Mobile Mortars: Fire Support For Every Intensity Conflict AUTHOR Major Patrick D. Connally, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MOBILE MORTARS: FIRE SUPPORT FOR EVERY INTENSITY CONFLICT I. Purpose: To point out the need for a Mobile Protected Mortar System (MPMS) to supplement existing indirect fire system; and show that the mortar variant of the light armored vehicle LAV/M, when upgraded with the 120mm mortar will best serve this purpose. II. Problem: Considering the proliferation of advanced weapon systems in the world today, the organic indirect fire support available to the Marine infantry battalion is simply not flexible enough, responsive enough or lethal enough to influence modern battle decisively. III. Data: The traditional role of mortars has been to provide close and continuous fire support for maneuver forces. The 81mm mortar, presently in service at the Marine infantry battalion is simply not enough organic indirect fire support for today's contingencies. Lessons learned through the years validate the need to have both organic mortars and direct support artillery. There is an unquestionable need to have an optimum blend of howitzers and mortars. However when budgetary concerns necessitate trade-offs, we must avoid cutting into the muscle of the infantryman's indirect fire support capabilities. Since hostile counterfires remain the single greatest threat to our indirect fire systems, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons the world over are cause for concern. To maintain a counterbalance we must have systems with the very best in tactical, operational and strategic mobility. The LAV/M, a mortar variant of the light armored vehicle, already in service, has these qualities. When equipped with the 120mm mortar and a number of other state-of-the-art upgrades, the LAV/M essentially becomes a Mobile Protected Mortar System MPMS. Maneuver tactics require that we deploy highly mobile and protected indirect fire weapons well forward. Whether to exploit successes on a fast moving and fluid battlefield, or to move rapidly inland during over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious operations, the MPMS would be the most versatile indirect fire weapon in our inventory. IV. Conclusions: The time has come for the infantry regimental commander to have a reliable, responsive and lethal means of indirect fire support dedicated to him in battle. The tactical and logistical advantages of fielding an MPMS are apparent. The major disadvantages exist in the development of doctrine for employment and in the dollar costs associated with its acquisition and fielding. V. Recommendations: The MPMS should be organic to the artillery regiment for training and logistics reasons. When employed in war MPMS units should be dedicated to the infantry regiment. With its superior tactical, operational and strategic mobility, the MPMS can provide fire support for every intensity conflict. MOBILE MORTARS: FIRE SUPPORT FOR EVERY INTENSITY CONFLICT OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Considering the proliferation of advanced weapon systems in the world today, the organic indirect fire support available to the Marine infantry battalion is simply not flexible enough, responsive enough or lethal enough to influence modern battle decisively. I. Historical Perspective A. Mission and Organization B. Employment Past and Present 1. Offensive employment 2. Defensive employment II. Considerations on the Modern Battlefield A. Combat Considerations 1. High and Low Intensity Conflict 2. Counterbattery Fires 3. Weapons Proliferation 4. NBC Environment B. Maneuver Warfare 1. Fluid Battle 2. Mobility 3. Depth of Target Area C. Special Scenarios 1. Low Intensity Conflict 2. Amphibious Operations 3. SOC/MEU D. Technical and Logistical Considerations E. Developments 1. 120mm Mortar Variant 2. Gunnery, Navigation and Fire Control F. Organization and Employment 1. MPMS Battalion a Part of the Artillery T/O 2. MPMS Battery the Dedicated Battery MOBILE MORTARS: FIRE SUPPORT FOR EVERY INTENSITY CONFLICT Historically, mortars have been considered the infantry battalion commander's "hip pocket artillery." Usually ground mounted and organic to the infantry unit, mortars are only as mobile as their infantry operators. Considering the proliferation of advanced weapons systems the world over, the organic indirect fire support available to the Marine infantry battalion is simply not flexible enough, responsive enough or lethal enough to influence modern battle decisively. The mortar variant of the light armored vehicle LAV/M, offers tremendous potential in the areas of tactital, operational and strategic mobility on the battlefield of the future. However, the tactics and employment of this exceptionally versatile weapon system must be well thought out. In this article I will examine critical thought from the past