Maneuver Warfare: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly AUTHOR Major William A. Card, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting Executive Summary Maneuver Warfare: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly In the last decade, the Marine Corps has moved aggressively to adopt maneuver warfare as its war fighting style. Most often the model for the maneuver style of war has been the German Army of the Second World War. The German research of many scholars has been used as justification for a variety of changes to our methods, doctrine, and institutions. In an analysis of maneuver warfare tenets, good, bad, and ugly, against the backdrop of German methods, training, and reality, the discussion indicates where misconceptions and mistakes are dangerously close to being institutionalized. The Good. Whether through enhancing traditional concepts or introducing more substantial change, much of the current movement has great value. The tenets of commander's intent, focus of effort, and mission orders have been a solid and positive change to the current body of tactical thought. The full benefit in some areas has yet to be fully realized. The Bad. The focus on destruction of enemy cohesion and the denigration of control measures, has created a variety of misconceptions and dangerous expectations. German battle intentions, experience, and training concepts do not support the current maneuver view of these concepts. Rather, our own doctrinal guidance has more value to the officer of today and is more in keeping with common sense. The Ugly. The assault on patterns, recipes, formulas, and standing operating procedures, coupled with changes in our professional military education has created a dangerous prescription for future failure. The body of thought that has developed in these areas are insupportable with historic evidence from German experience. Further, in a variety of areas, these concepts are insupportable from a common sense point of view. The scope of this discussion is not sufficient to cover all the good, bad, or ugly results of the maneuver evolution within our Corps. It does provide a pause for the reader to think about the possible ramifications and unintended results of a process that has been largely positive regardless of the painful method of its introduction. The Marine Corps must continue to embrace the maneuver style of warfare while understanding that it is not yet fully mature. It requires objective and critical analysis tempered with practical experience and common sense. Therein lies the prescription for success on the battlefield. Maneuver Warfare: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly Outline The basic tenets of maneuver warfare are sound, however the manner of their introduction has brought with it some very dangerous baggage. I. The Good. A. Commander's Intent B. Focus of Effort C. Critical Vulnerability D. Mission Orders II. The Bad A. Cohesion B. Control Measures III. The Ugly A. Assault on Patterns, Recipes, and Formulas B. Standing Operating Procedures C. Professional Military Education IV. Conclusion Maneuver Warfare: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly But to many people, our rebuttals seem to show us to be against a great many things without being for anything other than the status quo. There is a real danger that our critics have gained the intellectual high ground, too often causing us to appear defensive and reactive, rebutting arguments in the perceived absence of clearly enunciating an alternative vision.1 Given the current state of euphoria over the concepts ascribed by maneuver warfare, it seems a daunting task to cry out a caution. The majority of the tenets of maneuver warfare, as set forth by FMFM 1 (Warfighting) and such writers as W.S. Lind and Colonel Wyly, have great value. Each treatise has been instrumental in driving an evolution of current military thought. Though many times inspired, these concepts are not revolutionary as many have implied. They are a sub-set of the many painful lessons learned through the unpleasant experiences of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts coupled with demographic, fiscal, and threat realities. Therefore, the acceptance of the maneuver warfare concept is the natural evolution within an organization responding, with some degree of common sense, to the realities of modern warfare. The basic tenets of maneuver warfare are sound, however the manner of their introduction has brought with it some very dangerous baggage. The mental gymnastics that we have gone through for the past fifteen years have done a great deal of good for the Marine Corps. Conversely, some rather disturbing trends have become institutionalized within the Marine Corps, and particularly within its educational institutions. These trends are the result of a superficial understanding of historical events, the factors influencing them and the uniqueness of each circumstance. The focus has been the specific result (i.e. destruction of cohesion and route) rather than the manner in which opposing armies were trained, developed and employed. Further there has been a complete lack of attention to what Martin van Creveld calls historical "accidents."2 These historical accidents could include a specific leader, tactic, or weapon that gave one side a distinct and decisive advantage over the other. The bulk of these examples have been from the German experience in World War II. Many of the current "germanofiles" have viewed German experience through the tinted glasses of the maneuver zealot rather than through the cold objectivity of either a soldier or a historian. As a result, German methods and concepts have been plucked out of their historical context dangerously distorting their value and intent. While this has made