The Last Frog Pilot AUTHOR Major Robert D. Swisher, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues -TEXT- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE LAST FROG PILOT THESIS: A thorough understanding of the assault support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on the future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required to meet the threat in the 21st Century. ISSUE: The United States Marine Corps has historically lead the way in the development of innovative concepts and systems to better meet the needs of the nation. The early struggle to develop helicopter capabilities to fulfill assault support concepts paid large dividends in Korea and Vietnam. The experience gained from programing the introduction of the CH-46 and other innovative aircraft provided a solid base for developing timely and capable replacements. Not since the development of the amphibious doctrine and the introduction of the helicopter has the Marine Corps had the opportunity to make such an impact on the future. The development of the MV-22 can truly revolutionize the modern battlefield. However, the current budget constraints shelved this otherwise excellent plan to phase out the aging CH-46E medium lift helicopter. The postponement of the MV-22 program creates a foreseeable gap in our medium lift capability beginning in the mid 1990s. Currently there is an urgent need for the selection of a suitable MLR for the CH-46. The basic operational requirements for the helicopter MLR and the MV-22 are the same. Congress directed that a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis be done to determine if a pure helicopter can efficiently meet the need. The clock is running and the gap is growing. Many types of helicopters have been proposed as alternatives to the MV-22, but none have realistically competitive capabilities. The requirements set forth for the MLR can only be efficiently met by the MV-22. CONCLUSION: It is very important that the focus be maintained on the current and future threat when balancing capabilities against dollars. A better understanding of the true versatility and capabilities of the MV-22 by all concerned may have avoided the development of the MLR issue. And finally, at this juncture, it appears that the last Frog pilot is aboard. THE LAST FROG PILOT OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. A thorough understanding of the assault support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on the future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required to meet the threat in the 21st Century. I. The historical development of the medium lift assault support concept A. Development of Aviation Assault Support 1. The First Assault Support Mission 2. Introduction of the Helicopter B. Development of Medium Lift Concept 1. The First Medium Lift Helicopter 2. Introduction of the CH-46A II. Current Status of the CH-46E A. Navy/Marine Corps Assets on hand B. CH-46E Capabilities C. Developing Problems 1. Block Obsolescence 2. Attrition III. Replacement Plan for the CH-46E A. MV-22 Program B. Cyclic Budget Constraints C. CH-46E Medium Lift Gap IV. Development of the MLR Issue A. Criteria Established for the MLR B. Shortfalls of MLR Contenders THE LAST FROG PILOT For those of you, who may not be familiar with the Marine Corps amphibious assault support jargon, a "frog" is a CH-46 (Sea Knight) helicopter. My first experience with the Ch-46 was in late 1977. I was a newly designated Naval Aviator fresh out of Pensacola, Florida. While in training at Pensacola I began to notice a trend in the aircraft I was flying; they were all old. My class was the last to train at NAS Saufley Field and fly the aging T-34B primary fixed wing prop trainer. Both the field and the aircraft were retired from the active training. The next aircraft I climbed into was the reciprocating piston driven T-28 (Trojan). It served as the intermediate fixed wing prop trainer. That was the closest I ever came to realizing a dream of flying a WWII F4U Corsair. The T-28 workhorse was finally retired in the early 1980s. Basic helicopter flight training quickly followed in the Bell 206A (Jet Ranger). The final training was done in the single engine UH-1E, better known as a "Huey". Some of the Hueys were sporting battle damage patches from Vietnam. Since I left Pensacola, both helicopters have been retired from service. Needless to say, I was getting tired of flying antiques and was very anxious to get to the state of the art technology at the cutting edge of the Fleet Marine Force. After the initial shock of all the relatively complex systems and nomenclature subsided, I began to see the reality of the post Vietnam defense budget reductions. The CH-46, although a very capable aircraft in 1977, was still a product of 1950s' technology. The cockpit was full of steam driven style gauges that required an ever vigilant