Two Paths For MLR AUTHOR Major Louis J. Cipriani, Jr., USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Logistics EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TWO PATHS FOR MLR I. Theme: Current Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issues remain unresolved due largely to political maneuvering and funding disputes. Shortages in Marine Corps helicopter assets are likely if serious decisions are not made soon. II. Thesis: In resolving MLR issues, it is extremely important that DOD focus on the capabilities of the Marine Corps on the future battlefield of the 21st century vice nearsighted budget debates. III. Discussion: Key decisions during the struggle from infancy to Secretary of Defense Cheney's decision to cancel the V-22 program have always centered around budget disputes. Congress's response to cancellation was to appropriate APN/RDT&E and FSD funding for six aircraft. The Bell-Boeing team initiated numerous survivability studies to counter Secretary Cheney's preferred option of more CH-53Es/H-60s. In 1989, the Marine Corps started its search for a suitable helicopter replacement for MLR. This search has lead to the CH-46X program developed to fulfill medium lift shortfall of the Marine Corps. IV. Summary: Unresolved differences between Congress and DOD over the V-22/MLR program prevents the Marine Corps from executing either, and only serves to delay and increase costs associated with each program. V. Conclusion: There are no guarantees for any military procurement program that is so deeply dependent on political maneuvering and funding during today's budget crisis. It is hoped that the V-22 testing will provide positive results to convince the key members of DOD and Congress of the worth and desirability of the Osprey. TWO PATHS FOR MLR OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: In resolving MLR issues, it is extremely important that DOD focus on the capabilities of the Marine Corps on the future battlefield of the 21st century vice nearsighted budget debates. I. MLR DEVELOPMENT A. Key Decisions B. Joint Service Operational Requirement C. Funding II. V-22 PROGRAM A. Capabilities B. Mission Potential C. Cancellation III. NEW SEARCH FOR AN MLR A. Marine Corps SLEP Alternative B. New Funding Issue C. Current Program Status TWO PATHS FOR MLR Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) is the aviation program which will provide the replacement for the Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter scheduled later this decade. The final decision to procure a tiltrotor aircraft or an improved version of a reliable helicopter still needs to be made by the Department of Defense with funding being provided by the United States Congress. This decision, influenced by budgetary concerns and capability requirements, will be critical in shaping the doctrine of the United States Marine Corps in the early decades of the next century. The MLR program is a controver- sial and politically sensitive issue within the Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Marine Corps, and the Office of Management and Budget. This three letter acronym means very little to the average Marine. However, to the Marine Corps doctrine writers and more importantly to future Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), it is extremely important that the Department of Defense focuses on the capabilities of the Marine Corps for the future battlefield of the 21st century, and not on nearsighted budget debates. Early in 1980, the Marine Corps in cooperation with the other military services began searching for an aircraft that would update an aging fleet of helicopters and enhance modern battlefield survivability. Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Flanagan noted: Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. was instrumental in arguing for the tiltrotor concept. Dr. DeLauer in a memorandum from the office of the Under- secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering reinforced Lehman's case by saying, "It would appear that . . .requirements could best be met with a single, advanced but mature technology, rotary wing aircraft such as an operational derivative of the XV-15 tilt- rotor." But, because initial individual service development costs were exorbitant, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, in December 1981, formally established a joint rotorcraft project for all services --known as JVX. By December 1982, Deputy Secretary Carlucci stated, "I am pleased to note that... the ser- vices have agreed to a joint development strategy for the Joint Services Advance Vertical Lift Aircraft... By April 1983 the V-22 program was born! (9:9-11) This joint procurement strategy was to make the program more affordable, and as stated by Frank Gaffney, "The V-22 has been developed to serve as the principle support aviation workhorse for the future." (12:28) A Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR) for the Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft stated ten service specific missions, and a joint mission requirement for self deployment. The Marine Corps' mission would concentrate on the capability to lift Marines or cargo from ship to shore and to rapidly build combat power ashore as its primary focus. The Navy's mission would concentrate on strike rescue, fleet logistic support, and special warfare. The United States Army's focus would