for exciting and interesting conversations, it also created a cruelly shaky foundation for military theory, doctrine, and operations. I submit that our goal today must be to rein in on the zealots while simultaneously spurring the neanderthals, so as to move positively and decisively into the future with a coherent design for developing a Marine Corps for any and every eventuality. With that goal in mind, we will look at maneuver warfare, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. The Good Commander's Intent. The concept of commander's intent is a positive and substantiative change in doctrine. Unfortunately we have diluted it to a degree by making it a sub-paragraph within our old five paragraph order. The commander's intent is the glue, the very fabric that holds the unit together. Based on the German model, we have yet to embrace it in the manner in which it will be most effective. I submit, that if the commander issues his intent, there is no specific need to include the old baggage: concept of operations and mission. "The German Army used mission statements (although there is no German concept of mission precisely in the US sense) in the form of the commander's intent."3 Our own combat orders, particularly oral ones, could be streamlined if the commander clearly enunciated his intent and then gave subordinates tasks that clearly contribute to his intent. Once the subordinate commander understands the higher intent, in the German system he, ...could change or abandon his task within the framework of the higher commander's overall intent. This was a serious matter, and a commander who did this assumed full responsibility for the decision and its consequences. Immediate notification of the higher commander was a stringent necessity.4 This later caveat is of critical importance and one that is often overlooked by today's maneuver zealot. While the successful German commander did not attempt to "micro- manage," soldiers were expected to adhere to the accomplishment of the commander's intent with the same dogged tenacity that Marines in the past have evidenced in mission accomplishment. Focus of Effort. Though our old doctrinal definition of "main attack"5 is very close to the obnoxiously German expression "Schwerpunkt," main attack does not convey quite the same meaning. The central concept that is missing is the requirement of everyone to subordinate their own goals in order to advance the main effort. Further, our doctrine in the past has not applied the same type of concept to operations other than the attack. The concept of focus of effort should indeed be applied to our every endeavor throughout the wide range of military activities. Critical Vulnerability. The examination of the enemy in order to discover his critical vulnerabilities is a valuable addition to the body of Marine doctrinal thought. In the past, the fundamentals of offensive combat talked to enemy weaknesses: In situations created by opposing maneuvering forces, each seeking a tactical advantage, the commander avoids enemy strength and reacts with maximum speed to take advantage of known enemy weaknesses to enhance success. Weakness from faulty dispositions, poor morale, insufficient support, or tactical error, as well as a weakness in numerical strength, should be exploited.6 Clearly, the discussion fails to portray the search for that "one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us."6 However a superior concept is still capable of creating some unfortunate misconceptions. FMFM 1 (Warfighting) cautions us that the "critical enemy vulnerability will rarely be obvious, particularly at the lower levels."7 Yet, the concept has given birth to the elusive search for a way to unhinge the enemy in one climactic stroke, a very Napoleonic concept. Bill Lind, in his critique of the I MEF Campaign Plan, encourages the Marine Corps to search for the "coup de main"8 in order to fight a quick clean war. In the context of tactics, our old fundamental is much more germane, particularly for units of battalion size and smaller. There may very well exist a critical vulnerability, however we can't get wrapped up in a prolonged search for one. From the fireteam to the division, Marines must be prepared to develop the situation and create opportunities. Mission Orders. Though the concept of giving a subordinate just enough guidance to be able to accomplish his task is on the surface, a good one, it has generated some unfortunate and perhaps unintended byproducts. Command and issuance of orders to subordinates is a highly personal activity. It is not possible to make blanket statements as to how this function should be regulated. A commander must know his subordinates' strengths and weaknesses and issue his orders accordingly. As anyone who has commanded other officers knows, through training and operating together some officers will develop an intuitive understanding of what their commander wants them to do in certain circumstances and act accordingly. Other officers may never develop that special insight and therefore must be told what to do in relatively detailed fashion. One of the unfortunate fruits of this discussion has been to denigrate the manner in which most of our orders are issued. Combat orders and operation orders have in some organizations become highly stylized and voluminous documents of little practical value. Yet if we are to learn from the German experience, we should focus on how they trained rather than how they operated in certain isolated circumstances. The Germans listed a number of order types: (1) Warning Orders, (2) Complete Operations Orders, (3) Separate Orders, and (4) Special Instructions. Warning and Operation orders in the German system bear a striking resemblance to our own. The description of Separate Orders makes it sound very much like