Military Force Restructure For The Future AUTHOR Major Wayne E. Briggs, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MILITARY FORCE RESTRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE As the final page is turned on the 20th century, America must guard against falling into the historical cycle of demobilizing its military forces after conflict termination that it has followed since the Revolutionary War. With the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, many Americans consider the Cold War with the Soviet Union of the past 40 years has come to an end. They mistakenly believe, as our predecessors did, that America can dismantle its military structure and divert that portion of the Gross National Product (GNP) to other governmental projects, reaping the peace dividend. This would be a grave mistake. A strong America provides a stabilizing influence in the inter- national community. The socioeconomic pressures, coupled with a spiralling national debt, have caused defense planners to cut manpower in the military as a means of relieving fiscal burdens. Current plans will reduce the military by 25% with a total Department of Defense funding of less than 4% of the GNP by 1995. Restructuring the Department of Defense will provide a comparable budgetary bonus while retaining a credible manpower structure. This structure would consist of a dual military service arrangement, an expanded Marine Corps and the Navy administered directly under the Department of Defense. OUTLINE Thesis Statement: America can maintain her military strength while reducing the Defense Budget simply by restructuring the Department of Defense. I. Past National Security Policies A. Isolationist B. Nuclear Retaliation 1. Atomic Monopoly 2. Korean Invasion II. Present Peacetime Defense Policy A. Cost B. Threat 1. Bipolar 2. Multi-polar III. The National Security Act of 1947 IV. Future Defense Strategy A. End of the Cold War B. Budget Deficit C. Manpower Reductions 1. Forward Deployment 2. Multi-polar Threat V. An Alternate Defense Strategy A. Departmental Reorganization B. Dual Military Service Concept MAJ Wayne E. Briggs C. G. #4 MILITARY FORCE RESTRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE As the Cold War essentially draws to a close, America must responsibly plan for the future organization of its military. A military capable of handling contingencies in a multi-lateral international threat environment must be provided. Manpower cuts designed to relieve fiscal pressure must be done with common sense or we will doom ourselves to repeating the costly errors of the past. The past pitfalls can be avoided by restructuring the Defense Department into a two service organization (a combined arms service and the Navy) and eliminating the current service secretary administrative level. America can maintain her military strength while reducing the Defense budget simply by restructuring the Department of Defense. Throughout America's history the Armed Forces have been allowed to deteriorate to impotence after the termination of major conflicts. "After the end of the Revolution in 1783, both the Continental Navy and Marines waned into temporary nonentity under the Confederation's unified "Department of War"." (9/114) As we move through history toward more modern times, we see military forces reduced to postwar lows after the war with Mexico, the Civil War and most dramatically after World War II. Because of public euphoria, politics and parochial in-fighting between the services, together with competition for a limited share of the Federal Budget, we have witnessed this cyclic military degeneration phenomena with almost pinpoint predictability. In our recent past, we have seen America's military power reduced "under a skeletonized system that omitted up to one-third of a division's maneuver elements and much of its firepower." (6/3) Because National Security Policy was oriented toward the concept of global war originating in Europe, "the United States government was totally unprepared for the disaster befalling the Republic of Korea." (6/5) This policy orientation based on the single global war contingency together with "the complacent national mood, budget restrictions, and low enlistment rates had combined to lower Army strength ... to ... barely one-tenth of the World War II total." (6/3) "It is somewhat ironic that for the first 170 years of its existance the United States had no real military policy or strategy." (7/14) Although America had national interests, they rarely translated into a defense policy. Because of its isolationist policy, the government did not recognize the need for a peacetime defense policy, therefore large standing armies were not maintained. If the U. S. was required to fight a war, it would build a military force capable of achieving victory. The need for a large peacetime army along with a peacetime defense strategy became clear as the United States was thrust into, "the age of the superpowers," (5/83) at he end of the Second World War displacing the British empire as the dominant global power. "The production of the atomic bomb - which appeared to render both sea power and land power irrelevant," (5/82) lead the U. S. to depend on nuclear retaliation as the key to national defense strategy. "As a result of this defense policy, the American Navy and Army were not revitalized even during the darkest days of the Cold War in the late 1940s."