be on Air/Land Battle doctrine, special operations, cargo support, and aeromedical evacuation. The United States Air Force wanted to satisfy a long range special operational requirement. Based on the JSOR, the Department of Defense initiated development of the V-22 program, a multibillion dollar program designed to provide a hybrid aircraft designed with tremendous military applications. The V-22 is a tiltrotor aircraft which utilizes the flight envelope of a helicopter and converts to fixed wing at cruise altitude with a range of approximately 2100 nautical miles. The program incorporates advanced technologies being developed by the prime contractors at Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and Boeing Helicopters. For the United States Marine Corps, the V-22 aircraft would provide the helicopter lift sorely needed and replace the CH-46 Sea Knight and the CH-53D Sea Stallion currently slated for retirement in 1997-2004. Tactically, the V-22 can revolutionize Marine Corps' amphibious assault timing for building combat power ashore in all worldwide environments through surprise, speed, lift capabilities, and stealth. Also, the delivery of the V-22 would augment the NECK-DOWN strategy for Marine Aviation over the next few decades. (See enclosure 1) Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney cancelled the V-22 program in April 1989, on the advice of his Director of Pro- gram, Analysis, and Evaluation Dr. David Chu. Dr. Chu recommended: the Marines substitute a 950 aircraft mix of CH53Es/UH-60s instead of the V-22s. The Marine Corps quickly and accurately countered that such a strategy would be more expensive than the original V-22 program. Dr. Chu revised his estimate to approximately 650 CH-53Es/UH-60s. It is not surprising that this adjustment brought the cost below the V-22 package. But more importantly, this new adjustment does not meet the original CH-46 lift and survivability require- ments on the modern battlef ield for the United States Marine Corps. Based on his final assessment of the program, Dr. Chu recommended a one year slip in the V-22 program at the Defense Review Board deliberations on the FY-90 budget, but Secretary Cheney eventually made the final decision to cancel the program, and directed that an alternative aircraft be procured in lieu of the V-22. (9:12-13) Even though Secretary Cheney killed the V-22 in April 1989, Congress provided $300 million in FY-89 APN (Advance Procurement Navy) funding for the V-22, $200 million of which DOD subsequently deferred. Congress also provided $355 million in FY-89 RDT&E (Research, Development, Testing, and Evalua- tion) funding which was reportedly spent. In FY-90, Congress provided an additional $255 million for six full scale development (FSD) aircraft, even though the V-22 had been cancelled by DOD. A total of 2.6 billion dollars has already been spent on this program to date. (12) General Gray has repeatedly said, "that acquiring the V-22 to replace Marine Corps helicopters is his top priority." (12) Also, General Gray said, "No Marine Corps requirement is more pressing than the need to identify a solution for the replacement for our medium lift capability. (14:65) Senator John Glenn has stated, "the V-22 is more important than the Air Force's B-2 stealth bomber, the stealth fighter or railbased mobile ballistic missiles." (18:15) The problem with cancelling the V-22 program is the Marines have planned their long-term mobilization strategy around the arrival of the Osprey and have included it in their assault ship and troop ferrying plans since early 1980. Finding and cultivating helicopter replacements will cost additional research and development money plus time needed to produce the prototypes and develop them into a mission capability. (17:11) In testimony before Congress, Secretary Cheney explained the cancellation of the V-22 by saying "I didn't see how I could afford it relative to the priorities of the declining budget." (20:36) Also, Secretary Cheney in Armed Forces Jour- nal International said, "The Pentagon will continue to push for termination of the Marine Corps/Bell-Boeing V-22 tiltrotor--We love the V-22, but it's an expensive system." (26:20) After the cancellation of the V-22 program because of affordability, the Marine Corps embarked on a crash, revised MLR program in April 1989. Back to square one in the process, planners started a frantic search for a purely helicopter MLR. Critical to this search is the Marine Corps desire to retain the MLR funding for the 92 POM (Program Objective Memorandum). The proposed funding for FY-92 is $51.5 million. Each delay or missed POM cycle of the PPBS (Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System) pushes the delivery date of an approved MLR later and later into the next century. The Marine Corps will suffer particularly because progressively fewer CH-46s/CH-53Ds will be operationally available in the out years due to attri- tion, the 10,000 flight hour restriction, or 30 year service life of these assets. (See enclosure 2) I have seen a photocopy of a letter sent to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) signed by General Gray requesting the current JS0R be used as the Operational Requirement for the alternative medium lift aircraft replacement. (12) Confir- mation of a CN0 response could not be obtained. A CH-53E/H-60 combination was proposed when the V-22 was