our own Fragmentary Orders. Special Instructions are the instructions to units other than tactical units dealing primarily with administrative and logistics functions normally included as separate annexes in our orders. The German view on orders was: Publishing orders is an art that can be learned only by continual practice. Prompt distribution of faultless orders furthers the confidence of the troops in the leader and often has a decisive influence in achieving success in combat. Conversely, power in the attack or strength to resist in the defense can be greatly reduced by faulty orders.9 I am not endorsing a return to voluminous orders in which the format takes on more importance than the content. I am not endorsing a rigid mind-set over how to dot i's and cross t's. The simple fact of the matter is that the Germans operated effectively because they paid a lot of attention to the importance of giving clear, concise, and in their own words "faultless" orders in preparing for war. This precision guidance created an army that was capable of issuing and following orders under the stress of combat. The point is that we must not allow the maneuver zealot to so denigrate the concept of issuing orders that we loose sight of the vital function they play. Certainly the more time there is the more complete an order will be. As time for developing an order decreases the length and detail of that order will of necessity be decreased. The training and practice that an officer has received will allow him to cut to the essence of his plan and issue it in a form that everyone will understand. It doesn't take long to find an example of a military disaster caused by orders that were not clear and thus created confusion. The charge of the light brigade was a heroically performed, though tragically useless event caused in large part by a misunderstood wave of an arm that passed for an order. Common sense must guide the determination as to length, detail and form of the order. The Bad Cohesion. Through the promulgation of the OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) cycle, there has grown a perception that battles and indeed wars can be won by attacking the cohesion, the psychological glue, that holds the enemy together. Certainly the Germans in many a battle destroyed the cohesion of their enemy. There was however, no goal in the German army of attacking cohesion. "All missions must have as their objective the destruction of the enemy."10 Faced with imminent death or destruction some German opponents crumbled, others did not. During Operation Crusader, November 1941, General Erwin Rommel threw away a hard fought victory over the British by not adhering to the German doctrine of annihilation. After smashing the British attack, and in particular the British 7th Armored and 1st South African Infantry Divisions, rather than finish the job, he raced off to the frontier of Egypt with his mobile forces. Rather than lose their cohesion, shattered British units rebuilt themselves on the battlefield and re-entered the action during Rommel's reckless advance. The New Zealand Division, though cut off by Rommel's stroke, continued to attack west in the direction of Tobruk.11 One can only speculate that if Rommel had listened to the advice of his subordinate commanders and annihilated the British within the salient they had created, he might not have been forced into a long retreat west through the desert a short time later. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived into believing that a dashing maneuver will necessarily unhinge our enemies to the extent that they will simply give up. An enemy who is dead or grievously wounded is no longer a problem. An enemy who is confused, embarrassed, or surprised, may very quickly be a problem again. If we are to learn from the German experience, we should not focus on some of the unintended results of their operations. We should clearly understand what their objective was and make it our own. In war, our objective should be to annihilate the enemy, not upset him. Control Measures. It is in the realm of control measures that the maneuver zealot shows himself to be a pessimist. When given a boundary, the zealot will scream bloody murder that you are restricting him (the glass is half empty). However, the maneuver realist will look at the boundary pleased to know that he is free to fire and maneuver within that entire area and that his troops will be relatively safe from friendly fire (the glass is half full). Where anyone got the idea that Marine officers would rigidly adhere to control measures when common sense dictated otherwise, is beyond comprehension. They were taught at The Basic School from FMFM 6-4, "To give subordinate echelons maximum freedom of action, the minimum control measures necessary to ensure that the attack progresses in the desired manner are prescribed."12 The prudent commander provides such control as is required based on his assessment as to the capabilities of his subordinates, their level of training, and the complexity of the mission. The Ugly Assault on Patterns, Recipes and Formulas. In an effort to create simple understanding, Americans have frequently been guilty of attempting to boil things down to the essential elements. In the military this attempt has resulted in lists of principles, fundamentals, and related information. In and of itself, there is nothing inherently wrong with a checklist or any other list. FMFM 6-4 offers a most cogent caution: ... any attempt to rigidly apply all the principles to all battlefield environments may lead to defeat. The commander should recognize the need to apply the principles as flexibly as all other tactical principles, based on the circumstances with which he is confronted . No commander can rigidly follow the examples provided by