The Gulf War AUTHOR LtCol Mukram F. Tal, Jordan Armed Forces CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues -TEXT- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: The Gulf War THESIS: The conflict between Iraq and Iran has deep roots in the history of the Middle Eastern region. ISSUE: The rise of Islam in the sixth century led to the fall of the Persian empire and its absorption into the emerging Islamic empire. The later seventh century witnessed the emergence of the Shiite sect, which was dominated and influenced by the Persians. This was the first fragmentation of the Islamic empire. There was also a new rise of the consequential confrontations between the two rival factions, the Shiites and the Sunnis. The split of Islam into these two rival sects during the late seventh century still fuels much of the current Muslim unrest in the region. Iraq was under the Ottoman Empire, which claimed the role of protector of the Sunnis, and Iran was under the Safani Dynasty, which presented itself as the protector of the Shiites. The quarrel over Shatt Al-Arab, the river running between Iraq and Iran, cast a long shadow of conflict during the modern era and clashes between the two countries continued. Another reason for the conflict is the ideologies that govern the political systems of Iraq and Iran. Iraq is led by the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party, while Iran is led by an Islamic fundamentalist regime. The internal situation for both Iraq and Iran is almost the same, and both of them have ethnic minority groups and different religions and religious sects. The superpowers were looking carefully at the war, but the United States and the Soviet Union were not involved directly in the war. The Arab states in the Gulf were two groups, one supported Iraq and the other group was conservative. CONCLUSION: The Iraq-Iran War lasted for eight years, and it's estimated that one million died on both sides. As of today, no peace agreement has been reached and no one knows what's going to happen to that historical struggle. THE GULF WAR OUTLINE THESIS. The conflict between Iraq and Iran has deep roots in the history of the Middle Eastern region. Introduction I. The Main Causes of the War A. General History of the Conflict B. Two Different Ideologies C. Iraq's and Iran's Internal Situation D. The Personal Causes of the War II. The Super Powers and the War III. The Gulf States and the War IV. Conclusion INTRODUCTION The War between Iraq and Iran lasted for eight years and it is estimated that 1 million people died on both sides. As of today no peace agreement has been reached, the negotia- tions have stopped and nobody knows what is going to happen. This paper will discuss the main causes of the war, focussing on four different perspectives: 1) the historical context of the conflict, 2) the different ideologies in- volved, 3) the internal situation in each of the countries involved, and 4) the personal hatred of the leaders of Iran and Iraq toward each other . The paper will also discuss the positions of the superpowers as well as that of the other Gulf states (in the G.C.C.) concerning the war. I. THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE WAR A. A General History of the Conflict I would argue that this conflict goes deep into the history of the Middle Eastern region. In order to facilitate understanding of the conflict, therefore, it is important to give a short historical background of this long-term conflict between the Arabs and the Iranians. In general, it is believed that a long-term conflict is usually caused by two types of precipitants - - general and specific. William O. Staudenmaier stated: "The general precipitants are the underlying cause of a conflict, usually rooted in history, while the specific participants are the more provocative and proximate causes of a conflict."1 In the case of the Iran-Iraq conflict, the general precipitants can be traced to the ethnic and cultural differences that divided the Arabs and the Persians. These differences led to a persistent conflict between these two groups which has been present since the early Islamic period. The rise of Islam in the seventh century led to the fall of the Persian empire and its absorption into the emerging Islamic empire. It is believed, however, that during Abasaid Caliphate's regime the dispersion of the Persian elements throughout the Islamic Arab society produced a new influen- tial Persian power within the Islamic empire. The late seventh century witnessed the emergence of the Shi'ite sect, which was dominated and influenced by the Persians. This was the first manifest sign of the fragmenta- tion of the Islamic empire. There was also a new rise of consequential confrontations between the two rival factions -- the Shi'ites and the Sunnis. Staudenmaier believes that Islam's split into these two rival sects during the late seventh century still fuels much of the current Muslim unrest in Southwest Asia.2 There was a consequential incorporation of the Middle East into the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, along with the rise of the Safawia Dynasty, which presented itself as the protector of the Shi'ites, while the Ottomans claimed the role of protector of the Sunnis. During this era, Iraq became a stage of conflict and a target between the two rival powers of the Ottomans and the Safawia. Under the Shah Ismail, the Safawi ruler of Persia, Iraq fell under Persian occupation in 1508. However, after a consequential conflict, Iraq was retaken by the Ottomans in 1543. This rivalry between the two regimes over Iraq reflected, in effect, the precarious military balance between the Ottomans (the Sunni and the Safawia) and the Shi'ite on the one hand, and the administrative weaknesses of the two powers on the other hand. In fact, neither of the two powers could decisively defeat the other and achieve permanent military control over the region of Mesopotamia, nor could either establish effective administrative control when in possession of it. In 1639 the Treaty of Zuhab was signed between the two powers, briefly establishing a peace and defining the border between the