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Maneuver Warfare:  The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly
AUTHOR Major William A. Card, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
			Executive Summary
     Maneuver Warfare:  The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
     In the last decade, the Marine Corps has moved
aggressively to adopt maneuver warfare as its war fighting
style.  Most often the model for the maneuver style of war
has been the German Army of the Second World War.  The
German research of many scholars has been used as
justification for a variety of changes to our methods,
doctrine, and institutions.  In an analysis of maneuver
warfare tenets, good, bad, and ugly, against the backdrop of
German methods, training, and reality, the discussion
indicates where misconceptions and mistakes are dangerously
close to being institutionalized.
     The Good.  Whether through enhancing traditional
concepts or introducing more substantial change, much of the
current movement has great value.  The tenets of commander's
intent, focus of effort, and mission orders have been a
solid and positive change to the current body of tactical
thought.  The full benefit in some areas has yet to be fully
realized.
     The Bad.  The focus on destruction of enemy cohesion
and the denigration of control measures, has created a
variety of misconceptions and dangerous expectations.
German battle intentions, experience, and training concepts
do not support the current maneuver view of these concepts.
Rather, our own doctrinal guidance has more value to the
officer of today and is more in keeping with common sense.
     The Ugly.  The assault on patterns, recipes, formulas,
and standing operating procedures, coupled with changes in
our professional military education has created a dangerous
prescription for future failure.  The body of thought that
has developed in these areas are insupportable with historic
evidence from German experience.  Further, in a variety of
areas, these concepts are insupportable from a common sense
point of view.
     The scope of this discussion is not sufficient to cover
all the good, bad, or ugly results of the maneuver evolution
within our Corps.  It does provide a pause for the reader to
think about the possible ramifications and unintended
results of a process that has been largely positive
regardless of the painful method of its introduction.  The
Marine Corps must continue to embrace the maneuver style of
warfare while understanding that it is not yet fully mature.
It requires objective and critical analysis tempered with
practical experience and common sense.  Therein lies the
prescription for success on the battlefield.
     Maneuver Warfare:  The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
			 Outline
     The basic tenets of maneuver warfare are sound, however
the manner of their introduction has brought with it some
very dangerous baggage.
I.   The Good.
     A.  Commander's Intent
     B.  Focus of Effort
     C.  Critical Vulnerability
     D.  Mission Orders
II.  The Bad
     A.  Cohesion
     B.  Control Measures
III. The Ugly
     A.  Assault on Patterns, Recipes, and Formulas
     B.  Standing Operating Procedures
     C.  Professional Military Education
IV.  Conclusion
     Maneuver Warfare:  The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
	But to many people, our rebuttals seem to
	show us to be against a great many things
	without being for anything other than the
	status quo.  There is a real danger that our
	critics have gained the intellectual high
	ground, too often causing us to appear
	defensive and reactive, rebutting arguments
	in the perceived absence of clearly
	enunciating an alternative vision.1
     Given the current state of euphoria over the concepts
ascribed by maneuver warfare, it seems a daunting task to
cry out a caution.  The majority of the tenets of maneuver
warfare, as set forth by FMFM 1 (Warfighting) and such
writers as W.S. Lind and Colonel Wyly, have great value.
Each treatise has been instrumental in driving an evolution
of current military thought.  Though many times inspired,
these concepts are not revolutionary as many have implied.
They are a sub-set of the many painful lessons learned
through the unpleasant experiences of the Korean and Vietnam
conflicts coupled with demographic, fiscal, and threat
realities.  Therefore, the acceptance of the maneuver
warfare concept is the natural evolution within an
organization responding, with some degree of common sense,
to the realities of modern warfare.  The basic tenets of
maneuver warfare are sound, however the manner of their
introduction has brought with it some very dangerous
baggage.