(7/21) It was recognized to some extent that conventional forces would be needed to defend Western Europe with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The flaw in the massive retaliation strategy of the Truman era became evident when it was discovered that the Soviets detonated an atomic weapon of their own, thereby breaking America's atomic monopoly. Additionally, the invasion of South Korea, for which the United States government was completely unprepared, demonstrated a clear need for a strong standing conventional force. The lesson that should be taken away from the Korean experience is "the need for a balanced defense policy with strong nuclear and strong conventional forces." (7/24) These forces will be necessary to insure American interests and national policy are achieved. American defense policy has evolved from George Washington's policy of avoiding foreign entanglements to a present day bilateral/coalition regional defense policy designed to protect American national interests worldwide. Can America continue to afford the cost of its current peacetime defensive strategy? As the cost of peacetime defense, become more prohibitive, Americans are questioning whether the expense has become too high especially in light of the many internal social programs competing with the defense budget for fewer and fewer tax dollars. In the future the costs will likely go up as the U. S. updates its arsenal with new and more technically sophisticated hardware. Americans must decide what national interests and foreign commitments are vital to the country's survival. A sound investment in a continued peacetime defensive strategy and a restructured, streamlined defense establishment will insure America will not have to pay greater costs in blood and treasure in the future. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union turning inward to solve its growing social and economic problems, the threat of a global conflict starting on the plains of Europe have greatly diminished. As the international environment fragments from a bipolar into a multi-polar arena, America must maintain its military strength and enhance its capability to defend national interests and allies throughout the world. Some cost savings for this new strategic focus can be realized by finding suitable alternatives for some of the high technology aircraft and weapons systems or by combining multiple missions into a single piece of hardware. "Substantial savings could, however, be made by reducing manpower costs." (7/220) Congress' desire to streamline the military establishment by transferring and consolidating functions of the executive department and unifying the military departments under a single cabinet level secretary was achieved after WW II when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed. "The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces. . ."." (4/2-14) The integration of the armed forces under unified control would allow for greater efficiency in the use of the nations military resources, "The National Security Act of 1947, which unified the Armed Services, is the controlling legislation of this country's (military)." (9/73) As such the NSA as ammended by public laws 432 (80th Congress) and 416 (82nd Congress, 2nd Session) and "The Function Papers" (originally known as "the Key West Agreement") clearly established the Marine Corps as the only truely combined arms force within the Department of Defense. The National Security Act as ammended requires the Marine Corps to organize based on a tri-division, tri-wing concept. Additionally, the Corps will train as a combined arms force with the supporting air components. This concept was successfully tested and proven to be sound during the Korean Conflict. "It is not possible to predict the future shape and direction of Soviet policy, there are changes that can be identified, some with positive benefits and some with unknown consequinces."(12/101) The Soviet Union is the only nation on earth that has the capability to destroy the United States and its allies. The continued modernization of the Soviet nuclear arsenal combined with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the social turmoil within the USSR poses a profound challenge to maintaining international security in the future. We must maintain a modern, flexible military force capable of responding to unexpected crises throughout the world. "Unilateral . . . disarmament, would remove our flexibility, weaken global deterrence and heighten global instability." (12/102) "Key prerequisites to our (future) success are the maintenance of our economic vitality and the sustainment of our strong ... military forces,"(3/A-6) Soviet/Warsaw Pact instability and our future economic interests demand we continue our strategy of forward deployment. We must maintain a strong security posture to insure attainment of national goals, especially inlight of current efforts to cut the national budget and control the national deficit. The lessons of the past must remain clear or we will repeat the costly mistakes of the past. Forty-three years ago Secretary of Defense James Forrestal discussed America's sudden demobilization after World War II and the requirement of a strong defense in maintaining peace. "We scrapped our war machine, mightiest in the history of the world, in a manifestation of confidence that we should not need it any longer. Our quick and complete demobilization was a testimonial to our good will rather than to our common sense. International fractions which constitute a threat to our national security and to the peace of the world have since compelled us to strengthen our armed forces for self-protection." (11/x) America must not allow this cycle to repeat itself as it has in the past. With the approach of the 21st century and the end of the Cold War brought about by the failure of communism, "the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military." (1) Considering