Ottomans and the Persian Safawia. The 1639 treaty was a commitment to a short period of peace throughout the historical conflict between the Ottomans and the Safawia. The eighteenth century brought with it more hostilities between the Persians and the Turkish. One of the most significant events during this era was the Persian occupation of Basra in Iraq which occurred in 1776. However, this new conflict was resolved by the first Treaty of Erzerum in 1823. "The creation of the Shi'ite state of the Safawia in the sixteenth century also sharpened the antagonism, some of them latent, between the Persians and their neighbors to the west. New relationships and exacerbations replaced the religious and cultural unity of the Arab and Iranian worlds. Certainly after this period relations and influences between the two declined. Not only did their religious paths part, but the development of culture and thought went more and more along separate ways."3 By the nineteenth century, the growth of the British imperialist power in the region of Mesopotamia and the Gulf area had transformed the balance of power and changed the nature of the conflict between the Arabs and the Persians. Within this framework, the instability maintained in the area by the Ottoman-Persian rivalries, the political autonomy of many tribes in the frontier zones between the two powers of the Ottomans and the Persians, and the general instability brought many difficulties to the British imperialists. At the same time, Britain was attempting to consolidate its position in the region by sponsoring support of the two powers. This was done in order to facilitate Britain's political and economic interest in the region. In short, the relations between the Arabs and the Persians has frequently been hostile in the past. The quarrel over Shatt Al-Arab, the river running between Iraq and Iran, cast a long shadow of conflict during the modern era. In the 1930s, the clashes along their disputed borders and the Shatt Al-Arab waterway led to a treaty between the two countries, Iran-Iraq, in 1937, which allocated the entire Shatt Al-Arab to Iraqi sovereignty except for small anchorage areas at the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr. The treaty was in line with earlier agreements of 1847 and 1913-14, and reflected the political weight of Britain as Iraq's sponsoring power. The next two decades were relatively peaceful between the two countries, after the signing of the treaty of 1937. However, this relative peace ended when Iraq's British monarchy was toppled by Iraqi army officers in July 1958. Iran had regarded the 1937 treaty as an imposition of British hegemony, and in November 1969 the Shah demanded that the river border be moved from the Iranian shore to the middle of the Shatt Al-Arab channel. Iranian ships stopped using Iraqi pilots or paying Iraqi tolls.4 The next month, Iraq's Abdul-Karim Qassem responded by also declaring the 1937 treaty void, claiming the waters around Abadan and Khorramshahr for Iraq. But Baghdad lacked the military strength to challenge Teheran.5 The dispute over territory and borders between Iran and Iraq came to the fire again after the Ba'ath party took over political power in Iraq in July 1968. And hostilities between the two countries erupted again in 1969. The dispute over territory escalated during late 1974 and brought direct military clashes between the Iraqi and Iranian military forces. "The border conflict was symptomatic of deeper problems between the two regions, and in many respects the shifting location of the river boundary simply expressed changes in the overall balance of forces between the two countries."6 This threat prompted mediation efforts first by Turkey, then by Algeria to end this new dispute over borders of the Shatt Al-Arab between Iran and Iraq. On March 6, 1975, Saddam Husayn, Vice President of Iraq (now President of Iraq), met with the Shah of Iran during an OPEC conference in Algeria. Their agreements called for an end to all acts of infiltration and hostilities. The two leaders signed a Treaty of International Boundaries and Good Neighborliness.7 In 1979, the regime of the Shah of Iran was overturned by a revolution led by Islamic fundamentalists under the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini abrogated the treaty of 1975 and a new outbreak of war erupted between the two countries on September 22, 1980. Thus, the general precipitants of the 1980 war were the legacy of centuries of religious, ethnic and territorial differences between the Iraqi's -- the Arabs -- and the Iranians -- the Persians. B. Two Different Ideologies Another reason for the conflict that should be addressed are the two ideologies that govern the political systems of Iraq and Iran. Iraq is led by the socialist Arab Ba'ath party while Iran is led by an Islamic fundamentalist regime. In order to understand the nature of this ideological conflict a summarization of both are given. The Ba'ath party is a nationalist party that was established in Syria on April 7, 1947, by Michel Aflak. The main goals of this party, as stated by its constitution, is to achieve unity, freedom and socialism. The Ba'ath party regards Islam as the Arab's great cultural heritage. It nonetheless subordinates it to Arab nationalism, which becomes the propelling force of Arab regeneration. Thus, Islam becomes an element and a manifes- tation of Arab nationalism while Arab nationalism takes precedence over Islam. In other words, the Iraqi Ba'athists are vehemently opposed to the politicization of the religion. By unity the Ba'ath Party means that the entire area from the Arabian Gulf in the east to Morocco in the west, and from northern Iraq and Syrian in the north to Somalia in the south is one nation that should be united politically, economically, militarily, etc., in one state. Freedom means the independence and liberation of all this area from colonizers. Self-reliance in all aspects of life is a main concept in the Ba'athist ideology. Socialism means equal distribution of the fortune, nationalization of the means of production, and equal rights for women and men. From the understanding of these