A Wake-Up Call For Air Refueling AUTHOR Major Andrew H. Cox, USAF CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING Thesis: Airpower's future responsiveness and the US ability to project its forces worldwide depends on air refueling. To insure insure responsiveness and global projection, the Air Force must expand its air refueling assets. Background: Recent events in Southwest Asia have reaffirmed the military's dependence on air refueling. Southwest Asia also showed that there is a shortfall in this critical area. The tanker shortfall is nothing new -- it has been with us for years. Yet, the Air Force has not corrected the problem. The tanker's historic relationship to the strategic bomber and the Air Force's procurement philosophy have hindered attempts to correct the problem. Furthermore, congressional policies have also hampered efforts to improve in this critical area. Recommendations: To correct the tanker deficiency the nation must first reevaluate bomber commitments to the SIOP. With the reduced threat posed by our chief adversary, the Soviet Union, improvements in other weapons systems, and better intelligence capability, we can reduce bomber commitments. As the number of bombers decreases, so will the number of tankers. The tankers can then be used for conventional operations. Secondly, we must accelerate the KC-135R modernization program. If we are unable to draw down our strategic forces, we must still have more tankers to support an ever-increasing conventional commitment. Conclusions: The Air Force has identified the need for more air refueling capability. However, if the Air Force does not act soon, we may be faced with no other alternative than to buy a new tanker. In a time when fiscal restraint is the watchword in Washington, buying a new tanker would be difficult. We have viable options to address the shortfall now, but we must act quickly. A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING Thesis Statement. To insure airpower's future responsiveness and the US ability to project its forces worldwide, the Air Force must expand its air refueling assets. I. Historical Background A. Primary mission - support the bomber B. Tankers in Vietnam C. The Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1973 D. GAO's 1984 study II. Procurement Policies A. Air Force B. Congress III. Solutions A. Reevaluate bomber commitments to the SIOP B. Accelerate the KC-135R modernization program C. Other solutions A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING Duffy surveyed the desert ahead of him. There, in the distance, waited no less than one brigade of tanks. Scores of well armed, combat-hardened infantry units lingered nearby. What was behind these units was anybody's guess, but if one believed intelligence estimates, there was much more of the same. Duffy had been in some tight spots before, but he had never felt so exposed to the enemy. Not even the dark days of Khe Sanh could match this moment. The only thing that stood between him and half the Iraqi Army were some TOWs, a few tanks, six Cobra gunships, a few Harriers, and not nearly enough miles of sand. How could they stop thatarmor if the Iraqis decided to cross the border? Maybe the boys were right--they were just a "speed bump" in the desert. Airpower could slow these guys down just like at Khe Sanh. But was there enough ? Sound like a short account out of a Tom Clancy novel? Or was it the same thoughts that American ground units pondered during the early moments of Operation Desert Shield. Like the fictitious Duffy, American units faced the same challenges over the first few months of Operation Desert Shield. And, like Duffy, they probably wondered "is there enough air?" Airpower will certainly play an important role in our next conflict. In the 1991 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney noted that the defense establishment must emphasize the qualities of versatility, global deployability, and rapid responsiveness.1 Forces such as the Marine expeditionary brigades and the Army airborne divisions are tailored to meet these requirements. These highly trained, elite units make up our force-in-readiness. They depend on strategic airlift to get them to the battlefield rapidly and they are, by necessity, light. They quickly deploy with enough firepower to sustain themselves, but depend on heavier forces to reinforce them. As the saying goes, "they are light enough to get there, but heavy enough to win." Light forces trade offensive capability for responsiveness. Artillery, tanks, and logistics support among other equipment must remain behind. Therefore, our forces depend on airpower to counter an enemy that in all probability outguns and outnumbers them. Getting strategic airlift and tactical units to the theater of operations is not easy; they also need support. To insure airpower's future responsiveness and the US ability to project its forces worldwide, the Air Force must expand its air refueling assets. In Desert Shield, we needed more air refueling assets than were available. The result was that for some time ground units did not have enough air support. The Iraqis did not attack, but will a future enemy remain in fixed positions or will he take advantage of our weakness during the early stages of our build-up? The loss of elite units and the rapid