     The mental gymnastics that we have gone through for the
past fifteen years have done a great deal of good for the
Marine Corps.  Conversely, some rather disturbing trends
have become institutionalized within the Marine Corps, and
particularly within its educational institutions.  These
trends are the result of a superficial understanding of
historical events, the factors influencing them and the
uniqueness of each circumstance.  The focus has been the
specific result (i.e. destruction of cohesion and route)
rather than the manner in which opposing armies were
trained, developed and employed.  Further there has been a
complete lack of attention to what Martin van Creveld calls
historical "accidents."2  These historical accidents could
include a specific leader, tactic, or weapon that gave one
side a distinct and decisive advantage over the other.  The
bulk of these examples have been from the German experience
in World War II.  Many of the current "germanofiles" have
viewed German experience through the tinted glasses of the
maneuver zealot rather than through the cold objectivity of
either a soldier or a historian.  As a result, German
methods and concepts have been plucked out of their
historical context dangerously distorting their value and
intent.   While this has made for exciting and interesting
conversations, it also created a cruelly shaky foundation
for military theory, doctrine, and operations.
     I submit that our goal today must be to rein in on the
zealots while simultaneously spurring the neanderthals, so
as to move positively and decisively into the future with a
coherent design for developing a Marine Corps for any and
every eventuality.  With that goal in mind, we will look at
maneuver warfare, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly.
			  The Good
     Commander's Intent.  The concept of commander's intent
is a positive and substantiative change in doctrine.
Unfortunately we have diluted it to a degree by making it a
sub-paragraph within our old five paragraph order.  The
commander's intent is the glue, the very fabric that holds
the unit together.  Based on the German model, we have yet
to embrace it in the manner in which it will be most
effective.  I submit, that if the commander issues his
intent, there is no specific need to include the old
baggage:  concept of operations and mission.  "The German
Army used mission statements (although there is no German
concept of mission precisely in the US sense) in the form of
the commander's intent."3  Our own combat orders,
particularly oral ones, could be streamlined if the
commander clearly enunciated his intent and then gave
subordinates tasks that clearly contribute to his intent.
Once the subordinate commander understands the higher
intent, in the German system he,
	...could change or abandon his task within the
	framework of the higher commander's overall
intent.  This was a serious matter, and a
	commander who did this assumed full responsibility
	for the decision and its consequences.  Immediate
	notification of the higher commander was a
	stringent necessity.4
This later caveat is of critical importance and one that is
often overlooked by today's maneuver zealot.  While the
successful German commander did not attempt to "micro-
manage," soldiers were expected to adhere to the
accomplishment of the commander's intent with the same
dogged tenacity that Marines in the past have evidenced in
mission accomplishment.
     Focus of Effort.  Though our old doctrinal definition
of "main attack"5 is very close to the obnoxiously German
expression "Schwerpunkt," main attack does not convey quite
the same meaning.  The central concept that is missing is
the requirement of everyone to subordinate their own goals
in order to advance the main effort.  Further, our doctrine
in the past has not applied the same type of concept to
operations other than the attack.  The concept of focus of
effort should indeed be applied to our every endeavor
throughout the wide range of military activities.
     Critical Vulnerability.  The examination of the enemy
in order to discover his critical vulnerabilities is a
valuable addition to the body of Marine doctrinal thought.
In the past, the fundamentals of offensive combat talked to
enemy weaknesses:
     In situations created by opposing maneuvering
     forces, each seeking a tactical advantage, the
commander avoids enemy strength and reacts with
     maximum speed to take advantage of known enemy
     weaknesses to enhance success.  Weakness from
     faulty dispositions, poor morale, insufficient
     support, or tactical error, as well as a weakness
     in numerical strength, should be exploited.6
Clearly, the discussion fails to portray the search for that
"one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive
damage to his ability to resist us."6  However a superior
concept is still capable of creating some unfortunate
misconceptions.
