The Keys To Successful Coalition Warfare: 1990 And Beyond AUTHOR Major Willie J. Brown, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Keys To Successful Coalition Warfare: 1990 and Beyond I. Theme: Coalition warfare has been practiced for thousands of years. Sometimes the results were a complete debacle, and other times the results were unequivocally successful. Germane to both case was a coalesced force acting in concert with all members to accomplish both their individual and collective goals. II. Thesis: Although coalition warfare was once looked upon as the perfect recipe for sure failure by Napoleon, an increasing world interdependence and collective abhorrence for unprovoked aggression has made it the modern recipe for success. But as with any recipe, a successful outcome depends on the careful measure and mixture of key ingredients. In coalition warfare, those tried and true ingredients include command relationships, training and tactics, combined operations, high technology weapons, personnel and equipment strength, and cultural relationships. III. Discussion: Coalition warfare has been a part of American history since its inception. From the American Revolution to our most recent involvement in Operation Desert Storm, coalition warfare has made significant contributions to the defense of America and her allies. The prerequisites for successful coalition warfare, command relationships and personnel and equipment strength and others, proved their worth during numerous conflicts. However, history also shed light on what happened when these key factors were not followed. IV. Summary: Although there were occasional setbacks during America's involvement in coalition warfare, the concept stood the test of time in proving its viability, resilience, and flexibility. Coalition warfare is no longer just a mutual arrangement of nations with common interests and values, it is a coalescenceof nations that of necessity transcend national core values and beliefs. V. Conclusion: As nations continue to rely upon one another more often for trade, technological research, and mutual defense, the importance of establishing coalitions becomes more critical with each passing day. Coalition member bodies like the United Nations, as proven during Operation Desert Storm, have the international respect, political clout, and the experience to continue to forge ahead in shaping and ensuring peace throughout the world. THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL COALITION WARFARE: 1990 AND BEYOND Thesis: Although coalition warfare was once looked upon as the perfect recipe for sure failure by Napoleon, an increasing world interdependence and collective abhorrence for unprovoked aggression has made it the modern recipe for success. But as with any recipe, a successful outcome depends on the careful measure and mixture of key ingredients. In coalition warfare, those tried and true ingredients include command relationships, training and tactics, doctrine, combined operations, high technology weapons, personnel and equipment strength, and cultural relationships. I. Coalition Warfare Experience A. World War I B. World War II C. Korean War D. Vietnam E. Operation Desert Storm II. Military Keys to Victory A. Command Relationships B. Training and Tactics C. Doctrine D. Combined Operations E. High Technology Weapons F. Personnel and Equipment Strength G. Cultural Relationships III. Current Coalition Experience A. Command and Control B. Conflict Termination C. Lessons Learned D. Impact of the Future THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL COALITION WARFARE: 1990 AND BEYOND by W.J. Brown Major CG #11 On 27 February 1991, President George Bush in a nationally televised report to Congress and the nation made the following statement: ". . .Ambassador Al Sabbah, I am happy to announce that Iraqi aggression has been stopped, and Kuwait is once again a free nation. . . ." To the joy of Ambassador Al Sabbah and to the relief of America and the other coalition members, this statement represented more than a military victory. It represented the combined resolve of several culturally diversified nations. This amalgamation of nations came together to answer the call to thwart aggression in Kuwait. In doing so, the viability of coalition forces had been successful once again. Coalition warfare has come a long way since the days of Frederick the Great. Although coalition warfare was once looked upon as the perfect recipe for sure failure by Napoleon, an increasing world interdependence and collective abhorrence for unprovoked aggression has made it the modern recipe for success. But as with any recipe, a successful outcome depends on careful measure and mixture of key ingredients. In coalition warfare, those tried and true ingredients include command relationships, training and tactics, doctrine, combined operations, high technology weapons, personnel and equipment strength, and cultural relationships. From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, America has witnessed firsthand both the benefits and shortcomings of coalition warfare. History tells us not only of the key factors that contributed to success in the past, but it suggests how and why coalition warfare is so vital to the future defense of America and her allies. America's involvement in World War I was viewed with skepticism by some -- most notably Great Britain. America reluctantly entered World War I after many years of isolationism. Her military did not reflect the muscle needed to challenge the might of Germany and her allies. Yet, she found herself in the trenches fighting alongside Great Britain, France, and Russia. Despite her courage and valor, America was not remembered as a mighty nation during World War I. