Fighting The MAGTF: The Multiple GCE Dilemma AUTHOR Major Luciano S. Silva, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: FIGHTING THE MAGTF: THE MULTIPLE GCE DILEMMA. THESIS: If the MAGTF is going to be able to fight across the entire spectrum of war using combined, joint or uni-service GCEs it must establish doctrine for employment of multiple GCEs. ISSUE: The Marine Crops has come a long way since recognizing the need for inovative changes in the permanent organization of the MAGTF headquarters. However, very little ground has been broken in establishing doctrine for the employment of multiple GCEs within the MAGTF. Normally the GCE is organized under the headquarters of a single combat organization. Traditionally, this is the preferred way. The issue arises when one or several components of the MAGTF are composed of joint or combined forces. What considerations should we looked at when attacking another service component to the MAGTF? Should it be a separate GCE. Will commonalty of equipment exist? What about combined operations? Most combined forces, regardless of size, will not subordinate themselves below the MAGTF level. Size than is a problem, politics is another. Fire support coordination with multiple GCEs is the most difficult issue facing the MAGTF commanders. When to create an FSCC at the MAGTF is the most difficult issue to be resolve. Finally, the collocation of the DASC with the senior FSCC in the MAGTF with multiple GCEs is another issue. Normally, one DASC will support a MAGTF of MEB size and above. Employment of two GCEs will require the DASC to be employed in a modified manner, a manner for which little doctrine exists. CONCLUSION: The MAGTF concept possesses a doctrinal organization that is well proven. It is time to move beyond this concept and start developing procedures for the employment of multiple joint, combined or uni-service GCEs. Only then can the full potential of the MAGTF be exploited in a joint or combined arena. FIGHTING THE MAGTF: THE MULTIPLE GCE DILEMMA OUTLINE THESIS: If the MAGTF is going to be able to fight across the entire spectrum of war using combined, joint or uni-service GCEs it must establish doctrine for employment of multiple GCEs. I. Introduction II. Multiple GCEs a. Historical b. Current doctrine c. OH-6-1 definitions d. Unique GCE arrangements (1) uni-service (2) joint (3) combined (4) reserve III. Fire Support Coordination a. MAGTF with a single GCE b. MAGTF with more then one c. MAGTF in joint and combine operations IV. DASC V. CONCLUSIONS FIGHTING THE MAGTF: THE MULTIPLE GCE DILEMMA Simply stated the primary function of the Marine Corps is to respond to the needs of our country for a highly mobile, instantly ready combat force skilled in the conduct of amphibious assault against a hostile shore. Naval amphibious forces featuring a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can emphasize either a posture of peacetime presence and a deferred wartime responsiveness or a posture of wartime responsiveness and a reduced peacetime presence.(1:4) A Naval projection force of Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) size can be employed as the major combat component of an amphibious, joint or combined task force. Moreover, whether delivered by sealift or airlift, or as a forward-afloat peacetime presence, the MAGTF represents a responsive, combined arms naval force capable of rapidly unleashing a wide range of flexible, decisive combat power in combined, joint or uni-service operations. The Marine Corps has come a long way since recognizing the need for innovative changes in the permanent organization of the MAGTF Headquarters. However, very little ground has been broken in establishing doctrine for the employment of multiple GCEs within the MAGTF. If the Marine Corps is going to be able to fight across the entire spectrum of conflict using combined, joint, or uni-service GCE's, we must establish doctrine for employment of multiple GCE's within the MAGTF. Historical Prospective To understand the dilemma of addressing multiple GCE's within the MAGTF structure we need to understand, from a historical prospective, the evolution of the MAGTF. The Spanish- American War lessons learned, demonstrated the need for establishing an instrument of naval power projection more powerful than the traditional ship's party. The General Board of the Navy acted upon those lessons, charging the Marine Corps with responsibility for the assaults, a powerful projection function within the fleet. The final outcome of the Spanish-American War lessons learned was the establishment of an Advanced Force Base concept that was to demonstrate its utility in Veracruz [1914], Haiti [1915], and Santo Domingo [1916].(2) World War I provided the Marine Corps the opportunity to demonstrate its "force in readiness" concept. While maintaining both identity and unit integrity, Marine forces were nonetheless fully integrated into the American Expeditionary Force structure, in an obvious continental, vice naval, mission. Again the Marine Corps demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness of an expeditionary force across the spectrum of war fighting requirement.