International Terrorism: The Poor Man's Warfare AUTHOR Major Robert W. Cerney, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY International Terrorism : The Poor Man's Warfare Terrorism has no widely accepted Definition, and is normally dependent upon your point of view, as well as which side of the conflict you support. Western nations are reluctant to recognize terrorism in any way that could be construed as legitimate warfare. The United States is facing growing international terrorism, particularly from state and drug cartel sponsored terrorist groups. International terrorism is increasingly referred to as a form of warfare, placed at the low end of the spectrum of warfare known in the United States as Low Intensity Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict excludes many terrorists as lawful combatants, because their targeting practices are not in compliance with the law. Terrorism is often described as mindless, senseless, or irrational violence. However that is not the case, terrorism is objective oriented and normally well choreographed to obtain maximum media coverage. The strategic objectives of international terrorism are to: (1) Gain publicity and support for their cause, (2) Disrupt social, political, and economic interaction among western nations, (3) Force the polarization of society, (4) Punish non-compliant civilians and government agents, (5) Intimidate and harass authorities to force concessions, (6) Provoke government overreaction, (7) Eliminate instrumental targets, (8) Provide for organizational needs. The gross inability of the international community to agree on even the definition of terrorism is indicative of why terrorism is so successful. The United States is as much to blame as any nation with our continually oscillating policies of support depending on what benefits us the most. Terrorism is a form of successful warfare that is growing because it is achieving it's goals. We may disapprove of it, but terrorists can assemble plausible, if not logical arguments in defense of their actions. Why should they play by the systems rules, when those rules were established to support the system they are fighting. When the Law of War deprives them of exercising their right to fight for what they believe in, the only way they can, with any hope of survival till the eventual achievement of their goal, they will never abide to it. Terrorism will not conform to international standards, we must adapt to it. Recognizing terrorism as warfare is the first step, developing an ef fective doctrine to combat it is the second. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM : THE POOR MAN'S WARFARE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs to be recognized as such. I. History of Terrorism A. Greek / Roman B. French Revolution II. Definition of Terrorism A. Zona Rosa Analogy B. Vice President's Task Force Definition III. Criminality of Terrorism A. Inability of Law to Deal With Terrorism B. Domestic Record of Law C. Lack of International Judicial System D. Extradition and Political Exemption E. Asylum F. Closing the Loopholes IV. Growth of International Terrorism A. Casualties B. Targeting C. Access to Media D. Economical Warfare E. Distribution of Attacks V. Impact of International Terrorism A. A Matter of Perception B. Achievement of Psychological and Political Results C. Strategic Objectives D. Reasons For Success VI. Growing Threat of International Terrorism A. Spectrum of Warfare B. Objective Oriented International Terrorism: The Poor Man's Warfare Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs to be recognized as such. Terrorism has no widely accepted or precise definition and the word is often used disparagingly. Rebel forces do not refer to themselves as terrorists, yet many governments declare violent acts by their opponents as terrorism. The definition of terrorism appears to depend on your point of view and the particular side of the conflict you support. Recognizing terrorism as warfare does not legitimize the criminality of terrorist acts; it will provide the first step in realizing an effective policy to counter terrorism. Terrorism can be traced back to Greek and roman periods, and found to some extent in every period of man's history. Terrorism as we know it originated during the French revolution and the Jacobin reign of terror.1 During this void of enlightened reasoning terrorism became institutionalized and if not legalized, sanctioned by the revolutionary governments. Revolutionary fervor spread rampant throughout Europe, accompanied by the violence and terror methods so effective in social control and political repression. A universally accepted definition of terrorism simply does not exist. The problem of defining terrorism has effectively hampered the development of a comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy at both the national and international level.2 The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism called terrorism a phenomenon that is easier to describe than define."3 For example the 1985 "Zona Rosa Massacre", a machine gun killing of four U.S. Marines, two American Businessmen, five Salvadorans, a Guatemalan, and a Chilean at a San Salvador sidewalk cafe was labeled a "Terrorist Atrocity". A very similar 1985 shooting of underworld figures outside a social club on a crowded New York street was simply called murder. Newsweek reported that a tiny rebel faction of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party had taken responsibility for the Salvadoran attack and quoted the leaders as saying, "the Marines killed in the Zona Rosa were not innocent; no Yankee invader is free of guilt."4 If someone would have claimed responsibility and stated they were from a political party, would the New York killings have been reclassified as a terrorist act? Without getting bogged down in a search for a definition that could please everyone, the definition found in the 1986 public report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism will suffice. According to the report, terrorism is: The unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies. This implies that terrorism is a criminal act, yet the report recognizes that some experts see terrorism residing at the lower end