eye. The Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system usually worked as long as the little fan lasted that cooled the large black box full of vacuum tubes. The coffee grinder style handle on the Automatic Direction Finding (ADF) radio was a constant source of many sea stories rendered by senior pilots. Other systems, such as the rotor blade, windscreen, and engine air inlet anti-icing systems became to maintenance intensive and costly to maintain. An aircraft with a working, dependable cabin heater was in high demand when cold weather arrived. Even then the lack of proper heater duct parts would allow the pilots feet to go numb. It appeared obvious to me at the time that the CH-46 was destined to become just another one of those antiques that I had the opportunity to fly. Yet, whenever that opinion was voiced, the veteran frog pilots would soundly declare, "The last frog pilot hasn't been born yet!" Realizing that the CH-46 would be around for some time to come, I never felt that this prophecy had much chance of coming true. Some rough calculations in 1977 required the CH-46 to be in service through the year 2004 for any newborn in 1977 to possibly become a frog pilot. As unbelievable as it seemed back in 1977, here we are today with the medium lift CH-46 still in service and nearly half way to meeting that prophecy. Many changes have occurred in the last decade to enable the CH-46 to fulfill the medium lift assault support requirement of the Marine Corps. Although the CH-46 is a very versatile and dependable aircraft, the cumulative effect of world wide high-tech threat, the onset of aircraft block obsolescence, and the staggering defense budget constraints created a critical gap in the Marine Corps medium assault support lift capability for the mid 1990s. A thorough understanding of the assault support Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issue and its impact on the future, highlights the need to avoid short term pitfall solutions and to remain focused on the capabilities required to meet the threat in the 21st Century. Like many things in the Marine Corps, our aviation assault support concepts and capabilities were borne out of necessity and innovation in response to the threat. The initial concept of assault support is attributed to the heroic actions of Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt in 1928, during the "Banana Wars" in Nicaragua. (22:2) He piloted his Vought O2U-1 Corsair against enemy fire to support a surrounded Marine force by repeatedly landing in the street of Quilali village to deliver supplies and evacuate the seriously wounded. In two days he delivered 1,400 pounds of supplies and evacuated 18 personnel. (3:22) The concept was firmly established and the innovations were soon to follow. The need for assault support to small tactical landing sites was quickly realized but technology was the restrictive factor. The advent of helicopter technology in the 1930s opened the door for assault support as we know it today. One curious concept tried to combine the speed of a fixed winged aircraft and the vertical take off/landing capability of a helicopter. The Marine Corps field tested the Pitcairn OP-1 autogyro but found the technology not up to the concept. (19:1) In 1936, Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Geiger summed it up well in a memorandum to his brigade commander, when he wrote: To date no type of autogyro has been demonstrated which will carry a reasonable fuel supply and military load and at the same time retain its peculiar characteristics of taking off and landing in a restricted area and hovering over a given spot. Until such time as this type aircraft can carry a satisfactory military load and retain its flying characteristics use [by] the Marine Corps is not recommended. (19:1) Following the success of Igor I. Sikorsky to produce the first practical helicopter in the United States, the industry saw the emergence of the three primary helicopter developers in the 1940s: Bell; Piasecki*; Sikorsky. With the military procurement of developmental helicopters during the war time defense budget spending, the industry and military helicopters were firmly established. The Atomic Age caused a great concern for the Marine Corps and it's amphibious doctrine. Dispersal was the key and the need for speed and mobility was apparent. Once more, in 1946, the Navy looked at a tilt-rotor concept. McDonnell Aircraft Corporation developed the XHJD-1 which cruised at over 100 miles per hour and carried a useful load of more than 3,000 pounds. Again, technology could not solve a stability problem and the concept was shelved. (19:7-8) A pure helicopter assault support lift concept became the focus as the industry struggled to develop the capability. Clearly the helicopter load capacity was unsatisfactory, but the future prospects warranted military development. In 1947, the Marine Corps formed