The Marine Corps Reserve And Its Future AUTHOR Major David R. Chevallier, USMCR CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND ITS FUTURE I. Purpose: To review the status of the Marine Corps Reserve prior to its activation for use in Desert Shield/Storm and make recommendations for its future shape for the remainder of the 90's and into the 21st Century. II. Problem: To determine if substantial flaws exist in the mission assigned the Marine Corps Reserve to include its organization, readiness and command relationships. III. Data: The Marine Corps Reserve was assigned the primary mission of providing the Marine Corps with pre-trained units and individuals with which to expand the FMF in time of national crisis. To meet this requirement the Reserve's focus was primarily directed towards the training and readiness of the Ready Reserve. The primary components of the Ready Reserve are the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve are used to make up the units of the 4th Division and Wing Team (DWT), a mirror image organization of the Marine Corps' active MEF's. The Individual Ready Reserve is a large pool of pre-trained individual manpower that is used to flesh out active and reserve units in times of crisis. To enhance readiness and ensure compatibility reserve units and individuals routinely integrate and train with regular units and receive testing and evaluation under the same criteria regulars are exposed to. Almost all of the units of the 4th DWT and a significant portion of the individual Ready Reserve were activated for service in Desert Shield/Storm. Based on preliminary indications their service exceeded most expectations. IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps Reserve's mission, organization, training and command relationships provided a sound basis for the preparation of the Marine Corps Reserve's participation in a major crisis. The Reserve provided the Marine Corps with the strategic capability necessary to meet the challenges of Desert Storm/Shield and maintain operational flexibility throughout other regions of the world. V. Recommendations: That the Marine Corps Reserve should be sustained at its current level of readiness with particular emphasis placed on maintenance of equipment compatibility and unit inter-operability with regular Marine Forces. THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE and ITS FUTURE THESIS STATEMENT: To conduct a critical review of the Reserve that supported the Marine Corps in Desert Shield in order to determine the kind of reserve the Nation and the Marine Corps needs for the 90's and into the 21st Century. I. RESERVE IMPORTANCE A. Upper strategic level 1. Policy Support 2. Grass Roots Support B. Lower Strategic level 1. Marine Corps Capability II. STATUS: MARINE CORPS RESERVE A. Missions B. Organization C. Readiness D. Training III. MISSIONS A. Expand the FMF in Time of Emergency IV. ORGANIZATION A. Ready Reserve 1. Selected Marine Corps Reserve 2. Individual Mobilization Augmentees 3. Full Time Support Program 4. Individual Ready Reserve B. Standby Reserve 1. Retired Reserve 2. Fleet Marine Corps Reserve V. READINESS A. Exercises and Operations B. Evaluation and Tests VI. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS A. Dual Command B. Autonomous VII. REVIEW A. Mirror Image B. Commonality C. Integration VIII. CONCLUSION A. Strategic Importance will grow B. Vital Importance of Reserve The Marine Corps Reserve and Its Future Desert Storm has drawn to a close, but that conflict will have an impact on he Marine Corps for the foreseeable future. At the strategic level, the decision to use the Reserve and National Guard proved to be a vital element of the President's source of power for implementing his policies in the Persian Gulf. From the moment he made the decision to use the reserve, he had irrevocably committed the American people to the support of his policies. The activation of the National Guard and Reserve units had overwhelming strategic implications. Unlike an individual going off to join or being drafted into the military where his departure only touches a fragment of a community, the activation of the guard and reserve introduced whole communities to the reality of potential cost of our policies in the Gulf. The make-up of today's reserve reflects a much broader spectrum of American society than the active duty military. Doctors, prominent businessman, professionals, nurses, college students, mechanics, .i.e. the people that make up the fabric of a community were directly involved. Consequently, the community instantly had a vital stake in the successful outcome of this conflict. Their desire to see the honorable return of friends, husbands, sisters, brothers and acquaintances insured strong support of the President's policies--so long as the people perceived those policies focusing on a rapid and decisive conclusion to the conflict. As the war continued with measurable success being achieved at a minimal cost in casualties, the people's support of the President's policies not only remained steadfast, but actually increased. On a lower strategic level, it has become an accepted fact that the Marine Corps could not have maintained its worldwide presence during the course of desert Shield/Desert Storm without the activation of its reserve. General Gray states that although our reserves usually are not used for crisis response, they provide a critical sustainment and reinforcement base for extended operations beyond 60 days. (6:14) This is the Corps' strategic ace in the hole. Without the reserve there is no depth. Desert Storm proved this categorically. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the current status of the Marine Corps Reserve with particular emphasis on the missions, organization, readiness and training, and command relationships is in order. Comparisons and critical review will be made to ensure that the reserve that supported the Marine Corps in Desert Shield is the kind of reserve that the Nation and the Marine Corps needs for the remainder of the 90's and into the 21st Century. At the onset of Desert Storm/Desert Shield the Marine Corps Reserve was organized, manned, and commanded according to the mandated of its mission. the basic mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide the Regular Marine Corps with pre-trained individuals and units with which to expand the FMF in time of national emergency. (2:68) Beneath this umbrella of employment the reserve mission was broken down into four major areas: 1. Augementation/reinforcement of active forces to field three Marine Expeditionary forces (MEFS) at full wartime strength. 