concepts, the Ba'athists main goals involved the government of Iraq having balanced relations between the two superpowers. Iraq has strong relations with the Soviet Union; they were even the first noncommunist group to sign a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Yet at the same time they do not hesitate to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They also condemn the U.S.A.'s policy toward the Middle East and the third world, and yet still keep good relations with the U.S. As for inside the country, in the last ten years Iraq has built and maintained an intensive economic plan aimed at modernizing all aspects of the country. The party also worked hard to institutionalize the country by encouraging people to participate in the election for the first National Assembly in Iraq.8 After the 1979 collapse of the Shah the Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran. Khomeini had a new ideology which introduced a new factor: pitting a radical, univer- salist, Pan-Islamic religious regime in Iran against a secular, socialist, nationalist regime in Iraq. Complicating the ideological clash was Khomeini's personal antipathy towards the Ba'athist government, which in 1978 had expelled him from Iraq (where he had lived for 14 years), at the request of the Shah. In order to understand the ideological orientation of the Iranian revolution, it is necessary to examine briefly the ideological precepts of Khomeini, the architect of Iran's new ideological orientation. In his work, Islamic Govern- ment, based on a series of lectures delivered in the holy city of Najaf, Iraq, in the late 1960s and early 197Os, Khomeini set forth his conception of society and government. His intense antipathy towards the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran was the point of departure for his unmitigated animosity towards a hereditary monarchy. He attributes the corruption and moral decline of society to the corruption of the ruling dynasty and the royal family.9 For Khomeini, the only salvation for Muslims was to overthrow the corrupt, oppressive and "anti-Islamic" regimes and establish the Islamic revolution which would usher in a new social and political order in the Islamic world. In his words: We have no alternative but to work for destroying the corrupt and corrupting systems and to destroy the symbol of treason and the unjust among rulers of peoples. This is a duty that all Moslems wherever they may be are entrusted - - a duty to create a victorious and trium- phant Islamic political revolution.10 Thus, the objective is to establish the Islamic revolu- tion which will destroy the heads of treason, the idols, the human images and the false gods who disseminate injustice and corruption on earth and preserve the unity of the Moslems.11 To achieve this objective, Khomeini called on the Ulema (religious leaders) to abjure passivity and to become involved in the political process: "The duty of the Ulema is to put an end to this injustice and to seek to bring happi- ness to millions of peoples through destroying and eliminat- ing the unjust governments and through establishing a sincere and active Moslem government."12 Since the Islamic govern- ment is a government of religious law (i.e., a theocracy), Khomeini argues that only the religious jurisprudents of the faqih and nobody else should be in charge of the govern- ment.13 This is equivalent to a total monopolization of power by the Ulema. Thus, the Ulema have exclusive authority over all matters. They have been trusted with governing, ruling and running the affairs of the people. Khomeini's delegation of absolute power to the Ulema stems from his perception and conviction that the religious jurisprudents are the representatives of the prophets. The religious jurist is defined as a person knowledgeable in the Islamic creed, laws, rules and ethics.14 Khomeini's concept of vilayati faqih (the governance of the jurist) is viewed by some scholars as an innovation and a radical departure from the classical doctrine of Ja'fari Shi'ism.15 The concept of vilayati faqih is based on Khomeini's conviction that the Islamic state is the best form of government, and that only in an Islamic state can the Muslims' interests be safeguarded and promoted. Since the Islamic state is the best form of government, only the faqih can provide genuine leadership for such a state, which aims at the spiritual regeneration of man.16 Upon his accession to power, Khomeini enshrined the concept of vilayati faqih in the newly proclaimed constitu- tion of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, the constitution grants the faqih wide-ranging powers in the political process, such as appointing and dismissing the chief of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, declaring war and even dismissing the President of the Republic on the basis of a supreme court decision.17 The power of the faqih is also manifested in his power to appoint half the members of the Council of Guar- dians, entrusted with the protection of the constitution as well as of Islamic precepts.18 Furthermore, article 162 of the constitution grants the faqih the power to appoint the head of the supreme court and the Attorney-General in consultation with the supreme court judges.19 These provi- sions conferred tremendous powers on Ayatollah Khomeini and made him the final arbiter in Iran's power structure. Implicit in Khomeini's attack on the status quo and his conception of the Islamic government is his intense opposi- tion to the territorial state and his quest to revive and reconstitute the universal Pan-Islamic state under his spiritual and political leadership. For Khomeini, the division and fragmentation of the Muslim states into indepen- dent political entities is an anomaly. He attributes this fragmentation to the schemes of the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers who have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic Umma (nation) from each other and artificially created separate nations.20 As a corollary, nationalism and the "west-phalian" territorial state are anathema and hence devoid of any legitimacy, according to Khomeini. This