The Future Of TACAIR In Joint/Combined Operations Major Steven P. Schavrien, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE FUTURE OF TACAIR IN JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS THESIS: One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint\Combined Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft (TACAIR), regardless of the nationality markings of the aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is assigned to - air or naval forces. BACKGROUND: The United States Air Force and Marine Corps have had many differences of opinion on how TACAIR should be em- ployed and controlled. Many historical cases point to each service as having a bona fide case for argument. Tradition has become outdated dogma in some cases. These traditions are likely to be a major stumbling block when US forces are employed in combat in the future. RECOMMENDATIONS: The military services need to get their acts together or we will face severe fragmentation in the next con- flict, global or regional. The Congress of the United States has realized this and is forcing the services to conform. It is time for the services to take the initiative and become a truly joint military force. We, the soldiers, not the Congress, should be striving to keep the military a viable and strong instrument of national policy. If we do not, then the soldiers of the future will bear our buffoonery. CONCLUSION: The time has come to put aside our differences between services. If the senior military leaders cannot agree on simple items, such as definitions, then it is up to the rest of us to make an all out attempt to make the "Joint" system work. The Future of TACAIR in Joint/Combined Operations OUTLINE One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint\Combined Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft (TACAIR), regardless of the nationality markings of the aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is assigned to - air or naval forces. I. Evolution of the Air Component Commander A. United States Army Air Corps B. United States Air Force C. Other Examples D. Omnibus Agreement II. Evolution of the Air Combat Element A. United States Marine Corps Doctrine B. The ACE in the Korean War III. Definitional differences A. View of the battlefield B. Airpower missions requiring study 1. Interdiction 2. Close Air Support 3. SEAD C. Airspace Management IV. Future of Joint/Combined Operations A. The Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986 B. Diminishing Resources THE FUTURE OF TACAIR IN JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS One of the most difficult tasks that the Joint/Combined Task Force commander will have to deal with in the future is the efficient and effective employment of tactical aircraft (TACAIR) , regardless of the nationality markings of the aircraft or to which branch of service the aircraft is assigned to - air or naval forces. In this age of shrinking budgets, many articles and papers have been written by experts inquiring why the United States needs four separate services. Especially when all four have some form of TACAIR capability to include the Army with its attack helicopters. If we, the military, do not get our act together it is distinctly possible that in the near future the United States military forces will loose their individual identities and become the United States Armed Forces, vice the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps. Turbulent Joint/Combined operations is not just a late 20th century problem, in World War II, the problems associated with combined operations were evident. General Eisenhower walked a fine line between his American and British generals and politicians during the planning for the invasion of the African and European continents. Inter-service parochialism within the Department of Defense (DOD) in the future could be the deciding factor in restricting the prudent employment of aircraft to include tactical fighters and bombers.1 The way to end inefficient use of TACAIR is to centralize the control of all tactical aircraft under one commander while decentralizing the execution down to the lowest level practical. This concept has been the position of the United States Air Force (USAF) since the inception of joint operations and the name of Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has been given to that individual wielding this awesome destructive power.2 According to the Joint Chief of Staff's Publication 26, the JFACC "derives his authority from the Joint Force Commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission." His responsibilities are the "planning, coordination, allocation and tasking of sorties" to support the Joint Force Commander's mission statement and concept of operations.3 The concept of the JFACC however, has not been totally embraced with open arms by all of the branches of the United States military, especially by the United States Marine Corps (USMC). The biggest concern of the Marine Corps is that their aviation assets will be taken away and placed under the operational control of the JFACC and that this individual will always be an USAF "blue suiter". The Marine Corps philosophy is that no Marine aviation will be under the operational control or command of anyone but an United States Marine and that Marine aviation, also called the Air Combat Element (ACE), can not be separated from its associated Ground Combat Element (GCE) of its parent Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).4 A great military theologian, Carl Von Clausewitz, discussed at great lengths the concept of the concentration of military forces in preparation for