the budget constraints of the future, the defense department's strategic planners calculate that America's security needs can be met with a force structure 25% smaller than today's funded with less than 4% of the gross national product (GNP) by 1995. These calculations are based on the assumption that a massive attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact is unlikely and a "new strategy (that) focuses . . . on major regional threats that could harm U. S. interests." (1) When completed in 1995, the force reduction will leave "American Armed Forces . . . at their lowest level since 1950," (1) the year the Korean War started. The new defense strategy plans for the likelyhood of a greater number of contingencies in regions outside the European theater; therefore, "we will need forces that give us global reach." (1) These forces must be ready to rapidly respond to crises throughout the world because of the reduction of forward deployed troops. The reorganization and restructure of America's armed forces based on a multi-polar international threat and internal socio- economic considerations must avoid reducing the military to a mere garrison force. Clausewitz warns, "The more restricted the strength, the more restricted its goals must be; further, the more restricted the strength, the more limited the duration." (2/283) A strong America will insure a stable world. Conversely, a weak America may send a signal starting a chain of events leading to another Korean style conflict. A strong military with the capability to secure American national policy objectives over the entire spectrum of war, from low intensity conflict to total war, must be maintained. If it becomes necessary to obtain a political, economic goal with force in the future, the military must have the capability to respond with the proper amount of force necessary to secure the objective. This response will require a combined effort using air, land and sea assets. The military force structure for America's future must be mobile and flexible. It must be appropriately balanced, trained and equipped to provide a strategic as well as a conventional deterrance posture. Keeping in mind the fiscal challenges of the remainder of this decade, defense planners would be able to attain a substantial budgetary reduction, without sacrificing military power through extensive manpower cutbacks, simply by restructuring the current military establishment. The new organization would be based on a dual service system made up of an expanded Marine Corps and the Navy. The Navy will continue in its traditional roles of protecting American shores, global power projection and nuclear deterrence. The Marine Corps, being the only true combined armes service, would absorb the Army's ground and aviation components as well as the Air Force's aviation assets. The basic administrative divison/wing structure would remain in place; however, it would be greatly expanded. The dual service organization retains a greater number of warfighters while reducing the overall administrative structure by desolving the offices of the Secretarys of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. With this administrative layer removed, the combined arms force and the Navy would be administered directly by the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense would function similar to the present Department of the Navy. Not only would this reorganization streamline command and control of deployed military forces, but it would also provide America with substantial financial benefits. These benefits would be realized through the consolidation of logistics and supply into a single centrally controlled combat service support organization. In summary, the skeletionization of America's military strength must be avoided to prevent a repeating of the errors of past peacetime defense strategies, best exemplified by the Korean conflict. The global community, particularly our allies, see a strong America as a stabilizing influence within the many regional global subdivisions. With a shift of international politics, from a bipolar to a multi-polar environment, caused by the failure of communism, U. S. forces will be called upon to exercise contingencies outside the European theater. These forces must be flexible, and capable of rapid deployment to anywhere in the world. The volume of our international commitments will not change substantially. Therefore, a military manpower reduction to ease fiscal pressures would not be prudent. America can maintain its military capability as well as reduce budgetary pressure by reorganizing the Department of Defense under the dual service concept, a combined arms force (the Marine Corps) and the Navy. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bush, George, President of the United States. Speech at the Aspen Institute Symposium. Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1991. 2. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War Ed. and Tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 3. Hardisty, Huntington, Admiral, USN. "Pacific Challenges" in Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies, The 1989 Pacific Symposium. Ed. Dora Alves. Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1990. 4. Kennedy, Paul. Strategy and Diplomacy 1870 - 1945. Boston: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983. 5. National Defense University. Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Officer's Guide 1991, AFSC PUB 1. Norfolk, 1991. 6. Robertson, William Glenn. Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, Leavenworth Papers, No. 13. 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