(2) The Marine Corps experience as an expeditionary force prior to WW II provided many critical lessons that would eventually shape the structure of the Marine Corps into an air-ground combined arms team. The Advanced Base Force was reorganized into the East Coast Expeditionary Force, with infantry, artillery and tactical air squadrons forming an "Air-ground team" that became the forerunner of the present day MAGTF. This concept, not always use during WW II, was first tried in the Korean War by the 1st provisional Marine Brigade at the Pusan perimeter. Unfortunately this concept did not become a permanent organization until the 1980's. It was not until the 1980"s that serious discussions about the present MAGTF were initiated. Recognizing the need for innovative change, the Marine Corps in 1983 decided to establish permanent, standardized headquarters for its MAGTFs.(3:2) This process,due for completion in 1990, is completed. Current Doctrine The doctrinal concept of the Air-Ground combined armed team is not new. It is based upon tasking in the National Security Act of 1947. This tasking provided the foundation for the structure and operation of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).(4:1-1) The MAGTF structure includes four major elements: a command element, and subordinate ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements. See figure I for the basic structure. It is the doctrinal concept of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) that I will now examine. The GCE is define as: The GCE is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is constructed around an in- fantry unit and varies in size from a reinforced battalion to one or more Marine divisions. The GCE also includes combat support and combat ser- vice support units. It is the GCE that executes maneuver and is the focal point for the applica- tion of firepower and the execution of combined arms. Normally, there is only one GCE in a MAGTF.(5:1-4) This definition conveys the wrong assumptions. First,that the GCE will be composed of Marine ground forces only. Second,that if two or more divisions make up the GCE, a separate headquarters already exists. Third,that only one GCE is in the MAGTF. This is a simplified way of looking at a complex issue. OH-2 further states: When operations with multiple GCE's of some duration are anticipated, the preferred alternative is to establish or add a separate GCE headquarters. For MAGTF's smaller than a MEF, a regimental headquarters may be added to coordinate two battalion-size GCE's, or a small division operational headquarters may be added to coordinate two regimental-size GCE's. When this occurs, review the task organization to ensure its adequacy and redesignate a MEU as a MEB or a MEB as a MEF.(4:2-6) Click here to view image Since the establishment of permanent MAGTF headquarters in 1983, doctrine and procedures for compositing MAGTFs has been continually refined. However, procedures for compositing GCEs are almost nonexistent. Furthermore, as noted in the above definitions, in cases where the MAGTF plans to employ multiple GCEs procedures are confusing and contradictory. While the Marine Corps day to day focus is on the forward deployed MEUs and crises response, _the Marine Corps bread and butter in the joint and combined arena, is the MATF's versatility to rapidly composite into a full MEF capable of sustain operations ashore. To assume that the GCE of a compositing MAGTF will be made up of Marine forces only is limiting the capabilities of the MAGTF. Recent operations such as "Operation Urgent Fury" and "Operation Just Cause", have demonstrated the inclination by the JCS to ensure that every service gets a piece of the action. Furthermore, "Operation Just Cause" benefited from the lessons learned of past joint operations and streamlined the employment of ground forces under a single commander. Within the Marine Corps, the MAGTF's _versatility as well as its responsiveness, are to a great degree the results of the close integration of the ground, air and combat service support elements. There is a common bond. Training, doctrine and background ensures that time is not lost developing operating procedures during employment. This will not be the case if the GCE is composed of joint or combined forces. Multiple GCE's Normally the GCE is organized under the headquarters of a single combat organization. Traditionally, this the preferred way. However,in the future this will not always be the case. We have to plan on multiple GCE's being employed. As an example, we can have two units of equal size which are too big to combine into one, or, to subordinate one into the other. For the most part it don't make sense to put two divisions size units together for reasons of span of control, fire support coordination, control of aircraft, and command and control. Another reason could be political. As noted in numerous exercise conducted by MAGTF's with joint, and combined military forces, there's a reluctance, regardless of size, for these forces to subordinate themselves lower than the MAGTF level. Size than is one problem, politics is another.