battle. He saw no reason to divide forces up peacemeal unless, it was for an urgent and necessary reason. He also stated that the division of forces should not be done just for the sake of an individuals whim of how the forces should be utilized as had happened many times in the past. An analogy can be derived from this axiom - do not let your doctrine become outdated dogma just because it has been stated so in the past in an attempt to perpetuate your existence. In this example, the concentration of airpower under one individual allows for the coordination and assignment of TACAIR missions by analyzing the available assets, i.e. the number of airframes available, and the required missions for that particular time period, i.e. the type of sorties that are required to accomplish the higher commander's intent with respect to airpower. This enables the coordinator to respond to the request of all the ground units and efficiently allocate out these assets. Clausewitz continues by saying that this grave error would not be repeated if one looks at the division of forces as the exception rather as the rule.5 There is no doubt that in some situations it would be beneficial for Marine aviation to remain operationally controlled by the MAGTF commander. However, the unwavering stance that the JCS have agreed that the ACE is never to be detached from its MAGTF does not hold water. An example is in the case of the NATO south flank. Allied Forces South-Air Forces South (AFSOUTH-AIRSOUTH), under CINCSOUTH Admiral Busey, requested that for sustained operations ashore, all aviation would be consolidated under COMAIRSOUTH, an USAF general. The Marine Corps, as might be expected, vigorously opposed this idea and attempted to invoke a JCS message published in March of 1986 called the "Omnibus Agreement". This agreement agreed to by all of the service chiefs states that "the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets." If only this statement is taken from the Omnibus Agreement then it is obvious that in the event of introduction of US forces into a conflict and a MAGTF is involved, the commander of that MAGTF will retain operational control of his air assets.6 However, there is another statement in the Omnibus Agreement which says: "Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force Commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign mission, redirect efforts (E.G., the reapportionment and/or re-allocation of any MAGTF TACAIR sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander that they are required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, ..." This statement obviously gives the Theater or Joint Force Com- mander the authority to organize his forces in any manner he or she sees fit. It is time to stop arguing over the issue of operational command and go about our business of maintaining a credible deterrent posture under the direction of the Joint/Combined Force Commander.7 But even in World War II, before Joint/Combined Operations was a buzz word, problems arose with the attempt to consolidate the Allied Air Forces to ensure unity of effort. The Eighth Air Force headed by General Ira Eaker, USAF, did not want to become a team player along with the British Bomber Command headed by Air Marshall Harris.8 The heavy bomber leaders felt that they could bomb Germany into submission (the old "bomb them into the stone- age" saying) without the aid of ground forces. For a short period of time, the Allied High Command allowed the bombers to attempt to force Germany into capitulation. The hourly bombings were having an effect on the German people but the Wehrmacht was still fighting. The decision was made to invade the continent and support was requested from the bombers, who promptly balked at the idea of becoming just a supporting role in the war effort. It was necessary for the General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, to step in and force the Bomber Command into line. The Joint/Combined Force Commander will have the same problem in the future and will probably solve it the same way - with a direct order!9 We apparently did not learn our lessons well in WW II as the airwar in Korea and Vietnam was not all rosey either. The United States divided up each of the countries geographically in an attempt to keep the different service's TACAIR separated. This dividing up of the countries did accomplish that but it prevented the concentration of forces required to hand the enemy a decisive defeat in the offensive air arena. Even though the United States and its allies enjoyed near total air superiority in both conflicts, the allies failed to coordinate the efficient use of TACAIR. There are however, two good examples of when Joint/ Combined Operations in the TACAIR community worked.10 The first example was during the retreat to the Pusan perimeter. The United States Air Force and Army had been utilizing jeeps with Forward Observers (FO) and they jointly decided that controlling air strikes could best be accomplished from the air.11 The USAF supplied the forward air controllers in "Mosquito" observer aircraft to direct the Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft, which were mainly United States Navy (USN) carrier based airplanes. However, problems did exist in the types of aeronautical charts and geographical reference system being used (which is still a problem today) during these CAS missions.12 The second example was during late 1967 in the Vietnam conflict, where General Westmoreland, Commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and General William Momyer, the Commander, Seventh Air Force, decided that a single air commander