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in World War II, said that running through all his thinking was a burning desire, retained from World War I, to prove something to the European commanders. He wanted to prove that the American soldier was equal to any in the field. Generals Marshall and Pershing and their World War I colleagues were never quite sure that their British and French comrades-in-arms sufficiently respected the American ability to command. (14: 191) It was with this military backdrop that America entered the early days of World War II. Colonel Robert J. Berens, USA (retired), echoed similar sentiments as a former member of the 34th Infantry Division, a National Guard unit from Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas in World War II. He wrote: While on a recent reading binge, I discovered that several World War II books, both British and American, were quite critical of American units that fought in the Tunisian campaign. (2: 24) Despite repeated pleas from Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Roosevelt was very cautious about America's involvement in World War II. Fortunately for Prime Minister Churchill and perhaps the world, Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Germany's subsequent declaration of war on the United States forced America into the Allies' camp. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, during the bombing of Pearl Harbor said, "I fear we have awakened a sleeping giant." It's debatable whether or not a sleeping giant was awakened, but there is no doubt that herculean commanders arose to meet the challenge of the Axis and Japan. A group of deer led by a lion will always defeat a group of lions led by a deer. There is much to be said of this wit and even more of the Allied commanders in World War II. General Eisenhower was but one of the titans of World War II; however, in many ways he was perhaps the greatest asset the Allies possessed. As with most coalitions, each party has its own agenda on how to fight the war, when to fight the war, and what conflict termination will look like. World War II was no exception. Despite unanimous agreement on a strategy which called for beating Germany first, containing Japan until Germany was defeated, and finally forcing Japan into unconditional surrender, there was much heated debate on when and how. (7: 27) Notwithstanding the differences in opinion on how the war should be run between Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General George S. Patton, General Eisenhower's tact and diplomacy held the Allies together. There were times when even the patience of General Eisenhower was stretched, as evidenced by this quote appearing in David Irving's, The War Between the Generals: I am tired of dealing with a lot of prima donnas. By God, you tell that bunch that if they can't get together and stop quarreling like children, I will tell the Prime Minister to get someone else to run this damn war. (9: iii) General Eisenhower's generalship and diplomacy not only held the Allies' command structure together, but provided the impetus necessary to take advantage of the personnel strength and high technology that were available through this alliance. It became painfully clear that the Allies had their hands full after Germany's blitzkrieg through the Ardennes and into France in the spring of 1940. Germany's invasion of Prussia followed a year later, and by December 1941 Britain and Russia were fighting with their backs to the wall. They were joined by the United States, but its only ready arm --the Navy--had been reduced to smoking wreckage at Pearl Harbor. However, Britain and the United States immediately formed an interlocking directorate, pooled their resources, and placed all that they could spare at the disposal of the embattled Russians. At once they began to concert plans for a worldwide offensive on the assumption that they could utterly defeat both the Axis and Japan. (7: 10) The foresight and thoroughness with which the Allies planned, developed and applied their resources, economic and military, was fundamental to the accomplishment later achieved by the Allies. In April 1942 a proposal -- at the urging of a desperate Soviet Union -- was made to immediately begin an Allied build-up of strength in England to launch a cross-Channel attack in the spring of 1943 (ROUNDUP). This attack did not occur as envisioned by the Allies in 1943 because of tactical considerations and a lack of the required men and landing craft. While attacking up the Italian peninsula as a sop to Stalin, Allies continued to amass personnel and shipping in England. The now famous Normandy landing occurred on 6 June 1944, a