Reducing The Power Projection Gap: The Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships

Reducing The Power Projection Gap: The Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships (AFSMPS) Program

CSC 1991

SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy

REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP:

THE ARMY FAST SEALIFT MARITIME

PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

Steven M. Anderson

Major, US Army

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent experiences of the US military in the Persian Gulf

identified a serious flaw in our ability to globally project heavy

forces. While success was achieved moving light infantry forces to

Saudi Arabia rapidly, armored and mechanized units from the US

Army were late arriving in the theater due to a number of problems

in our strategic sealift fleet. Exploitation of the mobile storage

capacity of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)

program and sailing speed of the Navy Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)

program leads to a new concept in heavy forces power projection,

the Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships program

(AFSMPS).

In order to fully understand the dynamics involved in reducing

the gap in our heavy force power projection capability, an

evaluation of the present and future threat is required This

examination reveals seven threat-driven defense challenges. In

order to deter and combat the threat during the next decade, our

military must posses the following capabilities: (1) sufficient global

strategic mobility; (2) rapid force closure ability; (3) the flexibility to

respond to a wide range of confrontation intensities; (4) the ability

to fight two wars simultaneously; and the capability to project

forces that have (5) combat power and mobility, (6) are maintained

in a high state of readiness, and (7) are self-sustaining.

The AFSMPS concept envisions using three fast sealift ships

to preposition equipment and 30 days of supplies. In the event of a

crisis, this equipment links up with fly-in personnel from the

standby brigade of the 24th Infantry Division in the contingency

area. There exists ample evidence that this concept reduces the

power projection gap by 70%, provides the decision maker more

flexible response options, and considerably increases our ability to

fight two wars at the same time. The AFSMPS Mechanized Infantry

Brigade is not only a ready and self-sustaining force, but it is a

heavy unit powerful enough to defeat a Soviet Tank Division.

By relying on proven technology to negate R&D demands and

advocating the use of a force credible without excessive

transportation requirements, the cost of the AFSMPS program is

relatively low. Procurement expenses for the high tech ships are

estimated to be $1.125 billion with operating costs in the $60

million range. Taking advantage of the upcoming drawdown from

Europe will enable the AFSMPS ships to use surplus equipment

that will reduce procurement costs further still.

Considering the many capabilities and advantages of the

program, the AFSMPS concept is worthy of immediate and serious

consideration by military planners interested in improving our

heavy force power projection capability.

REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP: THE ARMY FAST

SEALIFT MARITIME PREPOSlTlONlNG SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

OUTLINE

Thesis Statement: The AFSMPS concept is an efficient and cost-

effective means of greatly improving US heavy force combat power

projection capability

I. DESERT STORM RESULTS

A. The Good News - MPS and FSS

B. The Bad News - Gap in Power Prolection Capability

II. MOTIVATION TO REDUCE THE GAP - THE THREAT

A. Global locations

B. Short Warning Time

C. Wide Spectrum of Conflict

D. Simultaneous Conflicts

E. Conventional Lethality

F. Home Field Advantage

G. Extended Duration

III. REDUCING THE GAP AND MEETING THE THREAT - AFSMPS

A. Global Strategic Mobility

B. Rapid Force Closure

C. Flexible Response

D. Fight Two Wars at Same Time

E. Combat Power and Mobility

F. Readiness

G. Self-sustainability

IV. THE UNEXPECTED SURPRISE - AFSMPS IS AFFORDABLE

A. Proven Technology and Efficiency

B. R&D Costs and Equipment Procurement Costs

C. Ship Procurement Costs

D. Ships Operating Expenses

V. AFSMPS - THE TIME IS RIPE TO REDUCE THE GAP

REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP: THE ARMY FAST

SEALIFT MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

The Leader glared intently at the military map on the wall before him and tried to imagine

the impact of the proposed massive armored thrust his neighbor's country. Newly discovered oil

reserves less than 50 miles from his own eastern border offered a tempting reward, but he knew

the world would react with hostility to this bold invasion plan.

