Too Many General Officers? AUTHOR Major Stephen W. Baird, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TOO MANY GENREAL OFFICERS? I. Thesis: In light of the future reduction of G/FOs, the Marine Corps will have to continue to operate with a deficit of general officers when compared to overall requirements. The challenge for the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be to balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine Corps remains the force of choice. II. Problem: The present reduction of generals/flag officers (G/FOs) imposed by Congress will negatively impact on the Commandant's ability to adequately staff both his internal and external general officer requirements. A shortage of Marine general officers in the joint arena could result in less operational exposure for the Marine Corps with the combatant commanders. This could have a direct effect on the future of the Marine Corps. III. Supporting Points: Competing with the Commandant's flexibility in the assignment of his general officers is the fact that general officers are becoming a scarce resource. As a result of the the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, the Marine Corps will lose nine general officers. If we do not have general officer representation across the joint arena to advise the combatant commanders of the utility of Marine forces, then the Marine Corps will not be included in the CINC's force list. If we are not included in the combatant commanders' force list then we will not participate in future operations. An indication of how the shortage of general officers impacts on Marine Corps operational capabilities can be drawn from our experience in Desert Shield/Storm. In order to effectively conduct operations in the joint and combined operation in Southwest Asia, the Marine Corps temporarily assigned ten general officers to support both internal and external requirements. IV. Conclusion: The Commandant of the Marine Corps will have to carefully balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena. TOO MANY GENERAL OFFICERS? OUTLINE Thesis Statement: In light of the future reduction of G/FOs, the Marine Corps will have to continue to operate with a deficit of general officers when compared to overall requirements. The challenge for the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be to balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine Corps remains the force of choice. I. General officer (G.O.) reduction issues A. Impact on the Marine Corps B. Qualifications to address G.O. issues C. G.O. assignment options D. Present USMC G.O. authorizations II. How G.O. authorizations are determined A. Title 10, United States Code Annotated B. Historical perspective on authorizations III. DoD response to reduction of G.O. A. Hay Group Study B. Testimony by ASD for FM&P IV. Present reduction plan for general/flag officers A. Secretary of Defense plan B. Senate Armed Service Committee response C. 1991 Defense Authorization Act V. Future challenges for the Commandant A. General officers in joint billets B. G.O.s and Desert Shield/Storm C. General officer assignment challenge TOO MANY GENERAL OFFICERS? by Major S. W. Baird CG#11 One of the many challenges the Commandant of the Marine Corps will face in the future will be the assignment of his general officers. This challenge may seem minor when compared to the one he faces in structuring the Marine Corps to meet our security needs for the next century. However, his decisions regarding the assignment of his general officers will have a direct impact on the future of the Marine Corps. If you accept the premise that future military operations will be a joint effort; similar to Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia, then you would also agree that the Marine Corps must have general officer representation in the joint arena. Presently, the Marine Corps has a shortage of general officers when compared against total requirements. This shortage negatively impacts on the Commandant's ability to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena. A congressionally imposed reduction of generals/flag officers (G/FOs) will further limit the Commandant's ability to staff both internal and joint general officer billets. I want to highlight this problem of a shortage of general officers by addressing how general officer authorizations are made, how recent legislation has affected general officer authorizations, how the Department of Defense has reacted to general officer reductions, how the shortage of general officers was addressed with respect to staffing for Desert Shield/Storm, and how this problem of poses a future challenge for the Commandant. In light of the future reduction of G/FOs, the Marine Corps will have to continue to operate with a deficit of general officers when compared to overall requirements. The challenge for the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be to balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine Corps remains the force of choice. You may be asking yourself what qualifies a Marine major to write about general officers issues. During my last tour I served for one year as the General Officer Matters Officer at Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC). In this position I worked directly for the general officer who heads the Personnel Management Division at HQMC. My duties involved the administrative processing of all requirements pertaining to general officer assignments to include: slating, orders, nominations for joint positions, etc.. Having served in this position certainly does not make me the expert on all general officer matters; however, the tour did provide me with an insight into issues which few officers have had the opportunity to be exposed to. There is one thing I would like to emphasis, I held the position of the General Officers Matters Officer, but the true General Officers Matters Officer is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He, contingent upon approval by the Secretary of the Navy, made all assignment decisions concerning his general officers. The Commandant has two options of assignment for his general officers, he can either assign them to internal positions or external (joint) positions. Competing with the Commandant's flexibility in the assignment of his general officers is the fact that general officers are becoming a scarce resource. Congressional committees are challenging the Department of Defense (DoD) to demonstrate why the services require so many G/FOs. As a result of the the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, G/FOs will be reduced from the current ceiling of 1,073 to 858.(3) As part of this reduction the Marine Corps will lose nine general officers.