The U.S. Navy's Future In Drug Interdiction AUTHOR LCdr Mark J. Salonia, USN CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: The U.S. Navy's Future in Drug Interdiction THESIS: Present employment of U.S. Naval Forces in drug interdiction operations is ineffective and in need of revision. ISSUE: In the last decade, U.S. Naval Surface/Air assets have increasingly been utilized in drug interdiction efforts. Operating in conjuction with, and normally under the control of U.S. Coast Guard authorities, the U.S. Navy has not made significant progress in stemming the flow of illicit drugs into our country. This is attributable to the Department of Defense's inadequate and ill-defined strategy in an attempt to win the war on drugs. More importantly, the ever-increasing role of the military in drug interdiction is in part due to the present administration's over-reaction to public outcry on the drug issue. CONCLUSION: The military should be delegated total control of external drug interdiction. Too often, other federal agencies duplicate and/or interfere with the military's efforts. Next, the U.S. Coast Guard should be placed in overall command and control of maritime drug interdiction. The U.S. Navy will, in its present mission, require additional training/equipment in order to successfully assist the Coast Guard in maritime drug interdiction efforts. THE U.S. NAVY'S FUTURE IN DRUG INTERDICTION OUTLINE THESIS: Present employment of U.S. Naval Forces in drug interdiction operations is ineffective and in need of revision. I. Present Maritime Drug Interdiction A. USS FAIRFAX COUNTY conducting law enforcement operations. B. USCG Tactical Law Enforcement Team mission. C. DOD's strategy and role of military drug interdiction. D. Posse Comitatus Act. II. War on Drugs Status A. Illicit flow of drugs not impeded significantly by U.S. maritime forces. B. U.S. public opinion/military drug interdiction efforts. C. Military's strategy in drug interdiction ill-defined. III. Options/Solutions to Military's Role in Drug Interdiction A. External vs. internal drug interdiction efforts. B. Military requires a well-defined strategy/mission. C. USCG must have control of maritime drug interdiction. D. Transfer USN assets directly to USCG. E. Establish USN-USMC team as a drug interdiction team. F. U.S. must work with drug exporting countries in squelching drug flow. G. Deter and stop the demand for drugs in the U.S. H. USN training/equipment must be on par with USCG in order to continue present maritime drug interdiction mission. IV. Conclusion A. Concluding remarks concerning USS FAIRFAX COUNTY's mission. The U.S. Navy's Future in Drug Interdiction In early January of 1986, USS FAIRFAX COUNTY(LST-1193) was assigned a LEO (Law Enforcement Operation) mission and tasked to patrol the waters of northern Colombia in search of maritime drug traffickers. FAIRFAX COUNTY, in concert with other naval and Coast Guard vessels, was a participant in operation codenamed "Hat Trick II." Prior to departing on this venture, a U.S. Coast Guard TACLET (Tactical Law Enforcement Team), consisting of two officers and seven enlisted men, embarked FAIRFAX COUNTY in Little Creek, Virginia. This TACLET gave their prepared briefings to the officers and crew of FAIRFAX and imparted a basic knowledge of duties and responsibilities required of a naval vessel conducting a drug interdiction mission. The TACLET is truly a professional team. As CAPT Lockwood, former CARIB Squadron Commander (1986-87), notes: These teams of seven to nine petty officers are headed up by a junior officer who advises the ship's captain on law enforcement matters. The LEDET(TACLET) officer in charge ultimately decides which contacts are to be boarded. In order to establish a productive relationship with the ship's CO, this young first or second tour officer is expected to be an expert in law enforcement matters, a sharp, professional representative of the Coast Guard, and a consummate diplomat. He must also take pains to ensure that no vessels of interest get by. When not engaged in boarding operations, LEDET(TACLET) personnel conduct law enforcement team training and familiarization training for the ship's company.1 Upon arriving on station (approximately 60 miles north of Colombia), FAIRFAX COUNTY encountered strong trade winds which tossed her about and made for very uncomfortable steaming (six to eight foot seas were normal throughout the entire three and a half week period). During the second day of patrol, the afternoon watch spotted a white 85 foot trawler heading north-northwest towards the Yucatan Channel (the Yucatan Channel and Windward Passage are strategic chokepoints in the Caribbean for drug interdiction). FAIRFAX COUNTY quickly made an intercept course while the TACLET onboard attempted to establish VHF radio contact with the unidentified vessel. The USCG officer in charge ensured that the bridge-to-bridge radio was operated at low power so that other vessels in the area could not hear his transmissions. Nonetheless, the white trawler never responded. The unidentified vessel (now considered a probable drug smuggler) came about to a southerly heading and was fleeing towards Colombian waters. In the meantime, the crew of FAIRFAX COUNTY quickly and expertly manned her three inch guns and .50 cal machine guns2 and continued her pursuit of the vessel. This pursuit lasted nearly twelve hours. It was obvious that the unidentified vessel was heading for the sanction of Colombian waters. FAIRFAX COUNTY maintained a distance of 500 yards astern of her and at times closed to