escalation of the conflict is at stake. Desert Shield reiterated the importance of air refueling and showed that we are lacking in this critical area. It was a wake-up call. The roots of the current tanker deficiency start many years ago. In 1946, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was established. SAC's primary mission was to conduct long-range offensive operations anywhere in the world. Of course, the primary threat was the Soviet Union. One of the major problems that SAC faced was how to penetrate Soviet defenses and, once penetrated, attack heavily defended targets. In September 1947, General Carl Spaatz formed the Heavy Bombardment Committee to study methods of air delivery. The committee concluded that current and projected bombers had the same problem-limited range. They recommended that air-to-air refueling be developed as a matter of first priority. 2 In the fall of 1947, even as the Heavy Bombardment Committee was meeting, the Air force examined the possibilities of using modified B-29s or B-50s to air refuel jet fighters. Extensive testing was conducted for the next year. By the end of 1949, six operational squadrons had been established. SAC became the focal point for all air refueling, and it was SAC bombers that were the primary beneficiary of the early refueling efforts. The first fighter refueling occurred in 1951 with SAC-controlled fighters attaining refueling capability in early 1952. Tactical Air Command fighters started operational air refueling in the fall of 1952. Until the end of the Korean War, air refueling aircraft supported tactical aviation in the war zone; however, the bulk of SAC's air refueling assets remained dedicated to bomber refueling. In 1955, the B-52 Stratofortress became the Air Force's primary strategic bomber. To increase the B-52's range and payload, the Air Force realized that this new bomber would require air refueling. The air refueling aircraft of the day, the KC-97 and the KC-29, could support the B-52, but they had limitations. Both the KC-97 and the KB-29 were incapable of matching the B-52's speed and altitude. To receive its gas, the B-52 had to slow down and descend. As a result, the B-52s was unable to maintain the strict timing required for weapons delivery. To correct the problem, the Air Force decided to produce the KC-135 Stratotanker. The KC-135 was a far superior aircraft to the KB-29 and KC-97. Unlike its predecessors, the KC-135 was specifically designed for air refueling. The -135's inherent capabilities allowed it to fly as fast and as high as the B-52. The Stratotanker was a perfect complement to SAC's primary bomber. The KC-135 became exclusively tied to the B-52, and by inference, the strategic mission. Air Force planners clearly recognized the importance of air refueling in the strategic arena, but would the planners recognize the tankers's potential effectiveness in the conventional arena? The answer to the question was forthcoming. The Vietnam War forced the Air Force to focus on the KC-135's conventional capability. Tankers were invaluable in increasing the range, time-on-station, and payload of tactical fighters. They also provided intertheater refueling across the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, air refueling procedures were perfected and refueling equipment advanced. More air refuelable aircraft were produced. By the end of the war, most of the Air Force's aircraft were refuelable. New Marine and Navy aircraft also included an air refueling capability. Air refueling became commonplace. Air refueling had come a long way since the 1940s. Despite the realization during Vienam that the tanker was conventionally important, there was no attempt to increase the tanker force structure to meet both conventional and strategic refueling needs. As long as the likelihood of either a large scale conventional or nuclear war against the Soviet Union remained low, then there were enough tankers to meet our conventional requirements. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 finally convinced the Air Force to increase the number of tankers. During this conflict, the US provided Israel with essential military supplies and equipment. Strategic airlift was critical. All of the equipment delivered to Israel before the cease-fire was delivered by air. From October 13 through October 24, Military Airlift Command (MAC) delivered 22,395 short-tons of cargo to Israel.3 Though the primary airlifter, the C-5, was air refuelable, few crews were proficient in air refueling procedures. Those that were, were able to refuel enroute to Israel thus cutting the delivery times and lessening airport congestion at intermediate refueling stops. However, the vast majority of C-5s and C-141 were forced make a refueling stop enroute. Additionally, the US provided the Israelis with replacement aircraft throughout the war. The KC-135 was invaluable in supporting this process. The tankers provided inflight refueling for F-4 and A-4 aircraft who flew non-stop from the US to Israel in 15 hours. These same aircraft were accepted by the Israelis and in some cases flew combat sorties on the same day.4 Valuable lessons were learned from the conflict. MAC immediately required all C-5 crews to receive training in air refueling. Additionally, the Air Force decided to modify the C-141 to make it