The Boy Who Cried Wolf - The Death Of the Tank AUTHOR Major Ralph L. Schutte, PPCLI, Canadian Army CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE BOY WHO CRIED WOLF - THE DEATH OF THE TANK THESIS: Weapons developments could make armoured formations as they are currently structured obsolete. While the obsolescence of armour is by no means certain, it could provide some distinct advantages for technologically advanced nations. BACKGROUND: Weapon systems do become obsolete, often the fact is not accepted early enough and inappropriate weapons are taken to war. Cavalry in the Second World War is a recent example. Weapon systems become obsolete primarily because they are no longer effective or because they cost more than can be afforded. The Yom Kippur indicate that tank attrition could be higher than can be sustained in a modern war even when combined arms are employed well. THREATS: Tanks face a variety of very sophisticated threats which will require some reconsideration of designs. Missiles, mines, homing indirect projectiles, and, in the future robotics and directed energy weapons could make the battlefield too lethal for tank heavy forces. If sufficient armour is added, the tank loses its essential mobility. PROBLEMS: Tanks are increasingly expensive for marginal gaims in protection, mobility, and firepower. Limits on strategic mobility mean limited areas where tanks can be employed throughout the world. Logistic and production rate problems make tanks unattractive if anything else can perform their functions. PROPOSED SOLUTION: While tanks are designed to fight other tanks head-on, a combination of complementary missile systems could be designed to perform all the functions. These sysetms would be cheaper, lighter, easier to produce, and more versatile. CONCLUSION: While tanks can perform in Europe, losses will be so high they can not be replaced at the same rate. Missile systems in combined arms groupings could be a better more versatile solution. THE BOY WHO CRIED WOLF - THE DEATH OF THE TANK OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. Weapons developments could make armoured formations as they are currently structured obsolete. While the obsolescence of armour is by no means certain, it could provide some distinct advantages for technologically advanced nations. I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS A. TANKS COULD BECOME OBSOLETE LIKE ARMORED KNIGHTS B. ARMOR - ANTI-ARMOUR DISCUSSION REDUCED C. NO ARTICLES EXAMINE A FORCE WITHOUT TANKS D. CURRENT DOCTRINE EMPHASIZES COMBINED ARMS II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE A. CAVALRY UNITS MAINTAINED PAST THEIR EFFECTIVENESS B. HISTORICAL EXAPLES GIVE CAUSES FOR OBSOLESCENCE C. SOME REASONS FOR OBSOLESCENCE D. EXAMPLE OF ARMORED HORSEMAN III. THREATS TO ARMOR A. HIGH ATTRITION B. EARLY MISSILE LIMITATIONS C. SOME CURRENT AND FUTURE SYSTEMS D. INDIRECT FIRE HOMING MISSILES E. MINE THREATS IN FUTURE F. ROBOTICS G. ENERGY WEAPONS H. RESULTS OF THREATS IV. THE PROBLEM WITH TANKS A. MARGINAL GAINS IN PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO EFFORT B. MOBILITY LIMITS C. STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROBLEMS D. LOGISTICS E. PRODUCTION PROBLEMS F. INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY G. REDUCTIONS IN FORCES MEANS MULTI-PURPOSE FORCES H. TANKS INAPPROPRIATE FOR SOME MISSIONS I. SUMMARY V. SOLUTIONS A. FUNCTIONS OF TANKS B. AIM IS TO HIT ENEMY VULNERABILITY C. CURRENT TANKS DESIGNED TO FIGHT OTHER TANKS D. AN NLOS COMBINED ARMS SOLUTION VI. CONCLUSION THE BOY WHO CRIED WOLF - THE DEATH OF THE TANK INTRODUCTORY REMARKS - WHY ANOTHER DISCUSSION Armoured knights were eventually rendered obsolete by a combination of technological, financial, political, and societal changes in Europe. Yet this change was resisted until the last by those whose preeminence depended upon the supremacy of heavily armoured men on the battlefield. This understandable reluctance to part with a system that worked resulted in what may have been holding on to a good thing too long. A similar thing could happen to modern armies. Weapons developments could make armoured formations as they are currently structured obsolete. While the obsolescence of armour is by no means certain, it could provide some distinct advantages for technologically advanced nations. As a direct result of the extremely high attrition to early infantry anti-tank missiles in the Arab - Israeli conflicts1, some doubt was cast on the viability of armour formations, tanks in particular. After a flurry of 1 Arnold Sherman, When God Judged and Men Died (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1973), p. 98. speculation and thought expressed world wide in magazines and periodicals2 the discussion seems to have almost died. Literature since the Yom Kippur war centred upon lessons to be drawn from that war. Themes varied from stating that infantry anti- tank missiles spelled the immediate demise of the tank to business as usual. The general consensus, reflected in later design of tanks and armour formations was that combined arms - an age old concept - was the answer and we really had known it all along. After all, tanks were used as part of combined arms teams from their inception. Only the attempt to use pure armour resulted in the phenomenal losses experienced during the Yom Kippur war. None of the articles examined the appropriateness of tanks in a general purpose force, one which could function in at any level of conflict. None rigorously addressed the conditions under which a weapon system would become obsolete. None addressed the impact of further developments in anti-tank missiles and other anti- tank weapons. Current doctrine is that combined arms with heavily armoured tanks as the backbone is the only answer to the 2 No