     FMFM 1 (Warfighting) cautions us that the "critical
enemy vulnerability  will rarely be obvious, particularly at
the lower levels."7  Yet, the concept has given birth to the
elusive search for a way to unhinge the enemy in one
climactic stroke, a very Napoleonic concept.  Bill Lind, in
his critique of the I MEF Campaign Plan, encourages the
Marine Corps to search for the "coup de main"8 in order to
fight a quick clean war.  In the context of tactics, our old
fundamental is much more germane, particularly for units of
battalion size and smaller.  There may very well exist a
critical vulnerability, however we can't get wrapped up in a
prolonged search for one.  From the fireteam to the
division, Marines must be prepared to develop the situation
and create opportunities.
     Mission Orders.  Though the concept of giving a
subordinate just enough guidance to be able to accomplish
his task is on the surface, a good one, it has generated
some unfortunate and perhaps unintended byproducts.  Command
and issuance of orders to subordinates is a highly personal
activity.  It is not possible to make blanket statements as
to how this function should be regulated.  A commander must
know his subordinates' strengths and weaknesses and issue
his orders accordingly.  As anyone who has commanded other
officers knows, through training and operating together some
officers will develop an intuitive understanding of what
their commander wants them to do in certain circumstances
and act accordingly.  Other officers may never develop that
special insight and therefore must be told what to do in
relatively detailed fashion.
     One of the unfortunate fruits of this discussion has
been to denigrate the manner in which most of our orders are
issued.  Combat orders and operation orders have in some
organizations become highly stylized and voluminous
documents of little practical value.  Yet if we are to learn
from the German experience, we should focus on how they
trained rather than how they operated in certain isolated
circumstances.  The Germans listed a number of order types:
(1) Warning Orders, (2) Complete Operations Orders, (3)
Separate Orders, and (4) Special Instructions.  Warning and
Operation orders in the German system bear a striking
resemblance to our own.  The description of Separate Orders
makes it sound very much like our own Fragmentary Orders.
Special Instructions are the instructions to units other
than tactical units dealing primarily with administrative
and logistics functions normally included as separate
annexes in our orders.  The German view on orders was:
     Publishing orders is an art that can be learned
     only by continual practice.  Prompt distribution
     of faultless orders furthers the confidence of the
     troops in the leader and often has a decisive
     influence in achieving success in combat.
     Conversely, power in the attack or strength to
     resist in the defense can be greatly reduced by
     faulty orders.9
I am not endorsing a return to voluminous orders in which
the format takes on more importance than the content.  I am
not endorsing a rigid mind-set over how to dot i's and cross
t's.  The simple fact of the matter is that the Germans
operated effectively because they paid a lot of attention to
the importance of giving clear, concise, and in their own
words "faultless" orders in preparing for war.  This
precision guidance created an army that was capable of
issuing and following orders under the stress of combat.
     The point is that we must not allow the maneuver zealot
to so denigrate the concept of issuing orders that we loose
sight of the vital function they play.  Certainly the more
time there is the more complete an order will be.  As time
for developing an order decreases the length and detail of
that order will of necessity be decreased.  The training and
practice that an officer has received will allow him to cut
to the essence of his plan and issue it in a form that
everyone will understand.  It doesn't take long to find an
example of a military disaster caused by orders that were
not clear and thus created confusion.  The charge of the
light brigade was a heroically performed, though tragically
useless event caused in large part by a misunderstood wave
of an arm that passed for an order.  Common sense must guide
the determination as to length, detail and form of the
order.
			  The Bad
     Cohesion.  Through the promulgation of the OODA
(Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) cycle, there
has grown a perception that battles and indeed wars can be
won by attacking the cohesion, the psychological glue, that
holds the enemy together.  Certainly the Germans in many a
battle destroyed the cohesion of their enemy.  There was
however, no goal in the German army of attacking cohesion.