"Are you sure the Americans can't stop us?," the Leader demanded of his Chief of Staff.

"I am certain, Sir," stated the General resolutely. "They are still arrogant and overconfident

after their great victory in the Persian Gulf. No nation in the world can get here with armored forces

fast enough to stop the advance of our tanks or drive us out from our consolidated defensive

positions around the oil fields."

The Leader pressed his inquiry. "I'm sure we can handle any airborne forces, but what

about the Marines? Don't they have a maritime prepositioned force nearby?"

"You are correct, Sir," replied the general, "but that marine force has only 30 tanks! Even

with their tremendous air power, there is no way they can stop our armored division. The

Americans cannot quickly project anything but light infantry and airplanes. The advantages the

coalition enjoyed in the gulf war are not present here and we will not make the same mistakes as

Saddam Hussein. In only three weeks we should have positions so well fortified that they will not

be able to force us out without paying a high price in American blood; with such little oil and

political advantage at stake, the Americans will not be willing to pay that price."

"General, you have convinced me," the Leader said smiling. "Launch your attack."

At first glance, the scenario above seems ludicrous. Surely there is no

leader in the world irrational enough to test the military capability or resolve of

the United States after the recent events in the Persian Gulf. Is there really

such a gap in American combat power projection capability that a nation with a

substantial military force might dare to challenge us?

Unfortunately, events in operation Desert Shield revealed an affirmative

answer to this question. The slow of the movement of troops and equipment to

the Persian Gulf demonstrated a discouraging lack of ability to quickly project

heavy forces in order to counter global threats. However, the recent war

validated two extremely important programs, the Marine corps Maritime

Prepositioning Ships (MPS) concept and the Navy's Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)

program, and a completely new concept combining the mobile storage capability

of MPS with the sailing speed of FSS can be used to breech this power

projection gap. This concept is called the Army Fast Sealift Maritime

Prepositioning Ship (AFSMPS) program. By scrutinizing the lessons learned

from the recent war and evaluating the proficiency of the AFSMPS to address

the nature of our worldwide threat, the AFSMPS concept will be demonstrated

as an efficient and cost-effective means of greatly improving our heavy force

combat power projection capability.

GOOD NEWS FROM THE GULF - MPS AND FSS

The overwhelming majority of news from the gulf war was good and the

performance of the Marine's MPS concept was no exception. Less than ten

years old, the program was designed to enhance US combat power projection

by allowing the Marines to establish a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

ashore almost anywhere in the world. Three squadrons of special MPS ships

are positioned in key worldwide locations, and each squadron consists of four

or five ships that contain a MEB's equipment and thirty days of supplies. The

MPS cargo can be offloaded in stream over a beach, if no port is available, and

the MEB will be combat-ready ten days after the first ship arrival.(1)

Called up on 7 August, the MPS squadron from Diego Garcia arrived

within eight days in Saudi Arabia and it's associated MEB was combat capable

on 25 August.(2) LTG Walter Boomer, commander of the Marines during Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, declared the concept was "validated"(3) by the war

experience, as did an observer for the Marine Gazette,(4) and L.E. Prina, a noted

military analyst and reporter, called MPS one of the "stars of the Desert Shield

buildup."(5) VADM Francis Donovan, commander of the Military Sealift

command, referred to the operation as "a classic application of MPS doctrine."(6)

Marines were able to provide support to not only their own MEB, but numerous

Army and Air Force units in the Saudi theater with food, water, fuel and medical

sustenance for over sixty days.(7) Not surprisingly, the Marine Corps Lessons

Learned After Action Report stated that the "MPF capability has proven itself to

be an invaluable national capability that can respond rapidly to a crisis with a

credible force capable of significant self-sustainment."(8)