of the warfare spectrum and consequently, referred to as war rather than criminal activity.5 The approach taken by the task force clearly views terrorist acts as unlawful and criminal, with no caveat to allow the term terrorism to be defined in any other manner than as a crime. If we assume that a terrorist act is criminal, then one method of dealing with the terrorist is with the law. Abraham D. Sofaer, a legal advisor to the Department of State stated that; Americans are particularly attracted to the law as a means of repressing violence, and are committed domestically and internationally to using law to control criminal conduct and to resolve disputes. They invoke the law almost instinctively, and repeatedly, assuming that it regulates international conduct and in particular provides a system for bringing terrorists to justice.6 However, he also points out that the law has had a poor record of dealing with international terrorism. Dealing with internal or domestic criminals, less than fifty percent of crimes committed are subsequently solved with the capture and prosecution of the perpetrator. Dealing with international terrorism is even more difficult with no international police force to be called upon and if by chance a terrorist is apprehended, there is no international law or judicial system to ensure prosecution. In this case, deterrence or elimination of terrorism becomes a long term goal for governments which can only be obtained through the proper formulation of international laws. The United States recently completed a new extradition treaty in 1986 with Great Britain in an attempt to achieve this goal by identifying specific crimes that can no longer be exempted on political grounds.7 Prior to the extradition treaty, the Political Offense Exemption did not allow the extradition of members of a political organization who committed murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, or other violent crimes in connection with struggles for self determination. The United States had refused to extradite rebels of foreign governments for more than one hundred forty years. Between 1979 and 1986, U.S. courts denied four British requests for the extradition of accused or convicted members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. All four involved violent terrorist crimes, one case involved Joseph Patrick Doherty, who blasted his way out of prison while awaiting a British Court's decision on charges including the murder of a British Army Officer. Great Britain requested his extradition from the U.S. on charges of murder, attempted murder, possession of firearms with intent to endanger life, and charges related to his escape. However, due to the "political conflict" existing at the time and finding that the offenses were committed "in the cause of and in furtherance of that struggle", the Judge declared Doherty's offenses as political and denied the extradition.8 In addition to refusing extradition, it has also been custom since the nineteenth century for the detaining nation to provide "Political Offenders" asylum. Terrorist groups have exploited asylum granting and political exemption to avoid extradition and prosecution not only in this country, but throughout the civilized world. Judges are not at fault, the law is the core problem, because it has not been properly updated to reflect modern social standards and technological advances. Terrorists are the least likely criminal to be caught and punished. If they are caught and not provided asylum many governments immediately deport them to another country that will grant asylum, because they are fearful of retaliation from other terrorist groups. Americans assume that others will agree that certain aspects of international terrorism are unacceptable. The blunt reality is that there are many fanatics, political, religious,and otherwise who approve of terror. More startling is that the acceptance of terrorism as an extension of politics is far more widespread than is usually recognized. These nations, in fact regard terrorism as a legitimate means of warfare. For these nations that accept terrorism as legitimate, they continually make their arguments in the United Nations that the terrorist is a soldier and therefore should be accorded treatment as a soldier under the Geneva and Hague conventions. Nations have and are continuing to close the political offense exemption loophole, primarily through regional and bilateral agreements. The twenty six member nations of the Council of Europe outlined violent crimes that could not be treated as political offenses in 1977. These offenses included crimes such as murder, kidnapping, hostage taking, and the use of explosives or firearms. Until a truly international agreement is reached concerning terrorism and the international enforcement net is established international terrorism will continue to grow. International terrorism is growing. From 1975 through 1985 more than six thousand two hundred terrorist acts were recorded world wide. These attacks left four thousand seven hundred dead and over nine thousand wounded. In 1985 alone, the number of terrorist attacks reached a record annual high of over eight hundred. This was a sixty percent increase over the level of terrorism for the previous two years. These eight hundred plus attacks resulted in two thousand two hundred twenty three causalities, of which twenty three of the dead were Americans. Since 1969, terrorists have killed or injured over one thousand Americans.9 Over the past fifteen years, terrorist attacks against U.S. officials and installations have averaged one every seventeen days. These attacks have resulted in the murder of as many U.S. diplomats as were killed by terrorists in the previous one hundred eighty years. Additionally, almost fifty percent of the international terrorist incidents have been directed at U.S. interests abroad. In the 1970's eighty percent of the attacks were directed against property and twenty percent against personnel. The current targeting trend is fifty/fifty. There are many reasons for this growth. Political unrest and social economic problems create conditions of turmoil in the world. The resultant frustration of these continuing problems is easily expressed through acts