"All missions must have as their objective the destruction
of the enemy."10  Faced with imminent death or destruction
some German opponents crumbled, others did not.  During
Operation Crusader, November 1941, General Erwin Rommel
threw away a hard fought victory over the British by not
adhering to the German doctrine of annihilation.  After
smashing the British attack, and in particular the British
7th Armored and 1st South African Infantry Divisions, rather
than finish the job, he raced off to the frontier of Egypt
with his mobile forces.   Rather than lose their cohesion,
shattered British units rebuilt themselves on the
battlefield and re-entered the action during Rommel's
reckless advance.  The New Zealand Division, though cut off
by Rommel's stroke, continued to attack west in the
direction of Tobruk.11  One can only speculate that if
Rommel had listened to the advice of his subordinate
commanders and annihilated the British within the salient
they had created, he might not have been forced into a long
retreat west through the desert a short time later.
     We must not allow ourselves to be deceived into
believing that a dashing maneuver will necessarily unhinge
our enemies to the extent that they will simply give up.  An
enemy who is dead or grievously wounded is no longer a
problem.  An enemy who is confused, embarrassed, or
surprised, may very quickly be a problem again.  If we are
to learn from the German experience, we should not focus on
some of the unintended results of their operations.  We
should clearly understand what their objective was and make
it our own.  In war, our objective should be to annihilate
the enemy, not upset him.
     Control Measures.  It is in the realm of control
measures that the maneuver zealot shows himself to be a
pessimist.  When given a boundary, the zealot will scream
bloody murder that you are restricting him (the glass is
half empty).  However, the maneuver realist will look at the
boundary pleased to know that he is free to fire and
maneuver within that entire area and that his troops will be
relatively safe from friendly fire (the glass is half full).
Where anyone got the idea that Marine officers would rigidly
adhere to control measures when common sense dictated
otherwise, is beyond comprehension.  They were taught at The
Basic School from FMFM 6-4, "To give subordinate echelons
maximum freedom of action, the minimum control measures
necessary to ensure that the attack progresses in the
desired manner are prescribed."12  The prudent commander
provides such control as is required based on his assessment
as to the capabilities of his subordinates, their level of
training, and the complexity of the mission.
			  The Ugly
     Assault on Patterns, Recipes and Formulas.  In an
effort to create simple understanding, Americans have
frequently been guilty of attempting to boil things down to
the essential elements.  In the military this attempt has
resulted in lists of principles, fundamentals, and related
information.  In and of itself, there is nothing inherently
wrong with a checklist or any other list.  FMFM 6-4 offers a
most cogent caution:
	... any attempt to rigidly apply all the
	principles to all battlefield environments may
	lead to defeat.  The commander should recognize
	the need to apply the principles as flexibly as
	all other tactical principles, based on the
	circumstances with which he is confronted .
	No commander can rigidly follow the examples
	provided by doctrinal resources, but must modify
	them according to his mission, the situation, and
	the terrain over which he is fighting.13
Oddly enough, this quotation comes from the 1978 edition of
FMFM 6-4 in the discussion of the application of the
principles of war.  The maneuver zealots have created a
phobia over the mention of lists, checklists etc.  However,
in his book on maneuver warfare, Bill Lind gives us "mental
filters" with which to produce a unique approach to each
situation.14  In this context, the word filter is synonymous
with any number of checklists provided to unit leaders to
describe a planning sequence or an estimate of the
situation.
     No doubt there has arisen a modicum of a checklist
mentality in the Corps through some exercises such as the
MCCRES.  However, to abolish all lists, formulas, and the
like is not compatible with either common sense or
historical reality.  In the doctrinal material with which
the German Army prepared for World War II, there is a
section called "estimate of the situation."  Referred to (in
my english translation) as "Guiding Principles,"  it directs
a commander to consider the following essentials when
formulating a plan: (1) Mission, (2) Terrain, (3) Enemy, and
(4) Own Troops, 15  which sounds very much like our own
estimate of the situation.  The response of our community to
the hue and cry of the maneuver zealot has been a nearly
classic throwing the baby out with the bath water.  Call
them whatever is in vogue, but let's not abandon useful
checklists and filters in a cloud of hysteria.