ideological, Pan- Islamic version of the state was articulated by Iran's President, Ali Akbar Khamanai when he declared that "there is no geographic border for the Imman Khomeini."21 Convinced of his messianic vision of Islam and embol- dened by the collapse of the Shah's regime, Khomeini advo- cated the export of his brand of Islamic fundamentalism to every corner of the Islamic world. In a speech on 11 February 1980, he vowed to export his fundamentalist, radical Islamic movement abroad: "We will export our revolution to the four corners of the world," he declared, "because our revolution is Islamic, and the struggle will continue until the cry of `La ilaha illah'llah' ['there is no God but God and Muhammad is his messenger'] prevails throughout the whole world."22 It is this novel conception of international relations, advocated by Khomeini, which lies at the root of Iran's strained relations with Iraq and the other Arab Gulf states. C. Iran and Iraq's Internal Situation Iran is a big country with many ethnic minority groups such as Arab, Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchis, Kurds and Turko- mans. There are also different religions and religious sects in Iran, for example, Judaism, Christian, Islam (Sunni and Shi'ite), Baha'is and Zoroastrianism.23 After the Iranian revolution, these ethnic groups demanded independence and spurred their struggle to gain self-determination and other human rights. In 1978 the line of Khomeini and his clerical followers began destroying the power and position of other groups, whether conservatives or liberals, in the national front and related groups, the secular or Muslim leftists; the national minorities (who, in the case of the primarily Sunni Kurds, Turkomans and Baluchis, feared Shi'ite theocracy); or even some high reli- gious critics of Khomeini, notably Ayatollah Shariatmadari. Many in these groups opposed the proposal of Khomeini and his followers for a straight referendum allowing people to choose between monarchy and an "Islamic Republic," either because the latter was undefined (Khomeini explicitly refused to add the word "democratic" to the title), or because there needed to be a wider range of better defined choices, with time for debate. Khomeini's forces won and the referendum was held in late March of 1978, with an overwhelming vote for the Islamic Republic. In the Sunni Kurdish area, however, there were boycotts and some active fighting at the time of the referen- dum.24 In the same year there was also a revolt among the Kurds in the region of Khorasan, in northeastern Iran where a small minority of the Kurds live. This was met with severe action by the government's military.25 In the west of Iran, where the majority of the Kurds live, there were more rebels against the central government in Teheran. The Kurds operated in mountain country and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) enjoyed considerable support in the major towns, such as Mahabad, Sardasht, Bukan and Piranshahr. Mojahedin and Fadayan were receiving valuable training fighting alongside the Kurds. Both the KDP and the Mojahedin broadcast anti- government news and programs from small transmitters in Kurdish territory.26 From the beginning Khomeini tried to suppress all these opposition movements, including the Kurdish movement. In addition, he tried to monopolize the political power and put it in the hands of the clerics.27 Instead of declaring a secular constitution, Khomeini insisted on having a Muslim conservative constitution. The united Muslims of Kurdistan, meantime, threatened to take up arms if the constitution was not revised to satisfy their demands, while the Union of Muslims Party of Baluchistan demanded the right to revise any national law not in keeping with local requirements before application to their province. The assault on the draft constitution by the secular parties led Khomeini to spur the Islamic groups to a counter attack.28 In remarks to a delegation of preachers from Mashad at the end of June Khomeini said, "clerics and Islamic groups must review the draft from an Islamic perspective and for an Islamic constitution," rather than allowing "others" to correct the document. "This right belongs to you. It is those knowledgeable in Islam who may express an opinion on the law of Islam. Don't sit back while foreignized intellec- tuals, who have no faith in Islam, give their views and write the things they write. Pick up your pens and in the mosques, from the alters, in the streets and bazaars, speak of the things that in your view should be included in the constitu- tion."29 The minority groups, especially the Kurds, were also active in the military of Iran. Several military attempts to overthrow the Islamic regime were discovered. The chief judge of the military revolutionary tribunal, Mohammadi Rayshari, announced in quick succession the discovery of two plots in the armed forces. One of them was announced in June and code-named "Operation Overthrow" and was centered on the military base in Piranshahr in Kurdistan. Some twenty-seven junior and warrant officers were arrested in the plot. It appeared to be a minor affair, primarily related to the Kurdish rebellion, although Rayshahri treated it as an attempt at a full coup to return the Shah and Shapour Bakhtiar to power.30 In the three years that followed the overthrow of Bani- Sadr, the Khomeini regime beat back an attempt at armed rebellion by left-wing guerrillas, neutralized or eliminated other opposition groups, contained the Kurdish rebellion, and consolidated its hold on the country.31 The internal situation in Iraq, on the other hand, was not much better, as Shi'ite unrest inside Iraq started. This unrest made the leadership look to the Iranian revolution as a major threat to its power, especially after the attempt in April 1980 on the life of Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Premier.32 An Iraqi spokesman described the conditions inside Iraq as being near civil war in 1980.33 That was not the only problem facing Saddam Husayn, Iraq's President. There was also a struggle for power in the higher circles of the Ba'ath party. On July 18, 1979 