water mark in amphibious opera- tions during World War II. No period since then has seen the intensity of the amphibious assault in such vast a scope as was executed by Marines during the Pacific campaign beginning at Tarawa and ending at Okinawa. Throughout every island campaign aviation was an essential factor in both planning and execution. Marine aviation, however, played a lesser role in the initial stages of every amphibious assault being overshadowed by naval carrier forces. Throughout World War II and continuing until Inchon, and up to the present, Marine fixed-wing aviation has not been predominate in the initial stages of any amphibious operation. A few Marine carrier based squadrons have been em- ployed in the initial stages of amphibious assaults. However, the great preponderance of fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assaults has come from naval aviation forces. The necessity for airfields in or near the amphibious objective area has complicated the rapid response sought by the doctrinal employ- ment of the Marine air-ground team. This fact has not been lost among the Marine leadership. Early in the Pacific campaign this issue was addressed but was left unresolved. Even after the massive preassault bombardment and bombing of Betio at Tarawa, resistance to the assaulting forces remained fierce with correspondingly high casualties. To counter this deficiency General Holland Smith made a proposal as recorded in Isely and Crowl's, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: The most obvious need was for pilots better trained in close air support. Holland Smith, howev- er, was never successful in getting the type of pi- lots he wanted. "It is recommended," he urged after Tarawa, "that consideration be given to the assign- ment of at least one Marine Aircraft Wing specifical- ly for direct air support in landing operations. This wing would make direct air support a specialty and would train specifically for this purpose. They should be given a complete background of amphibious operations and a thorough and considerable period of training." The navy refused. Accepting such a recommendation would withdraw pilots from the decks of carriers who, in addition to air support were needed for strictly navy functions, and possibly for use in a fleet engagement. As long as the navy judged its own flight personnel superior to marine airmen in strictly navy duties, and as long as both fast and escort aircraft carriers were scarce and the enemy retained a strong fleet, the navy's position in this regard was understandable. The decision howev- er, prevented marine pilots from supporting their comrades and army troops ashore in the Marshalls and the Marianas. Marine pilots in the Central Pacific before Tarawa served important defensive missions, but after that battle, since their craft were of short range, they watched the war leave them far behind. Their principal function in that section of the globe was bombing bypassed atolls. (5: 230-231) By the time of the Iwo Jima assault, the Marines still did not have a place in anything but the aviation planning. Even in this area they met resistance when offering tactical guidance to Navy planners. The Fourth Marine Division under General Cates was assigned with the difficult task of assaulting some of the most hazardous terrain on the island. During the preassault and assault planning Marine officers urged their Navy counterparts to carry heavier bombs. Unfortunately, the Navy did not do so. (5: 472) Throughout the Pacific campaign Marine aviation continued to press its case for inclusion in the initial phases of amphibious assaults in order to best support ground forces. Again, however, even at Okinawa the Navy remained firmly in control of employment of aviation assets. In Okinawa: The Last Battle, Appleman puts things in perspective. "Aircraft from Task Force 58 and from the escort carriers flew 3,095 sorties in the Okinawa area prior to L-Day." (l: 64) Naval aircraft flew the preponderance of air support missions during the amphibious assault onto the island. In fairness, however, it must be stated that once established ashore on Okinawa, as was also the case in the Solomons and Palau, Marine close air support enjoyed complete preeminence. (5: 418-429) Historically, the amphibious assault into Inchon came clos- est to a textbook doctrinal employment of the Marine air-ground team. The assault was orchestrated around three Marine battalions making a surface attack directly supported by Navy and Marine aircraft aboard two aircraft carriers. However, even at Inchon, the majority of initial aviation support was provided by naval forces. The Marine Corps was able to achieve its objective of flying close air support missions during the initial assault only by forcefully having made its case during the planning stage. As Montross and Canzona have written in U.S. Marine Operations in Korea: Air support planning for Inchon was based on the decision that the sky over the objective area was to be divided between organic air units of JTF-7 and X Corps. JTF-7 counted on its fast carrier task force, TF-77, to gain air supremacy and furnish deep support and interdiction strikes. Close support for the landing was to be provided by the two squadrons of TG-90.5, on board the CVEs Sicily and Badoeng Strait, which had been the main air components of MAG-33 in support of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade. In addition, the Attack Force Commander could call upon the aircraft of TF-77 for close [air) support. (8: 