Another success story from the gulf war involved the FSS program. Eight

SL-7 technologically advanced roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO) FSS ships were built by

the Navy during the defense buildup of the last decade. These ships were

unique because they possessed the ability to travel at 33-knots, contrary to

standard sealift ships which only have a 20-knot capability, and are always

manned and maintained so that they can get under way within 96 hours of

being called up.(9)

On 7 August the group of eight high-tech SL-7s was ordered to deploy

from their various locations on the East Coast to the port of Savannah and

transport the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Dharan, and all the FSS

ships saw extensive action during the crisis. One of the ships experienced a

fire while crossing the Atlantic, but the lead ship was able to return to Spain and

pick up the load from the damaged ship and return to Dharan, minimizing the

lost time to only four days.(10) At times reaching speeds of 35 knots, the FSS

fleet made numerous round trips to the Saudi theater from the US and,

according to VADM Donovan, totally validated the FSS concept, demonstrated

the redundancy in the program, and proved that the previously untested FSS

designs were capable of delivering their cargo in a strategic mobility crisis as

quickly as advertised.(11) General Louis C. Wagner wrote that the superb

performance of these ships was "a major lesson learned in this deployment."(12)

L.E. Prina wrote recently that in Operation Desert Shield, the FSS "proved their

worth."(13)

THE WAR - THE COMBAT POWER PROJECTION GAP IDENTIFIED

The most significant strategic lesson learned during the gulf war was the

existence of a heavy force projection shortfall. Two factors contribute account

for this gap: (1) the MPS MEB lacks the land combat power to defeat a modern

armored division and (2) Army armored and mechanized forces were moved

slowly to the Saudi theater.

Shortly after the MPF MEB landed in Saudi Arabia, Marine commanders

sought to augment their land combat power with armored forces from other

nations and the US Army.(14) Authorized only 53 tanks (a figure that has since

been reduced to 30), 30 Light Armored Vehicles, and 72 TOW anti-tank

weapons,(15) it was obvious that a well-trained and modern armored Iraqi division

attacking in the flat, open terrain of the Saudi desert would have severely

tested the Marine force. As effective as the MPF MEB's considerable air assets

(20 AV-8Bs, 24 F1A-18s, and 12 Cobra helicopters(16)) proved to be, the time-

honored requirement that ground units are armed with enough firepower to

seize or hold physical terrain was once again validated. While the Marine and

Army light infantry forces waited for the heavy units to arrive in the gulf, ground

troops referred to their role in the wake of a massive multi-division Iraqi armored

attack as nothing more than "speed bumps."(17)

"If the lraqis had attacked us anytime in August or September," said one

Marine officer in a position to know, "they could have cleaned our clocks."(18)

Fortunately, political and logistical considerations prevented the lraqis

from attacking the armor-light MPF MEB when the Marines were the most

vulnerable. Marine LTC Charles Armstrong wrote that "light infantry is not the

answer to deterring Iraqi aggression or defending Saudi Arabia,"(19) and L.E.

Prina concluded the following:

Desert Shield ... showed a need for main battle tanks, armored

personnel carriers and heavy artillery to be deployed near likely trouble areas.

While the marines have tanks, they do not have nearly as many (nor are they as

modern) as those in an Army armored division and certainly not enough to take

on a veteran Iraqi tank division or divisions in the desert.(20)

The impotency of the MPF MEB against an armored opposition served to

exacerbate the slow arrival of Army heavy forces. One defense analyst objected

that armored and mechanized divisions took 45-60 days to deploy to the

Persian Gulf once shipping became available.(21) Retired General Glenn K. Otis,

noting the 7 August call-up date for the 24th ID (M), complained that "as of 4

September, only part of the division had closed onto Saudi Arabia,"(22) and it was

reported that the Army "took longer than its senior leaders desired to get heavy

divisions to Saudi Arabia."(23) According to a movements staff officer on the

Army Staff, the first heavy division to arrive in theater was not completely

combat ready as a entire unit until 23 September, over six weeks after it was

ordered to depart the US.(24)