(1) Today the Marine Corps is authorized 70 promoted. general officers and nine frocked brigadier generals to meet both internal and joint requirements. Per Title 10, United States Code Annotated,(USCA), Section 525, the grade breakdown of the 70 general officers is as follows: Grade # Authorized general 2 lieutenant general 8 major general 25 brigadier general 35 The Marine Corps presently has 82 internal general officer positions and presently staffs 15 billets in the Joint arena for a total requirement of 97 general officers.(1) This leaves the Marine Corps with a shortage of 18 general officers when compared to internal requirements. In order to understand how the reduction of general officers impacts on the Marine Corps I feel it is necessary to provide you with an appreciation for the complex issue of general officer authorizations. In doing so I will present a historical perspective of the Marine Corps' general officer authorizations focusing on recent events which have led to the current reduction in general officer authorizations. We must first examine the process of how general officer authorizations are determined for Marine Corps. The number of general officers the Marine Corps is authorized is promulgated by Title 10, United States Code Annotated, Section 5443. (Our sister services also receive their G/FO authorizations from Section 5443) The authorization for general officers is based on the number of officers serving in the grade of second lieutenant and above. At our present officer strength, in accordance with Title 10, USCA, the Marine Corps is authorized 73 general officers. However, the 73 general officers authorized by Title 10, USCA, is superceded by a ceiling imposed on G/FO authorizations by Congress and the DoD. This ceiling on G/FO authorizations takes precedence over the G/FO authorizations granted in Title 10, USCA.(7) The number of generals or flag officers (flag officer is the Navy term for an admiral) each military service is authorized is not an arbitrary number that the service singly determines. There is a method to the process and that method involves the Congress. At this point let's take a historical snapshot of how the Marine Corps arrived at its current authorization of 70 general officers. The Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947 established limits on the authorized number of general/flag officers (G/FOs) for each service. At that time, the Marine Corps was in the process of scaling down its general officer strength from a World War II high of 79 general officers. Upon the enactment of the 1947 OPA the Marine Corps had 47 general officers with a projected strength of 44 general officers in 1950. Following the Korean War, the Officer Grade Level Act (OGLA) of 1954 fixed ceilings that codified in law the dramatic growth of G/FO numbers between 1950 - 1954. During this period the Marine Corps increased from 44 to 60 general officers. In the years following the 1954 OGLA, 1955 - 1965, Congressional ceilings on G/FOs held the Navy and Marine Corps authorizations relatively stable while the Army experienced modest growth and the Air Force expanded dramatically. In order to support the conflict in Vietnam, the Senate in 1965 authorized an increase in G/FO authorizations for all the services. The Marine Corps gained 15 general officers in the Senate ceiling. Subsequent to the Vietnam conflict, the Marine Corps general officer authorization was reduced from the post Vietnam high of 79 to 69 general officers in 1975. The Fiscal Year(FY)78 Defense Authorization Act directed a reduction of 6% in the total number of G/FOs throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). This legislation reduced the number of G/FOs from 1141 to 1073, a total reduction of 68 G/FOs. The reason for the 6% reduction was the belief in Congress that there were too many generals and admirals in the DoD. The reduction was phased over several years with the final reduction to 1073 G/FOs directed in the FY82 Defense Authorization Act. The Marine Corps' share of the G/FOs was determined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as 65. The authorization of 65 general officers changed in June of 1986 when the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a reallocation of G/FO authorizations within the DoD. As a result of the reallocation, the Marine Corps general officer authorization increased from 65 to 70 as our general officer participation in the joint arena increased from 10 to 15. In FY87, in an effort to obtain relief from the 1,073 G/FO ceiling, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked each military service to conduct a billet review of all G/FO positions. OSD coordinated the review and contracted the Hay Group of Washington, D.C., to conduct the study. The Hay Group was chosen because it is a recognized pioneer and leader in the field of job measurement and job analysis. The purpose of the study was to develop a reliable, valid, and defensible methodology for establishing service requirements for G/FO positions. The study used the zero-based method of analysis in an effort to establish each G/FO requirement on its own merit and without regard to previous rationale or justification. The total number of G/FO positions validated by the Hay Group for the DoD was 1,436. (4) When compared to the present ceiling of 1,073 G/FOs for the DoD, there are 363 positions that require a G/FO that are either filled with an officer of a lower grade, or the responsibilities of that position are covered by dual-hatting (one officer filling two positions) a G/FO. Of the 1,436 validated G/FO positions, the Marine Corps had 82 internal positions validated. On August 10th, 1988, the Honorable Grant Green Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel for the Armed Services. His intent was to use the Hay Group findings as a basis for a request that Congress raise the G/FO authorization ceiling. An excerpt of his testimony is as follows: After years of being accused of lacking a coherent method of identifying flag and general officer requirements and constantly robbing Peter to pay Paul in order to stay within the current ceiling, the Department of Defense has developed a valid, credible, requirements determination process for its general and flag officers. We have provided the evidence that we have substantially more requirements than are currently authorized... As I indicated, I am sure there are individuals who still believe that there are too many officers wearing stars in the military today. No amount of data--no proof--to the contrary will be accepted....it is the Department's intent ion to submit a legislative proposal that accurately portrays the DoD's senior command and leadership needs. I believe we have demonstrated those needs, . . . . . I trust that you are confident as well, and that you will endorse this long overdue adjustment to the number of general and admirals needed to improve our ability to defend this nation.