Columbia: A Search For An Integrated U.S. Policy For Counternarcotics (CN) And Counterinsurgency (COIN) AUTHOR Major Arnaldo Claudio, USA CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: COLOMBIA: A SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATED U.S. POLICY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) AND COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) I. PURPOSE: To design an integrated U.S. policy requiring full coordination and cooperation of all U.S. CN and COIN programs in countries threatened by both phenomena (CN/COIN). II. PROBLEM: There is a remarkable similarity in requirements for CN and COIN, yet the U.S. Government operates its CN programs in near isolation from ongoing Host Nation COIN efforts. The failure to fully coordinate CN and COIN programs in countries such as Colombia has resulted in very limited successes in both efforts. III. DATA: In the past decade, the U.S. has logged numerous para-military operations in the Andean Ridge countries (Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia), to combat the influx of drugs to the United States. Unfortunately, U.S. policy for counternarcotics (CN) does not reflect the needs of countries, such as Colombia, where insurgency is seen as the main threat. Colombian President, Cesar Gaviria, has expressed the opinion that U.S. CN efforts should be focused counterinsurgency (COIN) which would stabilize the government and halt economic downturn. U.S. CN efforts presently do not allow the Colombian civil and military establishment to exercise their authority and develop their own expertise in CN matters. Data is presented from the Colombian perspective regarding how to integrate both CN and COIN programs to better serve U.S. and Colombian national interest. IV. CONCLUSIONS: The U.S. should link its counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. It has been proven that both programs need to be unified to properly address Host Nation (HN) national interest. By unifying CN/COIN efforts the U.S. will ensure HN support and U.S. policy success. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: To properly counter problems the U.S. faces in the international arena, the U.S. CN policy must have the following enabling characteristics: establish overall national objectives for both CN/COIN; establish reliable resource links to the U.S. budget process and should result in development of fiscally-constrained, realistic plans and programs for policy implementation; identify changes to U.S. laws and agency guidelines, i.e. DEA, FBI, DIA, CIA, etc., essential to effective lawful implementation. COLOMBIA: A SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATED U.S. POLICY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY Thesis Statement: There is a remarkable similarity in require- ments for counterinsurgency (COIN) and counternarcotics (CN) operations in the Andean Ridge countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru). Yet the U.S. government operates its CN programs in near isolation from host nation COIN efforts. The failure to coordinate fully CN and COIN in countries such as Colombia has resulted in very limited successes in both efforts. Clearly it is time for the design and implementation of an integrated national policy requiring coordination and cooperation of all U.S. CN and COIN programs in those countries threatened by both phenomena. I. Historical Perspective--Colombia A. History B. Government C. Political Conditions II. Present General Situation A. The Threat of Subversion B. The Threat of Narcotrafficing C. The Main Threat III. United States COIN and CN Programs A. Budget B. U.S. Narcotics Control Efforts and Achievements IV. Elements of U.S Policy A. Characteristics B. National CN/COIN Policy C. Objectives HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Colombia's contemporary record of political violence has been the most cruel, the most bloody and the longest lasting of all Latin American countries. Indeed it seems to have had neither a real beginning nor any prospect for ending in the foreseeable future. This is a country marked by contrasts which extend across the entire spectrum of socio-political development within the nation. The country boasts the oldest tradition of democracy in all of South America, with only one four-year period of military intervention in national politics during this century (1953-1957). It also bears the onus of a tradition of violence which has led to several periods of internal struggle, including eight civil wars and over fifty insurrections during the nineteenth century alone. Most notable during this century are the War of a Thousand Days, which claimed over 100,000 lives at the turn of the century (1899-1902), and the period known as "La Violencia" (The Violence) which cost almost 400,000 lives from 1948 to 1960.1 Since 1965 the International Communist Party has been organizing and supporting several insurgent movements and terrorist groups in order to take over the country because of its strategic position in the Caribbean basin.2 In 1549 the area was established as a Spanish colony with the capital at Bogota. In 1717, Bogota became the capital of the