The reasons for this slow transit are well documented. "The inability of

national sealift assets to meet the deployment challenge springs from the

erosion of the US' commercial assets and the declining readiness of the Ready

Reserve Fleet (RRF)," wrote John G. Roos in the November 1990 Armed Forces

Journal.(25) The US maritime industry now possesses only the 14th largest fleet

in the world,(26) there is a serious shortage of qualified US merchant marine

personnel,(27) and the US ship building industry is essentially nonexistent.(28)

Admiral Paul Butcher of the US Transportation Command testified before

Congress that the "maritime fleet and its supporting industrial base is

eroding,"(29) and the President's Commission on the Merchant Marine and

Defense made the finding that "there is insufficient strategic sealift, in both

ships and trained personnel, for the US, using only its resources as required by

defense planning assumptions, to execute a major deployment."(30) Of the 46

RRF ships that were called up for Desert Shield, only 11 of them were available

to deploy within the five-day readiness target, a fact which stimulated General

Otis to decried that "a fundamental issue is that there is not a match between

the readiness of Army divisions to deploy and the readiness of the right ships to

transport them."(31)

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As seen during Desert Storm, the paucity of MPS MEB land combat

power and the late arrival of heavy Army units in the Saudi contingency area

serve to highlight the glaring gap of 47 days in American combat power

projection that is depicted in Figure 1. Heavy forces require more preparation,

support, and strategic lift than lighter forces and would be expected arrive last

in a distant regional conflict. However, the time that it took during Desert

Shield was unquestionably too long. The potential threat that this nation and

the US military is faces is too potent for the gap in power projection to be

acceptable.

MOTIVATION TO REDUCE THE GAP - THE THREAT

Conflicts of the future will probably bear little resemblance to the recent

gulf war. US forces were afforded many advantages by the host nation, and we

must assume our next enemy will fight with more tenacity than Iraq. An

understanding of the future threat characteristics will yield military imperatives

that can guide our efforts to project combat power more rapidly.

During the next decade, no single region will likely dominate our

defensive planning like Europe has done in the past. In the recent Annual

Report to the President and Congress (ARPC), Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney stated the following:

In response to the dramatic changes of the past two years,

the President devised and implemented last summer a new strategy that shifted

the focus of defense planning from countering the global challenge posed by

the Soviet Union to responding to threats in major regions -particularly Europe,

Southwest Asia, and East Asia.(32)

The propensity for the American people to support major military

commitments in any areas other than those shown in Figure 2 is doubtful. US

economic and cultural ties will unquestionably keep our commitment to Europe

and the East Asia strong. Concern over most of the world's oil reserves and the

tremendous potential for volatility will similarly demand unwavering US attention

on Southwest Asia and North Africa.

Such worldly commitments portend that the US military forces have global

reach. Previously, this has been achieved through forward stationing of troops

and equipment. A recent National War College study concluded that forward

bases are controversial in both the US and abroad, and that it "would be virtually

impossible to base units in all the likely contingency areas of the world in which

the US has a vital interest."(33) Forward outposts in Europe, Korea, the

Philippines, and Japan will unquestionably be reduced or eliminated in the next

few years. Therefore, the burden of demonstrating US commitment and resolve

must shift from forward presence to global strategic mobility and power

projection.

Despite an increase the advance warning time prior to an attack by the

Soviets in Europe,(34) short fuze contingency missions will still be the norm, as

Saddam Hussein demonstrated this past August. The warning time in places

like Korea and the Middle East, in fact, is measured in hours, not days.(35) The

1991 ARPC states that "the potential for regional threats to the US is growing.

Such threats can arise with very little warning."(36)

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In light of the increased mobility and lethality of most worldwide

belligerents, the importance of arriving early in a conflict with a credible force

cannot be overstated. General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, paid

homage to this concern when he said that moving forces rapidly throughout the

world "must be the center of a major national defense effort."(37) Failing to

properly anticipate the Iraqi attack, the US and the world watched helplessly last

August as the 6200 square miles of Kuwait was completely overrun in little more

than a day; the world coalition would spend the next seven months regretting

that short warning time. It is imperative that the US has credible forces that can

be rapidly projected to a trouble spot in order to counteract the impact of the

expected short warning time.