2. Field a MEB with reduced aviation and CSS capability (Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Combat Service Support). 3. Provide a nucleus for reconstitution of the Division, Wing, FSSG. (FSSG) 4. Provide a complete division, Wing, FSSG. (7:38) Manpower to perform these missions was divided into four categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, The Retired Reserve, and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR). The Ready Reserve is made up of individuals either assigned to the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) or the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The SMCR is comprised of individuals organized into the units of the 4th Division, 4th MAW and 4th FSSG (4th DWT); the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program; and the Full-Time Support Program FTS). The IRR is composed of pre-trained individuals not organized into specific units. The Ready Reserve has the largest amount of manpower assigned to it. As of 1 February 1991, the strength of the Ready Reserve was approximately 80,000. Within the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, the 4th Division-Wing Team accounts for the bulk of the manpower. This is the operational power of the Reserve. It occupies 166 ground or combat service support centers and 27 aviation centers dispersed geographically over 46 states, the District of Colombia and Puerto Rico. The 4th DWT is organized specifically to mirror active force combat organizations as much as possible and to be prepared to perform a variety of mobilization roles. When fully mobilized the 4th DWT represents 25% of the combat power available to Fleet Marine Force Commanders. The Individual Mobilization Augmentees are drilling reservists who are members of the SMCR but not members of the 4th DWT. They are assigned to mobilization billets at major bases and installations that require them to report within 24 hours of notification. They are to be used to augment commands during a crisis or mobilization. The personnel of the Full-Time Support program serve on full-time active duty in direct support of the Reserve forces. They are instrumental in augmenting our regular forces in the development of policy, administration, recruitment, training and logistical support of the reserve forces. The Marines of the Individual Ready Reserve are a pre-trained manpower pool who are not required to perform regular drills. The IRR consists of individuals who have served in the regular component or the SMCR and have some period of military service obligation remaining or individuals who have completed their military service and stay in the IRR by choice. They are and experienced and valuable manpower pool. Their primary importance is as source of manpower for augmenting the active forces in times of crisis, as was demonstrated in Desert Storm. The Standby reserve is a pool of reservists who may be ordered to active duty only in time of war or national emergency. They are only called when there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in a specific skill category to fill requirements. There are only about 1400 Marines in this category. The retired reserve is composed of those reservists who have completed 20 years of qualifying or federal service for retirement pay. About 4200 Marines are found in this category. The FMCR is made up of those Marines either regular or reserve who have retired for reasons other than physical disability after completion of 20 or more years but less than 30 years active service in the armed Forces. For our purposes, the SMCR and the IRR are the components of the Reserve that will address my remarks too. The operations and training of the reserve primarily revolve around the preparation of individuals and units of the 4th DWT for battery/company level up to regiment/group level for participation in joint and combined operations as designated by FMF commander's requirements. IRR members participate on an individual basis in major exercises and MOS training throughout the Marine Corps. However the major emphasis in reserve training is on the 4th DWT. To evaluate the competence and preparation of the reserve, the units of the 4th DWT are subjected to the following tests and evaluation: 1. Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) 2. Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT) 3. Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office (FASMAO) 4. Marine Corps Disbursing On-Site Evaluation Team (MMCDOSET) Results of MCCRES and MORDT for those units tested in Fiscal Year 90 were 100% for the MCCRES and 95% for the MORDT. This is substantial proof of the current state of readiness of the Reserve. (7:12) Command relationships within the Reserve are exactly like those of the active forces with two exceptions: the dual chain-of-command system used for reserve unit Commanding Officers and the Inspector-Instructors (I&I) below the battalion/squardon level, and the autonomous command exercised by the 4th Division and Wing Commanding Generals. The dual chain-of-command arrangement is unique to the Marine Corps Reserve. It is a long-standing practice and appears to be one that will remain, regardless of its obvious flaws. However, the autonomous command relationships enjoyed by the 4th Division and Wing commander appears to be sound one. These Commanders enjoy a direct line to the Commandant and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC),. which serves to ensure that reserves are not run-over or ignored in day-to-day operations with the active forces and FMF Commanders. That's the way the current missions, organization, organization, operations and readiness and command relationships of the Marine Corps Reserve were at the time Desert Shield began. We will now evaluate the reserves performance in order to determine the soundness of the policies that prepared the reserve for this crisis. It is the first time since the Korean war that there has been a large scale Mobilization of the Marine reserve. While it might be a bit premature to draw universal conclusions, there is none