Maneuver Warfare Enhanced With Land Mine Warfare AUTHOR Major Steven F. Barilich, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: MANEUVER WARFARE ENHANCED WITH LAND MINE WARFARE I. Purpose: Identify deficiencies with existing mine warfare doctrine that do not support maneuver warfare outlined in FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING. II. Problem: Mine fields are effective casualty producers, but their primary use is always defensive. This defensive orientation forces a commander to concentrate on the terrain. This runs counter to maneuver warfare, which directs the commander to concentrate on the enemy. Mines can be effective in offensive operations, but there is no U.S. doctrine for this purpose. Therefore, combat engineers do not receive training on the employment of mines in the offense. III. Data: All mine warfare doctrine supports defensive operations. Deliberate protective and tactical mine fields receive most attention because of their size and logistic effort to emplace. The other types of mine fields have potential use in the offense. However, the doctrine only views the mine fields as defensive measures. History shows tactical mine fields were not decisive in defeating a trained and determined attacker. Field Marshal Rommel and General Montgomery were not immune from the shortcomings of mine fields. The North African campaign is a perfect case study for this lesson. A review of the logistical requirements to lay a tactical mine field quickly identifies the Marine Corps' deficiencies. IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps' adoption of maneuver warfare requires the validation of supporting doctrine. Mine warfare has the potential to enhance offensive operations. Maneuver warfare can adapt several types of mine fields for the offense. Acceptance of mine warfare for offensive operations will be a combat multiplier for the Marine Corps. V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps combat engineers must take the lead and promote mine warfare in offensive operations. The combat engineers must write new doctrine to support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING. The Marine Corps Engineer School must change the emphasis of mine fields from the defense to the offense. ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LAND MINE WARFARE OUTLINE Thesis statement. The present mine warfare doctrine, accepted by the U.S. Marine Corps, does not support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING, because of the fixation on defensive operations. I. Doctrine A. Requirement to review and validate supporting doctrine B. FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING 1. Definition of maneuver warfare 2. Application of doctrine C. Mine and countermine warfare 1. Types of mine fields and their application II. Historical Background A. North African campaign; Montgomery vs. Rommel B. Failure of mine fields to be decisive C. Effects of maneuver warfare D. Historical lessons applied to Southwest Asia III. Logistics A. Feasibility of deliberate and tactical mine fields B. Number of mines required for a tactical mine field C. Man-hours required to lay a tactical mine field D. Availability of mines IV. Conclusion/Solution A. Identify mine fields that can support FMFM-1 B. New doctrine for offensive mine warfare C. Refocus of combat engineer training ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LANDMINE WARFARE Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING The United States Marine Corps is vigorously embracing maneuver warfare doctrine. The doctrine is ideal for the Marine Corps, particularly with the pending force reductions. The validation of supporting doctrine must occur when tactics and equipment change. The present mine warfare doctrine accepted by the Marine Corps does not support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING, because of the fixation on defensive operations. The challenge to the Marine Corps becomes twofold. First, develop new doctrine and techniques that "dove tails" with maneuver warfare, as expounded upon in FMFM-1, WARFIGHTING. FMFM-1 states, "Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it establishes general guidance that requires judgement in application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive."(11:44) Second, refocus the training of the combat engineers, in mine warfare, from the defense, to employing mines in the offense. Existing mine and countermine warfare doctrine is a simple concept with only the imagination limiting the application of the idea. Very good doctrine exists for the employment of mines in the defense and countermine warfare in the offense. Still, there is almost no U.S. doctrine for the employment of mines in the offense. The defensive "mind set" of mine warfare must be broken. FMFM-1 concludes " . . . that there exists no clear division between the offense and the defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to impose one artificially. The offense and the defense exist simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous." (11:26) MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE Current counter-mobility and mine warfare doctrine, FM 5-102 and FM 20-32, divides mine fields into five different types. A short description and purpose of each of these is important in understanding the focus of this subject. The first type is the protective mine field. The protective mine field has two sub-categories of fields; the deliberate protective and the hasty protective mine field. The deliberate protective mine field provides for the protection of static or semi-permanent installations. The best example is the expansive mine fields protecting the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The mine field uses the standard pattern to emplace the mines. The deliberate protective mine field usually incorporates the entire spectrum of conventional anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. A closer look at the logistics and manpower required to emplace such a field will be presented later. The hasty protective mine field provides for local, close-in security protection of the small unit. This mine field uses no standard pattern to lay the mines. The location of the mines