its first helicopter squadron, HMX-1 (Marine Helicopter Squadron 1) and got the backing of the National Security Act which firmly * Piasecki-Venzi. In `46 the company's name changed to Piasecki Helicopter Corp., to Vertol Aircraft Corp. in `56, to Vertol Div. of Boeing Company in `60, and in `72 to Boeing Vertol Company, a division of Boeing Company manufacturer of the CH-46. established the composition and mission of the Corps. One of the tasks assigned is the is the development, in coordination with the other services, of tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces in the execution of amphibious operations. (25:2-3) The Marine Corps immediately conducted a study and formulated requirements for the development of an assault support helicopter. It is commonly known as the Hogaboom Report submitted to the Commandant on 10 March 1947. It required the seating for 15 to 20 combat troops, a 5,000 pound payload capacity, a range of 200 to 300 nautical miles and 500 with auxiliary fuel tanks, a cruise speed of 100 knots, a hover ceiling of 4,000 feet, an external hook and hoist, and self-sealing fuel cells. (19:15-16) For the next few years, with the return of budget constraints and the lack of technological advancements, helicopter programs were in danger. Many alternatives were studied to include the use of seaplanes as a "flying LST" in coordination with surface craft and lesser capable helicopter assets. But the Marine Corps doggedly stood by its view of the future of helicopter assault support for amphibious operations. Still time was running out and the need for vertical assault support to support the doctrine was critical. An interim helicopter, within current technology, had to be acquired to fill the gap until the desired capabilities could be developed. The Korean War ultimately drove the decision to buy the Sikorsky HRS-1 based on optimal capability and earliest delivery date. This was the forerunner of the UH-34 and the medium lift category of helicopters. If there was ever any doubt of the utility of the helicopter the Korean War proved otherwise; their future was guaranteed. By the late 1950s the cyclic problem of budget constraints and aircraft obsolescence was back. This time technology was ready to provide the next generation of turbine-powered helicopters with the long awaited capabilities. The requirements issued for the UH-34 replacement were still within the 1947 Hogaboom Report capabilities list with one additional constraint. The capabilities had to be met by modifying a currently developed aircraft in order to meet an early delivery date. The Vertol Corporation won easily with their commercially developed 107M that was modified to meet the specifications. This became the CH-46A Sea Knight that evolved into the mainstay of the Marine helicopter force. Unlike the previous buy, this was a well planned, long term procurement designed to phase out the aging UH-34 without degrading current lift assets or capabilities. Admittedly the Vietnam defense budget spending aided this process. The first CH-46 was delivered in 1964 and the first CH-46 squadron entered Vietnam in 1966. (16:224) By 1969 the phasing out of the UH-34 was technically completed. Some initial problems were encountered with the CH-46 that were covered well due in part to the good phase-out plan. Being a modification of a commercial aircraft it had some system shortfalls that had to be corrected. Engine inlet screens and filters had to be added to protect the engines but this reduced the power output. The needed addition of protective armor and .50 caliber machine gun stations further reduced the load capability. Valuable lessons were learned here on the advantages of developing a military aircraft as opposed to modifying a commercial aircraft. The major problem occurred in 1967 when all of the CH-46s had to be grounded to fix a serious structural problem. Set backs are common with the introduction of any new system. At that time there were still enough UH-34s available to fill the temporary gap. (16:231) From that time until the late 1980s the CH-46 has been an extremely reliable and versatile asset. It's longevity is due to four major modifications to include the CH-46D/F/E modifications and the Safety, Reliability and Maintainability (SR&M) program. The last program was a major effort to maintain the high availability rate of the aircraft into the mid 1990s in order to meet the phase-in program of the follow-on aircraft. Currently our CH-46 assets are marginally adequate to meet the medium lift requirement today. Since the first delivery in 1964 a total of 624 aircraft have been purchased by the Navy/Marine team. Today, only 341 aircraft are remaining in service. The Navy is using 81 of them for their vertical replenishment (ship-to-ship/ship-to-shore) mission. The Marine Corps is using the remaining 260 aircraft to meet the Search Air Rescue (SAR), pilot training, and medium assault support missions. Rough estimates show the Marine Corps as much as 10 aircraft below optimal force requirements. The Navy has a similar relative shortfall. (10) The CH-46 is a highly versatile aircraft that is able to carry out all assault support missions except inflight refueling. It is capable of a cruise speed of 145 knots, a range of 150 nautical miles (ferry range with 3 internal tanks of 578 nautical miles), and an average payload of 4,500 pounds. The last planned block upgrade was recently funded. It incorporates three separate initiatives; an expanded stubwing extended range fuel system, an improved navigational system, and an emergency aircraft flotation system. The new fuel system allows an increased range but at the cost of reduced payload. The new navigation system provides for possible further upgrades to doppler hovering or Global Positioning Satelite (GPS) navigation capabilities. (20:49) The best way to explain the current situation facing our medium assault support lift capability is to address the CH-46 aircraft block obsolescence. The CH-46 is virtually a product of 1950s' technology in a 1960s' airframe. A general rule of thumb for the service life of a helicopter is 30 years or 10,000 flight hours. The 30 year mark begins in 1993. However, four aircraft have already reached the 10,000 hour mark and more are likely to do so before 1993. At the time of this writing a decision on the status of those aircraft had not been made. To complicate the problem the old technology parts are getting more expensive and harder to acquire. The aircraft has been out of production since 1971. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., is the only manufacturer still making their commercial version of the CH-46. (1:18) Additionally, some dynamic components of undocumented flight time usage or predicted service life are showing increasing failure rates. This is a cause of great concern and drives an increase maintenance man-hours for increased inspection cycles. One further factor is the approximate attrition rate of four aircraft per year over the last ten years. The problem is critical enough for the iterally 'phoenix' four aircraft and put them back into Navy to literally 'phonix' four aircraft and put them back into service. Two were reclaimed maintenance trainers from Millington, Tennessee. One was constructed from several major sections of other out of service aircraft. The last aircraft was the original test article that was impressed into service. There are no more spares. (10) General McCutcheon put it very clearly when he said: Aviation is a dynamic profession. The rate of obsolescence of equipment is high and new aircraft have to be placed in the inventory periodically in order to stay abreast of the requirements of modern war. (17:134) Taking full stock in what the General said, the Marine Corps developed a plan to phase out the CH-46 in a timely manner with the best threat oriented replacement available. The tilt-rotor concept and technology finally came together to provide the long awaited capabilities desired. The MV-22 is designed from the ground up to be a survivor in the assault support role against the threat in the 21st Century. The first aircraft were to be delivered as early as 1991 with the gradual phasing-out of the CH-46 to be completed by 1999. (20:50) Many of the CH-46s were to be turned over to the Navy to cover their vertical replenishment mission until they could eventually be replaced. The last Frog was expected to be retired from the Navy inventory by 2004. Taking all the hard lessons learned from the acquisition programs of the AV-8, CH-53E, and F-18, the MV-22 is a total package concept from flight simulators, maintenance trainers and facilities to new pilot helmets. Outside of normal minor slips in initial delivery dates, the program was progressing well. Then the ever cyclic budget crunch intervened. During April of 1989, the Defense Resource Board recommended the cancellation of the MV-22 program. This was done purely on the basis of perceived cost effectiveness in favor of the purchase of a mix of CH-60s and CH-53Es to replace the CH-46. The apparently misinformed Secretary of Defense quickly moved to cancel the program. His perspective of the MV-22 was clearly put forth in congressional testimony when he stated: I think it's probably a good aircraft, but I could not justify spending the amount of money that was proposed to be spent when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V--22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed in another fashion, specifically by using helicopters instead of the V-22. (2:8) After the smoke cleared, the Congress directed the performance of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) to evaluate reasonable alternatives for the replacement of the CH-46E. The COEA will include, but is not be limited