Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How To Neck Down Without Choking AUTHOR Major Benny L. Adams, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Artillery EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Title: Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to Neck Down Without Choking. II. Thesis: Even though there is no precedent to help us deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must consider alternatives to traditional squadron organization or face problems with availability and maintenance of equipment, availability and training of maintenance personnel, and training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission units. III. Discussion: Marine Corps plans call for a "necking down," or reduction in the number of different types of aircraft we operate into the year 2000 and beyond. The first community to deal with this new phenomenon will be the F/A-18D squadrons. The F/A-18D is replacing the A-6E and will eventually provide all-weather attack, reconnaissance, Supporting Arms coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)), and fighter capabilities. If we organize these multimission squadrons as currently envisioned, with six identical squadrons, three on each coast, problems will arise in equipment maintenance and availability, maintenance personnel training and availability, and aircrew training and proficiency. Problems with equipment will stem mainly from parcelling out limited reconnaissance sensor suites to six separate organizations where they will be handled extensively and replacements will be limited or not available. Maintenance personnel problems originate with the attempt to man day and night crews in all specialty areas in six squadrons. Training all aircrew to proficiency in all of the varied missions is virtually impossible. Alternatives include designation of rotating duty squadrons for particular missions, specialization within the squadron, and squadron specialization. IV. Summary: Designating one F/A-18D squadron on each coast to specialize in the reconnaissance/SAC(A) mission while the others perform the attack/fighter role appears to best resolve the potential problems of this multimission community. V. Conclusion: The Marine corps should organize its F/A-18D community based on a squadron specialization model vice traditional methods in order to overcome equipment, maintenance, and aircrew problems inherent to the multimission role. Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to Neck Down Without Choking OUTLINE Thesis: Even though there is no precedent to help us deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must consider alternatives to traditional squadron organization or face problems with availability and maintenance of equipment, availability and training of maintenance personnel, and training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission units. I. Necking down A. Inevitable B. Unprecedented II. The multimission F/A-18D A. Missions assigned 1. Attack 2. Reconnaissance 3. Supporting Arms Coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)) 4. Fighter B. Planned squadron organization III. Problems with planned organization A. Equipment B. Maintenance personnel C. Aircrew 1. Training 2. Proficiency IV. Alternatives to planned organization A. Rotating duty squadrons B. Squadron internal specialization C. Squadron specialization V. The future A. Status duo B. Innovation Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How to Neck Down Without Choking During a presentation at the Command and Staff college on March 15th, 1991, LtGen D. A. Wills, Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation indicated that the future for Marine Aviation into the year 2000 and beyond would include considerable "necking down". That is, a steady decline in the variety of aircraft which the Marines will own and operate. Replacing these many varied types of aircraft will be a handful of types, each with the capability to perform several different missions. An important consideration here is that there will be no decrease in the number or type of missions assigned to Marine Air. Regardless of the number of different types of aircraft the wing of the future possesses, it will still be called upon to perform reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare and control of aircraft and missiles (the six functions of Marine Air. (8:5-8) Necking down is inevitable. When considering that over 50 percent of the FY 90 Marine Corps budget went towards aviation, to operate, maintain, and support more than a dozen different models of aircraft, it becomes readily apparent that in these times of budget and personnel cuts, we can no longer afford to operate so diverse an air force. It seems intuitively obvious that eliminating an aircraft type will reduce costs. The danger here is that a bigger dose of a good medicine is not always better and is sometimes fatal. There is a point of diminishing returns, or culminating point, if you will, where the unique costs associated with necking down equal or outweigh the savings. Although we'll discuss some of these costs later, as they apply to the F/A-18D program, clearly Marine Aviation has a long way to go before it reaches this culminating point. The discussion, therefore, should center not on whether or not we should reduce the number of different types of aircraft we operate, but rather how to deal with some of the changes we know are coming. When first considering this problem, as an aviator, I naturally began to search for "the gouge". The gouge is a common term in the wing, as in "you live and die by the gouge" or "check with the OpsO, he's got the gouge". In simple terms, the gouge is the bottom line. Dont give me a lot of extraneous information, Just tell me how the last guy (who was successful) did it. Unfortunately, when it comes to necking down of aviation assets, there is no gouge. We've never done it. Consider the post war periods of our history. During 1920, when our armed forces were suffering through emasculation following the "war to end all wars", seven new models of aircraft entered service with