The present and future threat confronts the US with a broad range of

possible battle intensities. At one end of the confrontation spectrum is

terrorism and low intensity conflict. Many of our present and future rivals lack

the conventional means to challenge us, so terrorism and low-intensity conflicts

will persist.(38) At the opposite end of the spectrum is the continuing possibility

of nuclear war, as the strategic arsenal of the Soviet Union remains intact.(39) In

the middle of these extremes is the specter of conventional warfare. With the

reduction in Soviet and US forward basing and the proliferation of powerful and

mobile conventional arms, the likelihood that some nations may wish to take

matters into their own hands has increased and "the nature of warfare in the

Third World today will likely reach incredible intensity."(40) The obvious

implication here is that we must have the flexibility to respond adequately to the

entire range of possible threat intensities.

The possibility of two of our global adversaries mounting simultaneous

military challenges to the US also warrants attention. Recently LTC Charles

Armstrong acknowledged this dilemma when he wrote, "What would have

happened if we'd had two similar crises break out when we were midway through

the deployment to the Persian Gulf? We could not have responded adequately

to both."(41) With world attention focused elsewhere, border units in Korea were

recently put on alert in anticipation of an attack by the North Koreans.(42) It is

extremely unlikely that any foe would do the US the great favor of waiting to

make a aggressive move until after we had regrouped following another regional

conflict.

The response to the threat of simultaneous conflicts is, as stated in the

1991 ARPC, is having the force structure and the strategic lift required to "deal

with more than one concurrent major regional contingency," and handle a "major

shift in Soviet strategy or a major new threat."(43) General Colin Powell recently

said the "the superpower shingle now hangs only in one place."(44) If the CJCS

is correct and we really are entering an era where the US is the "Policeman of

the World," our power projection aptitude must have sufficient depth to fight

two concurrent wars.

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Perhaps even more alarming than the proliferation of nuclear weapons is

the tremendous growth of conventional arms in the world. Between 1976 and

1983, lesser developed countries purchased over $233 billion worth of

assorted armaments, including 17,310 tanks and self-propelled guns, 19,210

artillery pieces, and 32,816 armored personnel carriers.(45) As Chart

demonstrates, there are 42 countries in the world that possess at least a

division of tanks. The Armor 2000 white paper states the following:

Since sales of the full range of modern weapons to Third World

nations continue unabated, the US Army must be ready to fight an intense and

destructive battle anywhere in the world. Central and South America, Africa,

Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Korea, as well as the traditional battlefields of

Europe, are all possible areas for employment of Armor forces.(46)

Obviously, if we have to fight such battles we will want to win them, but

our first objective is to deter the conflict from occurring at all. The limitations of

light forces fighting an enemies heavy forces were articulated recently by

General Otis:

When a military operator knows that in a troubled hot spot to which

he is committed the potential enemies have mobile armored forces, he must

have armored and mechanized forces on his side. The so-called light US forces

can give good early defensive account of themselves in a fight against heavy

armored enemy forces, but they would not be able to sustain it for long, nor

would they be able to launch offensive actions without our own heavy forces

available.(47)

The military imperative dictated by the worldwide armor threat is that we

must be able to match, and thereby deter, the combat power and tactical

mobility of an enemy force with a similarly destructive armored force of our own.