testimony to the resolve of the Allies to combine their forces in an all-out effort to achieve a decisive victory at Normandy. The victory at Normandy was the result of brilliant planning and execution. All the while preparations were being made, Allied air power had been shaping the battlefield. Strategic bombing and the Allied success against the Luftwaffe were taking a heavy toll. Although air campaigns did not win the war, the advent of improved aircraft, munitions, and tactics were instrumental in wearing away both the Luftwaffe and the enemy's will to resist. Nevertheless, the Axis power continued to resist the ever pressing Allied combined operations. There were many factors that significantly contributed to the Allies victory over the Axis powers, but in the final analysis it was the men and women, the resources, the technology, and the combined efforts of the Allies that exacted victory out of armed conflict. General Walter B. Smith encapsulated this idea as follows: It is tribute to the bravery of our fighting men and the skill of their tactical leaders that the Allied forces never suffered a real military defeat during the entire course of the European campaign. But it is also a monument to the efficiency of our services of supply and particularly to the superiority of our Air Force in destroying its opposition and disrupting the supply system of the enemy. (6: 29) As befitting the man, General Eisenhower at the close of the war in Europe wrote, in massive understatement, "The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, May 7, 1945." (6: 229) World War II finally ended when the "sleeping giant" awakened the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the world's first use of the atomic bomb. Victory came at a very high price, but the dividends gained through coalition warfare were an investment for the future of alliances. The future was not long in coming. The very same Allied forces that worked side-by-side to defeat the Axis and Japan also were called upon in 1950 to liberate Korea. The seeds of the Korean war had been planted in the aftermath of World War II. On 15 August 1945 the Japanese surrendered to the Allies. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943, issued by the British and U.S. leaders and Chiang Kai-shek of China, had stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Russians accepted the Cairo agreement, but proposals made by the United States in 1945 led to the division of Korea into two military zones: the area south of the 38th parallel to be under U.S. occupation and the northern area to be under Soviet control. U.S. Forces were withdrawn from South Korea in June 1949, leaving only a small military mission. South Korea's forces were far weaker than the North's forces at the time. After tension and rivalry between the North and the South grew more menacing, a North Korean force of over 60,000 troops, supported by Soviet-built tanks, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the South on 25 June 1950. U.S. Forces arrived on 30 June after a United Nations request. Once again the call for help coalesced under one body. The United Nations (UN) mounted a collective defensive action in support of South Korea. Armed forces from 16 UN member states, attached to a unified commander under the U.S. Army, were sent to help repel the invasion. As with World War II, it was unity of command, tenacity, air power, and aggregate manpower that eventually turned the tide of battle against the North Korean invaders. Recognizing the importance of coalition warfare and the significance of sheer numbers of fighting men, the People's Republic of China sent 200,000 troops to assist North Korea. The Chinese advanced into South Korea but were driven back by a UN counterattack in April 1951. Thanks to strong UN Forces committed to keeping South Korea free, peace negotiations began in July 1951. However, hostilities continued until an armistice agreement finally was made on 27 July 1953. The narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates the two frontiers still is protected by the resolve of a wide coalition of forces dedicated to one another and the cause of peace. (12: 532) Somewhat like Korea, the State of Vietnam had been divided after the French left in the 1950's. The State of Vietnam, originally within the French Union, made an agreement with France in June 1954, after which French forces withdrew. South Vietnam's jurisdiction was limited to the zone south of 17 degrees N. Complete sovereignty was transferred by France in December 1954. For approximately 20 years after the Geneva agreements, the area south of the 17th parallel remained a separate state with an anti-communist administration supported by the U.S.. Gradually, South Vietnam moved out of the French ambit and into the U.S. sphere of influence. South Vietnam also developed much closer relations with other U.S. -aligned states: the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic of Korea. Although a coalition force, as in wars past, was committed to defend South Vietnam, it lacked some of the key military traits necessary for victory. The most glaring element mishandled in the Vietnam War was personnel strength. It alone did