air refuelable. The Arab-Israeli War highlighted the need for additional air refueling assets capable of refueling wide-bodied aircraft like the C-5. The KC-135, though capable of refueling the C-5 and the C-141, required multiple aircraft to pass the large amount of fuel these wide-bodied aircraft required. Thus, the Air Force identified a mission need for a bigger, more capable refueler. Eventually, the Air Force purchased 60 KC-10 Extenders to meet the need. The KC-10 increased the number of refueling assets and improved the refueling capability with respect to strategic airlift. However, even with the KC-10, the Air Force lacked the number of tankers required to satisfy all of the refueling demands of the 1990's. A 1984 General Accounting Office (GAO) study concluded that the minimum number of tankers needed through 1990 would equal 1000 tanker equivalents. Using the GAO's system, each KC-135A counted as one tanker equivalent. Tankers modified with more fuel-efficient commercial engines counted as 1.2 or 1.5 equivalents depending on which engine was used. A KC-10 counted as three A-model equivalents. The GAO reasoned that if the Air Force could field 1000 tanker equivalents through the early 1990s, the air refueling demand would decline and the shortfall would gradually correct itself. The Air Force agreed with the 1000 tanker equivalent figure and used it for subsequent calculations. One year later, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report used the same 1000 A-model equivalent figure to study procurement options for the tanker shortfall. Again, the Air Force agreed with using 1000 A-model equivalents as a baseline, but added that in times of increased world tension and with future weapons system needs, the figure would be low. The CBO report provided the basis of the Air Force's procurement plan of modifying enough tankers to meet the 1000 tanker equivalent level. With the commitment to expand to 1000 tanker equivalents, the Air Force implicitly acknowledged the tanker's utility in conventional operations. Unfortunately, when the Air Force finally recognized the tanker's conventional value it was unable to make needed changes. The problem now was in procurement policies of both the Air Force and the congress. Recent Air Force procurement policies have been characterized by the purchase of high-tech, high-cost weapon systems. The less glamourous systems like the tanker have suffered. For example, the B-2 bomber cost well over $550 million per copy. Critics charge that spending so much money on one aircraft effects the entire nation by taking money away from needy social programs. What people fail to realize is that the B-2 program also takes money away from other weapon systems like the KC-135. If, therefore, the Air Force fails to emphasize the reengining program, the congress will follow suit. Furthermore, the KC-135 reengining program is not a major program-it has few private firms benefitting from the program. Why should anyone in congress push for a program that has little economic impact on their constituency when there are other more lucrative programs to be awarded? So, both the congress and the Air Force are at fault. On the one hand, the Air Force understands the need for additional tanker capability, yet it does not give the program high priority in the budget wars. On the other hand, the congress continues to slip the program resulting in an ever-widening gap between the number of tankers needed and the number of tankers available. Continued slips in the reengining program increases the cost in the long run. And soon, modifying the tanker will not be cost effective-it is getting too old. The congress is also using old information. The 1985 CBO air refueling study continues to be a guide for the congress. The problem is that the CBO based its study on incorrect assumptions. At the time of the study, these assumptions were logical, but in six years factors have changed. The most important assumption made by the CBO was that by the early 1990's the number of aircraft requiring air refueling would start to decrease. Purchasing more fuel-efficient aircraft, retiring less fuel-efficient aircraft, and reducing the number of fuel-intensive bomber mission, would decrease the tanker requirement. Unfortunately, air refueling requirements have increased. The projected increase in more fuel-efficient aircraft and the changes in bomber missions have not materialized due to procurement slowdowns. Because the Air Force gets fewer aircraft at a slower pace, it must keep some older, less fuel-efficient aircraft to maintain their unique mission capabilities. Consequently, air refueling assets are needed more than ever. The world today is a lot different from the world of 1985. Nations have become more independent, more willing to exercise their sovereign rights. In the past, the US could make a request for landing or overflight rights and feel confident that its request would be granted. This is no longer the case. For a myriad of reasons, countries are unwilling to let the US forces transit their territory. A recent example was the 1987 airstrike on Libya. France refused to allow United Kingdom based F-111s to overfly her territory. Air refueling made the mission possible. With more and more countries denying access to their airspace and