In addition to the lethality that our future enemies will probably possess,

they will also have the advantage of fighting us in the vicinity of their own

homeland. This probable "home field advantage" affords our adversary such

advantages as interior lines of communication, shorter supply lines, and greater

familiarity with the terrain and weather. We will not have the luxury of time to

acclimatize our soldiers and conduct extensive training after arriving in a crisis

area, contrary to the example of the Persian Gulf war. Future adversaries will

recognize that a US military commitment is weakest during the early stages of a

conflict, so they will seek to achieve their military objectives before a massive

buildup of American troops and supplies can occur. This implies that soldiers

and their equipment arrive in the crisis area in a high state of readiness.

Another probable characteristic of the threat is that the enemy will try to

extend the duration of the conflict. During the recent gulf clash, a primary

strategy of Saddam Hussein's was to prolong the conflict and maximize the cost

in lives and resources required to expel his forces from Kuwait. While his forces

were crushed by a month of aerial bombardment and a 100-hour ground war,

Hussein succeeded in making the coalition's campaign against him very

expensive and lengthy; Saudi Arabia alone has incurred a $64 billion war debt,

and the US has had hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the gulf for many

months.(48)

Despite the extended duration of the war, the gulf clash was clearly an

optimistic test. VADM Paul Butcher of TRANSCOM has pointed out that the

host country provided outstanding support that we cannot count on in the

future.(49) Massive quantities of water, food, construction materials, and fuel

were provided by the Saudi's, and logisticians enjoyed excellent air facilities

and modern ports that could dock six ships simultaneously.(50) Despite the

attention that Pentagon planners have long given to the severing of our supply

lines by potential enemies, our resupply assets enjoyed safe passage to the

Saudi theater.(51) Our next conflict may not provide us with an ally like Saudi

Arabia, or an adversary as limited in sea power, air power, and strategic

positioning as Iraq. We must plan for an extended and isolated war and ensure

sustainability is built into any projected force.

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military must respond. The US must possess: (1) the global strateciic mobility

sufficient to move forces anywhere in the world; (2) rapid force closure ability;

(3) the flexibility to respond to the entire spectrum of confrontation intensities;

(4) the ability to fight two wars at the same time; and the possession of forces

the can be projected with (5) combat power and mobility, that are in (6) a high

state of readiness, and (7) are self-sustaining.

REDUCING THE GAP AND MEETING THE THREAT - AFSMPS

Operation Desert Shield identify the extent of the present combat power

projection gap, and the nature of the threat provides military imperatives that

attest to the urgency of reducing this gap as soon as possible. A new concept

in strategic mobility and power projection, the AFSMPS program, will help this

nation meet the seven challenges posed by the threat and substantially reduce

the time required to project a credible heavy force.

AFSMPS relies on two recent success stories, the MPS and FSS

programs, to provide a valuable new weapon to our strategic mobility arsenal.

The proposed AFSMPS consists equipment and 30 days of supplies for a

Mechanized Infantry Brigade (MIB) equipment prepositioned on three large 33-

knot FSS ships based in Diego Garcia. In the event of crisis, the ships would be

sent to the desired port or beach area and the preloaded equipment would be

offloaded at either a secure port or beach in the crisis area. A fly-in echelon

(FIE) from a rotating standby MIB from the 24th ID(M) (the heavy division from

the XVIII Airborne Corps) would land in the contingency area and link up with

the offloaded equipment. Ten days after arrival, this AFSMPS MIB would be

combat ready and prepared to take on a Soviet Tank Division.

Any program that advocates the construction of ships will improve our

global strategic mobility. Since AFSMPS envisions building three new ships,

this cannot help but improve our ability to move military assets to a distant

contingency. However, the primary advantage provided by AFSMPS is not

merely getting to a crisis area, but getting there faster. The military imperative

of rapid force closure is benefitted by this new proposal by improving our

proximity to a crisis and reducing both the transit time and load-up time

required.