doctrinal resources, but must modify them according to his mission, the situation, and the terrain over which he is fighting.13 Oddly enough, this quotation comes from the 1978 edition of FMFM 6-4 in the discussion of the application of the principles of war. The maneuver zealots have created a phobia over the mention of lists, checklists etc. However, in his book on maneuver warfare, Bill Lind gives us "mental filters" with which to produce a unique approach to each situation.14 In this context, the word filter is synonymous with any number of checklists provided to unit leaders to describe a planning sequence or an estimate of the situation. No doubt there has arisen a modicum of a checklist mentality in the Corps through some exercises such as the MCCRES. However, to abolish all lists, formulas, and the like is not compatible with either common sense or historical reality. In the doctrinal material with which the German Army prepared for World War II, there is a section called "estimate of the situation." Referred to (in my english translation) as "Guiding Principles," it directs a commander to consider the following essentials when formulating a plan: (1) Mission, (2) Terrain, (3) Enemy, and (4) Own Troops, 15 which sounds very much like our own estimate of the situation. The response of our community to the hue and cry of the maneuver zealot has been a nearly classic throwing the baby out with the bath water. Call them whatever is in vogue, but let's not abandon useful checklists and filters in a cloud of hysteria. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). An often repeated story, used to illustrate German genius, has two famous World War II generals visiting the site of a war game in Camp Pendleton, California. The gentlemen were asked if their army had any standing operating procedures (SOP). Allegedly, the concept was nearly untranslatable. When the point was finally adequately described, the two generals roared with laughter. Their response was, "We just did it."16 This statement has been used as an excuse to destroy both doctrine, school solutions, and unit SOP's in an attempt to prevent predictability. With all due respect, the General's response was absolute rubbish. Without the aid of the micro-chip and computers, the Germans were not able to proliferate SOP's to the extent that we have today. However SOP's were promulgated in a variety of forms. Throughout the war German officers, at all levels, participated in war games. This was nothing more than a German technique of standardizing procedures within a command. In another example, the Headquarters of Africa Corps on 22 May 1942 issued a directive on the use of heavy 88mm Flak batteries. The directive is described as a "succinct set of guiding principles."17 A rose by any other name . . . . Call them whatever you like, but recognize that the German army functioned as well as it did because they had specific and numerous SOP's established. Professional Military Education. One area in which there has been radical (some would maintain chaotic) change in the Marine Corps, has been in its educational institutions. Again, it appears that we have made an uninformed attempt to follow in the German tradition. Much has been made of the German method of directing a student to attack the problem from the top, understanding the whole, rather than the more traditional approach of breaking a problem down and studying its individual parts. Utilizing this training philosophy, the first sand table exercise for lieutenants at The Basic School is conducted on a regimental level. Majors at Command and Staff College study the theory and nature of war mixed with national policy and strategy before exercising a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). As so many times before, we have failed to completely grasp the essence of the successful German technique. During World War II, a German pursuing a commission in the German army had a long and arduous journey ahead of him. Even during the height the war, the training prior to commissioning was 14-18 months long. During this time the aspirant spent 3-4 months training as a soldier before another 4-6 months training as an NCO. After an additional two months training at the front, our young German was promoted to cadet. During the 7-10 months prior to his officer training, he learned what might be described as "the basics." It was later, in his 7-8 months of officer training, that he was exposed to military history, which was still considered secondary to tactics.18 Therefore, the German officer candidate was well acquainted with squad/section tactics prior to studying two levels above a platoon. He had been a member of a squad and a squad leader. As for the dogged adherence to the importance of history, for a time history was even omitted from the curriculum of the War Academy to shorten the course and provide trained staff officers to the active forces more quickly.19 Is it good to study history? Yes, absolutely. Is history a substitute for tactical fundamentals? Very clearly the Germans did not think so. The point is that if we agree that the Germans produced well trained officers, and they did, then we must look at the whole educational system not just the last 40%. Every officer requires a firm grasp of his services doctrinal fundamentals before he can apply maneuver concepts. Even Bill Lind recognized this when he said, "Read again your FMFMs and Operational Handbooks, this time with an eye on maneuver warfare, and see what is still applicable (a great deal will be)."20 Any discussion of our education system would not be complete without attention to "yellows" or school solutions. Our schools have shown nothing short of institutional cowardice in their failure to stand up to the maneuver zealot and their ridiculous prohibition