in order to evaluate the need for mobile mortars. Additionally, a glimpse at modern warfare will help draw conclusions about the organization and employment of a Mobile Protected Mortar System (MPMS). Historical Perspective The traditional mission of mortars has been to provide immediately responsive indirect fire support for maneuver forces. Organic to the Marine infantry battalion, the mortar platoon organization includes eight (8) 81mm mortars, and is normally employed in two sections of four (4) tubes each. In offensive operations mortars have always played an invaluable part in supporting the infantry scheme of maneuver. By providing immediate suppressive fires which augment the maneuver commander's fire support plan, mortars have become known as "hip pocket artillery." An all-weather source of fire support, mortars lend themselves to the attack of known, likely and suspected enemy targets to the front and flanks of maneuver elements. Mortars are certainly one of the most rapid means of delivering illumination and obscuration fires during daylight or at night. In defensive operations mortars have always been the weapon of choice to attack targets at ranges between that of the direct support artillery and the direct fire weapons organic to the infantry battalion. The high-angle of fire and rapid rate of fire of mortars, as compared with most artillery systems, makes mortars ideal for breaking up, disorganizing or channelizing dismounted infantry elements during an attack. As longer range, precision guided munitions are developed, the value of mortars against enemy armored systems will become more apparent. Over the past sixty years, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have experimented with a variety of mortars and their mobility variants. Included are the U. S. Army's 107mm mortar, 4.2 inch mortar and the Marine Corps' 107mm howitzer-mortar (HOWTAR). Originally the Army's 107mm mortar was intended for use as a chemical weapons delivery system and was eventually incorporated into the infantry battalion for the direct support mission.1 As speed and mobility became more pressing issues with regard to the tempo of modern battle, mortars were tested on a variety of tracked and wheeled carriages. Not only was there a need for mobility of the weapon system, but the need to move ready-service ammunition was great. During the 1960's the Marine Corps reconfigured their artillery battalions with fewer 155mm howitzers and created a 4.2 inch mortar battalion in the place of a 105mm howitzer battalion. There was an unquestionable need for heavy mortars at the infantry battalion, but the shortage of direct support (DS) artillery became apparent as the 4.2 inch mortars were regularly attached to the infantry battalions. The Marine Corps soon realized that 4.2 inch mortars were not accurate enough or of sufficient range capability to mass fires at distances necessary to effectively support the maneuver regiment. Ultimately the artillery's counterfire capability had been dangerously degraded when the artillery regiments were configured with mortars in the place of howitzers. The Marine Corps continued to search for a lethal, responsive and mobile method of indirect fire support for the infantry battalion, and one that would not degrade the capabilities of the artillery regiment. To this end the 107mm HOWTAR, combination howitzer and mortar, was tested and found superior overall to the 4.2 inch mortar as an organic infantry weapon. At the same time the HOWTAR was determined to be inferior to the 105mm howitzer as a direct support artillery weapon.2 With the improvements in the 81mm mortar and the demonstrated versatility of the 105mm howitzer, the HOWTAR never lasted as an alternative for a heavy mortar weapon system. Hence, during the period 1960-1970, the Marine Corps learned many important lessons regarding the employment of mortars and direct support artillery. Most importantly however, the need to have a medium-heavy mortar organic to the infantry battalion and a howitzer-heavy artillery regiment were points which were reinforced. Mortars simply could not replace the artillery's capability to mass fires at longer ranges. Through the years the 81mm mortar has continued as the organic indirect fire support weapon of the infantry battalion. More recently the infantry battalion has been augmented by the 60mm mortar at the company level also. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has always been constrained by a strict budget and has never achieved the optimum blend of heavy mortars and artillery. It is essential to have both systems, and the Marine Corps should make a commitment to field the very best of each. Considerations on the Modern Battlefield Since hostile counterfires remain the single greatest threat to our indirect fire systems on the battlefield, there needs to be an on-going effort to improve the mobility, responsiveness and lethality of these systems. Many allied and threat nations have already fielded variants of the 120mm mortar attesting to the greater versatility of a heavier mortar system. The Soviets have equipped their airborne units with a tracked, lightly armored personnel carrier (BMD) with a combination gun. The gun reportedly has direct fire capability out to one kilometer and fires a conventional 120mm round. The proliferation of Soviet manufactured weapons around the globe, a large percentage being indirect fire systems, emphasizes the importance of keeping our own similar systems in service. Also we must keep moving forward in the design and employment of weapons capable of surviving on the modern battlefield. Even though enemy artillery fire during this most recent conflict in Southwest Asia was inaccurate, and less intense than anticipated, doesn't mean that it will be that way in the next war. The potential for mass destruction of friendly forces by enemy artillery fire was clear and present. However, even without having to cope with the degree of terror and disruption wrought by weapons in the hands of better trained foes, there was apparently not enough Marine artillery to go around. The 81mm mortar obviously lacked the range, mobility, accuracy and lethality that was needed by forward infantry units. Artillery counterbattery fires and preparation fires were regularly interrupted by calls for fire that a heavier, longer range, and mobile mounted mortar might have satisfied.3 Thank goodness the enemy's counterfire capability malfunctioned this time. Although there has never been a single weapon system that completely satisfied contingencies in every clime and place, the LAV/M, literally a Mobile Protected Mortar System (MPMS), could very likely approach that lofty standard. When equipped with an NBC overpressure system, state-of-the-art fire control equipment, and "smart" munitions, the MPMS would be an excellent way to satisfy the indirect fire support needs of a maneuver regiment. During amphibious operations, including over-the-horizon (OTH) operations; deep vertical assaults and raids; or in sustained land actions anywhere, the MPMS would be a viable and survivable supporting arm. Particularly during those times that the artillery is constrained or vulnerable, the MPMS could be employed well forward to buy time or confuse the enemy about the point of main effort. Such employment options for the MPMS might include security force operations (screening,covering,guarding) and raiding or delaying tactics especially when the threat of NBC warfare exists. In Southwest Asia artillery units conducted pre-emptive raids on counterfire targets by moving closer to enemy emplacements, then rapidly displacing to safer locations following their attacks. Although the use of roving howitzers and artillery raids are viable concepts, one must remember that the sound, flash and counterfire surveillance systems of the Iraqis' were generally ineffective. The dismal show of Iraqi counterfire was the best evidence of this point.4 Artillery is a very precious asset, and in future wars we may not be able to afford any piece-mealing of our artillery support on raids that will be rapidly addressed by massive amounts of enemy counterfire. The MPMS would reduce the need to hazard the slower firing, less mobile and generally more vulnerable howitzers. The MPMS would also have the speed, range, rate of fire and selection of munitions which makes it the best candidate for on-call fire missions in support of the infantry scheme of maneuver. An infantryman must never have to wait very long for indirect fire support, especially when in contact with the enemy. However, when artillery must be pulled from counterfire missions and programs of targets to engage targets of opportunity three things occur: 1) fire support is slowed, 2) artillery positions may be unnecessarily revealed to the enemy and 3) some artillery units may have to move to avoid counterfire which reduces the availability of fire support for a time. Our howitzers must be guarded for action at the critical time and place against the most lucrative targets on the battlefield. The indiscriminate firing of artillery undoubtedly impacts on the time and space factors in battle, and in maneuver warfare time is of the essence. At the risk of over simplifying maneuver warfare doctrine, suffice to say that success in battle depends on the rapid and violent exploitation of weak points or gaps in the enemy's battle formations using combined arms action and aggressive maneuver. Showcased in this doctrine is the fluid nature of battle and the importance of time, space and tempo in war. These same time and space factors place the greatest demands on indirect fire agencies. In order to exploit our successes as suggested in maneuver warfare doctrine, it is imperative that