facilities, the US may find itself in a similar situation in the future. Air refueling will provide both military planners and political leaders flexibility. Finally, the CBO assumed a stronger economy and budget than what exist now. In all fairness, few could have predicted the size of the current budget deficit in 1985. This deficit has dampened government spending. The congress, in its attempt to arrest the deficit, is reluctant to spend money. They prefer to cancel or change new programs, or slowdown existing programs. The KC-135 reengining program has continually been slowed and it is likely that this policy will continue. The lack of air refueling aircraft is a serious problem with military's readiness. Correcting the problem is becoming more difficult with shrinking budgets, yet expanding military commitments. The solutions are available, but they require some hard decisions that must be made soon if we are to avoid a serious deficiency in our strategic mobility and responsiveness. The first solution involves decreasing the number of bombers required for strategic offensive operations. Doctrinally, the tanker's primary mission is to support strategic bombers committed to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation's general nuclear war plan. Daily, one-third of all bombers support the SIOP. Concurrently, each bomber on alert status has at least one mated tanker, but more probably, two or even three. In actuality, well over one-third of the tanker force is on alert. The higher number of tankers on alert is due to bomber requirements for multiple refueling and the need to maintain a strategic reserve of tankers. The number of bombers on nuclear alert can be reduced for several reasons. Advances in US intelligence gathering capabilities have given military and civilian leaders confidence in our ability to provide sufficient warning of an impending attack. Since 1957, we have maintained a large alert force to protect against surprise attack. Leaders now believe that such an attack is improbable. Our newly- acquired intelligence capability alleviates the need for a large standing alert force. Furthermore, our primary threat, the Soviet Union, has changed. Over the last several years, the Soviet Union has shown the desire to focus its' attention inward, and to improve relations with the US. The recent events in Eastern Europe support this observation. Finally, advances in weapons technology give the US alternatives to maintaining large bomber alert forces. The recent use of the Tomahawk cruise missile in Southwest Asia proved the accuracy and the penetration capability of the cruise missile system. More air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles could be used to attack targets formerly targeted by manned bombers. Individual bombers carrying cruise missiles will actually require more tankers, but the number of tankers required to support the entire SIOP will decrease. For these reasons the number of bombers on strategic alert can be decreased. If the number of bombers needed to meet strategic commitments decreases, the number of tankers supporting them will decrease. The additional tankers can be used to support conventional operations. The second solution to the Air Force's refueling shortfall is accelerating the KC-135 modernization program. One modification kit improves twenty-seven aircraft components and increases the offload capability of each aircraft by fifty percent. This modification will extend the KC-135's service life by approximately 50 years. By modifying the entire active duty KC-135 fleet, the Air Force will in effect increase its refueling capability from 636 to 954 A-model tankers. Current Air Force plans are to modify the entire KC-135 fleet with the CFM56 engine. This modification, known as the KC-135R, includes all of the previously modified National Guard tankers in addition to the remaining unmodified A-models. At the current pace, the 1000 tanker equivalent total will be reached in 1992. However, the 1000 tanker equivalent total includes the KC-10. At least 20 of the KC-10s are dedicated to the airlift mission.5 In times of crisis these aircraft may not be available for air refueling missions. The loss of 20 KC-10s, would require the purchase of 40 KC-135R kits to compensate. This translates to an additional 2 years before the Air Force would reach the 1000 A-model equivalent total at the current procurement rate of 24 modification kits per year. With continual slowdowns in the modification kit procurement schedule, soon the utility of this program will be questionable. The fact is that the KC-135A is an aging aircraft and despite continual modification it will eventually reach the point where its useful service life is limited. Why would congress continue support a system that has a limited lifetime? We have not yet reached this point with the KC-135; however, with the continuous program slowdown we may soon reach the point where the congress refuses to appropriate any further funds for new engines. Accelerating the re-engining program would require real growth in funding. The need to increase real growth would actually accentuate the slowdown, however. If the entire defense department is experiencing negative growth in its budget, real growth for this one program is unlikely. The overriding question is how