depends on the terrain, enemy, and situation. The hasty protective mine field primarily uses anti-personnel mines, although anti-tank mines may be employed depending on availability. An example of a hasty protective mine field would be placing claymore mines to cover an avenue of approach where the enemy could infiltrate. The second type is the point mine field. The primary use of this mine field is for reinforcing other obstacles such as road craters, abatis, or wire obstacles not associated with hasty protective mine fields. These mine fields also can stand alone as obstacles in streams, the entrance and exit of fords, or deny a landing zone. Point mine fields have no standard pattern and are dependent on the threat and situation. The point mine field should cause the enemy to deploy his forces and bring up his breaching assets, exposing those critical assets to indirect or direct fires. The point mine field takes advantage of limited resources and existing obstacles to maximize the effect. The third type is the tactical mine field. The primary use of this mine field is to stop, delay, and disrupt the enemy attack. The field can be used to strengthen defensive positions and protect the flanks. These fields use the standard pattern when laying the mines. The full spectrum of conventional mines may be used with a variety of scatterable mines. Like the deliberate protective mine field, the tactical mine field is logistically and manpower intensive. The tactical and deliberate protective mine fields have many deficiencies when employed under the premiss of maneuver warfare. The fourth type is the interdiction mine field. The primary use of this type of field is to trap or harass the enemy deep in their territory, assembly areas or defensive positions. The mine field can effectively delay a road march or block a retreat. The family of scatterable mines is ideal for this type of mine field. The methods of long range delivery, such as air or artillery, provide surprise and significantly add to the "fog of war." Reconnaissance and special forces personnel also can lay conventional mines to serve the same purpose. The significant advantage of the scatterable mines is the ability to self-destruct at predetermined times. This feature prevents the enemy from recovering the mines and using the mines against friendly units. The mines will not permanently restrict access to terrain that friendly forces may need to occupy or pass through in the future. Coordinated air strikes, artillery raids, or an ambush by combined anti-armor teams will significantly enhance the effect of an interdiction mine field. The fifth type of mine field is the phony mine field. The primary use of this type is to simulate the other mine fields, supplement or extend live mine fields, and conceal gaps in existing fields. All requirements for marking and recording mine fields apply to phony fields, including the requirement to cover them by fire and observation. The purpose of a phony mine field is to force the enemy to delay his attack, commit breaching assets, or force him to change the axis of his advance. Each of these actions will force the enemy to remain within the range of defensive fires for a longer period. Reviewing mine warfare doctrine and the mine field breaching results of Operation Desert Storm, several questions seem to stand out. Are deliberate protective and tactical mine fields still practical given the intensive logistic and manpower effort to lay them? Are deliberate protective and tactical mine fields compatible with FMFM-1, Warfighting? The purpose of raising these questions is not to cast aside mine warfare. History does show that mines are a very effective and economical means to produce casualties. However, history does not seem to prove that mines were the decisive factor in victory or defeat. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND A look at historical record can often place the development of military doctrine into perspective. The present doctrine of mine and countermine warfare originated from the battlefields of World War II. Mines have been effective in inflicting casualties and destroying equipment, since their inception. Still, the large expansive mine fields were not decisive in defeating an attacker. The historical results do not seem to justify the intense logistical effort to lay the fields. BRL Report No.1582, MINE AND COUNTERMINE WARFARE IN RECENT HISTORY, 1914-1970, written by Dr. Russel H. Stolfi, of the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, April 1972, for the Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, contains a detailed account of the development of mine and countermine warfare. Dr. Stolfi's report emphasizes the importance of mine fields in several wars and battles during the period of 1914-1970. The large mine fields, used by General Montgomery and Field Marshal Rommel, in the North African theater of operations, are of particular interest. Dr. Stolfi makes several observations, unrelated to mine warfare, while discussing the effects of mine fields during certain battles. These observations, highlighted in the following paragraphs, may be more significant to the outcome of a battle than the actual mine fields themselves. In 1941, "geography" presented Germany and its allies with formidable problems of attacking through the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia and Greece. The defending Yugoslav army worked on deficit time in preparing their defenses. The Greek army, engaged in a ground conflict with Italy in Southern Albania and soon supported by powerful British ground units, could offer stiff resistance against the Germans. The terrain canalized the movement of the motorized German formations along the few roads of a poorly developed transportation network. The location favored the employment of mines and demolition explosives as critical weapons for the Greek defenders. Neither the Greeks nor British armies involved in the defense in April 1941, used mines effectively. (6:24-25) The reader of this report might logically conclude that the defenders lost this battle because they did not effectively use mines fields. However, Dr. Stolfi continues with this side bar observation. "The Germans, who had the psychological