specific references are quoted. Twenty-five articles dating from 1973 to 1988 in a variety of professional magazines including Armor, Infantry, National Defence, International Defence Review, Asian Defence Journal, and NATO's Sixteen Nations, problem of tank vulnerability to anti-tank missiles and other threats. While tanks alone can not survive on a modern battlefield, tanks in the right mix and supported at the right times can function. There is little doubt that this is true. The real question, however, is whether combined arms with tanks the is best or most effective way of accomplishing the mission. This is particularly true considering that the mission is more complex than fighting other similarly armoured forces. Budgetary constraints will force the development of all purpose forces which could be used at any level of conflict. A solution must be found and technology appears to offer solutions. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Eventually weapon systems can become obsolete. The most recent example is cavalry. Although cavalry formations existed throughout the Second World War, their uselessness in general war was generally conceded during the First World War. Even then, the British Army did have cavalry following the Great War and even General Montgomery who supported tanks listed cavalry before tanks in his resume of army combat units3. In one instance, a cavalry regiment that was motorized for a trial in 1935 was given an apologetic 3 Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), p. 178. explanation that this would not affect its chances of remaining a horse mounted regiment4. All this was in spite of the fact that it is likely that had World War I continued, the British Tank Corps would have been the most heavily armoured and tracked force in the world until 1943 at least5. Although no amount of combined arms action could compensate for the vulnerability of cavalry to machine gun fire and rapid fire rifles, the tradition of cavalry was hard to overcome. Other examples abound. Bows were replaced by firearms although initially firearms were less effective in a number of respects. Chariots were a short-lived innovation soon replace by cavalry. Pikes gave way to muskets in stages. Heavily armoured knights disappeared from the battlefield. In all of these examples, there are some common causes which can be deduced. Further, the causes of obsolescence can be projected for any weapon system. In each of these cases, the weapon system disappeared for a variety of reasons. Often a better weapon system to 4 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Liddell Hart Memoirs Volume I (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965) pp. 261-262. 5 J.F.C. Fuller C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Armored Warfare (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943, Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1983) p xi. do a particular job is introduced. This is particularly evident in the case of rifled weapons replacing smooth bore firearms and repeating firearms replacing those and in return being replaced by automatic small arms. It is worthy of note that most often the increased cost of the weapon was offset by its increased effectiveness. The opposite is true for the musket replacing the bow. The musket was generally less effective in terms of range, accuracy, and rate of fire. Its initial disadvantages were balanced by reduced overall cost when the much reduced requirement for training musketeers over bowmen, particularly longbowmen, was calculated. An additional factor, possibly not considered at the time was the greater potential of the firearm. Of more immediate application to tanks today was the demise of the armoured horseman. "In the end, armour lost the competition to firearms which had attained such force and rate of fire as to impose on armour the contradictory requirements of ensuring greater resistance by the use of heavier plates while preserving the wearer's mobility in combat6." Part of the cause was that armoured knights preferred to charge other armies head on. The only worthy opponent was perceived as another knight. Of course cost and the change to the society also played a part. 6 Leonid Tarassuk and Claude Blair, ed., The Complete Encyclopedia of Arms and Weapons (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, translated 1982), p. 29 THE THREATS TO ARMOUR Tanks on a battlefield tomorrow face a wide range of threats equivalent to those faced by cavalry before it disappeared. The machine gun, obstacles, and entrenchments of World War I have equivalents in modern technology although some of them are only just now nascent. A combination of missiles, smart artillery munitions, and mines could impose the same level of casualties on a massed armour assault that machine guns, artillery, and wire imposed on cavalry and infantry. The impasse could occur sooner as modern armour formations can not be replaced as easily as the infantry and cavalry of World War I. Tanks are not used in civil endeavors as horses were and the training for an armour soldier is much greater than that required for the simpler World War I battlefield. After the Yom Kippur War, missiles were identified as a serious threat to tanks. At that time and still to some extent today those missiles had critical shortcomings which allowed combined arms action to reduce the threat to manageable levels. Their limited numbers in relation to the area they covered7, slow rate of fire, and vulnerability of 7 Since armour concentrates at critical points, a number of missiles able to attrite the concentrated the operator made it impossible for them to reach their potential. Now, the additional factor of limited effect against improved frontal armour must be included. New missiles