a distance of 50 yards off of her starboard bow (all the time directing searchlights into the pilothouse). However, the white vessel continued on her course. One mile short of Colombian waters the captain of FAIRFAX ordered the bridge team to slow and allow the vessel to continue. Ten minutes later, as the unidentified vessel steamed over the horizon, permission to enter Colombian waters was granted to FAIRFAX by Colombian officials (via our state department). This true example illustrates some very important lessons. First, the USCG TACLET at all times during the pursuit demonstrated the utmost professionalism in the execution of their law enforcement techniques, however, the only semblance of USCG authority was a small (2'x 2') USCG Ensign flying from FAIRFAX's yardarm. Secondly, FAIRFAX COUNTY was hampered in apprehending the suspected drug trafficker because it did not have a suitable "chaser boat"3. And lastly, but most importantly, FAIRFAX COUNTY could not continue the pursuit into Colombian waters without an outright violation of Colombian water rights. The bottom line was that state department bureaucracy had certainly created a major obstacle in her mission -- interdict maritime drug trafficking. Granted, national priorities have since changed and the role of the military in drug interdiction has now received additional attention. President Bush's "War on Drugs" campaign and public opinion certainly support an ever-increasing role of the military in bringing the drug traffickers to justice. Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, in detailing the Department of Defense's effort in drug control stated: Our specific mission is to protect national security. There can be no doubt that international trafficking in drugs is a national security problem for the United States. Therefore, detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority, national security mission of the Department of Defense... We also need to make it clear that the Defense Department is not a law enforcement agency. We do not enforce domestic criminal laws, nor can we solve society's demand problems. But there is much we can do without usurping the police role.4 Secretary Cheney's statement makes it very clear that Department of Defense assets will be employed to the fullest in countering drug trafficking. Additionally, he makes it clear that the military is not a law enforcement agency. The Navy, as well as the Army, Air Force, and Marines, will most likely agree that internal(within the borders of the continental U.S.) drug interdiction is better left to law enforcement agencies such as the DEA, CUSTOMS, and Departments of Justice and Treasury. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (later revised in 1976), specifically prohibited the use of military personnel to enforce the law. However, in 1981, a Military Appropriations Act (Public Law 97-86) did permit the employment of military assets in the role of law enforcement. The role of the Navy in drug interdiction, however, was limited in scope by the Secretary of Defense. "Navy participation in support of Coast Guard interdiction operations was limited by a directive issued to the Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of Defense on 9 August 1982. Specifically, operations were restricted to: (1) air and surface surveillance; (2)towing/escort of seized vessels and transporting prisoners; (3) logistic support to Coast Guard units and (4) embarkation of Coast Guard personnel to conduct lawful boardings of U.S. flagged and stateless vessels."5 Additional guidance from the Department of Defense in 1986 stated: Our proper role is to support drug law enforcement agencies with sophisticated equipment loans, maritime and ground surveillance of drug trafficking personnel, vehicles, ships, and aircraft; and to provide intelligence and communications to improve drug law enforcement effectiveness. While the Department of Defense support posture maintains the historic separation between civilian law enforcement and military missions as required by the Posse Comitatus Act, we endeavor to maximize assistance permitted under Public Law 97-86, particularly, in terms of training exercises.6 As a direct result of the foregoing, the United States Navy became more heavily involved in the drug interdiction role. At first, the Navy offered its assets (i.e. ships, aircraft, and associated personnel) on a not-to-interfere basis with scheduled training exercises. Nevertheless, as the need for drug interdiction escalated, the Navy then expanded the use of its assets exclusively for drug interdiction operations and not in conjuction with scheduled exercises. This will be addressed, later, in greater detail. One cannot argue that assuming the role of "policeman on the high seas" was, initially, a morale booster to navy crews who were normally accustomed to chasing ficticious submarines and churning "donuts" in the water. This uplift in morale was mainly due to the novelty of this type of operation. More importantly, we must not forget that the real expert in drug interdiction operations is the U.S. Coast Guard and not the U.S. Navy. Many proponents of increased involvement by the armed forces view maritime surface and air drug interdiction as demanding a command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system under the authority of a single military agency. Ideally, this agency should have broad maritime operational and law enforcement experience, and jurisdictional authority to coordinate and focus all federal drug interdiction assets, both military and