Viceroyalty of New Grenada, which included what is now Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Along with Lima and Mexico City, Bogota became one of the principal administrative centers of the Spanish possessions in the New World. On July 20, 1810, the citizens of Bogota created the first representative council to defy Spanish authority. Total independence was proclaimed in 1813, and in 1819 the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed. From the time of its independence from Spain until the first civil war (1838-1842), several factors combined to fuel the tradition of violence for this country. The most important of these factors were the "caudillismo" (a system of war lords), the "personalismo" (a concept of individualism), and a sense of regionalism that was greatly exacerbated by Colombia's geography. To some extent these systems still influence Colombian society today.3 Two political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have dominated Colombian politics. The Conservative Party, comprised of Simon Bolivar's supporters, advocated a strong centralized government, close alliance between the government and the Roman Catholic Church, and a limited franchise. The followers of Francisco de Paula Santander, forerunners of the Liberals, wanted a decentralized government rather than church control over education and other civil matters. They also wanted broadened suffrage. Although today these are no longer active issues, these differences were the principal topics of political debate throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Conservatives established a highly centralized government; the Liberals eventually won universal adult suffrage and a large measure of separation of church and state, although the Catholic Church retains some important powers such as the right to give religious instruction in all public schools. The 1886 constitution has been amended frequently and substantially. The most recent major revisions were approved in January 1991. Freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, along with other basic rights, are guaranteed by the constitution. The national government has separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Elected for a four-year term, the president may not serve consecutive terms and his extensive powers include appointing cabinet ministers as well as departmental and territorial governors without congressional confirmation. No vice president, as such, exists. Every two years, Congress elects a "designate" from the president's party to become acting president in the event of the president's ill health, death, or resignation. If the president's inability to serve is permanent, the acting president must call new elections within three months. The designate has no duties, receives no salary, and may hold other public or private positions while serving as designate. Colombia's bicameral Congress consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, all elected on the basis of proportional representation. Members and alternates are elected at the same time. Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and subordinate courts. The justices serve five-year terms and may be reelected. The country is divided into twenty-three departments, the Federal District of Bogota, three intendencias, and five comisarias (territories or lesser rank not having local legislatures). The presidentially appointed governors and mayors are considered agents of national government, although their powers are somewhat limited by the elected departmental legislatures and municipal councils. The April 1974 elections marked a return to normal competition for the presidency; candidates from all parties were permitted to run. The Liberal Party candidate won with 55% of the vote.4 The 1978 election illustrated the continuing dominance of Conservative and Liberal Parties. Several radical leftist parties and coalitions participated in the election and won six seats in Congress. During this election the most striking feature was the high rate of voter absention, particularly among city dwellers and the poor. The 1980 midterm elections confirmed this trend. This elected government focused on countering a limited but persistent Cuban-backed insurgency that sought to undermine Colombia's democratic system. The success of this government enabled it to lift the state of siege that had been in effect for most of the previous thirty years. In the latest Colombian election held in 1990, almost 8.5 million eligible voters participated. Turnout reached 68% despite repeated threats from subversive groups designed to keep voters home. Now the government continues promoting social justice, growth with equity, and amnesty for insurgents willing to return to the established political system. The armed element of Colombia's Communist party called the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has signed a joint communique with the castroide Army of National Liberation in which they ask that the guerrillas have representation in the constituent assembly and call for immediate peace negotiations.5 Colombia presently faces three threats against internal order: subversion, drug-trafficking, and