and a supporting staff could better manage all the air assets of the MACV and published a MACV directive so stating.13 The "Joint" system was put into effect in March of 1968 with the publication of a fragmentary order or "frag" that covered all in theater based air missions of MACV. The frag is a listing of all missions for a certain period of time and contains force size, targets, additional assets, and airspace assignments/restrictions. This frag was able to ensure efficient use of a very scarce resource, aircraft. The USAF and USMC commanders made the system work, sometimes because gentlemen agreements between the two were the only solution.14 But the official policy from Head- quarters Marine Corps was that Marine Air would not come under the control of a single air component commander which did cause the air war effort to lack synergism.15 The Marine Corps position is for retaining the operational control of the MAGTF's air assets to allow for the integration of aircraft into a combined arms package to engage the enemy on the battlefield. The doctrine of the Marine Corps is an expeditionary one and must provide for the protection of the MAGTF once the decision to employ the Marines is made. This concept of operational control of airpower is a valid one when the Marines are the only United States military presence in the theater of operations.16 For sustained joint/combined operations ashore it will be necessary to consolidate the air effort to ensure that a portion of the air arm is not idle or overtasked, i.e. a principle of the military historian Clausewitz, termed the economy of force.17 However, the Marine Corps system is not without it's merit. By the outbreak of the Korean War, the Navy-Marine team had already learned the value of CAS aircraft and the responsiveness of these aircraft to the ground commander from its experiences in the South Pacific Campaign of World War II. In Korea, a certain number of the carrier's attack aircraft were dedicated to each ground unit. While this enabled the ground commander to have aircraft overhead or on short call, the aircraft did not always have targets to drop their ordnance on which resulted in a waste of aircraft sorties. This could also limit the number of aircraft available for the next round of fighting. Without targets aircrews dumped their ordnance into empty fields. Carrier based aircraft are hesitant to bring unexpended ordnance back to the boat to minimize the damage to the aircraft and landing deck if a crash occurs.18 The first beginnings of the MAGTF occurred in the 1950's when Lieutenant General Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, informed General MacArthur and General Stratemeyer that the Marine contingent in Korea (a brigade) was an inseparable team and under no circumstances could they be broken up. He explained to General MacArthur that the Marine Wing and ground unit had trained for war together and complemented each other, General MacArthur agreed and the Marine Brigade remained intact. This set a dangerous pre- cedent for future Joint operations.19 Some of the biggest stumbling blocks to effective and efficient Combined/Joint operations concerning the USAF and USMC has been the following: the "view" of the battlefield, differences concerning the definition of tactical missions, and the functions of airspace management throughout the entire battlefield. The view of the battle is the most mis-quoted by the USMC as to the position of the USAF. The Marine Corps has stated that the Air Force states that the deep battle, i.e. interdiction, take precedence over the ongoing close-in battle or CAS missions.20 This statement is nothing further from the truth. The USAF and United States Army have agreed on the Airland Battle Future to be the two services doctrine to take them into the 21st century. This is the basic doctrine that will be used for the prosecution of the next conflict by these two forces. The concept does not put priority of missions into doctrine but does lay out the foundation for the employment of the Tactical Air Forces and Army Team.21 The premise in the Airland Battle doctrine is that deep operations, or interdiction, when properly executed will shape the close-in battlefield that will occur at a later time. It is difficult to imagine that at the outset of hostilities, a commander of ground force would not want to attrite the enemy beyond his immediate battlefield. If no time is available to interdict those enemy forces in the deep area then it is time to relieve pressure off the friendly ground forces by using synchronized effort of ground elements and air, to include battlefield air interdiction, rear area, and close or CAS missions. But if constant pressure is not applied to the enemies' logistical train and depots, then these second echelon forces will be in the close-in battlefield shortly, compounding friendly forces effort to the shape the battle- field as they desire.22 The Marine term for the interdiction mission is the function of Marine Aviation called Offensive Antiair Warfare. The definition of Offensive Antiair Warfare is "air attacks to destroy or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields, radars, air defense systems, and supporting areas." No mention is made of attacking and destroying enemy ground combat service support areas that do not directly supply the enemy aviation effort. This should be a distressing function of Marine Aviation to the GCE as most infantrymen would rather fight an opposing force that did not have it's full complement of ammunition and war supplies.23 Another mis-conception is that the United States Air Force is not committed to or