highly mobile and protected indirect fire systems are deployed well forward on the battlefield. Additionally, these systems must be able to accurately deliver both "smart" and conventional munitions at high sustained rates of fire to augment field artillery support. This point was also validated in Southwest Asia as Marines stormed through gaps in the Iraqi defensive lines and rapidly moved forward. The Marines soon out-ran the preponderance of their own artillery support.5 The fast moving tempo of the operation drastically compressed the time required to deliver fires. Forward units faced a target-rich and deeper battle area than could be adequately ranged by the majority of our mortars and artillery. If we would have had an MPMS, these gaps in time, space and tempo would have been filled until the artillery units were emplaced forward. Special Scenarios Warfare on the scale of that which Marines participated in Southwest Asia is something that we must certainly be prepared to contend with in the future. However, in the near term, more than likely, the talents of the Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Units (SOC/MEU) will be needed in a variety of special scenarios. Example scenarios include low intensity conflicts (LIC) in areas adjacent to critical sea lines of communica t ion (SLOC), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) in urban terrain and counternarcotics or counterguerrilla operations in the mountains and jungles of the world. In most special scenarios there is not much of a need for the heavier and longer range howitzers or multiple launched rocket systems. The greater need is for a highly capable mortar system. The MPMS would be more than adequate for the indirect fire support requirements of a SOC/MEU. For any higher intensity conflict, Maritime Prepositioned Shipping (MPS) would undoubtedly "upgun" the force as was demonstrated in Southwest Asia. Deploying MEU's would do well to leave their howitzers in the continental U.S. where they can continue to train for the high intensity conflict (HIC) with the artillery regiment. Instead the MEU's should deploy with a battery of MPMS's which are much more versatile and supportable on deployments of this nature. In support of the aforementioned position a brief comparison is helpful for clarification. The MPMS is its own prime mover, it takes less than half the shipboard space and weighs less than the current howitzer and prime mover. Unlike towed howitzers today, the MPMS brandishes a high rate of fire and mobility upon delivery in the operating area. Too often howitzers are left in place without a prime mover for long periods of time following helicopterborne insertions. Again a lesson relearned in Operation Desert Storm, the howitzer's massive ammunition load only complicates mobility.6 The tactical, operational and strategic mobility of the LAV in most circumstances is far superior to the tracked and wheeled vehicles in the U.S. inventory. Mobility is the critical ingredient in maintaining the tempo of the conflict. "Tempo is a significant weapon because it is through faster tempo that we seize the initiative and dictate the terms of war."7 As a derivative of the LAV, the MPMS would certainly be able to keep up with the tactical and operational tempo of the conflict. The MPMS is tailor-made for helicopterborne operations, deep vertical assaults, raids and OTH amphibious operations. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) are each capable of delivering four (4) battle- ready MPMS's along multiple axes during surface assaults. With its enhanced mobility, 400 mile cruising range and ability to negotiate inland water obstacles, an MPMS is capable of moving rapidly inland from widely dispersed points of entry. This clearly helps avoid the unnecessary build-up and delays commonly experienced by towed howitzers at landing beaches. Furthermore, the strategic mobility of the MPMS would provide for a rapid build-up of combat power in any theater of war as follows. The C-5A can carry eight(8) MPMS's, the C-17A six (6) MPMS's and the C-141 two (2) MPMS's. The LAV/MPMS's relative freedom from the complex logistics normally required to repair and maintain combat vehicles makes it particularly well suited for rapid deployment forces also.8 The reliability of this vehicle stated in mean miles between mission failures (MMBMF), is unparalleled. To strike a contrast, Tank- Automotive Command (TACOM) reported that the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle averages 580 MMBMF, meaning it can run for an average of 580 miles before it is likely to suffer a mechanical breakdown that will put it out of service. The LAV/MPMS demonstrated an astonishing 5,739 MMBMF in Marine Corps testing, and further testing by GM of Canada showed 6760 MMBMF. The LAV/MPMS also requires only 0.17 hours of maintenance per hour of operation which