against offering a possible solution. This most recently appeared in the Gazette in reference to the training of entry level lieutenants: A key factor in teaching any individual to think for himself is the establishment of an environment of open discussion and communication. It is also important to avoid suggesting that a student's solution is right or wrong, providing a "yellow" or "recommended" solution, or even for the instructor to muse on how he might have accomplished the task. In the first case, it will inhibit students from offering solutions in the future; in the second case, suggesting an institutional right answer will restrict the students' options if given a similar situation again.21 It certainly seems inconsistent that on the one hand we are training an officer to go out and kill large numbers of his nation's enemies, while on the other we are afraid of hurting his feelings. Our schools should be staffed with experienced officers who are capable and willing to offer their students competent advice. It would indeed be wrong to present a single right answer in that there are a multitude of ways to attack any problem. However there are also desperately wrong ways of attacking a problem, and entry level officers will produce them. The German officer of World War II would scoff at such a ridiculous way of conducting training. Instructions to German umpires in the conduct of field training included the following: 1. During flexible problems, they will assure that tactical conduct is adhered to, but will intervene only if the purpose of the problem does not seem to be achieved. 2. Nontactical conduct of individuals will have to be criticized and eliminated by the umpire without delay. During the second phase of basic training, the umpire may criticize and demand repetition of all incorrectly executed movements. 3. Punishment, by way of exclusion from problems, will be given only after the criticism by umpires has proven unsuccessful.22 No wonder that when Colonel Petske was asked about simulating combat training, he replied, "The eye and mouth of a good critical umpire are more important than 10 simulated detonations." He also told a group of Marine Officers: The most essential part of the map exercise is the officer-in-charge . . . During the final conference, the officer-in-charge must be clear in his value judgement of the decisions made. He must critically examine these decisions and say something about each of them.23 "I'm okay, you're okay" answers to tactical problems were not a tradition of the German Army; there is no compelling reason for us to adopt them either. The German Army that has been described to support a maneuver style of warfare was the most highly trained and rigidly (sometimes brutally so) disciplined military force in the twentieth century. The flexibility and tenacity they displayed in battle was a tribute to a training system the likes of which we are unlikely to emulate. However, we should understand the concept of training, intent, and execution in its entirety rather than pick and choose from those areas that suit personal beliefs. The later attempts to create a culinary masterpiece by reading every other line in the cookbook. The former, although more tedious and time consuming precludes a half-baked product. Finally reflect on the German army and the instrument it produced: . . .the German Army was capable both of fighting with the utmost heroism and of cold-bloodedly butchering untold numbers of innocent people. So perfect was its organization, so excellent its methods, that its personnel simply did not care whom they fought and why. They were soldiers and did their duty, regardless of whether that duty involved an offensive in the south, a defensive in the north, or the extermination of "bandits" in the center.24 This is not the kind of organization an American would be proud of. Americans want an American military that ruthlessly prosecutes a campaign yet shows the kind of humanity that Americans are known for like recent images of American troops racing across the desert destroying every hostile presence, yet calming and medically treating Iraqi soldiers who surrendered. Americans are intensely proud of those warriors. Conclusion This discussion has only touched on some of the results of the maneuver evolution within our Corps. It has not touched on all the things of value that have found their way into our war- fighting technique. Unfortunately, it is also true that these pages have not adequately listed all the bad and ugly things that have surfaced. Change is a difficult thing for an organization as conservative as the Marine Corps, but in the last decade, change it has, and in dramatic style. Let us all continue to march forward, but with our eyes wide open and our common sense finely tuned. To do that, we must critically analyze our own past as well as the past of other illustrious military organizations. We must analyze in an objective manner, not through the filter of wishful thinking caused by a commitment to one theory or another. An organization that does not change becomes stagnant and dies. However, all change is not necessarily good or healthy. Weigh each new idea, concept, and theory carefully before dashing headlong down a dark uncharted path. Keep and strengthen the good that has come about through embracing maneuver warfare throughout the Corps. At the same time excise the bad and the ugly. Do so aggressively and ruthlessly with the same subsuming humanity shown by those troops whose very lives depend on it. Endnotes 1. Watkins, Admiral James D. "The Maritime Strategy; The Real Reformers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986 supplement, page 15. 2. van Creveld, Martin "24:The Washington Papers; Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives." page ix. 3. Hughes, Daniel J. "Abuses of German Military History." Military Review December 1986, page 67. 