eliminate most of the limitations and make the obsolescence of the tank possible. I will examine some current systems and possible developments which can redress the limitations of missiles. First, tandem warheads and fly over top attack missiles8 can make missiles effective against reactive armour and thick armour. Future possibilities include ballistic caps to penetrate reactive armour before the shaped charge functions9 and improvements in initiation and shape of shaped charges to dramatically improve penetration. Second, fire and forget missiles are being developed to increase rate of fire and reduce the vulnerability of the operator. Missile systems under armour also aid in accomplishing the same end. Hyper velocity missiles add the additional possibility of another method for missiles to defeat armour10. Third, the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) missile formation must be established at every probable concentration point. 8 Bofors Bill and TOW 2A are examples. 9 Warheads for the 84 millimeter Carl Gustav and 106 millimeter recoil less rifle are being developed. 10 Until this development is in service, only guns, primarily tank guns penetrate by kinetic energy. allows engagements from behind cover at extended ranges11 with missiles launched at 20 second intervals to attack the vulnerable tops of tanks. The operator can see the target in the missile field of view on a video display before impact and avoid fratricide or select a more preferable target. Future possibilities include simultaneous launches with targets being designated for each missile on the image produced by a "lead" missile12. Simultaneous engagements of over 20 vehicles from a large launch system could be possible. A further advantage of modern missiles is training. Modern missiles such as the NLOS is reduced and simplified training time. An soldier can learn to operate the system in under 45 minutes13 and training can be conducted using the system without missiles because the operator never sees more than the image on a screen. Along with missiles, developments are being made to improve the number of self homing projectiles. The follow- on development to the cannon launched guided projectile (CLGP) or Copperhead is planned to be autonomously homing. 11 Ranges of 10 kilometer have been achieved and missiles have been controlled over 60 kilometer from the control station. 12 The author does not know if this possibility is being pursued but similar programs do exist for other computer applications. 13 Reported verbally by an observer of early trials. A round (Merlin) has been developed14 for the 81 millimeter mortar which will home on tanks. Finally, a round is under development for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which will carry at least three terminally guided projectiles. Any armour formation which is detected will face a variety of indirect fire homing missiles beginning at up to 40 kilometer distance. In addition to direct fire missiles and indirect fire homing rounds all either designed to overmatch frontal armour or strike vulnerable areas, mines are developing equally well. Off-route mines which sense a tank and fire a shaped charge into its vulnerable side have been developed. Most have ranges of up to 300 metres and many have multiple shot capability. Future developments include more discrimination either by including a computer in the mine launch platform or by connecting the sensor system to a display terminal by fibreoptic cable. Of course conventional mines remain with an increasing ability on the part of engineers to lay large number in a short time. Mines emplaced by indirect fire are fully developed now. The technology exists now to develop a deeply buried mine immune to ploughing and blast overpressure countermeasures such as line charges or fuel air explosives. Its sensor system could be developed so that it discriminated among 14 In the United Kingdom. several types of tanks. Mines will become an increasingly deadly threat to armour. To all of the above mentioned systems, robotics can be added, giving the potential of small, relatively inexpensive (mostly because the operator needs no training), autonomous tank killers. New attack mechanisms have not yet been mentioned. Such weapons as lasers which can destroy all external electro-optical sensors are feasible now. Weapons such as the Stingray laser15 designed to blind operators could be fielded now. Such weapons could literally blind every tank in a formation in seconds. Future directed energy weapons will give an additional attack mechanism or mechanisms which will drive additional armour requirements for tanks. The end result of the threats to tanks is that the battlefield is so lethal that movement can become impossible. It may be so already. Aircraft will add to the lethality and they are much more effective against concentrated attacking formations than the relatively more dispersed defenders. Traditional methods of dealing with the problem, increasing armour and emphasizing combined arms 15 "U.S. Army to Seek 48 Stingray Lasers to Help Blind Enemy Vehicles", Defense News, March 26 1990, p.33. may not be sufficient to restore the tank's viability. It should be noted with encouragement, however, that the threats to armour utilize high technology which most adversaries can not duplicate. The armed force that makes best use of this technology has the potential to win at relatively low cost. THE PROBLEM WITH TANKS Tanks have been developed extensively over the past 45 years since the Second World War. As a general rule, any such development eventually reaches a point of diminishing returns. The gains in performance are at the expense of inordinate costs in effort, material, and time. Tanks are rapidly meeting limits imposed on them by the role in which