general delinquency. The principal threat against the institutions and internal order of Colombia comes from the violent actions of armed groups, supported by the Communist Party and national and international organizations of the extreme left. These groups intend to take power by force of arms in order to change the present democratic system to one of Marxist-Lenist persuasion. Every subversive group has a political movement which acts openly and takes advantage of the freedoms of this democratic country. They take part in political events and elections. The most active of them are "The Patriotic Union" (UP) for the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), the "Popular Front" for the Popular Army of Liberation (EPL), and the movement called "To Fight", which represents the Army of National Liberation (ELN). The subversives agree that there are four stages in the fight to gain power: Stage I. Destabilization of the State Stage II. Weakening of the Armed Forces Stage III. Generalized violence, insurrections, and popular uprisings Stage IV. Downfall of the government and the success of the Revolution Colombia presently finds itself in Stage I of this framework. Firm steps have been taken by subversives in order to reach the objectives of Stages II and III. They are currently trying to weaken the military and foment violence, insurrection, and uprisings in society. In addition to the actions of armed subversive groups, another undesirable development affecting public order at the national level is narcotrafficking. The production of raw materials, the processing and commercialization of drugs, and the worldwide demand for marijuana and cocaine, particularly in the United States, has made Colombia one of the leading countries in illegal drug business.6 Marijuana has been relegated to second place in demand. Cocaine production occupies 80% of the drug market, bringing traffickers huge profits.7 Few incentives exist to disaude people from this lucrative business. General delinquency constitutes a very important threat to internal security considering that its actions, day-by-day, are becoming more serious to the country. Delinquency gravely attacks security in both the countryside and the cities, is the result of the high 23% unemployment rate. It is influenced as well by groups of guerrillas, narcotraffickers, organized gangs of murderers (sicarios), and anti-socials in general. Colombians consider communist subversion the main threat for the country because of communist long-range plans for the Latin American region. At present, subversive groups with their supplies of weapons total over 9,000 people. Additionally the auto defenses militias, comprising of 9,000 more men, can be mobilized at any moment for a total of approximately 18,000 men. This was confirmed in October 1990.8 Sufficient evidence exists to establish a link between narcotrafficking and subversion, as a result of operations against narcotraffickers where laboratories with FARC security were found. The narco-guerrilla link comprises moral, financial, and operative aspects. The area of illegal activities of narcotraffic-subversives compels the two to maintain united interests. The narcotraffic-guerrilla alliance is a major cause of worry for political authority and for other representative sectors of the society as the two enemies unite to destabilize the system. Political authorities are disturbed by this link. Representatives and political leaders have fully identified narcotrafficking and subversion as the real threat to the Colombian democratic system. Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters (INM), recently stated before a Congressional committee: "I want to be very frank in saying that where the insurgency and drug traffickers are inextricably bound together, we have to deal with them together....We have an interest in helping them (Andean Ridge nations) fight that insurgency."9 Reassuring words from a top U.S. official, however the question remains whether or not such statements reflect an intended approach to the problem as an integrated counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN) policy by the U.S. government that will address the specific counteraction requirements of Andean Ridge nations among others. The following is a preliminary examination of how U.S. and Colombian counterinsurgency and counternarcotics activities are coordinated and executed. It reveals some dismaying inconsist- encies. It further indicates that the U.S. government does not, in fact, have a clearly defined and integrated CN/COIN policy. The total budget in FY-90 for U.S. counternarcotics programs exceeded $3.5 billion. In FY-91, the DOD budget alone for surveillance, interdiction, and counterdrug support activities is over $1 billion dollars. Worldwide security assistance programs aimed at counterinsurgency and internal defense and development in 1991 add almost another $750 million. Such an impressive allocation of assets would seem to suggest that U.S. foreign policy objectives are being vigorously and effectively pursued in coordination with friendly governments. Nothing could be further from the truth.10 In the Andean Ridge