the Marine Corps. (6:6) In 1921, four new models entered service and in 1922, five more were added. (6:6-7) When armed forces manpower plummeted again following World War II, the Marines received 18 new models of aircraft in 1945, 19 new models in 1946, and 11 new models in 1947. (6:29-33) After the "forgotten war" of Korea, the Marines added ten new models in 1954, seven more in 1955 and 11 more in 1956. (6:41-44) As a matter of fact, a review of aircraft flown by Marines from 1913 to the present indicates a consistent diversity of aircraft being maintained in an ever modernizing force. (1:3-41) It may very well be, then, that the F/A-18D community will be the first in the history of Marine Aviation to deal with the problems inherent in necking down. This two seat version of the F/A-18 Hornet is scheduled to replace Marine A-6 squadrons by 1993. (7:56) In addition to the night/all-weather mission of the A-6, the F/A-18D will assume the tactical reconnaissance mission of the RF-4, the Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) mission of the OV-10D, and the Forward Air Controller Airborne (FAC(A)) mission of the OA-4M. (Actually, both the OA-4 and OV-10 can perform as a TAC(A) or FAC(A). In addition the OV-10 can act as a Supporting Arms Coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)) by calling and adjusting artillery and naval gunfire.) We have, therefore, replaced four aircraft with one multimission aircraft while maintaining all of our previously held capabilities. Two points are in order here before we continue with a discussion of the missions assigned to the F/A-18D. First, not all the capabilities planned for the F/A-18D are present in the current model. For example, the radar must be upgraded before it is all-weather capable and a sensor suite must be procured to add the reconnaissance capability. (4:23-24) I am assuming that these plans will be carried out in time. Although the current lack of these capabilities is a serious issue in itself, it is not considered here. Second, although general capabilities may carry over, just considering speed differentials between an OV-10 and an RF-4 will make it obvious that no single aircraft can exhibit all the characteristics of both. For example, the F/A-18D can perform the general TAC(A)/FAC(A) mission of the OV-10 -- but the OV-10, due to its speed, also makes a good helicopter escort. The F/A-18D probably would not. Of all the missions assigned to the F/A-18D, it is probably most suited to that of attack. The two-man crew allows for management of the heavy workload required to navigate, locate targets, avoid the ground and anti-aircraft fire, and operate weapons systems while flying fast at night. There are several skills involved in this mission which must be learned, practiced, and performed regularly in order to maintain proficiency. Bombs can be delivered during daylight or at night, from high altitude or low, by visual means or by radar, manually or by computer, and with or without laser guidance. Each delivery method requires peculiar knowledge and proficiency. Getting to and from a target may require instrument navigation, night formation flight, low level navigation, use of night vision goggles, night terrain clearance flight, aerial refueling, and an instrument recovery. Each of these skills again requires particular knowledge and practice to remain proficient. If the F/A-18D crew is to be nuclear weapons delivery qualified, as the A-8 crews were, this will require a complete syllabus of ground instruction and flight evaluation of ingress and delivery methods. Annual certification by graded check flight would also have to be conducted for all nuclear certified crews. This list of skills required to perform the attack mission is certainly not a comprehensive one. It should make it clear, however, that attempting to maintain proficiency in the attack mission is a challenge to any squadron. East Coast squadrons face the additional problem of not having a live fire range available. In order to drop live ordnance, these squadrons must deploy to the West Coast or overseas. Another mission to be assumed by the F/A-18D is that of reconnaissance. This will place more requirements on the squadron for training and proficiency. Many basic skills required for the attack mission, such as instrument flight and aerial refueling, will obviously carry over to the reconnaissance role. There are, however, many unique skills that will have to be learned and practiced. Very high speed low level flight and navigation as well as sensor operation will be most important for the aircrew. Equipment handling and repair will top the list for maintenance personnel. In the F/A-18D community the combined FAC(A) and TAC(A) missions are referred to as the Supporting Arms Coordinator Airborne (SAC(A)) mission. Operating as a SAC(A) will not require any new hardware, however, to be proficient at it will require a pilot and Weapons Systems Operator (WSO) with extensive knowledge of the Marine Aviation Command and Control System (MACCS) as well as a well rehearsed game plan for crew coordination. The final mission assigned to F/A-18D squadrons is the fighter mission. Crews will have to be proficient in operating air-to-air radar, running intercepts, employing air-to-air weapons, and employing aerial combat tactics as a single fighter or as a member of a larger formation. Also inherent in this mission is the necessity of thoroughly understanding the escort role and escort tactics. In order to be proficient crews must also study aircraft and tactics of threat nations. I hope by now it has become evident that we really need to put some thought into how we plan to organize, equip, and train a truly multimission aviation community. So far, the plans call for business as usual. Six F/A-18D squadrons, three on each coast, with identical organizations, equipment, and training requirements. Even though there is no precedent to help us deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must consider alternatives to traditional squadron organization or face problems with availability and maintenance of equipment. availability and