is less than half the maintenance time needed for the Army's new M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC). Capabilities and Developments The LAV/M presently under development is a turreted, recoil mounted, 120mm mortar with a breech load capability. The 81mm mortar variant is now in service in the Fleet Marine Force. According to TACOM, the LAV's only real weakness may be its relatively weak armor. Although the details are still classified, the LAV's armor is all-steel and sufficient to withstand 7.62mm AP (armored-piercing) projectiles in the front and 7.62mm standard projectiles elsewhere on the vehicle. Direct hits from anti-tank weapons and artillery are quite obviously a concern, but the LAV's ability to avoid being hit through concealment, speed, firepower and maneuverability is documented. The 1984 test crews from 1st LAV Battalion discovered that 70% of the time the LAV emerged from combat simulations completely unscathed.9 The LAV/M fully combat ready weighs 28,200 pounds. If it is equipped with the 50 caliber machine gun instead of the 7.62mm, then the weight increase is approximately 150 pounds. The weight allocations for the LAV/M are as follows: Hull 21470 Turret 3625 Crew 1215 Ammunition 1890 120mm 60rds 7.62mm 1000rds 50cal 600rds L8A1 Smoke Grd Depression of the barrel from -7 to +85 degree allows the weapon system to address direct fire targets such as bunkers, urban structures, and other targets of opportunity. An ammunition family has not been determined, but all previous experimentation and testing has been accomplished using the Israeli K6 120mm family of ammunition. TACOM's suggested approach is to develop an ammunition family for the LAV/M 120mm, but make it acceptable for ground mounted systems also. The family of munitions under consideration includes high explosive (HE), smoke and illumination shells. However the application of special purpose rounds, such as an anti-tank round and precisely guided munitions, will be assessed as they are developed. Recently, British Aerospace Dynamics Division, in cooperation with Thomas Brandt Armements of France, have conducted guided firings of 81mm anti-armor mortar munitions called MERLIN. When fielded, MERLIN will enable forward deployed infantry elements to engage enemy armored vehicles at two or three times the distance of direct fire anti-tank weapons. The 120mm guided mortar round being developed will be even more capable. This round will have a range of 8000 meters and a warhead capable of defeating main battle tanks fitted with reactive armor.10 Moreover, the LAV/M's maximum firing rate with its turreted and breech-loaded mortar would be 20 to 25 rounds per minute using an auto-rammer and a slidifly wedge breechblock. If an automatic feeding system was ever made feasible, then a 40 rounds per minute rate of fire should be achievable.11 The crew of five (5) includes the commander, gunner, loader, ammunition handler and driver. As this design becomes more sophisticated, a reduction in crew strength by one member is projected. Fire Control and Navigation From 1988 to 1989 the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) evaluated alternative methods to improve fire control and navigation for the LAV/M. The Marine Corps desires greater efficiency in both fire control and navigation to compensate for the increased speed and variability of the modern battlefield and anticipated constraints on manpower and training. To improve the capability of the LAV/M to perform its fire support mission in a more timely manner, three pieces of equipment were incorporated into the mortar fire direction and laying system: 1) the North Finding Module (NFM), 2) the M1A1 Collimator and 3) a magnetic compensating compass. These three items allow the LAV/M to become a nearly self-supporting weapon system independent of normal mortar procedures for emplacement. This fire direction and laying system is compatible with any mortar or artillery system that a vehicle might be equipped with.12 The first part of the system, the NFM, is a pendulous gyrocompass and can give azimuth information to align the mortar on an azimuth to an accuracy of two (2) artillery mils. This means that the mortar can be laid for direction within three (3) minutes without the use of an M2 aiming circle. The NFM can also determine an azimuth with respect to grid north or true north. The second part of the system, the M1A1 collimator is an infinity aiming reference device used by the artillery to simulate an azimuth reference at an infinite distance. The collimator provides the most accurate reference for laying and firing indirect fire weapons. In the past the collimator was usually ground mounted, but a vehicular mount has been devised. With this capability the crew no longer needs to place out aiming reference stakes and can place the weapon in action without dismounting the vehicle. The