advantage of one and one half years of successful ground attacks, showed remarkable flexibility and elan on the offensive. Those factors probably would rapidly overcome a defense in the mountains, which included even ruthless and extensive use of mines and demolitions. "(6:25) Thus, the theory behind maneuver warfare, as outlined and explained in FMFM-1, begins to appear as a decisive element in the outcome of a campaign. Surprise, training, and boldness are just a few of the characteristics that exemplify maneuver warfare. The Germans demonstrated the same traits in their Balkan campaign. These characteristics enabled the Marines in Southwest Asia to breach and penetrate the vast defensive mine fields in Kuwait. The Germans and the British continued to emphasize the use of mines during the latter part of 1941. The British leaned heavily on them in the defense of Tobruk and the Germans increased the numbers in the defenses on the Egyptian frontier. The British launched a powerful offensive in December of 1941. The offensive was an expensive one in terms of casualties, equipment losses, and the revelation of inferior operational techniques. Despite the losses, the British Imperial Corps forced the Germans to retreat from the battlefield in the critical El Adem area.(6:27) The important feature of this encounter is not the British overcoming the mine fields. The phrase, "revelation of inferior operational techniques" jumps off the page. Applying the operational art of war to the campaign is more crucial to success than the physical defeat of the enemy. The British may have defeated the Germans in this battle, but the losses they suffered could have cost them the campaign. A commander must shape the battlefield to attack the enemy on the ground of his choosing. Mines continued to be used in an ever increasing amount on the battlefield. Commanders viewed these artificial obstacles as purely a defensive weapon. This viewpoint seemed to trap these commanders into the same limitations and inflexibility whether they were in the offense or in the defense. They simply did not develop an offensive concept for the employment of mines. Even today, mine warfare in the offense is a neglected technique that must be further exploited. Mines can become a real combat multiplier when combined with true maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps should take the lead in perfecting the tactics as it has in perfecting the tactics of an amphibious landing.(6:28) Field Marshal Rommel penetrated the mine fields of Tobruk that had a perimeter of mines thirty five miles long. The success was partially due to the inner mine fields of the British defenses having fallen into decay. The British were also unable to launch a credible counter attack. The defeated British retreated, but the Germans were unable to exploit the success due to the terrain. This illustrates another example of a large deliberate protective mine field defeated by a determined attacker. Later, the British defenses stalemated Rommel at Alexandria, not because the mine fields were impenetrable, but because he made the advance without reinforcing or resting his Army.(6:30) The British began an intensive training program during the previously mentioned stalemate. Many participants felt the emphasis on countermine measures and the techniques used to clear enemy mine fields, were perhaps the most vital preparations before the second battle of Alamein. The British engineers developed a deliberate and well rehearsed method for breaching. The technique incorporated direct and indirect fires and supporting armor. Rommel began an intensive mine laying effort sowing over 500,000 mines. He wanted to form a barrier that no British soldier could penetrate. The mine fields did delay the British attack and inflicted many casualties. Still, the training, the coordination and air supremacy forced the Germans to disengage and flee west.(6:30-38) The prelude and scenario of the second battle of Alamein is strikingly similar to the training effort, fire support coordination, and well rehearsed breaching operations of the U.S. Marine Corps combat engineers during Operation Desert Storm. The only difference is the extremely low number of casualties suffered by the Marines, due to the unwillingness of the Iraqis to fight. The Marine Corps must not forget these parallels. Again, the example shows that a trained, determined, and disciplined force will not allow a mine field, no matter how extensively laid, to stop them. Dr. Stolfi makes several positive points on how the Germans used mine fields at Alamein. Most of the points are common knowledge but two of them are worth noting. First, mines are effective barriers to movement and are useful weapons for weak defenders. Second, mines benefit the attacking forces. They block the shoulders of penetrations against counter attacks and cover the flanks of attacking motorized columns still engaged against units defending in deep echelon. This second point is very interesting since neither the British nor the Germans used mines offensively. The negative points Dr. Stolfi identifies are equally important. Mine fields, once emplaced, are static in nature and restrict the mobility of friendly forces. They can be just as difficult to clear by friendly forces as they are for the enemy.(6:39) The preponderance of Dr. Stolfi's report seems to emphasize the value of mine fields in the defense, but two observations stand out. Mines failed in adding enough defensive strength to prevent either Field Marshal Rommel or General Montgomery from achieving victories. Again, the question rises: Were the effects of mine fields really worth the effort to prepare and could another more mobile and flexible weapons system have done the same job? The second observation was the large-scale use of mines preceded the defeat of the user. A conclusion may be drawn that a defending force, that resorts to extensive mine laying, has already acknowledged the superior strength of the adversary and its own impending defeat. (6:40-41) LOGISTICS Logistics and manpower surface as reasons to diminish the emphasis of deliberate protective and tactical mine fields on Marine Corps combat engineer training. These two types of mine fields exist in Cuba