to the CH-53E, CH-60, CH-46, BV-360, EH-101, or any mix of aircraft. The Institute for Defense Analysis is conducting the COEA that is further required to be submitted with the FY91 budget request. The latest report has the COEA running behind schedule. (10) For the moment the MV-22 has been put on hold with Congress only making continued research and development funding available. The obvious result is the development of a gap in the medium assault support capability for the mid to late 1990s. The Marine Corps was quick to begin adjusting to the sudden change in plans. In March, in his Annual Report to the Congress, the Commandant summed it up best by saying: No Marine Corps requirement is more pressing than the need to identify a solution for the replacement for our medium lift capability. The Aging CH-46 helicopter is entering its 26th year of service life. While it has served us well, we can no longer expect it to carry Marines in harm's way on the modern battlefield. Precision guided munitions and hand-held surface-to-air-missiles place these thirty year old helicopters and the Marines they carry at risk. (6:65) The development of the medium lift operational requirements to provide the criteria for the COEA that Congress directed was quickly accomplished. The requirements were not carelessly established but rather was based on many years of study and analysis as the Joint Service Operational Requirement for the MV-22 remains current. However, the selection of an MLR vise the MV-22 requires some additional actions. The additional actions are based on the projected MLR fleet introduction date of no earlie than 1997. Unfortunately this will still allow a gap in lift capability to occur. Therefore, an interim buy of CH-46s and service life extension programs for the on hand CH-46s and CH-53Ds will be necessary to fill the gap. In consideration of any alternative to the MV-22 the added cost of these actions must also be considered. (12) It is all very clear that the only system readily able to efficiently meet the criteria of the MLR and possibly prevent an interim gap in capability is the MV-22. A review of the MLR candidates will further distinguish the MV-22 from the alternatives. The Anglo-Italian EH-101 has the obvious problem of being a sole source foreign purchase. This alone is usually criteria enough to fail selection. The BV-360 was produced for commercial use and as such would require extensive cost prohibitive modifications. It too is considered a non-starter. A totally new CH-46(X) is still on the drafting table. However, current technology and tandem rotor aerodynamics as we understand it today would limit capabilities to less than the MV-22. The CH-53E was primarily designed for heavy lift and to stay in the rear with the gear. Therefore, not only is it slower but it is twenty-one times more susceptible to small arms fire than the MV-22. The CH-60 can not carry heavier loads in the medium lift spectrum. It also can not carry the required number of Marines. Therefore more aircraft would have to be purchased. With an already crowded flight deck, this is a show stopper. Any mix of aircraft would defeat the goal of commonalty and requires an aggregate increase in specialized support personnel. All of the contenders, due to speed and range capabilities require strategic air lift to deploy globally by other than surface means. At this time a true contender for the MLR as an alternative to the MV-22 does not exist while the need for a MLR is critically real. General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, again in his Annual Report to the Congress, focused the issue when he said, "We cannot allow ourselves to regress to an era of budget driven strategy." (6:62) The Marine Corps must be capable of meeting the current as well as future threat anywhere in the world. Limited strategic lift and potential lose of strategic foreign basing rights places a premium on the capabilities of speed, range, mobility, and sustainability. The prospects of having CH-46s in service through the first decade of the next century are not very promising or desirable. It is very likely that the last Frog pilot has been on board for quite some time. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bond, David F. "CH-46E Replacement may be Ch-46X; Marines Believe UH-60 Is Too Small." Aviation Week & Space Technology,February 19, 1990. p. 18. 2. Cheney, Dick. "Where We Must Cut the Defense Budget...and Why." Defense 89, (July/August 1989), 2-8. 3. Condon, John P. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation. Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC. 4. Darling, Buck. "Warfighting the V-22." Amphibious Warfare Review, 7 (Spring 1989), 26-37. 5. Fickett, Richard. "Anti-Amphibious Warfare in the `90s." Amphibious Warfare Review, 7 (Summer 1989), 108-113. 6. Gray, A. M. 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