capable of carrying out the CAS mission in support of the troops on the ground. The USAF, active and reserve, possesses approximately 2500 tactical aircraft that can and do train in the mission of CAS on a regular basis. Of these 2500 aircraft, 590 of them can perform only the CAS mission. These aircraft have only one designated operational capability (DOC), they are incapable of performing any other mission. The United States Army has 25 divisions as of 15 Dec 88, the ratio of USAF CAS capable aircraft to Army division is approximately 100 aircraft to each division.24 The ratio in the USMC is approximately 109 to 1, both services are almost equal in their dedication to the CAS mission.25 The differences in missions is a definitional one and no amount of Joint exercises or pontificating by service chiefs will cure this. The USMC is determined to use the term function of aviation and the USAF considers the term mission to refer to that type of sortie that the aircraft performs. A more well written and refined JCS Pub 26 would be a good start and both services would be able to align its doctrinal definitions along with this publication. However, the chances of acquiring an agreement on the wording of this publication is not very high. Difficulty has been experienced with any concerted effort to publish a definitive JCS publication that would please all the services.26 The one area of disagreement that could have the most devastating effect on airframes and infantry soldiers on the ground is in airspace management. The USAF has trained not only for the expected global conflict, triggered by NATO, but also for the "low-intensity" conflict such as in Panama. To totally integrate airpower into the battlefield, control measures must be instituted to ensure safety of aircraft and ground troops. The USAF and USA have agreed under the Airland Battle doctrine that the deep battle or interdiction missions will be the total responsibility of the Air Force. All other missions to include the close and rear operations will be a joint responsibility of both services requiring extensive coordination to prevent fratricide. The United States Air Force and Army have extensively worked together in the areas of Joint Air Attack Tactics (JAAT) where Army helicopters work with Air Force fast movers during CAS missions. These JAAT missions require enormous amounts of coordination to ensure a truly combined arms attack. Great progress has also been made in the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD). J-SEAD is the use of all tactical resources, Army and Air Force, in an effort to neutralize, destroy or deceive the enemy's air defense system by electronic or physical means.27 The dividing line between deep and close missions will be the Fire Support Coordination Line or the FSCL. This FSCL will be mutually agreed upon by both services. The FSCL allows TACAIR to conduct an interdiction campaign without being concerned with "short rounds", basically bombing friendly forces by friendly TACAIR.28 The USMC uses the FSCL as a phase measure and not one of control, a violation of their own doctrine. Marines typically send reconnaissance ground teams past the FSCL. To protect these teams, restricted fire zones are established and will be moved by a time schedule or on order. But the fallacy is that these teams, who are very mobile, could easily outrun or be overrun by these moving restricted fire zones, moved by time, and then be engaged by friendly TACAIR. The movement of the zones on order will require communication between the Tactical Air Control System and the aircraft. To date, USMC aircraft do not possess state of the art jam-resistant radios such as the ARC-164 "Have Quick" UHF radio to allow for communications on today's electronic warfare intensive battlefield.29 By doctrine though, Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-1 states that no coordination by aircraft is required past the FSCL to strike any target. This allows for the greatest flexibility of airpower by not tying the aircrews to visual recognition of targets while flying at speeds of over 800 feet per second.30 So what does the future hold for the employment of TACAIR? As stated earlier, the services of the United States are having difficult times working out the "Joint" problem. Congress, realizing the problem of getting the services to work together was not going to improve, passed in 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This bill requires the services to exchange more officers in operational and academic units to further the "Joint" effort. The bill also requires that all Generals be Joint Service Officers (JSO). An officer is a JSO when he/she has completed Joint Professional Military Education and a 3 year tour in a designated Joint billet.31 Basically because of the services unwillingness to press forward in the "joint" arena, the politicians stepped in and are now force feeding the services to make them cooperate with each other. This has not been all bad, as exchange officers in sister service jobs and educational institutions are able to learn of the other services operations and at the same time offer their own services views and capabilities. One answer to our problems in this time of diminishing budgets, might be a concerted effort by all services, starting at the service chief level, to operate in a truly Joint/Combined environment with out regard to individual service desires. Another might be definitive JCS Pubs which address directly the Joint issues. What's the bottom line? Let's "stop quibbling about airpower, the idea is to win the war"ù32 The intent has not been to point fingers at any one service, but more as to point out our weak areas. If we define our problems and come up with appropriate solutions to these problems, then we will be able to do our job more efficiently. If not, the next war may be a repeat of Vietnam and we would have to listen to the United States Congress harangue us unmercifully for another twenty years about the US military's ability to work together. ENDNOTES 1 D. Clayton James, A Time For Giants, (Franklin Watts, New York, 1987), p. 31. 