(2) The subcommittee was not receptive to the testimony provided by Mr. Green with respect to the recommendations made by the Hay Group. Senator Nunn indicated that any study that does not address military requirements carries little weight. Senator Nunn is one of the lawmakers who has been most responsible for the current limit on G/FO authorizations. Another senator who echoed the same sentiment concerning G/FO authorizations, but is more critical, is Senator Glenn. Senator Glenn has been an active force in the Congress to reduce the size of the officer corps. He observed that generals do not work alone and any increase in G/FO authorizations would also lead to an increase in staff personnel to assist the G/FOs. Senator Glenn also noted that if the Hay Study recommendations were approved, the military would have 84 more G/FOs than it had at the height of Vietnam. Senator Glenn further stated "I am not sure it takes more generals to wage peace than to wage war."(4) Mr. Green was successful in one area, his testimony and the Hay Group Study temporarily forestalled any further congressional reduction of the 1,073 G/FO ceiling. The easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has resulted in plans for drastic personnel cuts for our armed forces. With these force reductions we can expect G/FO reductions. On June 28, 1990, Secretary Cheney announced a seven percent cut in G/FO billets over the four years. This reduction represents the loss of 78 G/FOs. The DoD G/FO ceiling would be reduced from 1,073 to 995 G/FOs by the end of FY 94. Under this plan the Marine Corps loses 3 of its 70 general officers. General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a statement released by the Pentagon regarding the seven percent reduction said "The Joint Chiefs and I believe this plan reflects an appropriate balance between the continuing requirements and the changing force structure."(5) Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee did not feel that Secretary Cheney went far enough with the reduction of G/FOs. The committee recommended for the 1991 Defense Authorization Bill a 20% reduction of G/FOs over a five year period. This would reduce the total number of G/FOs from 1,073 to 778 by the end of FY 95. The present reduction plan as set forth in the 1991 Defense Authorization Act is for the DoD to reduce the number of G/FOs from 1,073 to 1,030 by the end of FY91. Under this plan the Marine Corps will lose 2 general officer authorizations. The long range plan is for the DoD to reduce the number of G/FOs to 858 by the end of FY95.(3) Under this plan the Marine Corps will lose nine general officers. By the end of FY 95 the Marine Corps will have a total of 61 general officers. The grade breakdown of the 61 general officers is as follows:(1) Grade # Authorized general 2 lieutenant general 7 major general 21 brigadier general 31 As the Marine Corps reduces its general officer corps, it will also reduce general officer billets. However, I do not foresee the reduction in general officer billets coming into balance with the total of number of general officer authorizations we will have. Thus the Marine Corps will still be faced with the same old problem of too many general officer requirements and too few general officers. If we do not have general officer representation across the joint arena to advise the combatant commanders of the utility of Marine forces, then the Marine Corps will not be included in the CINC's force list. If we are not included in the combatant commanders' force list then we will not participate in future operations. This could have a negative influence on the future of the Marine Corps. At present the Marine Corps has representation on every CINC's staff who is a combatant commander with the exception of the U.S. Southern Command.(1) This serves as a testament to the Commandant's resolve to ensure Marine Corps general officer representation throughout the joint arena. However; as our general officer strength is reduced, these reductions could severely impact on the Commandant's ability to staff the joint arena with general officers. An indication of how the shortage of general officers impacts on Marine Corps operational capabilities can be drawn from our experience in Desert Shield/Storm. Both the 1st Marine Division and the 2d Marine Division deployed to Southwest Asia without general officers filling the billets of Assistant Division Commander. The fact that no general officer was serving in these positions prior to Desert Shield/Storm is due in part to the current general officer shortage. In order to effectively support the joint and combined operation in Southwest Asia, the Marine Corps temporarily assigned ten general officers to support both internal and external requirements. Eight of the ten general officer's were assigned to internal billets, some of which were: two Assistant Division Commander billets, one Assistant Wing Commander billet, and four general officers to support billet requirements for the MarCent staff.(I) I have tried to highlight the problem of general officer shortages by addressing how general officer authorizations are made, how recent legislation has affected general officer authorizations, how the Department of Defense has reacted to general officer reductions, how the shortage of general officers was addressed with respect to staffing for Desert Shield/Storm and how this problem of poses a future challenge for the Commandant. In light of the upcoming force reductions and the perception in Congress that we have too many general officers, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will have to balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena, so as to ensure that the Marine Corps remains the force of choice. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Christie, Richard, General Officer Matters Officer, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. Personal interview about general officer issues. Arlington, Virginia, April 5, 1990. 2. Green, Jr., Grant, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Mangement and Personnel. Statement before the Subcommitte on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Statement concerning requirements of the military services for general and flag officers. Washington, D.C., 10 August 1988. 3. Maze, Rick, "Senate panel favors 20% fewer top officers," Air Force Times, July 30, 1990, p.3. 4. Maze, Rick, "Senate balks at proposal for 363 more flag officers," Air Force Times, August 22, 1988, p.4. 5. Nelson, Soraya, "Cheney orders 7% cut in generals by `94," Air Force Times, July 9,1990, p.6. 6. Title 10, United States Code Annotated, 1991 Addendum 7. U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, "Summary of General and Flag Officer Authorizations, undated.