they are cast. There are definite size and weight limits, limits to the unit cost in relation to numbers required, logistic difficulties, and pressures for change due to changing threats and roles for armies, the American Army in particular. With the increasing threat from missiles and more powerful kinetic energy weapons, more armour is required for tanks to maintain their relative invulnerability. Ironically, another argument for heavier armour and increased protection is the high unit cost arising in part from the high cost of the armour. There are limits imposed by strategic and tactical mobility. The current weight of the M1 Abrams tank is near the limit for modern main battle tanks. Few bridges in the world exceed Class 60. Any vehicle which exceeds this limit will require special assistance to cross each river or overpass. As an illustration of the difficulty, bridges exist on average every 20 miles on routes in Germany. Heavy tanks also face problems in mobility due to high ground pressure. With each increase in weight, less terrain becomes passable to armoured formations. Weight also limits the carriage of tanks by aircraft and shipping due to overall weight and point stress on the cargo deck or floor. Intra theater transportation by wheeled tank transporter is even more severely constrained by weight as the transporter vehicle weight is added. To illustrate the problem, adding one inch in thickness to the bottom of a tank will impose a weight penalty of about 1.5 tonnes weight but is not sufficient to defeat belly attack mines. Size limits affect strategic mobility by aircraft, ship, and more importantly by rail and road. Heavy tanks are not designed to move long distances under their own power because the wear and maintenance problems are so great. Normal long distance movement is either by road or rail. Maximum height and width is dictated by heights of underpasses and distance between parallel railroad tracks and between tracks in a rail yard. The most commonly used size envelope is the continental "TZ" gauge which limits width to 3.54 metres. The M1 is 3.655 metres wide. Tanks have logistic problems aside from those involved in staging into a theater. First, fuel usage increases dramatically with weight. Second, very heavy tanks require heavy wreckers which do not exist or are available in small numbers. Replacements will likely be more difficult to produce than tanks due to the limited production. Finally, as weight increases, so does the maintenance requirement. Any country producing tanks has a difficult problem in determining the rate of production. If sufficient are produced quickly to meet the meed, factories will close before the next tank can be produced but the production rate will be high enough to replace battle losses. If production is spread over time, factories will remain open until a new tank is in production but the capacity will not be high enough to replace battle losses. Manufacturers understandably have to recoup their costs in setting up factories by increasing the cost of the product. The absolute cost of tanks has risen steadily over time reflecting the high cost of improvements in design near the upper limits of performance and the cost of heavy manufacturing facilities. The export price of an M1 could reach five million dollars and the newest European tank, the LeClerc could cost ten million. Recent changes in Europe have begun to cause reductions in the level of American force permanently stationed in Germany. At the same time while the intentions of the Soviets has almost certainly changed, their ability to move tank heavy forces to the German border faster than NATO has not changed. The requirement to reinforce rapidly with forces capable of defeating armour formations remains. At the same time, strategic lift capability will be eroded by the same budgetary pressures resulting from the perceived reduction in threat. The problem then is to move more forces with fewer assets in the same time. Increasing the size and weight of the principal tank defeating weapon is not the answer. A further problem is that actual forces in being will likely be reduced. In addition to the lift problem, there is the even more difficult problem of increasing production of tanks and their associated maintenance equipment and training their crews in time to be moved. A heavy, complex main battle tank is probably the most difficult system to put into service quickly. The establishment of increased requirements for rapid armed forces intervention along the line of the Panama invasion compounds the problem. Light forces are required to enable rapid deployment yet studies indicate that many potential enemies possess potent relatively modern armoured forces. At the same time, tanks are inappropriate for use in many potential situations. They can give the wrong signals leading to unwarranted escalation and unfavorable world opinion. The threat must still be met but at lower cost and by systems with a lower profile than tanks. It should by now be clear that tanks, even in a combined arms team are expensive, difficult to move strategically and tactically, and will be subjected to attrition at a rate much higher than can be supported by industrial production. There must be a better solution. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS In order to identify possible alternatives to tanks it is first necessary to identify what function they perform on the battlefield. In their early history, tanks were intended to break the impasse of defence on the Western Front. Tanks were designed to withstand machine gun fire and indirect fire while having the mobility to move over wire, ground churned by artillery, and trenches. Once the defence belts were penetrated, the aim was to disrupt the opposing army's lines of communication so quickly and thoroughly that it would be unable to hold its positions and would lose cohesiveness in the attempt to reform in a new area. Initially, cavalry was to be used for the latter function but eventually light (cruiser) tanks were used primarily. It is important to note that tanks were never intended to be invulnerable nor were they intended to fight strong points any longer than necessary to get into the rear. They had to be sufficiently strong to break through defences in sufficient numbers to allow penetration. Following that, the natural targets for tanks were those facilities that allowed resupply and reinforcement. In Liddel-Hart's expanding torrent ideas and Fuller's comments implemented with modifications in the Panzer armies of Germany the natural target for tanks was the enemy rear, communications, supplies and reserves. German tanks were relatively more lightly armoured and armed16 than their adversaries Yet they prevailed because they overpowered local tank and anti-tank defences and fought primarily in the rear areas. Tanks were not designed primarily to fight other tanks but to gain and exploit success achieved by local overwhelming superiority in numbers. 16 They had a more powerful gun but still lacked penetration power against the more heavily armoured French tanks. Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 511-512. In modern armies, all operations are ideally aimed at enemy vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity, not at the armoured forces which are his strength. Fighting enemy armour formations is often a necessary prelude but it is not the desired result. The idea is expressed in FMFM-1 by the idea of surfaces and gaps17. Although armoured forces should be aimed at rear areas, current development of tanks seems to aim them squarely at enemy tanks. They carry increasingly heavy armour which reduces overall mobility (although impressive gains have been made in local tactical mobility) and their armament is designed to defeat the strongest enemy armour at the expense of being able to move farther and destroy the much more numerous soft targets in rear areas. In order to win, then, an army must destroy defending forces in a local areas only to the extent required to enable an attack on enemy weaker and more critical rear areas, communications, logistic support, and headquarters. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully develop a force to do the job but some ideas can be presented. One weapon system which can reduce local enemy defences with 17 Headquarters, USMC, Warfighting, FMFM 1 (Washington, 1989) pp. 74-75. concentrated fire while not concentrating physically itself is the NLOS system. With a range of 10 kilometers, potentially double or greater, and a rate of fire that allows destruction of three targets a minute, systems can be dispersed in width and depth while allowing concentrated point destruction of opposing forces in the desired area. The majority of opposing heavily armoured forces and static positions can be destroyed allowing more lightly armoured forces to move through and into the rear. Such vehicles need only be protected from artillery shrapnel and light direct fire weapons. By moving under an umbrella of NLOS systems, a lightly armoured vehicle can concentrate on soft targets while still being relatively immune to heavier tanks. The same kind of umbrella protects current formations from aircraft. The resulting lighter force would be less dependant upon logistics because range for a given fuel load can be higher, more ammunition can be carried, and maintenance for lighter vehicles is less. Some of the vehicles could be wheeled, similar to the LAV with perhaps a more powerful gun. A range of complementary vehicles would be required for air defence, counter obstacles, and logistics to enable extended independent operations. Further into the future, air cushion vehicles could become feasible, further improving mobility while retaining adequate firepower and protection. CONCLUSION The tank is certainly not dead yet and its functions must continue to be done. However the tank as it is currently designed has a number of weaknesses. It is extremely expensive, slow to produce, and difficult to move. It can not provide protection against numerous all round threats without becoming unmanageably large and heavy. Although theory gives its ideal role as exploitation, it is designed to fight other tanks in a modern version of combat by armoured knights. There is no doubt that armour formations using combined arms concepts can succeed on a modern battlefield. In an era of reduced budgets and increased requirements for strategic mobility the real question is whether the functions can not be done better by a less expensive combination of systems. I believe it can. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Fuller, J.F.C., C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.. Armored Warfare. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943, Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1983. 2. Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The Making of a General. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. 3. Jones, Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 4. Liddell Hart, B. H.. The Liddell Hart Memoirs Volume I. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965. 5. Sherman, Arnold. When God Judged and Men Died. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1973. 6. Tarassuk, Leonid and Claude Blair, ed. The Complete Encyclopedia of Arms and Weapons. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, translated 1982. 7. "U.S. Army to Seek 48 Stingray Lasers to Help Blind Enemy Vehicles", Defense News, March 26 1990, p.33. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, 1989.