training of maintenance personnel, and training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission units By equipment I mean principally the high value sensor suite that will give the F/A-18D its reconnaissance capability. Equally dividing these assets among the six squadrons will create a maintenance nightmare and could result in a lack of availability. Squadrons will not be able to dedicate particular airframes to exclusively perform the reconnaissance mission. That means that these sensitive systems will have to be uploaded, downloaded, and transported extensively. Every movement is a potential break, and with only a few assets, the squadron may be unable to replace them. Even with the tenderest of care, experience has shown that uploading and downloading of equipment will result in some failures. Most aviators have experienced the anxiety that comes with waiting to see if the newly uploaded fuel pod will really transfer its fuel. Most have also experienced several that did not, due to damaged or improper connections or some other malfunction that is just part of the game when dealing with equipment that is not permanently installed. By dividing our assets we increase the maintenance workload and increase the probability that at some point we will not have the operable equipment required to complete the mission. Closely related to the equipment problem is the problem of maintenance personnel. One of the big benefits of necking down should be savings in personnel. By having six identical squadrons, each required to perform every mission, our potential personnel savings are drastically reduced. Squadron maintenance departments operate 24 hours a day. At a minimum, the department must have a day and night crew each composed of enough competent maintainers to fix whatever problem arises in a multitude of specialty areas. So for each mission we add that requires a special maintenance skill, we not only have to man that shop once, but twice. Manning must also take into account normal and emergency leave, detachments, and absences due to training. The maintenance department required by a "do everything" F/A-18D squadron will be huge, and we haven't even considered detailed maintenance manning concerns such as Quality Assurance Representatives (QARs) and Collateral Duty inspectors (CDIs) required by maintenance instructions. Aircrew training and proficiency have to rate high on the list of concerns involved with multimission squadrons. Aircrew training for each type of aircraft is governed by a Training and Readiness (T&R) manual. This manual sets out a building block approach to aircrew training and establishes a minimum refly interval for currency. The actions necessary to complete each syllabus flight are set out in the manual and a number in the 100 to 600 series is assigned. Higher numbered flights are more advanced and require that certain specified lower numbered flights be current before a crew can fly the advanced flight and receive the "tickie." It must be noted that currency and proficiency are completely different concepts. Currency simply refers to the refly interval, anywhere from three months to six months, required by the T&R manual. Proficiency concerns the crews competency level for performing a particular mission. A crew who has not flown a low level flight in five months might be current, but they are certainly not proficient. The T&R manual also assigns a Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP) to each flight, usually .5 to 1.0 percent. By adding the percentages of each flight for which the pilot or WSO is current, you can determine that individuals CRP. The squadron operations department is responsible for managing aircrew training and uses CRP as an indicator of how well their training program is working. An average CRP of 90% for any individual A-6, RF-4, OV-10 or OA-4M squadron would be high. Consider the challenge then in training every aircrewman in an F/A-18D squadron to be current in every one of those missions -- and then remember that even if it were possible to make them current, it would say nothing of proficiency. There simply is no way to do it without lowering standards and risking lives. We know that necking down is inevitable and unprecedented. We know that it will affect the F/A-18D program in the near future and that the transition, if it goes according to current plans, will be fraught with potential problems. Lets now consider some alternatives which might alleviate or at least reduce these problems. One option is a system of rotating duty squadrons. Although there is no precedent for necking down, we have had the opportunity to experiment with multimission platforms. Helicopters, and the CH-46's in particular, are a case in point. (5:B-3,4) This community has had to deal with missions ranging from low level night vision goggle (NVG) flights to over ocean search and rescue (SAR). The way at least one group handled this was to designate a particular squadron as the primary NVG flyers for the quarter. Another squadron might be designated as the primary SAR flyers for the quarter. Assignments would rotate quarterly with each period preceded by extensive aircrew training in the upcoming duty mission. Duty squadron assignments in an F/A-18D group might take the form of one squadron designated for the reconnaissance mission, one for night attack, and one for SAC(A)/fighter. This might help eliminate the equipment problems if the reconnaissance sensors were transferred in bulk to the new duty reconnaissance squadron each quarter (or at the interval selected by the group commander). Accountability might become a problem, though, and there would be a spool-up time required for the receiving squadron to upload the systems, troubleshoot them, and get them working properly. Another problem is that other aircraft systems which aren't exercised tend to break. We might end up spending the majority of each period trying to get the bombers and shooters up to speed too. This concept would not lessen the maintenance personnel problem. You could not transfer the maintenance expertise from squadron to squadron along with the sensors