before the Revolutionary Command Council meeting, a special inves- tigation committee declared that some of the senior members in the party were cooperating with Syria for the overthrow of President Husayn and established a federation between the two countries.34 As this indicates, the internal situation in Iraq was very bad for the ambitious young President Saddam Husayn, and thus he had to take action, no matter what the cost, in order to maintain power. D. The Personal Causes of the War The personal factor is an important one in considering the causes of this war. The personalities of the two leaders and their hatred for each other played a major role in both causing and maintaining the war. Ayatollah Khomeini was very active in working against the Shah's regime. Because of Khomeini's activities, the regime of the Shah of Iran arrested him for several days but, under pressure from the Ulema (the religious body in Iran), the Shah's regime did not impose a severe punishment and instead banished him to Turkey. In October 1965, he was permitted to change his place of exile to the Shi'a Shrine city of Najaf, in Iraq, where he spent thirteen years.35 Khomeini was very active against the Shah of Iran during this period from 1964 to 1978. In exile in Iraq, Khomeini directed his efforts to the type of activity that, during his Qam period, he had described as incumbent on a religious leader: teaching, writing, speaking, and issuing declara- tion, all aimed at exposing the "crimes" of the Iranian government, warning of the threat posed to Islam and Iran by a regime of "tyranny and unbelief," using Islam as an instrument for mobilizing and forging a united opposition, and teaching his followers to gird themselves for resistance to a ruler who had turned himself into "a servant of the dollar."36 As discussed earlier, the Iraqi government signed a peace treaty with Iran concerning the dispute over Shatt Al- Arab in March 1975, during the OPEC conference in Algeria. Because of friendlier relations between the two nations, the Iraqi government, at Iran's request, pressured Khomeini to desist from political activities and inflammatory statements. When Khomeini refused, he was asked by the Iraqi government to leave the country. Khomeini tried to cross over into Kuwait, but was refused entry. Khomeini next considered trying to enter Syria. But Ebrahim Yazdi, who had hurried to Khomeini's side, urged him to come to Paris rather than to try to settle in another Arab country. It is possible that the incident of being deported from Iraq led Khomeini to have resentment toward Iraq and the Iraqi government. On the other hand, the personality of the President of Iraq, Saddam Husayn, and his mentality toward peace with Iran must be taken into account. In 1975, President Saddam Husayn was forced to sign a treaty to cease fire with the late Shah of Iran. It is not the purpose of this paper to detail the circumstances that forced the President of Iraq to sign the treaty at that time. Suffice it to say that the outcome of the treaty was the dividing of Shatt Al-Arab between Iraq and Iran. The treaty was considered unfair from Iraq's point of view. However, there was a kind of compromise, land in replacement for peace, because Iran was more powerful than Iraq at that time. The Iranian revolution created new circumstances and Saddam Husayn thought it was the proper time to break the treaty that he and the Shah had signed. Here we have a leader who believes that he was forced to sign a treaty which hurt his dignity. He also felt that he could use the new situation in Iran. At the beginning of the revolution in Iran there was an absolute collapse of the old institutions and the new ones were not yet established. Therefore, Saddam was mentally prepared to go to war against Iran. On the other side, Khomeini once lived as a political refugee in Iraq and was politically active there but he was deported because the 1975 treaty indicated that both Iraq and Iran should eliminate the opposition against each other from their lands. II. THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE WAR It is very important to examine the superpowers' position towards this war because the war took place in a very important area of the Middle East, the Gulf region, which has oil reserves. This area is of importance, espe- cially to the United States, because the U.S. and its allies are depending on this area for their oil needs. When the war broke out in September 1980, the U.S. was involved in policy planning and in the hostage crisis. Thus, a defined policy was not made towards the war except to take a position of neutrality. In 1981, the new administration was less worried about the war itself than about its "spillover" to other Gulf states. The U.S. policy was "to support the resolution of the war...by negotiation and in a manner consistent with the principles of international law, including nonintervention in internal affairs of another state...We have taken steps to guild the confidence of key states in our commitment to their security from Soviet and Soviet supported external threats and from Soviet exploitation of conflict...we have increased the national resources for our own military to accelerate the development of their capability to better deter threats to the region..."38 The war reached a point of stalemate in mid-1981 and did not seem threatening to the lower Gulf. Between 1982 and 1984, Israel invaded Lebanon and the U.S. attention shifted back to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. continued a policy of arms sale to Saudi Arabia that reached $16.182 billion from 1981-85.39 In 1984, Iraq began air attacks against oil tankers and oil facilities on the Iranian Gulf coast. Iran responded by attacking Kuwaiti ships and oil facilities. During that year 71 ships were attacked, 53 attached by Iraq and 18 by Iran.40 Thus, the U.S. changed its first concern from the Soviet threat to the flow of oil. On June 11th, Under Secretary of State Richard Murphy outlined the U.S. policy in the Gulf as one that consists of four crucial elements. The first is to ensure the free flow of oil to the west. Second, to contain