cancelled. Initially, the Marine Corps challenged the surviv- ability, capability, cost, lift signature (amphibious ships) and associated increases in Marine force structure of this proposal compared to the V-22 program. The Marine Corps, who was a vocal supporter of the V-22 after cancellation of the program, suddenly became silent on V-22 issues. Marine Corps planners have been instructed to work on alternate plans for a helicopter option MLR. But, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa) and the Bell-Boeing contractors continued their vocal support for V-22 funding. General Gray endorsed Secretary Cheney's tough decision to cut the V-22 program in the following statement in Navy Times: Clearly there will be some tough choices, and we will not be able to get some of the systems that we defi- nitely need. So we will have to look to alternatives, and when you look to alternatives to equipment, this means that you're looking at your doctrine, your con- cepts, and alternative methods of mission accomplish- ment and the like...What should be our strategy for the near and long term? The United States Marine Corps should stick to the facts. One, the Marine Corps will have a MLR requirement in the year 2000. The Corps must hang our hat on improving the... capability that defines the Marine expeditionary role in the future: Capability to conduct amphibious raids on short notice at night, in adverse weather conditions under emissions control from over the horizon via air or surface means against distant inland targets. (7:14) Again, General Gray made a point of stressing the Marine Corps backing of Secretary Cheney's cancellation of the V-22 in the following statement: I say this because the media and others persist in the rumor about Marines 1obbying in Congress for the pro- gram. Let me tell you that's a lie. I'm very serious, because we have a issue of integrity. We have an issue of loyalty. I want to make crystal clear that we have stated our operational requirements. We have done that in the most honest and best way we can, and if there are Marines here lobbying, in or out of uniform, than I sug- gest you owe it to me to tel1 me who the hell they are so I can take appropriate action. (13) The Bell-Boeing team has been conducting an aggressive lobbying campaign on Capital Hill to win support for reinstating the V-22 program in the Defense budget. These prime contractors unveiled a new V-22 mission analysis con- ducted by the Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore Labora- tory (LLL) , which reported V-22 capabilities very favorably. According to this analysis, the V-22 sustained less attrition, generated more sorties and delivered more reinforcements as compared to the CH-53E/H-60 mix. This study refuted Secretary Cheney's reliance on other helicopter substitutes mentioned when he cancel1ed the V-22. Richard F. Spivey acknowledged, analyses like LLL's pit estimated cost of the V-22 acquisi- tion and operations, which may turn out to be too optimistic, against the better understood costs of a derivative helicop- ter." (2:119) Other survivabi1ity studies stated, "During six months of combat, Marines would lose three times as many aircrews using the CH-53/H-60 rather than the V-22." (16:28) General Gray in Warfighting describes the Marine Corps doctrine on warfighting which provides the authoritative basis for how Marines fight and how Marines prepare to fight. This document provides definitive guidance for equipping our force in the following paragraph: In order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, the Marine Corps will exploit existing capabilities of off-the-shelf technology to the greatest extent possible....We should base these requirements on an analysis of critical enemy vulner- abilities and develop equipment specifically to exploit those vulnerabilities....As much as possible, employ- ment techniques and procedures should be developed concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the operating forces. (31:52-53) The V-22 is specifically designed to enhance the over-the- horizon threat of amphibious assaults on a foreign shore embedded in Marine Corps doctrine. History has demonstrated that the JSOR, which was intended to enhance the affordability of the V-22 program, has not worked because some services have been allowed to back out of the V-22 program. Now is not the time for Marines to be frustrated with the political gamesmanship in budget issues. The Commandant has made it clear--Marines concentrate on your jobs and let me worry about manpower and procurement issues. If the V-22 is in fact never to be resurrected, what are the options left to the United States Marine Corps? The Marine Corps will not demand a new helicopter built from the ground up, but will settle for a helicopter which is in production with some modifications. The H-60 is in production, but does not match the capability goals sought by the Marine Corps. The H-60 cannot carry the required number of Marines per sortie, nor the heavier external loads during an amphibious assault. It will increase the required strategic lift requirements for the United Stated Transportation Command to get Marine forces into any theater of operations. Buying more CH-53Es, although plausible and in production, is not the smart way to get combat-ready Marines into landing zones. The CH-53E is built primarily for heavy cargo lift support, and