of terrorism. Additionally, frustrated splinter groups are realizing they can make their own mark through acts of violence. Advanced communications technology almost assures instant publicity for terrorist acts. International travel is much easier today and weapons are ever increasingly available to terrorists. Most of all, some governments see terrorist acts as a less costly way to strike a blow at their enemies. The most deadly groups continue to operate from the middle east. Attacks from this area account for roughly fifty percent of the total world wide terrorist incidents. The terrorist's main targets are the governments and citizens of Israel, United States, France, Italy, Great Britain, and the moderate Arab countries of Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Western Europe suffered two hundred of the over eight hundred world wide terrorist attacks in 1985. There are indications that terrorist groups such as the Italian Red Brigade, French Direct Action, German Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army are beginning to coordinate attacks throughout Europe.10 Social, economic, and political turmoil has prolonged patterns of terrorism in Latin America. Countries experiencing particularly high terrorist activity include El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, and Peru. A significant portion of this appears to be associated with the drug trade in order to obtain financial support. Since 1985 more terrorist attacks were directed at U.S. citizens in Latin America than any other area of the world. World wide distribution of terrorist attacks for 1985 were: Middle East 46.6% Western Europe 25.6% Latin America 16.3% Asia 5.7% Africa 5.1% North America .5% Eastern Europe .2% ,11 Is the impact of terrorism being overstated? From 1975 through 1985, a period of ten years, four thousand seven hundred people were killed by terrorist actions around the world.12 During the same period two hundred thousand people were murdered in the united states alone.13 This provides an important perspective, but we must remember that terrorism is largely a matter of perception. A few spectacular terrorist incidents may give the impression of a serious terrorist problem which is bearable within it's present limits.14 This does not mean that terrorism is tolerable or will not increase in the future. While casualty figures are numerically smaller than domestic crime, terrorist casualties have a symbolic impact and are politically significant. The real lasting effects of terrorism can not be measured in property damage or body count, but in the long term psychological impact and political results achieved.15 Terrorism has altered U.S. foreign policy, affected U.S. ability to implement policy, demonstrated U.S. difficulty to respond to terrorism and has compelled the U.S. to divert resources to protect facilities and personnel. Terrorist groups have the potential to force concessions normally unattainable through diplomatic means. Allowing terrorist groups to disrupt our decision making process, and erode confidence in the accomplishment of our initiatives will continue to seriously weaken our international credibility unless we can effectively deal with terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu is the former Israeli Deputy Ambassador to the United States and representative to the United Nations. He stated that the major damage from international terrorism is not personal or physical damage. Instead he maintained it is the "shaken confidence in Government", the questioning of it's "abilities and competence to insure a world subject to the rule of law. Terrorists have become increasingly successful and it appears their goals are expanding. The strategic objectives of international terrorism are to: 1. Gain publicity and support for their cause. 2. Disrupt social, political, and economic interaction among western nations. 3. Force the polarization of society by dividing the populace and fostering a breakdown of the status quo. 4. Punish non-compliant civilians and government agents in areas that terrorists control or influence. 5. Intimidate and harass authorities to force concessions. 6. Provoke government overreaction. 7. Eliminate instrumental targets. 8. Provide for their own organizational needs by forcing governments to free prisoners and pay ransoms.16 Terrorism has grown because it has been able to fulfill these objectives. Terrorists have achieved political gains from their activities. They have enjoyed crucial support from many states and believe they can spread fear in the general public of governments they perceive as hesitant to respond to their challenges. International terrorists are succeeding because: 1. There is no universal agreement within the international community about who is or is not a terrorist. 2. The media assures terrorists of an almost immediate and extensive world wide audience. 3. The world's tolerance and sympathy has often permitted terrorist organizations to employ religious symbols, terms, and ideas to support secular goals. 4. Some states tolerate, appease, and often glorify terrorists as heros. 5. Liberal democracies have often lost the resolve to deal with terrorists, despite the fact that they are aware of the threat. 6. A history of weak response has made terrorism a low risk venture.17 The threat of international terrorism is growing in impact. It captures world attention with violent and spectacular attacks, targeting U.S. foreign interests and the ability to execute international policy. The future challenges are increasing and the ability to respond internationally is not keeping pace. In the spectrum of warfare, terrorism is placed at the lower end of what the United States refers to as Low Intensity Conflict. It may occur at all levels of warfare and assigning it a specific level may by default grant a degree of legitimacy. Quotes and statements from numerous civilian, military and governmental leaders can be brought forward such as, Secretary of State George Shultz in a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 5 February 1986 stated, "Terrorism is a form of warfare waged by political forces --- including some foreign states."18 to further substantiate terrorism as a form of warfare. Terrorism