nations of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, for example, a recent Congressional study revealed that U.S. narcotics control efforts have achieved minimal results over the past year (1989).11 Eradication efforts have failed even to reduce the overall increase in coca leaf production that was expected. Corruption at all levels of the Colombian, Peruvian, and Bolivian governments was effectively gutting counternarcotics efforts. A myopic focus by U.S. officials on counternarcotics to the near exclusion of counterinsurgency and internal development programs in the Andean Ridge resulted in policy and procedural schisms between U.S. governmental officials and host regimes. Open disagreement between the Bush administration and newly elected Colombian President, Cesar Gaviria, reflects Colombia's general dissatisfaction with U.S. sensitivity to host nation perceptions and priorities. Not only is there disagreement on what priorities should be jointly pursued by U.S. and host governments in CN and COIN campaigns, but there is bickering, lack of coordination, and political infighting among U.S. agencies. In Colombia, for example, there is tension between the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Department of State over who will have access to limited helicopters DEA wants priority for coca eradication operations and U.S. military liaisons want priority for training of Colombian police and military personnel. Fundamental disagreements on whether to employ certain chemical sprays on coca leaf growing areas have continued to hamper crop eradication operations. Failure to agree on priorities with several narcotic producing countries has been reflected in a general lack of host government will to pursue CN activities, particularly in Peru and Bolivia. U.S. efforts to enforce import control and limit internal distribution of precursor chemicals necessary for cocaine production have also been largely ineffective. One of the reasons is lack of strategic analysis concerning chemical distribution control. Many chemicals used in drug manufacturing such as kerosene, ammonia, and sulfuric acid are also widely utilized in various industrial applications. Strict control would cripple some significant host country industries. While efforts to reduce coca leaf cultivation and cocaine production have been almost uniformly ineffective, inadequate response to shifting patterns of cocaine shipment into the United States offers still another picture of a poorly coordinated group of U.S. agencies and departments. In this instance, a heavy emphasis on Caribbean infiltration routes, both airborne and maritime, has resulted in concentration of detection and intelligence assets to the areas from Texas through the Bahamas. Over 90 percent of E-3A AWACS missions, for example, are flown east of Brownsville, Texas, with only an occasional mission over the Mexican-U.S. border.12 This pattern of asset distribution has continued, despite intelligence information for over a year that narcotics traffickers have been steadily shifting their infiltration operations from the Caribbean to the Pacific and southwestern U.S. routes, largely through Mexico. The failure to effectively manage our intelligence detection and interdiction efforts is at least partially due to the large number of U.S. agencies involved. In the California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas areas, there are some 61 state and local law enforcement agencies under the Project Alliance coordination umbrella. This does not include the major federal players in the counternarcotics interdiction campaign such as DEA, FBI, CIA, DIA, USCG, NSA, U.S. Border Patrol, Customs, NORAD, the military services, and Joint Task Forces. While the array of U.S. agencies is impressive, their record of cooperation and coordination is not. As early as 1981, a study of Caribbean counternarcotics efforts involving U.S. and Caribbean government agencies revealed there was a frequent failure to share intelligence information with cognizant U.S. organizations. Much of this was attributed at the time to bureaucratic competition. For example, an agency might conveniently avoid passing intelligence to another in order to give its own personnel a chance of "making the bust," even though another agency might have a much higher probability of intercepting the narcotics shipment. This past summer, a senior official of Project Alliance admitted that this practice is alive and well throughout U.S. counter- narcotics agencies. His candid assessment was, "We are doing a little better than we did in the past to coordinate our activities and share information. Unfortunately, we are doing a whole lot better at concealing our lack of coordination. I believe this is due to increased competition for the counternarcotics pie."13 At the national level, the U.S. State Department has been given the lead in both counternarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts overseas. Despite this, scrutiny of almost any in-country CN/COIN group of programs reveals continuing struggles within the U.S. Ambassador's "Country Team." Personnel who have recently been a part of in-country CN/COIN program management