(6) Several organizational concepts are feasible for establishing command and control of this nonstandard GCE. OH-6, now canceled, offered the following options: a. One is to allow the MAGTF commander to function simultaneously as the GCE commander. b. Another solution is to add a headquarters cell from the parent command of one of the two infantry organizations (e.g., in a Marine Expeditionary brigade (MEB) with 2 RLT's add a headquarters from the parent division of one of the RLT's and designate it as HQ _ division (-). c. A third alternative is to designate the senior of the two subordinate element commanders as GCE commander.(7:3-3) In analyzing these options they both have disadvantages and advantages. In option one, the difficulty is not so much in competing demands for the personal attention of the commander, but in greatly increased requirements for his staff. This is particularly true in the communications section due to greatly increased responsibilities and in the fire support coordination center (FSCC) since the FSCC of the GCE normally functions as the FSCC of the MAGTF. Fire support coordination in multiple GCEs will be discussed in a later section. In both of these areas the MAGTF staff would require augmentation to function as GCE headquarters. Since there would be little reduction command and control requirements for the two infantry headquarters of the GCE, this augmentation could not likely come from them but would have to be obtained from sources external to the MAGTF, preferably at the activation of the MAGTF. In option two, if the MAGTF were being deployed as the forward element for follow-on forces, which would include the remaining elements of the parent command, then having a headquarters cell already forward deployed and functioning would facilitate further operations (e.g., the remaining regiments and separate battalions of the division in the above example arrive in theater and the division is reconstituted with its headquarters already in place). In the third option, this could possibly be accomplished with less personnel augmentation than designating the MAGTF headquarters as GCE headquarters, but it carries the disadvantage of causing a maneuver commander. whose primary responsibility is controlling and directing his own organization, sometimes in intense combat situations, to control and direct the activities of a like-sized organization as well as his own. SO what procedures should we use when employing multiple GCEs? As noted above, procedures for employment of the MAGTF in joint operations are well defined. The MAGTF could be employed in a uni-service role reporting directly to the unified commander. It could be employed under the operational control of a Joint Task force commander, or within a joint command as a component command. The problem arises when joint forces are assigned to the MAGTF. Figures I and II depict two possible options for task organizing a joint MAGTF. Click here to view image Army units operating with Marines is not a new concept. The V Amphibious Corps had Army units assigned to the landing force during WW II, as did III MEF in I corps in South Viet Nam. This is not the issue. In todays environment, given the instability of the Third World, the war on drugs, changes in Europe and a declining defense budget, the force of choice will more likely be a small MAGTF (MEU/MEB) with joint Army, Navy, and Air Force units assigned for a quick operation. The scenarios are numerous, and are not relevant to the issue, suffice it to say that procedures are needed to ensure a smooth interaction of forces within the MAGTF. What consideration should be looked at when attaching another service component to the MAGTF, such as the 82nd Airborne Division? Should it be a separate GCE? [Figure II] Should we form one GCE? [Figure III] Will commonalty of equipment exist? These are questions that are best addressed by doctrine and procedures. I don't think that we need a hard and fast rule as to when we create another GCE or GCE's. The commander should have the flexibility base on his estimate of the situation to organized his forces as best as he see fit to accomplish his mission. What he needs is well defined procedures that will facilitate his decision making process as he considers his options. Consider the following examples, a joint MAGTF has two GCE's, one Army and one Marine. The Marine GCE does an Amphibious assault and the Army GCE an Airborne drop. Coordination between GCE is minimal until the forces do a link up. Coordinations of all maneuver for the command objective is being done at the MAGTF level. The Army GCE will get an Anglico team for full integration within the MAGTF combined Arms team. Very little contact and coordination is required between the GCEs. On the other hand, if the two GCE's are going to do an operation that require close cooperation, as when one unit is abreast of each other, there needs to be more exchange of personnel than just an Anglico team. We must consider liaison teams for boundaries, COCs, FSC ect. This is one of several ways that we can overcome the lack of common training procedures and employment of organic weapons system. We still used two GCE's but in the latter case we need more lateral as well as horizontal coordination. What about combined operations? This type of operation will be characterized more by politics than