70) The actual Marine squadrons supporting the assault from carriers were VMFs-323 and -214 flying F4U Corsairs. These two squadrons were integrated with three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders which all conducted strikes continuously from H-l80 onward. Additionally, Fast Carrier Task Force 77 kept another 12 aircraft airborne for deep air missions. However, the bulk of aviation support for the 1st Provisional Brigade would not come into play until after the initial phase of the operation. (8: 102) Mon- tross and Canzona further amplify Marine aviation's dependence upon land-basing for combat employment: MAG-33 was designated by General Harris from the Forward Echelon, 1st MAW, to serve as TAC X Corps, with VMFs-212 and -312 in addition to VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513. These units were not to be assigned, however, until X Corps assumed con- trol of operations in the objective area, whereupon they would be based at Kimpo Airfield. (8: 71) The Vietnam War saw Marine aviation primarily land-based at Da Nang and Chu Lai. Amphibiously, the few landings were unop- posed and militarily insignificant. In March 1965, the 9th Ma- rine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) went ashore uneventfully in the vicinity of Da Nang supported by Marine Medium Helicopter (HMM) Squadron 365 embarked aboard the USS Princeton. On April 13, 1965, VMFA-531 flying F4Bs from Da Nang conducted close air sup- port missions for the 9th MEB which were the first Marine fixed-wing sorties in Vietnam. The earliest fixed-wing opera- tions were primarily navy actions flown from the carriers Ticon- deroga and Constellation on Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf and were directed against targets in North Vietnam. In December 1965, VMF(AW)-212 flying F8s, was the only Marine carrier based squadron conducting strikes against North and South Vietnam. (4: 75,161) In both South and North Vietnam, however, the Marine air contribution to initial aviation operations was small. The naval aviation units of Task Force 77 on Yankee Station saw the majori- ty of all early actions. Not until the establishment of the land bases at Da Nang in 1965 and Chu Lai in 1966 did Marine aviation coordinate and integrate the MAGTF concept into combat opera- tions. Gurney, in his book,Vietnam: The War in the Air, gives us the reason for establishing a southern counterpart to Yankee Station in the north: In April 1965, Task Force 77 pilots drew still another role -- a role which for the nth time reflect- ed their value -- flying regular close [air] support missions against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The initial effort by aircraft from the Midway and the Coral Sea, plus Marine F-8Es from VMF-212 flying from the Oriskany with CVW-16, was so successful that General Westmoreland requested the permanent assign- ment of a carrier stationed off the northern half of South Vietnam to support his ground forces. Since land bases for tactical air were not available and could not be produced quickly enough, CinCPacFlt directed on 16 May the establishment of Dixie Station about 100 miles southwest of Cam Ranh Bay. This assignment would last for 15 months until land based aviation had been established sufficiently so as to be able to handle the bombing load within South Viet- nam. (4: 168) During the recent actions in Southwest Asia the 4th MEB was employed in the northern Persian Gulf to fix Iraqi forces arrayed along the Kuwaiti coast. Although an amphibious assault was not conducted, the usefulness of this amphibious strategy was demon- strated. The threat of an assault by 4th HEB tied down five Iraqi divisions. In the larger scope of the war, however, the role of Marine aviation was dwarfed by the massive naval and air force air campaigns. Although Marine air was fully integrated into the air campaign, its role was duplicative of its air force counterparts - land-based air interdiction and deep support mis- sions. Marine ground forces played the same role as Army units in the land campaign. Marine air was integrated into the execu- tion of Marine ground operations but not exclusively and not independently. The Air Force also played a major role in the Marine ground scheme of maneuver. Again, the Southwest Asia conflict substantiated the historical record that Marine fixed-wing aviation is limited in the initial stages of amphibi- ous or any large scale operations. The initial days of the air campaign in the gulf did not include the Marines in any major offensive air operations. The beginning of the air campaign was conducted by primarily air force and navy squadrons. Amphibious doctrine is sound, combat proven, and constantly undergoing refinement. The lessons learned by Marine aviation in the Second World War were costly but have been fully integrated into Marine aviation's part of amphibious doctrine. As Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1 states: This expeditionary aspect sets Marine Corps aviation apart from other aviation organizations. Marine Corps doctrine envisions that Marine Corps aviation will support the landing forces throughout an assault landing and subsequent operations. Marine Corps aviation must be prepared to provide this support by operating tactical aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air groups or from air- fields within striking distance of an amphibious objective area. (15: 2) However, knowledge of doctrinal employment has not always been forthcoming in practice. In crisis situations