continue to report that day-to-day operations resemble our dilemmas of the early Vietnam era. Sadly, with no clearly defined policy mandating our strategy and management, we continue to operate on a case-by-case basis, with the strongest personalities driving "preferred" U.S. programs over host government programs. In the Andean Ridge area, this lack of U.S. national policy guidance has resulted in a deaf ear to the priorities of host governments we are attempting to assist. Elements of a U.S. National Policy for Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency To properly counter the problem I suggest that U.S. policy must have the following enabling characteristics: - It must be at the highest national level. Any governmental level below the National Security Council (NSC) will be unable to compel major U.S. agency players to get their houses in order. Elements of the Department of Defense civilian staff, for example, continue to compete for pieces of the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict missions, which supply a significant amount of the total DOD support to CN and COIN. An NSC level policy would make it possible for the Secretary of Defense to unambiguously direct integration of the programs of DOD agencies, the military services, and the regional CINCS. - The policy must establish overall national objectives for both counterinsurgency and counternarcotics. These objectives would then guide development of very specific regional and country objectives, and enable the State Department to manage in-country programs within a defined national policy framework. - An effective national policy for COIN and CN must establish reliable resource links to the U.S. budget process, and should result in development of fiscally-constrained, realistic plans and programs for policy implementation by U.S. agencies. Within DOD, for example, Security Assistance Programs should directly support the national CN/COIN policy and should implement national strategy. Within the Department of State, economic development programs and AID should provide a coordinated CN/COIN influenced input to the annual budget request. - An effective national CN/COIN policy must identify changes to U.S. law and agency guidelines essential to effective, lawful, policy implementation. Issues such as posse comitatus, and preferential forgiveness of developmental and security assistance loans must all be reviewed at the NSC level. Legislative and policy change proposals should be assigned to specific agencies for development and submission to the White House and Congress. It is the security policy of the U.S. government to attack these problems concurrently overseas where they coexist, in full cooperation with the governments of insurgent afflicted and drug producing countries. A defined spectrum of tailored, mutually agreed upon, bilateral, and multilateral programs will be implemented and sustained that include developmental, security, economic, and law enforcement assistance. Goals: During the period 1991-2010, implement and sustain a fully integrated, National Security Council (NSC) monitored program of assistance to cooperating governments that will neutralize or at least measurably reduce the threats and effects of subversive insurgencies and the illicit narcotics industry. Objectives 1. The NSC should develop and implement an integrated, interagency strategy for control and constant evaluation of U.S. government CN and COIN programs to take effect immediately. 2. Regional focus, for planning purposes, will be prioritized as follows: a. South America b. Caribbean Sea c. Northern Southeast Asia (Golden Triangle) d. Africa (selected countries) e. Southwest Asia 3. Initial countries for strategy implementation program assessment, and adaptation (assuming host government concurrence) are: a. Colombia b. Peru c. Burma d. Nigeria e. Pakistan 4. Initiate Foreign Internal Defense (FID) programs tailored to host government and U.S. Country Team stated objectives and requirements. These programs will act as the country level umbrella for U.S. government department and agency efforts to assist the host nation, under the guidance and control of the respective Ambassadors, in close cooperation with the regional U.S. military CINC. The measure of effectiveness, on a yearly basis, will be the increased ability of the host government, military and/or police to conduct sustained internal defense and development activities. 