sound tactical doctrine. While a similar concept as joint operation can be employed, it is doubtful a combine force, regardless of size, would subordinate itself below the MAGTF level. For command and control purpose a foreign contingent should be a separate GCE. (Figure IV) Depending on the size of the foreign GCE fire support coordination and other support can be accomplished through the USMC components of the MAGTF. In essence if the foreign contingent is a small force, treat it like another battalion. Click here to view image Reserve Should the MAGTF reserve be a separate GCE? Normally the MAGTF will not have a reserve. However, if a reserve is designated will it be control at the MAGTF level? Not necessarily. It will depend on the MAGTF concept of operation and the commanders intent. If he decides he needs a reserve, he may put a string on the GCE reserve. Consider the following example. The GCE is composed of two divisions. Based on the MAGTF's concept of operation the MAGTF commander doesn't"t see a need to hold a separate reserve. However, he wants to have the flexibility if something comes up and he needs to rapidly exploit it, to have the option of having a force available for his used. In this case he would go down to one of his divisions and put a string on that GCE's reserve.(6) This will require the GCE to clear employment of the reserve prior it being committed. There is no requirement for the MAGTF to have a specific task for this reserve; it just have to be available should an opportunity arise. Now let assume that the MAGTF commander is executing an operation that involves complicated maneuvers by his two GCE's. His intent being to place the enemy in a situation where he can deliver a decisive blow. He feels that this task will require a helicopter-borne operation, beyond the control of the two maneuvering GCE's. In this case he decides to designate a MAGTF reserve under the command of another task force commander. By doing so the MAGTF commander now possess the flexibility to commit the helo-borne force at the decisive moment, his intent is to strike the enemy deep and he feels that his two maneuvering GCE's will be to consume executing their scheme of maneuvers to effectively control this additional force. In essence he has elected to create a new (temporary) GCE to execute the mission of the MAGTF reserve; exploitation. Fire Support Coordination For a composite MAGTF (a MAGTF formed with forces drawn form more than one MEF) to be an affective combat force, all FMF units of the same type must be guided by common concepts and skilled in Common procedures. In fire support coordination , units must have a common understanding of the fire support coordination roles and responsibilities and a common set of procedures. The same argument can be made for compositing GCE's or for employment of multiple GCE's. The most difficult issue facing the MAGTF with multiple GCE's is in fire support coordination In a MAGTF with a single GCE headquarters, the primary responsibility for planing and coordinating fire support is in the GCE. The GCE and ACE both have weapons and target acquisition assets for providing fire support, but only the GCE has a FSCC. The FSCC is the single agency in the MAGTF with sufficient target analyses and communications capability to plan fires, perform targeting, integrate fires with maneuvers and accomplish coordination during execution with minimal delay. To separate the FSCC from the GCE operations section defeats one of the primary purposes of fire support coordination. The GCE operations section is responsible for planning, monitoring, and, if necessary, altering the scheme of maneuver. So what do we do when the MAGTF employs multiple GCE's? Under present doctrine fire support coordination is executed at the lowest echelon possible. For this reason the MAGTF headquarters does not posses a FSCC. The Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS) in the MAGTF, simple functions as an advisory body to the MAGTF Commander. The question now arises whether or not an FSCC is necessary at the MAGTF level. Doctrinally, OH-2 states that there are three possible options for organizing the MAGTF'S FSCC when two or more GCEs are assigned to a MAGTF. (1) Employ the FSCC of one of the GCE's as the MAGTF's FSCC. This arrangement will require personnel and equipment augmentation for effective coordination of its own fires as well as those of LF. (2) The FSCC of higher headquarters of one of the GCE's or a like FSCC may be assigned to the LF to function as its FSCC. For example, a MAU with two battalion-size GCE's may use a regimental FSCC as the LF FSCC. This requires tasking from commands out side the MAGTF and may be best employed when a smaller MAGTF (e.g.,MAU) is the lead force for a larger MAGTF :(e.g.,MAB). (3) The MAGTF may organize its own FSCC using its supporting arms special staff as the nucleus. This will require augmentation from either external agencies or from the separate GCE's. (4:5-14) This is an simple approach to a complicated issue. I submit that these three options need to be look at based on the environment the MAGTF is operating in. The MAGTF does not need an FSCC if it only has one GCE. As stated in OH-2 fire