     Standing Operating Procedures (SOP).  An often repeated
story, used to illustrate German genius, has two famous
World War II generals visiting the site of a war game in
Camp Pendleton, California.  The gentlemen were asked if
their army had any standing operating procedures (SOP).
Allegedly, the concept was nearly untranslatable.  When the
point was finally adequately described, the two generals
roared with laughter.  Their response was, "We just did
it."16  This statement has been used as an excuse to destroy
both doctrine, school solutions, and unit SOP's in an
attempt to prevent predictability.  With all due respect,
the General's response was absolute rubbish.
     Without the aid of the micro-chip and computers, the
Germans were not able to proliferate SOP's to the extent
that we have today.  However SOP's were promulgated in a
variety of forms.  Throughout the war German officers, at
all levels, participated in war games.  This was nothing
more than a German technique of standardizing procedures
within a command.  In another example, the Headquarters of
Africa Corps on 22 May 1942 issued a directive on the use of
heavy 88mm Flak batteries.  The directive is described as a
"succinct set of guiding principles."17  A rose by any other
name . . . .  Call them whatever you like, but recognize that
the German army functioned as well as it did because they
had specific and numerous SOP's established.
     Professional Military Education.  One area in which
there has been radical (some would maintain chaotic) change
in the Marine Corps, has been in its educational
institutions.  Again, it appears that we have made an
uninformed attempt to follow in the German tradition.  Much
has been made of the German method of directing a student to
attack the problem from the top, understanding the whole,
rather than the more traditional approach of breaking a
problem down and studying its individual parts.  Utilizing
this training philosophy, the first sand table exercise for
lieutenants at The Basic School is conducted on a regimental
level.  Majors at Command and Staff College study the theory
and nature of war mixed with national policy and strategy
before exercising a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).  As
so many times before, we have failed to completely grasp the
essence of the successful German technique.
     During World War II, a German pursuing a commission in
the German army had a long and arduous journey ahead of him.
Even during the height the war, the training prior to
commissioning was 14-18 months long.  During this time the
aspirant spent 3-4 months training as a soldier before
another 4-6 months training as an NCO.  After an additional
two months training at the front, our young German was
promoted to cadet.  During the 7-10 months prior to his
officer training, he learned what might be described as "the
basics."  It was later, in his  7-8 months of officer
training, that he was exposed to military history, which was
still considered secondary to tactics.18  Therefore, the
German officer candidate was well acquainted with
squad/section tactics prior to studying two levels above a
platoon. He had been a member of a squad and a squad
leader.  As for the dogged adherence to the importance of
history, for a time history was even omitted from the
curriculum of the War Academy to shorten the course and
provide trained staff officers to the active forces more
quickly.19
     Is it good to study history?  Yes, absolutely.  Is
history a substitute for tactical fundamentals?  Very
clearly the Germans did not think so.  The point is that if
we agree that the Germans produced well trained officers,
and they did, then we must look at the whole educational
system not just the last 40%.  Every officer requires a firm
grasp of his services doctrinal fundamentals before he can
apply maneuver concepts.  Even Bill Lind recognized this
when he said, "Read again your FMFMs and Operational
Handbooks, this time with an eye on maneuver warfare, and
see what is still applicable (a great deal will be)."20
     Any discussion of our education system would not be
complete without attention to "yellows" or school solutions.