5. Maintain the absolute minimum levels of U.S. military presence necessary to train, advise and assist host nation military and law enforcement counterparts in the sub-areas of counterinsurgency. All supporting psychological operations and civil affairs aspects will be fully coordinated and approved by responsible host nation and U.S. Country Team officials, with U.S. Information Service (USIS) guidance. To be effective, a U.S. national policy must be seen by the Administration, Congress, and the public as necessary. Its objectives must be seen as achievable. This implies that the problem must be perceived by policymakers and resource providers as significant, important to resolve, and within the ability of the U.S. government in cooperation with other international actors to reduce or resolve. For CN, the evidence is compelling and the public is sympathetic. For COIN, there is little U.S. public constituency. Thus, the interconnectedness of the challenge, or the exacerbation of the narcotics problems by insurgent involve- ment, must be convincingly demonstrated. To date there has been little progress in this regard. Galvanizing U.S. national will, political resolve, and pro-active attitudes requires that means and ends are defined, related, and seen as lawful and rational. This is particularly difficult if policy is stated too broadly and if resources are unspecified. In the case of CN and COIN, there is some good news: a lot can be done at low cost if activities are well focused at the operating level in each host country. Let's start with Colombia. FOOTNOTES 1. Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, Colombia A Country Study (Washington, DC, 1988), pp. 37-39. 2. Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics In Colombia (California, 1971), pp. 15-16. 3. Jesus Maria Henad and Geraldo Arrubla, History of Colombia (Chapel Hill, 1938), p. 333. 4. Journal of Internamerican Studies and World Affairs, A Publication for Advanced International Studies, The University of Miami, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1981, p. 132. 5. Colombia's Elections Lead to Deaths, Insight Magazine (November 26, 1990), p. 37. 6. Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Fall 1988), p. 84. 7. National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC, September 1989), pp. 1-6. 8. Brian Michael Jenkins, Colombia's Bold Gamble For Peace, (February 1985), p. 6. 9. U.S. Aid to Fight Rebels, a New York Times Report, reprinted in the Tampa Tribune (June 21, 1990), p. 3. 10. Conference Report 101-938, 101st Congress, 2d Session to accompany H.R. 5803 (October 24, 2990), p. 123. 11. Stopping the Flood of Cocaine with Operation Snowcap: Is It Working? H.R. 101-673, 101st Congress, 2d Session, August 14, 1990, pp. 1-5, pp. 12-13, p. 17. 12. Richard MacKenzie, "Borderline Victories on Drug War's Front Line." Insight Magazine (14 January 1991), pp. 8-17. 13. Millan, Guillermo, LTC, Colombian Army, Personal Interview, Ibague, Colombia, October 17, 1989. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abadia, Guillermo et al. El Gran Libro de Colombia, I, 1st ed. Bogota, Colombia: San Vicenc dels Horts, 1984. "A Report from the Front Lines in Colombia: The Drug War will be Long." New York Times, 18 September 1989, p. A4. Bagley, Bruce M. "Colombia and the War on Drugs." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Fall 1988), p. 84. Boyce, Daniel, "Narco-Terrorism," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (October 1987), p. 24. Burton, John. Deviance, Terrorist and War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Collett, Merrill. "The Myth of the Narco-Guerrillas," The Nation, (13 August 1988), p. 30. Colombia's Elections Lead to Deaths, Insight Magazine (November 26, 1990), p. 37. Conference Report 101-938, 101st Congress, 2d Session to accompany H.R. 5803, (October 24, 2990), p. 123. Craig, Richard. "Mexican Narcotics Trafficking: Binational Security Implications," Latin American Narcotics Trade, ed. Donald J. Mabry, Westport, CT: Grenwood Press, 1989. "Espectador Newspaper Bomb," Lost Angeles Times, 3 September 1989, p. 1. Hanratty, Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz. Colombia A Country Study (Washington, DC, 1988), pp. 37-39. Henad, Jesus Maria and Geraroo Arrubla. History of Colombia, (Chapel Hill, 1938), p. 333. Jenkins, Brian Michael. Colombia's Bold Gamble For Peace, (February 1985), p. 6. Journal of Internamerican Studies and World Affairs, A Publication for Advanced International Studies, The University of Miami, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1981, p. 132. Kupperman, Robert H. and Darrell M. Trent. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response. Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1979. Mackenzie, Richard. "Borderline Victories on Drug War's Front Line." Insight Magazine (14 January 1991), pp. 8-17. Millan, Guillermo, LTC, Colombian Army, Personal Interview, Ibague, Colombia, October 17, 1989. Maullin, Richard L. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics In Colombia, (California, 1971), pp. 15-16. National Drug Control Strategy. (Washington, DC, September 1989) pp. 1-6. Painter, James. "Bolivia Struggles in War Drugs." Christian Science Monitor, (6 September 1989), p. 6. Steinitz, Mark S. "Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade," Washington Quarterly, Vol 8, No. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 145-150. Stopping the Flood of Cocaine with Operation Snowcap: Is It Working? H.R. 101-673, 101st Congress, 2d Session, August 14, 1990, pp. 1-5, pp. 12-13, p. 17. U.S. Aid to Fight Rebels, a New York Times Report, reprinted in the Tampa Tribune (June 21, 1990), p. 3. Thackrah, John R. Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence. New York, Rutledge and Kegan Paul Inc., 1987. Weinraub, Bernard. "Bush to let U.S. Anti-drug Troops Move Outside Latin Base Corps," New York Times, 10 September 1989.