then for passenger support. The Anglo-Italian EH-1O1 has the obvious problem of being a sole source foreign purchase. This criteria alone is enough to fail selection. (22:14) The CH-47 showed some early merit, but fails because it is too large to operate from smaller air capable ships, would need extensive modifications for shipboard service, and require more deck space than the proposed V-22. Even Boeing's Model 360 technological demonstrator was mentioned, but disregarded because it is not in production. The leading helicopter candidate for the MLR is a redesigned CH-46X, basically, the same airframe Marines have today with 80's technology incorporated. Even though CH-46 production tooling is no longer avail- able and would have to be bought from Kawasaki Heavy Indus- tries Ltd., the Marine Corps has proposed a four phased pro- gram to extend and upgrade the fleet of CH-46s. (Kawasaki Heavy Industries, LTD. will stop manufacturing the KV-107 under license from Boeing within the next few months.) Phase I is a service life extension program; Phase II is procurement of CH-46s; Phase III is the development and production of the CH-46X line; and Phase IV is a conversion of remaining CH-46s into CH-46Xs. Total cost for this four phased program is $10.21 billion. (12) The service life extension program (SLEP) for most of the current fleet would emphasize dynamic components including the rotor system, transmission, and hydraulics. This dynamic component replacement program (DCR) must be done for all Navy and Marine H-46s regardless of what aircraft is selected as the MLR. The SLEP kits wil1 be funded in FY93/FY-94 timeframe. The Phase II procurement of seventy-five new CH-46s built to current configuration standards would be an interim stopgap measure to provide sufficient lift to the current fleet and time to develop an MLR helicopter option. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has cancelled procurement of these new CH-46s during budget reviews due to end strength reductions and decreased numbers of amphibious deck spots. Therefore, if this decision is not reversed, the Marine Corps will begin to experience a shortage of medium lift helicopters in 1998. Phase III development and production of a CH-46X, would include modern equipment developed from other programs, inclu- ding integrated controls and the V-22 derived glass cockpit. The proposed number of new CH-46Xs would be 108 airframes. (See enclosure 3) Phase IV is the upgrade of all CH-46Es remaining in the fleet to a CH-46X configuration. A thorough remanufacturing program would start the new X models off with a service life lasting well into the 2020s. In the current proposal, all four phases would be complete by the year 2004. In spite of congressionally approved V-22 funding, the Secretary of Defense and his staff have successfully cancelled the V-22 and delayed overal1 resolution of the Marine Corps medium lift problem. Although the Marine Corps has publicly supported these actions, Congress and the prime contractors continue to keep the V-22 program barely alive and funded. Four of six V-22 aircraft have been constructed and are now undergoing f1ight testing. The other 2 aircraft are over 60% completed. Last month the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter that requires the Pentagon to release the 1991 funding for the V-22. If the Senate approves the measure and it becomes law, the Defense Department is obligated to release the money within 30 days. Release of the disputed funding is critical for the program to begin operational testing by Marine Corps pilots in August 1991. If the program successfully passes this rigorous testing, the V-22 could receive Defense Acquisition Board approval to initiate limited production in December 1991. (15:8) Unfortunately, funding rather than mission accomplishment or capability is the key issue. The Marine Corps has rightly put the onus on the Depart- ment of Defense to decide this MLR political "hot potato." A joint approach did not guarantee procurement of the V-22. Documented operational need and survivability data did not guarantee the V-22. Continuing unresolved differences between Congress and DOD over the V-22/MLR prevent the Marine Corps from executing either program as planned and only serves to delay and Increase costs associated with each program. (12) Obviously there is no guarantee for a program that is so deeply dependent on political maneuvering and funding, or so vulnerable to current military reductions. But the fact is that the Marine Corps will begin to suffer unplanned and unwarranted aviation losses in the very near future if some MLR resolution isn't decided soon. It is to be hoped that Marine testing of the V-22 this summer at HMX-1 will provide sufficiently positive results that will finally convince the key people in DOD and Congress of the worth and desirability of this aircraft. Until then, the future of the Marine Corps helicopter capability remains an unanswered question. Click here to view image BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bay, Dr. Austin. "Weapons Systems and the Defense Spending Dilemma." Strategy and Tactics Magazine, Nov-Dec 1989, pp. 56-57. 2. Bond, David F. "Bell, Boeing Unveil New V-22 Mission Effective Analysis." Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 17, 1990, pp. 117, 119. 3. Bond, David F. 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