the expansion of Soviet and other radical influences. Third, to maintain the security of the Arab states of the Gulf. Finally, "...whatever steps we take must complement our efforts to achieve peace between the Arab states and Is- rael."41 In December 1984, the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations with Iraq, which was cut off after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, thus giving Iraq some assurances that the U.S. will not allow an Iranian victory. However, for the next two years the United States was implicated in secret arms deals with Iran that became public in 1986, President Reagan told the American public that "for 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initaitive was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the...war... Without Iran's cooperation, we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war, without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East."42 This new perception of Iran was further elaborated in geopolitical terms and common interests. Reagan continued in the same speech, "Iran encompasses some of the most critical geography in the world. It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean... The Iranian revolution is a fact of history, but between American and Iranian basic national interests there need be no permanent conflict."43 This change of perception conveys that U.S. power, as has been claimed, cannot determine the course of events in the region, and that CENTCOM was designed only to meet a Soviet threat. Along the line of meeting Soviet threats, the U.S. policy towards the war continued in the last two years of the war. In 1987, the U.S. agreed to protect the Kuwaiti cargo- ships under the reflagging agreement. When Kuwait requested the protection in March of 1987, the U.S. was reluctant to do so. On May 17, 1987, Iraqi fighters mistakenly hit the American battleship Stark, killing 37 American servicemen.44 This attack made it difficult for the administration to sell the idea of protecting Kuwait tankers to Congress. When the issue came before Congress on May 20, the Senate voted 91-5 demanding information on the safety of American escort forces.45 The rationale that the administration used to defend this policy was the fact that the Soviet Union offered such protection to Kuwait. In April, the Soviets offered the leasing of the cargo ships to Kuwait. President Reagan used this to defend his policy. "We will accept our respon- sibility to guard the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf and keep the oil flowing to the West. If we abdicate our role as a naval power we would open opportunities for the Soviets to move into this check point of the free world's oil flows."46 This policy produced a rather lengthy debate among academicians and policy makers.47 The debate took the shape of asking many questions on definition of the Gulf policy, rules of engagement for the U.S. forces, mission capabilities and objectives that are sought. In July, the State Depart- ment issued its Gulf policy that talked about U.S. interests, threats, and policy.48 The U.S. interests were defined in strategic terms (keeping the Soviets out), economic terms (maintaining the flow of oil) and political terms (stability of friendly countries). Threats were over-exaggerated ones: - Iranian ability to "sink" tankers passing through the straits of Hormuz by using the newly bought Chinese Silk Worm missiles; - The existence of Soviet combat vessels outside the Gulf (number unspecified); - Spillover of the war to the Arab Gulf states. The U.S. policy was described as a "two tracked" one -- diplomatic to end the war and "strategic" to protect U.S. interests. The flows in the treat argument were many. First, the assertion of an Iranian closing of the Straits of Hormuz was unreal because, on the one hand, Iran, despite Iraqi air attacks, continued to use the Gulf for most of its oil exports. On the other hand, in 1987 the world market was flooded with oil and was selling at $12 per barrel, the lowest price since 1974.49 Second, the "Soviet naval force," consisting of 12 combat ships outside the Straits of Hormuz, could hardly be compared to 23 ships, including two aircraft carriers, two to five nuclear powered submarines, 16 warships and four warships stationed in Bahrain, inside the Gulf.50 Finally, the "spillover" of the war: This threat was indeed real, as evidenced by the fact that Kuwait and Saudi oil facilities were hit in 1986 by Iranian missiles and jet fighters. But since 1981 countries in the area became aware of the threat and acted by forming their own regional security arrangement, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United States has talked about this threat but does not have a real policy of how to respond to it. The U.S. policy followed more than "two tracks" towards the war. The U.S. first took a neutral stand but was concerned with Soviet threat, then tilted towards the side of Iraq after 1984, sold arms to Iran after 1985, stood against Iran in 1987, and when the war ended in 1988, launched a media campaign against Iraq for an alleged use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population. The only consistent stand the U.S. kept was the continuous fear of a perceived Soviet threat. In responding to the war, the Soviets wanted to maximize their basic regional policy objectives. But they could probably not achieve such a goal without incurring political penalties. The fundamental problem was that the war raised the possibility that Moscow might have to choose sides at an inconvenient time. On the one hand, Moscow has supported the Iranian revolution as a means of ingratiating itself with the mullahs. Moscow's support did not extend to Iranian schemes for exporting the revolution. On the other hand, Moscow pursued a parallel Arab policy, which emphasized support for Arab causes and amicable bilateral relations. There was a complication. If Moscow gave its treaty ally, Iraq, full support, Iran would be enraged, and if Iran became desperate enough, the mullahs could turn toward the West. As it turned out, Iran accepted Israeli military aid. Failure