the less enough evidence available to be able to form a fairly sound evaluation of the Reserve's ability to meet the mandates of its missions. This following is drawn directly from the testimony of the Marine Corps' Deputy Assistant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Major General Davison, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. As of 26 February 91, 24,084, members of the 4th DWT, 7171 IRR's and 871 IMA's had been activated in operations supporting Desert Shield and other Marine Coprs Commitment. In is augmentation role, many reserve units were called to deploy with active forces not operating at full strength. In its reinforcing role, SMCR units deployed to provide additional combat capability to Fleet Marine Force Commanders. Many individual reservists with critical military occupational specialty skills were also called to fill specific billet vacancies or as combat replacements. Regardless of the specific mobilization role or assignment, the integration of highly motivated and dedicated reservists with the Active Component has give impetus and momentum to our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The infusion of state-of-the-art equipment within the 4th DWT has also provided additional capability and firepower. the entire process has validated long-standing principles in areas of manpower management, training, and procurement of equipment which have guide our management of the Marine Corps Reserve." (7:38) From these remarks, we can make the case that the Reserve has met all its mandates and has more than justified its existence. But what are the major lessons to be gleaned from the success of the Marine Corps Reserve up to this time? Three major points come to mind: 1. The SMCR organized to mirror image an active MEF is a sound one. Because of this flexibility and depth the Corps was able to draw the units it needed to meet the specific mission requirements of Desert Shield and also meet the needs for the constitution of sufficient forces for other world-wide commitments. Lessons one then would indicate that the 4th DWT should remain a mirror image of an Active MEF. 2. The success of the integration of reserve forces and active forces can also be credited to the commonality of equipment and weapon systems found in both forces. The 4th MAW still lags in certain aircraft, but steps are being taken to close this gap. This is a critical factor in any attempt to integrate reserve and active forces. All efforts in procurement in the future must be focused on ensuring the reserve's equipment and weapons remain on an equal par with the active forces. Waiting until the next crisis to make up shortfalls will be too late. 3. The third and final point of the Reserves success can be attributed to the level of readiness and training expected of the reserve and the integration of the reserve in active duty exercises in and out of CONUS. Familiarity, mutual respect, and appreciation for the other's strengths and abilities in these exercises laid the ground work for the successful integration of the Reserve in the augmentation/reinforcement role requirement of it in this recent crisis. These then were the cornerstones of the Reserve success in Desert Shield. They are simple and straightforward. Nurturing and maintaining them should spell success the next time the Reserve is needed. The primary focus in the Reserve buildup has been the SMCR. It is imperative that it remain so. In the days of looming budget cuts and shrinking resources many attempts will be made to take shortcuts. Shortchanging the 4th DWT cannot be one of them. To many regular Marines, the Marine Corps success in Desert Shield will be laid totally at the feet of the active forces, because their claimed success overshadows the reserves importance. But what would have happened if the Iraqi's had put up token resistance? Increased casualties would have occurred, surely. The primary source for these replacements would have been reserve Marines. Likewise, an extended emergency in another area of the world would have called for large scale usage of the Reserve in direct operations. Although, the likelihood of such concurrent contingencies on the future may seem remote, remember that the post Cold War world is a volatile one. A characteristic of this volatility is that the U.S. will usually find itself reacting--as happened in Desert Shield/Storm. Because of the proven success of the reserve activation, the rapid transition from peace to war that exists in the modern world, and the natural aversion to a draft by the American people, the Reserve will remain the major source of manpower augmentation for regular forces in a future crisis of any duration short of a worldwide conflict. Therefore, the strategic importance of the reserve for the Regular Marine Corps will grow, not lessen. In the future, with reductions of the active forces looming, the only source of trained units and individuals for the regular Corps will be the Marine Corps Reserve, so the Marine Corps cannot afford to let the Reserve languish. And on an even larger strategic scale the reserve makes a unique contribution, because it embodies the very fabric of American society. It is not an exaggeration to say "Call-up the Reserve and you call up America!" As Vietnam proved so tragically war is too serious not to involve all America. So, all these considerations together point to the requirement for a strong Guard and Reserve. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cancian, Mark F, LtCol USMCR, "Why Not the Best?." Marine Corps Gazette,(January 88), 63-70. 2. Davison H. E., Major General USMC,"Active/Reserve Relationship Acts to Enhance Corps." The Officer, (February 91), 68-74. 3. Howell J. D. Col USMCR and LtCol G. I. Wilson, USMCR, "In the Event of War, Its the USMC". Marine Corps Gazette, (December 85), 71-76. 4. Jacobs, Jeffrey A. "Integrating the Total Army: The Road to Reserve Readiness", Parameters, XX 4 (December 1990), 73-84. 5. Kufeldt, E. Col USMCR. "The Reserve Wing." Marine Corps Gazette (May 1983), 81-85. 6. U.S. Congress, House. Annual Report to the Congress Before The Senate Armed Services Committee. Gray, A. M., Commandant of the Marine Corps, (21 February 91). 1-27. 7. U.S. Congress, Senate. Annual Report to the Congress Before The Senate Armed Services Committee. Davison H. M., USMC, (22 February 91) 1-36.