support coordination cannot be separated from maneuves control. The first option is when the MAGTF has one GCE. With one GCE (i.e. one maneuver element) FSC is simplified and unit SOP's should suffice to ensure maneuvers and fire support are properly orchestrated. In this case the Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS) is all that is required at the MAGTF level. However, the MAGTF commander needs to be focus on what is happening with the ground battle. If the MAGTF commander is going to fight the MAGTF he has to get involved with the GCE's scheme of maneuver and fire support in order to understand what is going on in the ground. One way is to assign one or two liaison officer from the SASS to the GCE FSCC. A second option involves intricate, complex ground operations requiring close coordination with two or more GCE's. In this case the issues would be too many and complex to kick down stairs to one of the GCE's and an FSCC is required at the MAGTF level. Because of the large maneuver area used by two or three GCE's, the significant maneuver going on, the large number of FSC issues that would have to be resolved, simply designating a senior FSCC from one of the GCE's will not work. The third option involves the MAGTF in defensive operations with multiple GCE's. Due to the nature of the defense a more centralize control of fire support is desire. The MAGTF commander may not only desire to create a FSCC at the MAGTF level, he may also pull the general support artillery from the GCE's and form a MAGTF artillery group. This will not only provide him with a FSCC, but the tools necessary to influenced the action with general support artillery into any one of the GCE's areas of operations without the delay that would accompany lateral coordination between the GCE's FSCC's. DASC A final issue centers around the collocation of the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) with the FSCC of the GCE in a multiple GCE scenario. Normally, one DASC will support a MAGTF of MEB size and above. Employment of two GCEs will require the DASC to be employed in a modified manner, a manner for which little doctrine exists. Concept of employment for the DASC as described in OH 5-8, Control of Aircrafts and Missiles, states: "Coordination and control of direct air support functions for MEF operation require a substantial DASC capability based on the number of TACP's (size of GCE) that will request air support, as well as the number of aircraft anticipated. Collo- cation of the DASC with the senior FSCC generally means at the "Division FSCC." Integration of direct air support assets and other supporting arms to effectively contribute to the MAGTF point of main ef- fort requires solid communications as well as a con- tinuous exchange of information between the DASC and the FSCC. However, extensive communication re- quirements with other agencies, aircraft, terminal controllers, and air defense weapons systems re- quire that communications considerations take priority in DASC siting." These procedures do not take into consideration the problems associated with supporting multiple GCEs. From the GCE's prospective the biggest concern will be keeping track of helicopters supporting the separate GCEs. Conclusion The GCE will always operate as part of a MAGTF. Ground maneuver has been and will continue to be the focus of effort of the MAGTF. We need to have the doctrine and procedures that will facilitate employment of multiple joint or combine GCE's. These procedures are not intended to take the place of unit SOP's but serve as a starting point when planning to employ joint or combined GCE's in the MAGTF. No set of procedures will be totally effective, but must provide enough of the Do's and Don't to ensure the exchange of critical information with the variety of forces that a MAGTF will employ. The MAGTF concept possesses a doctrinal organization that is well proven. It is time to move beyond this concept and start developing procedures for the employment of multiple joint, combined or uni-service GCEs. Only then can the full potential of the MAGTF be exploited in a joint or combined arena. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bednarsky, Remained H., Major, U.S. Marine Corps, "A Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Model," Command and Staff College, 1 May 1979, P. 2. Martelo, Frank J., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, "Historical Evolution of the MAGTF Concept," Lecture presented at Command and Staff College, January 2,1990. 3. U.S. Marine Corps. Advance Amphibious Study Group Background paper. The permanent MAGTF headquarters concept and how it applies in the formation of a composite MAGTF, second edition, (15 July 1985), P.2 4. U.S. Narine Corps. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, OH-2 Quantico, 1987 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1. Quantico, 1988 6. Zinni, Anthony, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Personal interview. 7. U.S. Marine Corps. The Ground Combat Element (GCE). OH-6, Quantico, 1986 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Advance Amphibious Study Group Concept Paper Guidelines for forming a composite MAGTF. third edition, 1 Aug. 1985