the forces current- ly available are used, which in the majority of cases means the employment of a naval carrier battle group with its organic carri- er air wing. In the majority of these cases, these carrier air wings are composed entirely of navy squadrons. When the need has arisen for amphibious capacity and the introduction of Marine forces into a potentially hostile area, such as the use of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the attendant Marine fixed-wing counterparts, being shore-based and completely out of range from the amphibious objective area, are almost always lacking. In some minor operations involving limited or no fixed-wing capaci- ty, such as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), the need for substantial preassault bombardment, air interdiction, and close air support is usually nonexistent. On the non-crisis side of the initial hostilities spectrum, naval air and air force units are first deployed to the adjacent waters and airfields in the potential conflict area to buildup the necessary combat pow- er. In Vietnam and Southwest Asia, lengthy periods of buildup relegated Marine aviation to deployment and employment similar to its air force counterpart, supporting not only Marines on the ground but an entire theater of ground forces. Gurney, in Viet- nam: The War in the Air, describes the subordination to higher commands which limited Marine aviation's involvement at the start of the war: Up to April 1966, ComUSMACV was not involved in the air war in North Vietnam. That war was conducted by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPACFLT), and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force (CinCPACAF). 1st MAW electronic EF-l0Bs flew missions in the north before this, but they did so in support of the Seventh Fleet or the Seventh Air Force as subordinates of PacFlt and PacAF. On 1 April 1966, ComUSMACV was authorized by CinCPac to conduct air strikes in, and to the north of, the DMZ in what was known as Route Package One. By summer [1966), Marine aircraft were assigned to strike against artillery and rocket sites as well as other military targets. (4: 83) The current deployment of Marine fixed-wing aviation units limits the ability of the Marine Corps to employ its fixed-wing air arm doctrinally in an amphibious role. Marine aviation is spread throughout three major areas -- land-based in the states, land-based overseas, and afloat. Far and away, the great majori- ty of Marine fixed-wing aviation is land-based. Overseas and in Conus, the Marine Corps' aviation strength is easily matched or exceeded by USAF fixed-wing counterparts. Afloat, only a token deployment of Marine fixed-wing detachments and squadrons can be found at any one time aboard navy ships and carriers. The vast majority of fixed-wing units afloat are navy squadrons. There is no established requirement or continuing effort in the Navy or Marine Corps to employ Marine aviation routinely aboard carriers to ensure the doctrinal employment of Marine fixed-wing units in amphibious operations. General Holland Smith's argument in World War II is just as applicable today. (5: 230) If Marine fixed-wing aviation is to be employed doctrinally, it must become an integral part of the carrier air group, otherwise, it will be limited in its amphibious role. Overseas, Marine air bases are few -- one in Hawaii, one in Okinawa, and one in mainland Japan. From these locations the ability of Marine aviation to impact worldwide potential threats suffers from simple geography. The combined effect of land-basing and lack of deployments on carri- ers further limits any initial fixed-wing action in an amphibious role. MAGTF structure does not adequately address the incorpora- tion of fixed-wing aviation into amphibious operations. Fundamen- tally, the MAGTF is task organized around three core elements, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEU is formed around a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), the MEB around a Regimental Landing Team (RLT), and the MEF around a Marine divi- sion. Currently, in any one of these MAGTFs, Marine rotary-wing aviation is thoroughly deployed and employed for use in the am- phibious role. However, its fixed-wing counterpart is not em- ployed until a suitable field is secured ashore which will sup- port sustained land-based operations. Historically, this is in the post-assault time frame or when it has been possible to fly into a suitable and unopposed field. The record is clear that the Marine Corps has not conducted any offensive amphibious opera- tions with fixed-wing aircraft that have not been directly sup- ported by naval forces. Current MAGTF planning and operating procedures in all phases of amphibious operations are concentrat- ed around the Navy's amphibious shipping (LHDs, LHAs, LSTs, LPDs, etc.). These ships have no capacity for handling the fixed-wing assets associated with anything larger than a MEU. Even at the MEU level, the Marine Corps satisfies its need to demonstrate the full spectrum of the air-ground team by rational- izing that a small detachment of Harriers (AV-8s) fulfills the requirements of fixed-wing aviation associated with amphibious operations. It must be stated, however, that the employment of the Harrier for primarily close air support substantiates not only doctrine but the noteworthy historical achievement of close air support by Marines in all conflicts. Realistically, the Marine Corps must accept the fact that if Marine fixed-wing squad- rons are not embarked aboard