magnetic compensating compass forms the third part of the laying system. With this device mounted in the driver's compartment, nearly all of the magnetic signature of the vehicle can be canceled allowing the driver to align the vehicle very close to the initial direction of fire. These upgrades on the LAV/M allow the mortar or any indirect fire system to be self-contained systems without any need for the crew to dismount the vehicle during emplacement or firing. In brief, the laying process is speeded, the crew is protected and accuracy of the mortar is enhanced. With the possible addition of a position determining system the LAV/M is well on its way to becoming the MPMS that we need. At present the Tandy PC-6 hand-held computer is being used to experiment with gunnery data associated with the 120mm LAV/M. The NSWC has proposed to continue to develop the 120mm software on the PC-6, then at a later date upgrade the software to a militarized computer with full screen capability. Full screen capability will interface the entire gambit of firing table data (ie. angle of sight, MET+VE corrections, fuze settings etc.), mortar and howitzer capabilities, multiple guns, multiple targets, multiple forward observers, automatic safety checks, survey and more. The 120mm mortar ammunition firing data already exists in computer form for use on the PC-6 or proposed militarized fire direction center (FDC) computer. A proposed FDC computer, fully militarized, is expected to be capable of digital radio communications and linked to an onboard vehicle navigation/position determining unit.13 The impact of these upgrades on accuracy, responsiveness and survivability of this versatile system is significant. Organization and Employment The infantry battalion is presently equipped with the 81mm mortar in a ground-mounted configuration. If there must be trade-offs to enhance chances of fielding the MPMS then let them come from someplace other than the field artillery regiment. If that proposal is rejected, then we should configure our direct support artillery battalions with four (4) firing batteries of six (6) howitzers each instead of the eight(8) howitzer batteries now in service. This arrangement would also streamline operations and logistics connected with the artillery battalion making it better suited for faster moving scenarios. Certainly the potential maintenance and logistics requirements of the MPMS need to be considered in decisions about organization and tactical employment. Most importantly, the infantry battalion must always have some form of indirect fire support immediately responsive to its needs. The MPMS is the weapon of choice. If the 81mm mortar platoon became a victim to trade-offs or budget restrictions then the MPMS would more than fill the void. Hopefully the Marine Corps would strive to keep as many indirect fire systems in service as possible and take cuts and make trade-offs elsewhere. However, to make the MPMS organic to the infantry organization presents a variety of training and logistics ptoblems. Instead the MPMS should be made organic to the direct support artillery regiment, but when it is tactically employed it would be dedicated to the infantry regiment. Under the aforementioned proposal there would be one MPMS battalion in each artillery regiment. The MPMS battalion would have three (3) MPMS batteries, and each MPMS battery would have four mobile mortars and one command vehicle. The MPMS batteries would be manned and commanded by artillerymen, and the artillery regiment would be responsible for the maintenance and logistics details associated with the system. This arrangement makes sense since the artillery regiment is maintenance and logistics intensive and structured to meet such requirements. Training of MPMS units would also benefit by close association with, and supervision by, the artillery regiment. Employing the MPMS battery in a dedicated role has several marked advantages. Furthermore, if the direct support artillery organization continues to match one artillery battery for each infantry battalion, then the advantages become more pronounced. First, the MPMS battery would be unquestionably more responsive than howitzers are to calls for fire on targets of opportunity. Artillery batteries would also be more flexible and responsive to the "bigger" and longer range missions for which they are better suited. Next there would not be a need to have teams of forward observers (FO) for both the MPMS battery and the DS artillery battery. Calls for fire from the FO would simply be monitored by the DS artillery FDC, as they are now, and the artillery would remain prepared to engage the most lucrative targets in mass. Most importantly, the infantry regimental commander would have a formidable indirect fire asset dedicated to him to supplement his artillery support. In this way he would be able to weight