civilian. The Coast Guard fits the bill. It is a single federal law enforcement agency that has the infrastructure for such a C3I system, has the broad maritime experience and has the requisite jurisdictional authority.7 Now let us shift our attention to a crucial question. And that is to consider whether or not the increase in military maritime drug interdiction has substantially reduced the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. Eventhough the daily news bring word that a number of drug traffickers, with their cargo of drugs, have been seized at sea, the number of interdictions does not equate to this all out war on drugs. Interdiction of drugs before they cross our borders is the key to drug law enforcement. To date, the nation's interdiction efforts have had only limited success. Informal government estimates reflect that less than 10% of all illicit drugs destined for the United States are interdicted. Reliable data cannot, of course, be compiled. Observers believe the 10% figure is optimistic.8 Today, the increased employment of military forces in the area of drug interdiction is merely, as previously mentioned, a "knee-jerk" response to public opinion. It seems that each and every maritime drug bust receives some form of national media attention. Thus, the average american is lulled into a misconception. What the public does not realize is that we are not winning this war. Drug smugglers are quite ingenious. They are capaple of changing their drug routes, employing decoys, monitoring USCG/USN communication frequencies, acquring the lastest in weaponry, etc. Drug smugglers are quite content to accept a 10% loss of drug flow knowing full well that 90% of their product is reaching the desired destination. Charles Fuss, a former member of the National Narcotics Border Interdictory System, emphasizes this point when he argues: The drug war bears unavoidable similarities to the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War, the high command was convinced that the United States could bleed the enemy to death by a war of attrition, and that productivity could be measured in body counts and battlefield days in the field... In the war on drugs, seizure and arrest statistics define success and the various antidrug agencies involved fight for the numbers -- the "body counts." Attrition did not work in Vietnam, and it will not help the United States win the drug war.9 The United States is pouring millions of dollars into drug interdiction efforts which, in the long run, will not substantially stem the flow of illicit drugs into our country. As for the Navy, most of their ships are now pulling double-duty. In other words, each assigned ship will serve three to four weeks in the Caribbean (patrolling for drug traffickers) either prior to or upon completion of a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean. This constant wear and tear of naval assets will certainly cost the U.S. government in terms of extensive ship/aircraft repair not to mention crew fatigue. To complicate matters further, U.S. military decision makers have now encountered opposition to increased military involvement by those countries cited as main exporters of illicit drugs. The Navy Times reports that the Department of Defense has not yet defined a workable strategy in its war on drugs and that drug exporting countries are not pleased with increased military involvement. Four months after Defense Secretary Cheney pledged that the military would be an "enthusiastic participant" in the nation's drug war, the Defense Department is fumbling for a workable strategy in an unfamiliar warfare. The military's first big anti-drug operation -- posting an aircraft carrier off the coast of Colombia to detect drug smugglers -- had to be aborted in early January when news of it sparked furious denunciations in Colombia and other Latin American countries. And even with President Bush's January 25th (1990) announcement that defense spending would increase to $1.2 billion next year, the scope and nature of the Defense Department's role (in drug interdiction) remains undefined.10 This is an unfortunate and clear indication that when the military (in this case, the Navy) attempts to display a true show of force by employing a carrier (with all of its air/surface surveillance assets) in identifying and seizing drug smugglers, the government backsdown to foreign public reaction. Morever, it is those same countries which are responsible for having instituted our intensive drug interdiction efforts. Once again, the quest for successful drug interdiction becomes a "no-win" contest. in the meantime, our government is content to report sporadic drug seizures despite the overwhelming cost incurred in terms of military equipment and manpower. There exist some viable options and/or solutions to our present employment of the military in conducting drug interdiction. First and foremost, the responsibility for external (i.e. outside the borders of the continental U.S.) drug interdiction should reside strictly with the military. Our military does have the necessary assets to actively pursue and apprehend drug traffickers without the unnecessary interference and/or duplication of efforts from the civilian federal agencies (i.e. DEA, Customs, etc.). Moreover, the key to successful military drug interdiction is a viable and well-defined strategy which, as previously depicted, does not exist. In the area of maritime drug interdiction, the U.S. Coast Guard must maintain overall command and control. "The agency that can best manage our nation's