not cast the die for military defeat, but its lack of proper application was quite costly. The number of U.S. forces in Vietnam increased from 23,000 at the beginning of 1965 to more than 500,000 by March 1968. In addition, contingents were sent from the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. Although the number of personnel were substantially high at the end of the war, the U.S. and its Allies had sent in forces piecemeal; therefore, the awesome power of this coalition was never realized. Its dynamic lethality was never unleashed, and so the war continued to take a predictable course. The war took a turn for the worse in January-February 1968, when the communists launched an offensive to coincide with the lunar New Year (known as Tet). The Tet offensive, although only a partial success, forced the U.S. to reconsider her policy of "defending South Vietnam at all costs." President Johnson decided against a further expansion of the war and rejected the request of General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, for an additional 200,000 men. A gradual U.S. withdrawal ensued under the guise of a new U.S. policy, `Vietnamization'. The end of the Vietnam War was the predictable outcome of the erosion of coalition forces that had started with the enemy's TET offensive. Although air power and high technology weapons did not turn the tide of battle in Vietnam, the combined use of strategic bombing with conventional and guided munitions was quite effective when the principle of concentration of power was repeatedly and systematically applied. However, victory was not lost because one principle of war was violated; rather, it was lost because many principles of war were violated. In the end, the Paris Agreement provided for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, together with the return of U.S. prisoners of war, by the end of March 1973. For the U.S. the war was over. We had suffered 45,941 combat deaths and over 10,000 deaths from other causes in Vietnam, as well as 150,000 wounded. The statistics, unfortunately, did not show the toll on the pride of a great, powerful nation who boasted not only her own strength but the strength of her allies. (15: 1088-89) What was to become of this world power and her ideas of coalition warfare in the face of such a humiliating defeat? It is said that time heals all things, but the bitter wounds plagued the U.S. military like a Ieper. Confidence in the military eroded. The U.S. no longer stood as the symbol for deterrence and retribution. Although there were a few successful campaigns/operations -- Urgent Fury, Just Cause -- confidence in America's military was at low ebb. Thus, when America agreed to help her ally and friend Saudi Arabia when threatened by Iraq following an unprovoked Iraqi blitzkrieg into Kuwait, many doubted her ability to accomplish the mission. Unbeknownst to the public at large was a U.S. military reborn. A somewhat unusual advertisement in a March 18, 1991 edition of U.S. News and World Report read as follows: Thanks America and the Global Family of Nations. The people of Kuwait are appreciative for the swift response from the United States Forces and the United Nations Coalition to reinstate the independence of the country and sovereignty of Kuwait. . . Our unwavering gratitude to the people of America who were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in the defense of the peaceful people of Kuwait. From Desert Storm. . .to Desert Peace. Thank you. (10: 71) The transition from the debacle in Vietnam to the devastation of Iraq's army resulted from many lessons learned and relearned. Among those relearned was the importance of coalition warfare, the gathering of all nations with similar interests and values to subdue an aggressive dictator. As in World War II, the importance of a good commander and command relationship was paramount to the United Nations' forces arrayed on the battlefield against a well fortified Iraqi army on the desert floor of Kuwait. This time the general was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command. General Schwarzkopf, and everyone around him, accepted that this would be a combined operation in every sense of the word. On August 2, 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Schwarzkopf's command existed largely on paper and in the minds of several hundred staff people. That paper force turned into the command of more than 500,000 American troops and co-command of an additional 200,000 allied forces poised on the Saudi-Kuwati border awaiting the order to attack. Schwarzkopf and his staff brought this force together in the desert, and planned and coordinated the mission of a polyglot multinational force. This was the largest American led military coalition since Vietnam. Perhaps this was the first time America had a larger- than-life general to lead troops since General Eisenhower. In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, General Schwarzkopf revealed himself as follows: I really think of myself as a soldier who tries to do his duty with honor, serving his country. Contrary to what has been said about me, I have never had any illusions of grandeur, of leading huge armies into battle, and I will