carrier battle groups that are in direct support of a MAGTF, or if a suitable airfield is not avail- able for a fly-in echelon, then the Marine Corps will not have organic fixed-wing air to support the initial phases of any am- phibious operation. This is a very weak link of MAGTF aviation in the amphibious role. Sister services are quick to note this fact and with the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the imperative towards joint operations, Marine fixed-wing aviation has fought to keep the MAGTF commander's air assets under his control. In most current conflict scenarios joint operations have become the status quo. In 1986 the Omnibus Agreement was written to underscore and retain the doctrinal integrity of the MAGTF's fixed-wing aviation employment concept. This agreement strongly illuminates the shortcomings of Marine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious opera- tions by what it does not say. The agreement is based on -- joint sustained operations ashore -- and states that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) shall retain authority to exercise opera- tional control of all air assets in the accomplishment of his mission, including MAGTF organic air assets, although "normally" MAGTF air assets will fly in support of the MAGTF mission. (14: 50) The entire controversy surrounding MAGTF aviation, the JFC, and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) stems from the fact that the preponderance of fixed-wing aviation will be employed in post-assault sustained land operations, not in the initial assault of an amphibious operation. An excellent summari- zation of this entire subject has been succinctly described by William White in U.S. Tactical Air Power: Missions, Forces. and Costs: In fact, Marines have been only used once in an opposed over the beach assault since World War II -- the Inchon landing of September 1950 -- and only six battalions (two-thirds of a division) went ashore then. Even if some future contingency should require mounting a similar operation on a larger scale, short- ages in appropriate sea lift would make it impossible to employ more than half the present active force in such a capacity. The bulk of whatever Marine forces might be committed to a future conflict would proba- bly serve as was the case in both Korea and Southeast Asia, in much the same way as the Army's infantry divisions. [This is exactly what happened in South- west Asia.] It is not necessary, therefore, to chal- lenge either the special requirement for air support during amphibious assaults or the current level of Marine surface forces to question whether the Marine Corps needs to maintain all the tactical air forces it now has. If one or more Marine divisions are likely to be deployed alongside Army divisions in Central Europe (as NATO planners assume ) or to oper- ate once again as elite infantry somewhere in Asia, a strong case can be made for a more efficient arrange- ment that would consolidate the air support responsi- bility for these divisions within the Air Force, the Marine Corps retaining only enough airwings to sup- port the surface forces that might actually be used in amphibious assault operations. (12: 78,79) Current Marine Corps long-range planning for fixed-wing force structure is aimed at the objective of attaining an Ad- vanced Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (AVSTOL) aircraft capa- ble of employment aboard amphibious shipping and fulfilling fixed-wing carrier functions. As the turn of the century nears, the Marine Corps will have reduced the types of tactical fixed-wing carrier based aircraft it employs to two -- the Fl8 Hornet and the EA6B Prowler. The Corps will retain the AV8 Harri- er for its deployment and employment aboard amphibious shipping. As Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation shrinks in numbers and types of aircraft, its ability to impact amphibious operations will be further limited. The historical record to date substantiates the limited employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assault operations. Exacerbating this trend is the current deployment concept of fixed-wing aviation from limited bases overseas and the minimal deployment of Marine air aboard Navy carriers. These physical constraints hamper and restrict the Marine Corps' ability to employ its air assets in a worldwide amphibious capacity. With the fully implemented concept for joint operations necessitated by the Defense Reorganization Act, the Marine Corps' MAGTF doctrine remains under pressure in justi- fying the need, use, and size of its fixed-wing force to support amphibious operations. Furthermore, as overall force reduction continues within the Department of Defense, and as Marine Corps aviation planning remains focused on AVSTOL and away from carrier deployments, the Marine Corps' fixed-wing air employment in the amphibious role will further diminish. Together, the combination of these factors will continue to limit severely the use of Ma- rine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assaults. 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Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1975. 11. White, William D. U.S. Tactical Air Power: Missions. Forces. and Costs. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, LFM 01. Washington, D.C., 1986. 13. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center. MAGTF Command Relationships in Joint Operations, C(C)2225. Quantico, 1990. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979.