operational interdiction responsibilities -- both air and sea -- is the Coast Guard."11 With the recent disclosure of cutbacks in armed forces personnel and equipment, the Navy could easily transfer reserve (or soon to be reserve) ships and the necessary personnel directly to the Coast Guard. In essence, transform "haze gray" vessels into Coast Guard "white and orange." Eventually, this would minimize command and control problems which presently persist in the USCG/USN drug interdiction combined operations. Secondly, the military forces must be employed on a much larger scale. In addition to the established drug interdiction operations, we should allow military forces to tackle the problem head-on. In other words, if a military raid is required in known drug exporting countries, then let's do it. The recent invasion of Panama was labeled a military intervention in order to save our citizens and restore democracy. However, one must not forget that one of the specific tasks of our troops in Panama was to capture and arrest General Noreiga. Gen. Noreiga, an alleged drug "kingpin," is now facing criminal charges in the United States. What we need is a small, but potent, Navy-USMC team embarked onboard an amphibious ship standing by in the Caribbean basin. This team may at the discretion of our government, be employed on a moment's notice strictly for drug raids. Drug exporting countries (e.g. Colombia, Peru, etc.) will certainly think twice about harboring drug kingpins and their industry knowing full well that a U.S. military force is able to strike without warning. "To be fully effective, interdiction must aim at trafficking organizations and individuals themselves, creating a serious risk of punishment or financial loss. Where overseas efforts are concerned. This implies the need for activities in drug source and transit countries that are specifically designed to disrupt and, if possible, dismantle trafficking organizations -- through application of strict enforcement and criminal sanctions and through stringent interdiction of trafficking routes and modes."12 We must interpret "stringent interdiction" to mean the use of full and unrestrained military might. Thirdly, our government must establish a solid working relationship with known drug exporting countries and convince them of our resolve to stem the flow of illicit drugs. Perhaps our government should subsidize these countries into producing legitimate food crops vice growing cocoa leaves. The recent drug summit held in Colombia is certainly a step in the right direction. Fourthly, aside from the military, our nation's federal agencies must do everything in their power to handle internal drug interdiction and apprehend the distributors and users of illicit drugs. Stifling the demand for drugs will most definitely affect the supply of same. This is a very difficult task, but improvements in this area are being made. The American Public must be made aware of the fact that external drug interdiction efforts is not the panacea in abating drug usage and that we will not experience swift results. We must simply maintain a relentless internal drug interdiction campaign. Lastly, if the U.S. Navy should continue to work in close partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard in maritime drug interdiction, then the Department of Defense must provide additional drug interdiction training and associated equipment to the Navy in order to conduct this mission successfully. At the same time, the Department of Defense must be willing to sacrifice the operational tempo of the fleet presently deploying to the Mediterranean. As for USS FAIRFAX COUNTY, the twenty-three days at sea patrolling the waters of northern Colombia resulted in ten interceptions, two actual boardings, and zero arrests. However, the USCG Cutter DALLAS (operating in an area adjacent to FAIRFAX) did make a seizure and requested assistance in escorting the drug smugglers and their vessel to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There was finally an end in sight to this long, arduous, and primarily monotonous patrol. At the same time, the officers and men of FAIRFAX COUNTY couldn't help but feel that perhaps their small contribution might make an impact in our military's drug interdiction efforts. ENDNOTES 1 John W. Lockwood, CAPT USCG(RET). "Blocking Caribbean Drug Traffic." Naval Proceedings. Dec. 1986, p. 102 2 Though FAIRFAX COUNTY's main batteries were manned, the rules of engagement only permitted the ship to return fire in self-defense. Firing across the bow of a vessel in order to have stop was not permitted at this time. 3 As a result of post action reports, U.S. Naval vessels today involved in drug interdiction missions are provided with a USCG RHIB (outboard motor rubber craft) which is easily launched and recovered in rough seas and is capable of high speeds. 4 Richard Cheney, SECDEF. "DOD and its Role in the War against Drugs." DEFENSE 89. Based on a news briefing at the Pentagon, Sep. 18, 1989, p. 3 5 Patrick D. Mahaffey, LCDR USN. "What is the U.S. Navy's Role in Drug Interdiction?" Naval War College Newport R.I. DTIC Jun. 27, 1988, p. 7 6 Ibid., pp. 7-8 7 Richard Young, RADM USNR. "Customs or Coast Guard." Naval Proceedings. Aug. 1987, p. 69 8 Ibid., p. 62 9 Charles M. Fuss, Jr. "Lies, Damn Lies, Statistics, and the Drug War." Naval Proceedings. Dec. 1989, pp. 65-66 10 William Matthews. "Pentagon Strategy in Drug War undefined." Navy Times. Feb. 5, 1990 issue, p. 25 11 Stephen G. Duca, CAPT USCG(RET). 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