confess that sometimes the awesome responsibility that is placed on my shoulders flat scares me to death...I love my country, I love my troops, and I dearly love my family. ... (6: 32-34) The significance of good generalship is a key to success. Sun Tzu wrote: The expert commander strikes only when the situation assures victory. To create such a situation is the ultimate responsibility of generalship. Before he gives battle the superior general causes the enemy to disperse. When the enemy disperses and attempts to defend everywhere he is weak everywhere, and at the selected points many will be able to strike a few. (8: 39-42) General Schwarzkopf's orchestration of Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the results of painstaking preparation and accommodation. He built up his forces, applied the principles of war, made use of air power, employed high technology weapons judicially, and combined the capabilities of each coalition partner efficiently and effectively. He also respected core values of the varied cultures involved. The efficiency and effectiveness of Operation Desert Storm yielded some new "lessons learned." Although the air war lasted just 1000 hours and the ground war a paltry 100, it will be weeks before all the after-action reports, bomb-damage assessments and prisoner-of-war debriefings can be examined in a systematic, objective fashion. Nevertheless, some lessons have surfaced in what must be regarded as a rapid, total and remarkably low-cost allied victory. Critical ingredients to this allied victory were addressed by General Michael Dugan, retired former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, in a recent article in U.S. News and World Report. He stated that the first lesson of the gulf was about personnel and leadership. General Dugan further commented: The quality of the people involved - their performance under fire, their self-discipline and their victory - reveal the payoff and the value of America's all-volunteer force. From the dustiest marine to the commander in chief, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Americans in the gulf been impressive. (5: 32-36) General Dugan also applauded the training, technology, and doctrine of the coalition forces. Although all the factors mentioned contributed significantly to the success of Operation Desert Storm, much of the success resulted from the unity and resolve of the coalition. The forces that united against Iraqi aggression had one thing in common -- the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They had several things that were diametrical opposites: religion, dietary habits, cultural beliefs, etc. Yet in the face of a common antagonist, they set aside their differences and united their resources and energies toward liberating Kuwait and thwarting aggression. Realizing the fragile nature of our coalition, Saddam Hussein attempted to bring Israel into the war in order to fracture the united front. He introduced the Palestine Liberation Organization issue of a homeland into the equation in hopes of creating a rift. He declared the war with the "infidels" a holy war. He did everything possible to strain the relationship of the coalition forces amassed against him. However, fellow Arabs preferred fratricide to unprovoked homicide. (11: 44-46) In the final analysis, cultural differences yielded to common good. Sun Tzu believed that moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success. He also believed the master conqueror frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances. (8: 39-42) The coalition forces of Operation Desert Storm proved that the master conqueror can be an alliance. The American Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm all have a common thread among them - coalition warfare. America is facing and will continue to face budgetary constraints that will force reductions in military spending, personnel strength, and technological research and development. Nevertheless, the requirements to maintain a viable force in readiness will continue to grow as America approaches the year 2000. Growing international interdependency, third world developments, arms proliferation, and numerous other variables will require America to be vigilant and responsive. Can we respond in the face of so many challenges? We can. However, we can only do this in concert with our allies. National unity was deemed by Sun Tzu to be an essential requirement for victory. That is still true today. Notwith- standing, coalition unity will of necessity be deemed a requirement for victory in the future. A verse from Isiah 2:41 is inscribed on the United Nations building which reads as follows: And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. Perhaps the ultimate coalition will be the United Nations. Although it has sputtered and faltered since it inception in 1945, it has shown a resilience and stamina that enabled it to survive. The UN played a major role in Desert Storm and will assume an even larger role in the post-war period. Although the U.S. is riding high after its Desert Storm success, a formidable challenge awaits her as she adjusts to the ultimate coalition -- the UN. 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