to support Iraq, however, would only worsen the already cooling Soviet-Iraqi relationship. In the year or so preceding the outbreak of the war, the views and interests of Moscow and Baghdad had diverged in several areas, including trade and economic matters, political affairs (particularly over Afghanistan and regional security) and arms purchases.51 A decisive tilt toward Iran offered potential strategic gains, particularly if Iran disintegrated under the impact of the war. Moscow would be much better positioned to pick up the pieces. Such a course of action had associated costs, however. In addition to losing Iraq, a significant tilt would alarm the Gulf states, which view Iran as a threat, and would significantly reduce if not eliminate Moscow's hopes of increasing its acceptability in the Arabian Peninsula. An Iranian tilt would reinforce the U.S. claim that the Afghan invasion was indeed another step in a series of offensive moves into the region. Therefore, in framing a policy toward the war, the Soviet took the line of least resistance. They acted as through they were neutral, although they made no official statement specifically outlining such a position. Instead propaganda emanating from Moscow stressed that only "the imperialists" could gain from such a mutually destructive war. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev commented that "neither Iraq nor Iran will gain anything from mutual destruction, bloodshed and the undermining of each other's economy."52 On September 23, the Soviet newspaper Izvestia claimed that the United States was seeking to exploit the war to gain control of the region's oil while weakening Iran's ability to resist U.S. pressure on the hostage issue..53 III. THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES AND THE WAR There are two groups of countries in the Gulf states. The first group includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. This group is led by Saudi Arabia as the largest oil exporter in the world and opinion leader of the smaller arab states in the peninsula. This group fully supports Iraq's armed forces against Iran, because they are not comfortable with the Khomeini revolution and its success in the Gulf area. There are minority of Shi'ite Muslims in most Gulf states and these may try to gain power with Iran helping to change the region. The Islamic revolution in Iran constituted a danger to the Saudi regime on both ideological and communitarian grounds: Khomeini threatened to knock out the religious prop to Saudi legitimacy.54 When the Islamic revolution succeeded in Iran and its charismatic leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, denounced the very institution of kingship as un-Islamic, the Saudis were faced with the danger of being undercut on precisely the issue on which they themselves had chosen to take a stand.55 Ayatollah Khomeini began appointing personal envoys to the Gulf states in order to propagate his religious and political teachings. Thus, Iran announced the appointment of Hajat al-Islam Abbas al-Mohri of the Friday Congregationalist Prayer in Kuwait. He began politicizing his religious sermons, attacking what he saw as the all-pervading corrup- tion,a nd disseminating Khomeini's fundamentalist precepts. Equally disturbing for the Gulf countries was Iran's commitment to export its Islamic fundamentalism to neighbor- ing states. Iran began directing an extensive media propa- ganda barrage against the conservative Gulf regimes. In November 1979, for example, the Iranian Broadcasting service, beamed in Arabic to the Gulf, incited and exhorted the Muslim faithful to rebel and overthrow the reactionary and oppres- sive and anti-Islamic regimes of the Gulf.56 Iran established and harbored both the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the Islamic Revolution Or- ganization of the Arabian Peninsula.57 For all these reasons, this group (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain) became fully supporting of Iraq in its war with Iran. The second group, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, is conservative and neutral regarding the conflict. There is a good relationship, both diplomatic and economic, with this group for both Iran and Iraq. This group unsuccessfully attempted to mediate the conflict. However, all the Gulf states did not welcome the Khomeini revolution from the beginning because this revolution is a threat to all of the Gulf states regimes without exception. IV. CONCLUSION This paper shows that the Iraqi-Iran conflict has historical roots which go back to the Ottoman Empire. We saw that a number of treaties were signed in an attempt to solve this conflict throughout the history of these two countries. This historical conflict formed the base for this recent war along with more specific reasons which contributed to its outbreak. These other reasons included conflicting ideolo- gies, the internal situation in each of the two countries, and the personal factor concerning the two leaders involved. One cannot look to any one reason as the sole cause of the war. Rather, all the reasons discussed in this paper, along with the historical context, form the cause of the war. If we take a look at the position of the superpowers it is obvious that at the beginning that the U.S. did not think that this war constituted a major threat to its interests in the Gulf. But after the attack of U.S. ships by both Iraq and Iran, the U.S. saw that danger and as a result it became more involved in solving this conflict to protect its interests. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, took a neutral position towards the war because it supported the Iranian Revolution and at the same time Iraq was its main ally in the region. This caused the Soviets to be very careful in their policies. Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States were two groups with different stances on the war. The first group (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain) fully supported Iraq because of its fear of the exporting of the Iranian revolu- tion to their countries and the fear that a victory to Iran would prove to be a disaster for them. The other group, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, was very conservative because it wasn't sure that Iraq would hold up against Iran. The nations of this group did not want to loose the good rela- tions they enjoyed with both Iran and Iraq. ENDNOTES 1. W.O. Staudenmaier. "A Strategic Analysis." In Kheli and Ayubi (Eds.). The Iran and Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflict. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983, p. 28. 2. Ibid., p. 28. 3. Richard Frye. Quoted by Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iran and Iraq: The Years of Crisis. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 4. Dilip Hiro. "Chronicle of the Gulf War," MERIP Reports. July-Sept. 1984, No. 125, Vol. 14, pp. 3-14. 5. Ibid., p. 4. 6. Ibid., p. 4. 7. Ibid., p. 10. 8. John F. Derlin. The Ba'ath Party: a History from its Origins to 1966. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California, 1979. 9. Abdulghani, Jami. Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis., p. 170. 10. Ibid., p. 179. 11. Ibid., p. 179. 12. Ibid., p. 180. 13. Ibid., p. 181. 14. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, "Islamic Government," AL- ANBA Newspaper - Kuwait, April 26, 1982, p. 13. 15. Mangol Bayat. "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, Fundamentalist." Middle East Journal, 37, No. 1, Winter 1983, pp. 30-41. 16. Hamin, Enayat. Iran: Khomeini's Concept of the "Guar- dianship of the Jurisconsult", in James P. Piscatori (Ed.), Islam in the Political Process. London: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983, p. 164-165. 17. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Journal, 34, No. 2, Spring 1980, pp. 184-204, Principle [Article] 10. 18. Ibid., Principle 91. 19. Ibid., Principle 162. 20. Hamid Algar (transl. and ed.). Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imman Khomeini. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 48-9. 21. Washington Post, April 13, 1982. 22. Cited in the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Repub- lic: Conference Proceedings. Washington, D.C. Middle East Institute, 1982, p. 196. 23. Dilip Hiro. "Chronical of the Gulf War." MERIP Reports, July-Sept. 1984, No. 125, Vol. 14. pp. 3-14. 24. Nikki R. Keddie. Roots of Revolution. 1981, p. 258, Yale University Press. 25. Ibid., p. 88. 26. Shaul Bakhash. Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. 1984, p. 225, New York: Basic Books, Inc. 27. Ibid., p. 69. 28. Ibid., p. 71. 29. Ibid., p. 77. 30. Asaf Hussain. Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter- Revolution. London: Frances Pinter Publishers, p. 118. 31. Amir Taheri. The Spirit of Allah, Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. Bethesda, Maryland: Adler and Adler Publishers, Inc., 1985, p. 111. 32. Samir al-Khalil. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 264. 33. Ibid., p. 265 34. Majid Khadduri. The Gulf War: The Origins and Implica- tions of the Iran Iraq War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 76. 35. Shaul Bakhash. Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, p. 34. 36. Ibid., p. 35. 37. Ibid., p. 49. 38. "Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Document 292, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, Dept. of State, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 677-679. 39. William D. Bajusz and David Lonscher. Arms Sale and U.S. Economy: The Impact of Military Restraint Re- stricting Military Exports, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, p. 21. 40. Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. War in the Persian Gulf: The U.S. Takes Sides, Washington, D.C., November 1987. 41. "Our Policy in the Gulf," Document 225. American Foreign Policy Current Documents, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 523. 42. "Secret Diplomatic Initiative to Iran," Statement by the President. American Foreign Policy Current Documents, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 404-407. 43. Ibid. 44. New York Times, May 20, 1987. 45. New York Times, May 22, 1987. 46. New York Times, June 16, 1987. 47. See New York Times, "Blood and Oil" by James Cashman, Jr. Week in Review, and Steven Roberts "Congress and White House at Odds Over Growing Presence in Gulf," May 21, 1987 and Barry Robin "Drowning in the Gulf" Foreign Policy No. 69, Winter 1987-88, p. 120-134. 48. "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf," Special Report No. 166, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1987. 49. Edward Morse, "After the Fall: Politics of Oil," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 4, Spring 1966, p. 792. 5O. Richard Halloran, "Superpower Maneuver at Sea Off Iran Coast," New York Times, May 3, 1987. 51. For further treatment of this topic, see Karen Dawisha, "Moscow and the Gulf War," The World Today, 37, No. 1 (January 1987). 52. Ibid., p. 11. 53. Quoted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The USSR and Khomeini's Iran," International Affairs, 57, No. 4 (August 1981): 610. 54. James Buchan. "Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia," in Tim Niblock (Ed.) Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 124. 55. Ibid., p. p. 126. 56. New York Times, November 25, 1979. 57. Charles G. MacDonald, "Iran as a Political Variable: Patterns and Prospects," in Enver M. Kouy and Charles G. MacDonald (Eds.) Revolution in Iran: A Reappraisal, (Maryland: Institute of Middle East and North Africa Affairs, 1982), p. 56. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdulghni, Jasim. Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Bakhash, Shaul. Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984. Kheli and Ayubi, eds. The Iran and Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflict. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Derlin, John F. The Ba'ath Party: A History from its Origins to 1966. California: Hover Institution Press, 1979. Bayat, Mangol. "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, Fundamen- talist," Middle East Journal 37 (Winter 1983). Piscatori, James, ed. 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