and Korea. The maintenance of these fields requires extensive manpower and assets. The ordnance used to replace deteriorated mines might have better use elsewhere. These mine fields have a limited effect on a well trained, equipped, and determined enemy. The logistics of defensive mine fields have the potential of seriously limiting the offensive options of a commander, if emplaced without any relation to the enemy's intent. This assessment of mine fields raises other questions. Can a commander afford the assets and manpower required to remove the mine field if the enemy's intention changes or the mine field is no longer required? Does a commander risk becoming permanently fixed to a location because of the effort and assets required to lay the mine fields? A closer look at the requirements for a small, generic tactical mine field, using the planning guidance from FM 20-32, should clearly illustrate this point. The size of the mine field will have a front of 200 meters and a depth of 300 meters. This would barely cover the front of a platoon in the defense. The total mines required would be as follows: 246 anti-tank; 931 anti- personnel fragmenting; 1811 anti-personnel blast; for a total of 2988 mines.(9:29-31) The time involved just to lay the mines would take 350 man- hours and could exceed 450-500 man-hours during limited visibility or NBC conditions. The man-hours do not reflect moving the mines into position, breaking the mines out of their crates, or the laying out and recording of the mine field. Additionally, an engineer unit must be dedicated for continued maintenance on the field and therefore, be unavailable for other vital engineer tasks. (9:35) Currently, there is a total of only 4500-5000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships. Obviously, employing these mines in a tactical mine field, in support of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade would be futile. The mines would be best used in support of the offense, laid in point or interdiction mine fields. A commander also must question whether an area or asset he considers vital requires an extensive mine field. If the answer is yes, then perhaps the asset is in the wrong location in the first place. The ability to displace and conceal a vital asset becomes paramount in a tenuous situation. Protecting assets or an area with mine fields forces the commander to focus on terrain and not the enemy. This fixation runs counter to maneuver warfare. An area surrounded by a large mine field can attract the enemy's attention and become a lucrative target. CONCLUSIONS The Marine Corps must concentrate its training effort in the employment of the point, the interdiction, the phony, and the hasty protective mine fields. All four mine fields have application in the defense, but their combined effect with offensive operations has the most potential. The point and interdiction fields are ideal for confusing and disrupting the enemy. They can be used to protect exposed flanks or avenues the enemy can use to counterattack. These mine fields can be placed behind the enemy blocking his retreat and helping to fix him in place to be defeated. The phony mine field can enhance the general deception plan. The hasty protective mine field is ideal for our forces when they have reached their culminating point in the attack. Mine warfare focused in this direction now truly becomes a combat multiplier. Operation Desert Storm proved the Marine Corps' ability to adapt and find solutions for difficult situations. The operation also showed the value and abilities of combat engineers to breach extensive enemy mine fields. They wrote another chapter in the history of mine and countermine warfare. Again, history shows that large, deliberate mine fields will not be decisive in defending against a determined, well trained attacker. Yet, do not forget that mines still produce casualties, both psychological and physical. Thus, mines are still a valuable weapon. The goal is to maximize the effects of mines, as with any other weapon system. Refocusing the employment of mines to the offense will multiply the total effect of maneuver warfare. If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist. FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING The Marine Corps' engineering community has the opportunity to take the lead toward achieving that "ultimate goal." The combat engineers must develop an aggressive doctrine for the employment of mines in the offense. The new doctrine must take advantage of the latitude provided by FMFM-1 and must not become strangled by a static defense or terrain oriented mentality. The combat engineers cannot sit on the laurels of the success they received from the breaching operations in Kuwait. The engineers must use the momentum of Operation Desert Storm to correct past deficiencies. A new doctrine for using mines in the offense will provide a "full tool box" to take to the next war. When mine warfare begins to support the direction and guidance of FMFM-1, the Marine Corps will remain the innovative force the world knows and respects. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, Italy 1943-1944, Washington D.C., 1972. 2. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, Korea 1950-1954, Washington D.C., 1972. 3. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, North Africa 1940-1943, Washington D.C., 1972. 4. Lucas, James, War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945, New York: Bonanza Books, 1982. 5. Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von, Lost Victories, California: Presidio Press, 1982. 6. U.S. Army, Aberdeen Research and Development Center, BRL Report No. 1582, Mine and Countermine Warfare in Recent History, 1914-1970, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 1972. 7. U.S. Army, U.S. Army Engineer School, Engineers in the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Task Force, FC 5-71-2, Virginia, 1986. 8. U.S. Army, HQTRADOC, Countermobility, FM5-102, Virginia, 1985. 9. U.S. Army, HQ TRADOC, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32, Virginia, 1985. 10.U.S. Marine Corps, Campaigning, FNFN 1-1, Washington D.C., 1989. 11. U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FNFN 1, Washington D.C., 1989.