4. Ibid., page 68. 5. U.S Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon. Quantico, 1978. Page 101, "Main Attack. --The main attack contains the greatest concentration of combat power. Its purpose is to secure the decisive objective and destroy or cause the destruction of the enemy force. The main attack is the commander's bid for victory. The following are primary characteristics of the main attack: (1) Directed against the decisive objective. (2) Launched on a narrow front. (3) Allocated the preponderance of combat power and fire support. (4) Reserves positioned to exploit success." 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Rifle Company and Platoon, FMFM 6-4. Quantico, 1978. 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. FMFM 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989, page 35. 7. Ibid, page 36. 8. Lind, William S. letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps entitled "Visit to 1st Marine Division and MCAGCC, 29 Palms, November 13-21, 1989" dated December 4, 1989. Underlined in original, page 8. 9. German Tactical Doctrine, Special Series, No. 8, MID 461. Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, DC, December 20, 1942. Page 30. 10. Kesselring, Fieldmarshal Albert. MS # P-060 b, Small Unit Tactics, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units. Translated by the Historical Division European Command, no date, page 27. 11. Gordon IV, Major John. Operation Crusader, Preview of the Nonlinear Battlefield. Military Review, February 1991, pages 48-61. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Rifle Company and Platoon, FMFM 6-4. Quantico, 1978, page 121. 13. Ibid, page 18. 14. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs. Boulder, Colorado, 1985, page 12. 15. Military Intelligence Service. Special Series No. 8, MID 461, War Department, Washington, December 20, 1942, pages 26-28. 16. Lind, William S., in a variety of lectures between 1981 and the present. 17. Stolfi, Dr. Russel H.S., German Battle Style in Ultra Mobile, High Intensity War: North African Desert 1941-42. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. No date, page 52. 18. van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power, German Military Performance, 1914-1945. Art of War Colloquim, U.S. Army War College, November, 1983. Pages 158-161. 19. German Military Training; A study of German Military Training. Produced at GDMS by a combined British, Canadian and U.S. Staff. May 1946, page 53. 20. Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, page 35. 21. Kelley, Major John F. and Smith, Captain Philip E., "Teaching Light Infantry Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, Volume 75, Number 3, March 1991, page 68. 22. Appendix 39, Conducting and Umpiring Field Problems, to German Training Methods, A Study of German Military Training, Produced at GMDS, by a combined British, Canadian and U.S. Staff, dated May 1946, pages 260-265. 23. Staff, MCEC, "German Training and Tactics: An Interview With Col Pestke", Marine Corps Gazette, Volume 67, Number 10, October 1983, pages 60 and 61. 24. van Creveld, Martin, "Fighting Power, German Military Performance, 1914-1945," Art of War Colloquium, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 1983, page 190. Bibliography 1. Center For Strategic and International Studies. 24: Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives. Martin Van Creveld. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1975. 2. German Military Training; A Study of German Military Training. GMDS, May 1946. 3. Gordon IV, Major John. "Operation Crusader, Preview of the Nonlinear Battlefield." Military Review, February 1991, 48-61. 4. Hughes, Daniel J. "Abuses of German Military History." Military Review, December 1986, 66-76. 5. Hughes, Daniel J. Book Review. Military Review, August 1990, 90-91. 6. Kelley, Major John F. and Captain Philip E. Smith. "Teaching Light Infantry Tactics." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1991, 66-73. 7. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 8. Lind, William S. President, Military Reform Institute. Letter about a visit to 1st Marine Division and MCAGCC, 29 Palms, November 13-21, 1989, 4 December 1989. 9. Lind, William S. "Tactics in Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1981, 36-39. 10. Lind, William S. "Why the German Example?" Marine Corps Gazette, June 1982, 59-63. 11. Military Intelligence Service, War Department. "German Tactical Doctrine." Special Series No. 8, MID 461, December 20, 1942. 12. Historical Division European Command. "MS # P-060 b, Small Unit Tactics, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units." July 17, 1952. 13. Staff, MCEC. "German Training and Tactics: An Interview with Colonel Pestke." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1983, 58-65. 14. U.S. Army. U.S. Army War College. Fighting Power, German Military Performance 1914-45, Martin Van Creveld. Carlisle Barracks, 1983 15. U.S. Marine Corps. Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, DC, 6 March 1989. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. German Experiences in Desert Warfare During World War II, Volume I, FMFRP 12-96-I. Quantico, 1 October 1990. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Rifle Company and Platoon, FMFM 6-4. Quantico, 1978. 18. U.S. Navy. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. German Battle Style in Ultra Mobile, High Intensity War: North African Desert 1941-42. Prof. Dr. Russel H.S. Stolfi. Monterey, no date. 19. Watkins, Admiral James D. "The Maritime Strategy; The Real Reformers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986 supplement.
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