Our schools have shown nothing short of institutional
cowardice in their failure to stand up to the maneuver
zealot and their ridiculous prohibition against offering a
possible solution.  This most recently appeared in the
Gazette in reference to the training of entry level
lieutenants:
     A key factor in teaching any individual to think
     for himself is the establishment of an environment
    of open discussion and communication.  It is also
     important to avoid suggesting that a student's
     solution is right or wrong, providing a "yellow"
     or "recommended" solution, or even for the
     instructor to muse on how he might have
     accomplished the task.  In the first case, it will
     inhibit students from offering solutions in the
     future; in the second case, suggesting an
     institutional right answer will restrict the
     students' options if given a similar situation
     again.21
It certainly seems inconsistent that on the one hand we are
training an officer to go out and kill large numbers of his
nation's enemies, while on the other we are afraid of
hurting his feelings.  Our schools should be staffed with
experienced officers who are capable and willing to offer
their students competent advice.  It would indeed be wrong
to present a single right answer in that there are a
multitude of ways to attack any problem.  However there are
also desperately wrong ways of attacking a problem, and
entry level officers will produce them.
     The German officer of World War II would scoff at such
a ridiculous way of conducting training.  Instructions to
German umpires in the conduct of field training included the
following:
     1.  During flexible problems, they will assure that
     tactical conduct is adhered  to, but will intervene
     only if the purpose of the problem does not seem to be
     achieved.
     2.  Nontactical conduct of individuals will have to be
     criticized and eliminated by the umpire without delay.
     During the second phase of basic training, the umpire
     may criticize and demand repetition of all incorrectly
     executed movements.
     3.  Punishment, by way of exclusion from problems, will
     be given only after the criticism by umpires has proven
     unsuccessful.22
No wonder that when Colonel Petske was asked about
simulating combat training, he replied, "The eye and mouth
of a good critical umpire are more important than 10
simulated detonations."  He also told a group of Marine
Officers:
     The most essential part of the map exercise is the
     officer-in-charge . . . During the final
     conference, the officer-in-charge must be clear in
     his value judgement of the decisions made.  He
     must critically examine these decisions and say
     something about each of them.23
"I'm okay, you're okay" answers to tactical problems were
not a tradition of the German Army;  there is no compelling
reason for us to adopt them either.
     The German Army that has been described to support a
maneuver style of warfare was the most highly trained and
rigidly (sometimes brutally so) disciplined military force
in the twentieth century.  The flexibility and tenacity they
displayed in battle was a tribute to a training system the
likes of which we are unlikely to emulate.  However, we
should understand the concept of training, intent, and
execution in its entirety rather than pick and choose from
those areas that suit personal beliefs.  The later attempts
to create a culinary masterpiece by reading every other line
in the cookbook.  The former, although more tedious and time
consuming precludes a half-baked product.
     Finally reflect on the German army and the instrument
it produced:
     . . .the German Army was capable both of fighting
     with the utmost heroism and of cold-bloodedly
     butchering untold numbers of innocent people.  So
     perfect was its organization, so excellent its
     methods, that its personnel simply did not care
     whom they fought and why.  They were soldiers and
     did their duty, regardless of whether that duty
     involved an offensive in the south, a defensive in
     the north, or the extermination of "bandits" in
     the center.24
This is not the kind of organization an American would be
proud of.  Americans want an American military that
ruthlessly prosecutes a campaign yet shows the kind of
humanity that Americans are known for like recent images of
American troops racing across the desert destroying every
hostile presence, yet calming and medically treating Iraqi
soldiers who surrendered.  Americans are intensely proud of
those warriors.
			 Conclusion
     This discussion has only touched on some of the results
of the maneuver evolution within our Corps.  It has not
touched on all the things of value that have found their way
into our war- fighting technique.  Unfortunately, it is also
true that these pages have not adequately listed all the bad
and ugly things that have surfaced.  Change is a difficult
thing for an organization as conservative as the Marine
Corps, but in the last decade, change it has, and in
dramatic style.  Let us all continue to march forward, but
with our eyes wide open and our common sense finely tuned.
To do that, we must critically analyze our own past as well
as the past of other illustrious military organizations.  We
must analyze in an objective manner, not through the filter
of wishful thinking caused by a commitment to one theory or
another.