2 Major John E. Valliere, USAF, "Stop Quibbling About Air Power; The Idea Is To Win The War", (USMC CSC, Quantico VA, Jan 90), p. 4. 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26," Fundamental Principles For Counter-Air", (JCS, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1986), p. B-5. 4 Major General M. P. Sullivan, USMC, "The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Command And Control Of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation", (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 9 Mar 89), p. 2,4. 5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p. 204. 6 Lieutenant Colonel John Roe, USAF, "Point Paper On Omnibus Agreement For Command And Control of USMC TACAIR", (HQ USAF/XOXWD, Washington, D.C., 17 Oct 89), p. 2. 7 Roe, p. 5. 8 James, p. 100-01. 9 James, p. 102. 10 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, (The Viking Press, New York, 1983), p. 415. 11 Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War In Korea, (Nautical and Aviation Publication Company of America, Baltimore, Maryland, 1986), p. 44. 12 Commanders Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, USN, "The Sea War In Korea", (United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1957), p. 55. 13 "The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973", (History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1985), p. 274. 14 "The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973, p. 275. 15 Martin Van Creveld, Command In War, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985), p. 243. 16 Sullivan, p. 2. 17 Clausewitz, p. 213. 18 Cagle and Manson, p. 51-53. 19 Cagle and Manson, p. 61-62. 20 Sullivan, p. 2. 21 US Army Field Manual 100-5, "Operations", (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 5 May 1986), p. 14. 22 USA FM 100-5, p. 19. 23 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1," Marine Aviation", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 24 Aug 1979), p. 7. 24 "An Air Force Almanac", Air Force Magazine, (Air Force Association, Washington, D.C., May 1989), p. 52-53. 25 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 1- 11, "Fleet Marine Force Organization 1990", (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 14 February 1990), p. 5-26,5-48-50. 26 JCS Pub 26, p. App B. 27 USA FM 100-5, p. 48. 28 USA FM 100-5, p. 48-49. 29 US Marine Corps Publication "Horizons", (MCRDAC, Quantico, VA, November 1989), p. 17. 30 US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-1," Fire Support Coordination", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 23 April 1981), p. 2-11. 31 Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Stenner, USMC, "Title IV And The Marine Corps", Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1988), p. 24,26. 32 Valliere, p. 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY "An Air Force Almanac", Air Force Magazine, (Air Force Association, Washington, D.C., May 1989). Cagle, Malcolm W. and Manson, Frank A., Commanders, USN, "The Sea War In Korea", (United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1957). Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984) Hallion, Richard P., The Naval Air War In Korea, (Nautical and Aviation Publication Company of America, Baltimore, Maryland, 1986) James, D. Clayton, A Time For Giants, (Franklin Watts, New York, 1987). Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 26, "Fundamental Principles For Counter-Air", (JCS, Washington, D.C., 1 April 1986). Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam, A History, (The Viking Press, New York, 1983) Roe, John, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "Point Paper On Omnibus Agreement For Command And Control of USMC TACAIR", (HQ USAF/XOXWD, Washington, D.C., 17 Oct 89). Stenner, Peter R., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, "Title IV And The Marine Corps", Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1988), p. 24,26. Sullivan, M. P., Major General, USMC, "The Joint Force Air Component Commander And Command And Control Of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation", (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 9 Mar 89). "The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973", (History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1985). US Army Field Manual 100-5, "Operations", (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 5 May 1986). US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-11, "Fleet Marine Force Organization 1990", (MCCDC, Quantico, VA, 14 Feb- ruary 1990). US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1, "Marine Aviation", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 24 Aug 1979). US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 7-1, "Fire Support Coordination", (MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 23 April 1981). US Marine Corps Publication, "Horizons", (MCRDAC, Quantico, VA, November 1989). Valliere, John E., Major, USAF, "Stop Quibbling About Air Power; The Idea Is To Win The War", (USMC CSC, Quantico, VA, Jan 90). Van Creveld, Martin, Command In War, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985)