important is air refueling to our nation's readiness. All indications from both the Air Force and the other services is that the need for more tankers is a critical. Several other solutions could relieve the air refueling shortfall. These solutions are not as effective as the previous solutions, but they do provide viable alternatives. Re-engining the reserve tanker fleet can also provide additional tankers in the near term. Purchasing additional CFM56 engines will increase the refueling capacity of each reserve tanker by thirty percent. If reserve tankers are re-engined, the Air Force will in effect add 39 tankers to the refueling force. As mentioned earlier, the current Air Force plan calls for reengining the KC-135E after all the A-models conversions are completed. Another solution allows the Marine Corps to use its own KC-130 tankers for intertheater refueling. Current DoD policy assigns the Air Force the responsibility of intertheater refueling. Even if the Air Force does not wish to relinquish this responsibility, provisions could be made within DoD allowing the Marines to conduct emergency intertheater refueling. This solution would add three active duty and two reserve Marine refueling squadrons for intertheater service. The appeal of this solution is that it requires no additional cost to the nation. However, it offers limited improvement in air refueling capability. The solution that we may soon be faced with is to build a new aircraft. This of course would be difficult during these fiscally constrained times. However, we must ask ourselves what is important. Certainly, we must start to consider replacing the KC-135-it can not live forever despite all of the modifications. The Air Force reported in its most recent report to congress. "..even when these enhancements are complete, we will remain unable to meet conventional force requirements while simultaneously supporting the SIOP. Meeting this shortfall will require the eventual procurement of a new KC-X tanker."6 By presenting this to congress, the Air Force has acknowledged that the 1000 tanker figure is no longer valid. Furthermore, the Air Force is emphasizing air refueling and showing that it is willing to spend the required funds to correct the deficiency. No one predicted the events of Southwest Asia (SWA), nor can we accurately predict what will happen in the future. What SWA should tell us is that we must be responsive to a wide range of worldwide contingencies. We must also be able to project our forces quickly and over great distances. In order fulfill these requirements, we must have more tankers. By reducing the number of tankers committed to strategic refueling and by accelerating the procurement of the KC-135R modernization kits, we will be better prepared in the near term to cope with an uncertain world. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1991. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 2. Department of the Air Force. The Air Force Issues Book, 1990. Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1990. 3. Department of the Air Force. The United States Air Force Report to the 101st Congress of the United States of America, 1991. Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1991. 4. Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol I. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1971. 5. Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol II. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989. 6. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Uphoff, eds. The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 7. Morger,Randal E., Maj, USAF. "Tankers for a Thirsty Fleet." Air Force Magazine, 69 (June 1986). 8. Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. Seventy Years of Strategic Air Refueling, 1918-1988, A Chronology. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 9. Polmar, Norman ed. Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and Missiles. Annapolis, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 10. The Congress of the United States. " Modernizing the Aerial Tanker Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost. Washington D.C.: The Congressional Budget Office, 1985. 11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Armed Services. Investigations of National Defense Phase II. Hearing Before a Special Subcommittee on Armed Services. 85th Congress,2nd sess. ,1958 12. U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on the Air Force. Study of Air Power: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Air Force, 84th Congress., 2nd sess., 1956. 13. Wolf, Richard. The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on Roles and Missions. Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987. FOOTNOTES 1 Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1991.( Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p.4. 2 Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol I. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1971), p.233. 3 Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol II. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), p.642. 4 Ibid. p.644. 5 The Congress of the United States. " Modernizing the Aerial Tanker Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost. (Washington D.C.: The Congressional Budget Office, 1985), p.xiii.