     An organization that does not change becomes stagnant
and dies.  However, all change is not necessarily good or
healthy.  Weigh each new idea, concept, and theory carefully
before dashing headlong down a dark uncharted path.  Keep
and strengthen the good that has come about through
embracing maneuver warfare throughout the Corps.  At the
same time excise the bad and the ugly.  Do so aggressively
and ruthlessly with the same subsuming humanity shown by
those troops whose very lives depend on it.
			  Endnotes
1.   Watkins, Admiral James D.  "The Maritime Strategy; The
Real Reformers."   U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January
1986 supplement, page 15.
2.   van Creveld, Martin  "24:The Washington Papers; Military
Lessons of the Yom Kippur War:  Historical Perspectives."
page ix.
3.   Hughes, Daniel J.  "Abuses of German Military History."
Military Review December 1986, page 67.
4.   Ibid., page 68.
5.   U.S Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and
Education Command.  FMFM 6-4, Marine Rifle Company/Platoon.
Quantico, 1978.  Page 101,  "Main Attack. --The main attack
contains the greatest concentration of combat power.  Its
purpose is to secure the decisive objective and destroy or
cause the destruction of the enemy force.  The main attack
is the commander's bid for victory.  The following are
primary characteristics of the main attack:  (1) Directed
against the decisive objective.  (2) Launched on a narrow
front.  (3) Allocated the preponderance of combat power and
fire support.  (4) Reserves positioned to exploit success."
6.   U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and
Education Command.  Marine Rifle Company and Platoon, FMFM
6-4. Quantico, 1978.
6.   U.S. Marine Corps.  Department of the Navy, Headquarters
United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.  FMFM 1,
Warfighting, 6 March 1989, page 35.
7.   Ibid, page 36.
8.   Lind, William S. letter to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps entitled "Visit to 1st Marine Division and MCAGCC, 29
Palms, November 13-21, 1989" dated December 4, 1989.
Underlined in original, page 8.
9.   German Tactical Doctrine, Special Series, No. 8, MID
461. Military Intelligence Service, War Department,
Washington, DC, December 20, 1942.  Page 30.
10.  Kesselring, Fieldmarshal Albert.  MS # P-060 b, Small
Unit Tactics, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of
Smaller Units.  Translated by the Historical Division
European Command, no date, page 27.
11.  Gordon IV, Major John.  Operation Crusader, Preview of
the Nonlinear Battlefield.  Military Review, February 1991,
pages 48-61.
12.  U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and
Education Command.  Marine Rifle Company and Platoon, FMFM
6-4. Quantico, 1978, page 121.
13.  Ibid, page 18.
14.  Lind, William S.  Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview
Special Studies in Military Affairs.  Boulder, Colorado,
1985, page 12.
15.  Military Intelligence Service.  Special Series No. 8,
MID 461, War Department, Washington, December 20, 1942,
pages 26-28.
16.  Lind, William S., in a variety of lectures between 1981
and the present.
17.  Stolfi, Dr. Russel H.S.,  German Battle Style in Ultra
Mobile, High Intensity War:  North African Desert 1941-42.
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18.  van Creveld, Martin.  Fighting Power, German Military
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19.  German Military Training; A study of German Military
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20.  Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview
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21.  Kelley, Major John F. and Smith, Captain Philip E.,
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Volume 75, Number 3, March 1991, page 68.
22.  Appendix 39, Conducting and Umpiring Field Problems, to
German Training Methods, A Study of German Military
Training, Produced at GMDS, by a combined British, Canadian
and U.S. Staff, dated May 1946, pages 260-265.
23.  Staff, MCEC, "German Training and Tactics: An Interview
With Col Pestke", Marine Corps Gazette, Volume 67, Number
10, October 1983, pages 60 and 61.
24.  van Creveld, Martin,  "Fighting Power, German Military
Performance, 1914-1945," Art of War Colloquium, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 1983, page 190.
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