The AFSMPS proposal envisions stationing prepositioning ships and

equipment as close as possible to likely areas of employment. Chart II shows

the distance from four principle US staging areas to the three regional "hot

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spots" discussed earlier. Using the cost-cutting assumption that the US can

only afford one such AFSMPS MIB, Diego Garcia is the optimal location for the

AFSMPS home base. The Diego Garcia facility is, on average, 38% or 2889

miles closer to the major port within each region than any of the other staging

locations.(52) This close proximity represents an average reduction of four days

sailing time required for an FSS ship, and six less transit days for a standard

RRF vessel. One of the great advantages maritime prepositioning affords is that

the force could be sailed even closer than Diego Garcia if the intelligence

community can provide some advance warning, so the AFSMPS option

represents even more potential time savings from proximity to a crisis.

The tremendous capability of the new FSS ships is its sailing speed.

Steam-driven SL-7 ships averaged 27 knots making 8600 mile trips from

Savannah to Dharan during Desert Shield, reducing the transit time from 30

days for many slower RRF ships to less than 12 days.(53) General Wagner

recently wrote that "the US cannot afford to depend on old, slow, poorly

maintained ships from the RRF to project forces in our national interests to

contingency areas worldwide."(54) It is impossible to measure the value of

reducing even a few days from the transit time; we hope to have the luxury of

methodically moving our assets to the desired theater, but the nature of the

threat is such that a few days saved will probably be crucial to the successful

resolution of the conflict. Armor 2000 points out that "a tank platoon landed on

Day 1 may be more critical than an armored division landed on Day 30."(55) The

importance on using the new FSS technology to reduce transit time cannot be

over-emphasized.

According to the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso, "the

biggest problem with sealift is loading time."(56) During the recent deployment of

the 24th lD(M), many problems were associated with this phase of the

deployment. One can easily imagine the complexities associated with a no-

notice deployment; the FSS was able to deploy to Savannah and the 24th

succeeded in receiving, loading, and discharging the first of ten ships carrying

their equipment in only nine days. However, this relatively fast load-up time was

achieved loading an FSS RO/RO ship, a faster-loading vessel than conventional

RRF ships. Load-up of the other divisions deployed during Desert Shield took

longer.(57) Since AFSMPS, like the Marine Corps MPS, involves prepositioned

ships with preloaded equipment, the rapid force closure requirement is greatly

enhanced by avoiding the challenging load-up requirement.

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Chart III shows the reduced closure time achieved by AFSMPS over two

other possible alternatives. The "FSS" column represents our present best-

case strategic mobility assets, and "AMPS" identifies the Army Maritime

Prepositioned Ships alternative, a duplication the Marine MPS concept with 20-

knot prepositioned ships in Diego Garcia. This chart clearly depicts the benefit

accrued by proximity, transit speed, and preloading, as the Brigade Ready Date

in the three critical regions for a MIB is improved an average of 43%. This large

reduction occurs despite the assumption that the AFSMPS ships are no closer

to the deployment area than Diego Garcia. General Otis clearly recognized the

potential for rapid force closure when he wrote that the SL-7 ships with "their

33-knot speed and RO/RO configuration make them ideally suited for moving

heavy forces."(58) The 46-day heavy force combat power projection gap

identified during Desert Storm is reduced a remarkable 70% to only 13.6 days.

Even in the worst-case theater, Europe, the time savings are considerable.

The proposed AFSMPS program will improve the US capacity to meet the

military imperative of flexible response in several ways. From a security

viewpoint, floating AFSMPS ships offer a less exposed target to terrorists than

forward based units or equipment.(59) Prepositioned ships aid the low end of the

confrontation spectrum by giving the commander the opportunity to move his

equipment assets to a less dangerous area, an option not available if the

equipment is stored in a warehouse or motor pool. At the opposite end of the

range of possible conventional threats the US may face, AFSMPS MIB allows us

quickly mount a serious challenge to a well-armed opponent.

AFSMPS serves the vague middle ground of confrontation, too. The

Marine Corps has recently investigated the flexibility provided by selective

offload of assets from the MPS squadron, and constructed modules that a