is often described as mindless, senseless, or irrational violence, but if that was the case it would not continue to affect national and international policies. Terrorism is not an end unto itself, it is the means to an end, the achievement of an objective. Terrorism is violence against the "system", waged outside the "system" , and therefore the rules of the "system" do not always apply. Most other forms of warfare, at least in theory, recognize several categories of non- combatants and do not target them. Terrorists recognize far fewer non-combatants and apply little effort to limit subsidiary damage. Terrorists may regard a person as an enemy, a combatant and therefore a target, solely on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. This is not to say that people we call terrorists are always indiscriminate killers, or that groups we call armies are scrupulously discriminating; it does compel us to recognize that soldiers may sometimes be terrorists. As you have read terrorism can be documented as a form of successful warfare that is growing. We may disapprove of it, but terrorists can assemble plausible, if not logical arguments in defense of their actions. Why should they play by the systems rules, when those rules were established to support the system they are fighting. When the Law of War deprives them of exercising their right to fight for what they believe in, the only way they can, with any hope of survival till the eventual achievement of their goal, they will never abide to it. Terrorism will not conform to international standards, we must adapt to it. Recognizing terrorism as warfare is the first step, developing an effective doctrine to combat it is the second. END NOTES 1. Walter Laquer, "The Anatomy of Terrorism," in Ten Years of Terrorism : Collected Views, et al, Jennifer Shaw, 8 2. Anthony C. E. Quainton, "Moral and Ethical Considerations in Defining a Counter-terrorist Policy," in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, ed., The Rationalization of Terrorism (1982) : 40 3. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1 4. Martha F. Brady, "The Zona Rosa Massacre," Marine Corps Gazette (March 1991) : 39 5. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1 6. Abraham G. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986) : 901 7. Christopher H. Pyle, "Defining Terrorism," Foreign Policy (Fall 1986) : 63 8. Edward H. Houle, Maj. USAF, "The Use of Force to Counter International Terrorism - A Diplomacy Dilemma," Defense Technical Information Center Report (November 1987) : 61 9. Casper Weinberger, "Framing an Appropriate Response to Terrorism," R.O.A. National Security Report (August 1986) : 8 U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism - Selected Document Number 24 (1986) : 2 10. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1 11. Ibid 12. Casper Weinberger, "Framing an Appropriate Response to Terrorism," R.O.A. National Security Report (August 1986) : 8; U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism - Selected Document Number 24 (1986) : 2 13. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism : The Other World War (1985) : 20 14. Brian Jenkins, "Terrorism - Prone Countries and Conditions," in Ariel Merari, ed, On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism : Proceedings of an International Seminar Tel-Aviv. 1979 (1985) : 28 15. George Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation : Building a Governmental Consensus on Terrorism," SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 1987) : 7 16. William Waugh, International Terrorism - How Nations Respond to Terrorists (1982) : 130 17. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State Sponsored Covert Warfare (1986) : 9-10 18. U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin (April 1986) : 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Brady, Martha F., "The Zona Rosa Massacre," Marine Corps Gazette (March) 2. Brusitus, J.M., LtCol USA, "Terrorism : Crime or War?" Defense Technical Information Center Report (June 1987) 3. Bush, George, "Prelude to Retaliation : Building a Governmental Consensus on Terrorism," SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 1987) 4. Cline, Ray S. and Alexander, Yonah, Terrorism as a State Sponsored Covert Warfare (1986) 5. Elson, Stephen J., "Terrorism : Some Answers to Some Difficult Problems," Defense Technical Information Center Report (March 1982) 6. Houle, Edward H., Maj. USAF, "The Use of Force to Counter International Terrorism - A Diplomacy Dilemma," Defense Technical Information Center Report (November 1987) 7. Humphries, John G., Maj. USAF, "International Terrorism as a Lawful Form of Warfare : an Idea Whose Time Should Not Arrive," Defense Technical Information Center Report (April 1986) 8. Jenkins, Brian M., "International Terrorism : A New Kind Of Warfare," Rand Corporation Paper (June 1974) 9. Jenkins, Brian M., "International Terrorism : The Other World War," Rand Corporation Paper (1985) 10. Jenkins, Brian M., "Terrorism - Prone Countries And Conditions," in Ariel Merari, ed, On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism : Proceedings of an International Seminar, Tel-Aviv 1979 (1985) 11. Laquer, Walter, "The Anatomy of Terrorism," in Ten Years Of Terrorism : Collected Views , et al, Jennifer Shaw (1979) 12. Pyle, Christopher H., "Defining Terrorism," Foreign Policy (Fall 1986) 13. Public Report of The Vice President's Task Force On Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) 14. Quainton, Anthony C.E., "Moral and Ethical Considerations in Defining a Counter-terrorist Policy," in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, ed., The Rationalization of Terrorism (1982) 15. Sloan, Stephen, "Beating International Terrorism" (December 1986) 16. Sofaer, Abraham G. ,"Terrorism And The Law," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986) 17. U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin (April 1986) 18. Waugh, William, "International Terrorism - How Nations Respond To Terrorists" (1982) 19. Weinberger, Casper, "Framing An Appropriate Response to Terrorism," R.0.A. National Security Report Aug 1986, U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism - Selected Document Number 24 (1986)