his main effort on the battlefield as he saw fit without degrading his artillery support. Finally, our deploying SOC/MEU's would have the most responsive fire support available today. Conclusion History shows that there is a need to have close continuous fire support for maneuvering infantry. The 81mm mortar is simply not enough organic indirect fire support for today's contingencies, and the field artillery is not responsive enough to make the difference in most scenarios. There is an unquestionable need to have an optimum blend of howitzers and mortars. However, when budgetary concerns necessitate trade-offs we must avoid cutting into the muscle of the infantryman's indirect fire support. The proliferation of sophisticated indirect fire systems the world over suggests that we must maintain a counter-balance in weapons technology and in the tactical, operational and strategic employment of those systems. The Marine Corps needs a versatile and highly mobile means of indirect fire support for its maneuvering regiments especially when the artillery is constrained or vulnerable. LAV/M a mortar variant of the light armored vehicle has already been fielded. This system is a step in the right direction because it is highly mobile and has been equipped with an 81mm mortar. When equipped with 120mm mortar and a number of other state-of-the-art upgrades, the LAV/M is essentially the Mobile Protected Mortar System (MPMS) that will best meet the challenges of the future. The time has come for the infantry regimental commander to have a reliable, responsive and lethal means of indirect fire support dedicated to him in battle. With its superior tactical, operational and strategic mobility, the MPMS can provide fire support for every intensity conflict. FOOTNOTES 1 Kler, Timothy. "LAV/120mm Turreted Howitzer/Mortar." Tank- Automotive Command; Warren, Mich. 1991 (Mimmeographed). 2 Commanding Officer, 11th Marines Transmittal. " Infantry Heavy Mortars and Direct Support Artillery." 11th Marines, FMF Organization Test Program Phase I Unit Field Tests, Camp Pendleton, Ca. Dec. 1960. (Monograph 1960). 3 Interview with Captain Thomas J. Connally, S-3A, 11th Mar, 1st Mar Div., March 15, 1991. 4 Humble, LtCol, G-3, 1st Mar Div. "1st Marine Division Operations in Southwest Asia." Quantico, Va. MCCDC, 1991. (Lecture presented at the Command and Staff College, MCCDC). 5 Ibid. Humble. 6 Mazzara, Andrew F. LtCol USMC, "Artillery in the Desert 1991 Report #1," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1991, pp.53-55. 7 U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine, "Campaign Demands Strategic Aims," Marines, 20 Jan. 1991, pp.22-25. 8 Segal, David "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1991, pp,39-40. 9 Ibid. 10 Foss, Chris F. "Merlin Development Still on Line." Jane's Defence Weekly, (26 Nov. 1988), 1349. 11 Ibid. Kler. 12 Bambi, Robert, "LAV 8lmm/120mm Fire Control & Fire Direction Point Paper." (Unpublished Paper of the Naval Surface Warfare Center), Sept. 1989. l3 Lorenzo, John M. Jr. "Mortar FDC Software and Computer Point Paper." (Unpublished Paper of the Naval Surface Warfare Center), Sept. 1989. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Bambi, Robert. "LAV 81mm/120mm Fire Control & Fire Direction Point Paper." (Unpublished Paper of the Naval Surface Warfare Center.), Sept. 1989. Commanding Officer, 11th Marines Transmittal. "Infantry Heavy Mortar and Direct Support Artillery." 11th Marines, FMF organization Test Program Phase I Unit Field Tests, Camp Pendleton, Ca., Dec. 1960. (Monograph 1960). Foss, Chris F. "Merlin Development Still on Line." Jane's Defence Weekly, (26 Nov 1988), 1349. Humble, LtCol., G-3 1st Marine Division. "1st Marine Division Operations in Southwest Asia." Quantico, Va.,1991. (Lecture to Command and Staff College, MCCDC). Interview with Captain Thomas J. Connally USMC, S-3A, 11th Mar, 1st Mar Div., March 15, 1991. Kler, Timothy. "LAV/120mm Turreted Howitzer/Mortar." Tank Automotive Command; Warren Mich.,1991. (Mimeographed). Lorenzo, John M. Jr. "Mortar FDC Software and Computer Point Paper." (Unpublished Paper of the Naval Surface Warfare Center. ), Sept.1989. Mazzara, Andrew F. LtCol USMC. "Artillery in the Desert 1991 Report #1." Marine Corps Gazette, April 1991, pp. 53-55. Rozman, Thomas R. LtCol USA. "Organic Indirect Fire in the Heavy Maneuver Force." Infantry. (March-April 1990), 18-20. Segal, David. "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment?" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1991, pp.39,40. Thomas, Jim. "Mortar Ammunition, M374 (series) and M821 (series) Equivalence," P.M. Mortars, Picatinny Arsenal, Sept. 1989. (Report to MCRDAC,MCCDC, Quantico, Va.). U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine, "Campaign Demands Strategic Aims." Marines, 20 Jan. 1991, pp. 22-25.
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