and therefore the expertise would have to be resident in each squadron. There would be no savings in manpower, in fact there might be a loss as ordnancemen sit idle in the reconnaissance squadron, fire controllers sit idle in the SAG(A) squadron, etc. Aircrew training and proficiency would certainly be high in one particular area, but the flexibility of each squadron would be limited. A new system of recording and tracking CRP, to coincide with the rotating schedule, would have to be devised. Although probably manageable from the aircrew training aspect, the rotating duty squadron concept might cause more problems than it solves in the equipment and maintenance areas. Another idea is specialization by aircrew within each squadron. This obviously would not address the equipment and maintenance concerns, but it might at least provide relief on the aircrew side and could be accomplished independently by each squadron. It would work similar to the previous alternative except that groups of aviators within the squadron, vice squadrons as a whole, would be designated to perform duty missions. Currency and proficiency could again be expected to remain at a high level in designated mission areas and the same requirement to alter CRP measurement would have to be addressed. This has the potential to become a scheduling nightmare. Very little flexibility would be afforded the operations department or the squadron commanding officer. With the limited redressal of problems, and even the limited benefit being questionable, the internal squadron specialization is not a good idea. My final proposal would be a permanent squadron specialization. One squadron on each coast would be designated the reconnaissance/SAC(A) squadron. The remaining two squadrons on each coast would be all-weather attack/fighter squadrons. I believe this option would most adequately address the problem areas. Equipment benefits are obvious. This plan would concentrate high value reconnaissance assets at just two points. Once a sensor suite was installed and working on an aircraft it could remain there indefinitely. There would be less handling of the reconnaissance systems and less chance of malfunction. If a malfunction did occur, sufficient assets would be on hand to continue with the mission. The fighter/attack squadrons would exercise all aircraft systems routinely and thus ensure improved reliability. Maintenance personnel benefits are also obvious. Now instead of needing 12 reconnaissance specialist maintenance crews (day and night crew for each of six squadrons) you would only need four. Likewise, for the fire control and ordnance crews, the requirement would go from 12 to eight. Total maintenance personnel needed would thus be decreased and the utilization of those present in each squadron would increase. Aircrew training and proficiency would likewise benefit. The range of missions that each pilot and WSO would have to train for would be reduced to a manageable number. No deviation would be required from standard CRP measurement practices. With a decrease in missions and resultant increase in proficiency would also come increased safety. The aircrew would no longer have to be so overwhelmed that they would be proficient in nothing and dangerous in everything. Besides the benefits accrued in equipment availability, maintenance personnel, and aircrew training and proficiency, this plan has the added bonus of reestablishing a separate aviation reconnaissance community. This community disappeared from the Marine Corps when the last RF-4 was retired. Having a separate community for reconnaissance does several good things. It ensures that there is a well trained and proficient reconnaissance capability within the Marine Corps, it provides a vehicle for proposing needed changes and upgrades of equipment, and it ensures the best possible upkeep and usage of equipment on hand. Marine Corps aviation is changing. Necking down will bring many benefits as well as many challenges to be overcome. If the challenges are not met with innovative solutions, necking down may end up choking the usefulness out of our aviation assets. Even though there is no clear precedent that sheds light on how we should organize, equip, and train future multimission capable units, to simply stick with the status quo of several identically organized squadrons will certainly result in problems with equipment availability, maintenance personnel, and aircrew training and proficiency. The F/A-18D transition program provides us an opportune time to think about and try some alternatives. For this particular community, specialization by squadron as described earlier seems to afford the greatest benefit. Let's reestablish the reconnaissance community, enhance the availability and reliability of our equipment, realize the full effect of expected personnel savings, and produce well trained, proficient, and safe aircrew. We can do it now with the F/A-18D program. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Condon, John P., MGen, USMC(Ret). Diamond Anniversary 75th Year of Naval Aviation. V: UPS Marine Corps Aviation. Ed John M. Elliott. Washington: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare). 2. Donahue, Paul F., Maj, USMC. "The F/A-18D for the A-6E: A Good Deal That Warrants a Closer Looks" Marine Corps Gazette, 73 (July 1989), 26-27. 3. Gevock, James R., LtCol, USMC. "Capability for the Future or Longing for the Past?" Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (May 1990), 68-69. 4. Krupp, Dennis T., LtCol, USMC, and Rash, David J., Maj, USMC. "F/A-18D Hornet: Strike Fighter for the Future." Marine Corps Gazette, 73 July 1989), 22-25. 5. Lively, Charles M., LtCol, USMC. Feasibility of Permanently Organizing Marine Helicopter Squadrons as Composite Squadrons. Quantico: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1974. 6. Marine Cords Aircraft 1913-1965 Washington: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1967. 7. Pitman, C. H., LtGen, USMC. "Aviation Posture Statements" Marine Corps Gazette,74 (May 1990), 53-57. 8. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation. FMFM 5-1 Quantico, 1979.
