War Reserve Stocks And Marine Corps Sustainability AUTHOR Major Joseph L. Styons, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence -TEXT- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: WAR RESERVE STOCKS AND MARINE CORPS SUSTAINABILITY I. THESIS: While the foundation of Marine Corps War Reserve Policy is sound, the weaknesses associated with the acquisition, storage, maintenance, and ability to deliver these assets creates a long-standing, complex problem. II. PROBLEM: Although the Marine Corps allocates a tremendous amount of manpower, time and money to sustainability, a number of problems prevents the optimum management of this critical part of MAGTF combat capability. III. DATA/BACKGROUND: The sustainability available to MAGTFs is a primary factor in determining its ultimate victory on the battlefield. Sustainment, logistically speaking, is normally expressed in Days of Supply (DOS) available to Marine forces during combat operations. Sustainment levels in the Marine Corps vary by Class of Supply. In some critical areas, shortages in POL, ammunition, principal end items and repair parts, are likely to have a severe, negative impact on the "staying power" of Marine forces. There are a variety of complex problems which contribute to these shortages and prevent a rapid recovery from their effect. First and most significant are the fiscal constraints for the purchase of War Reserve Stocks. A flawed acquisition process, storage and maintenance limitations and transportation constraints also add to the problems associated with maintaining a full 60 DOS of War Reserve Stocks as required by current Defense Guidance. IV. CONCLUSION: These problems are under continuous review and improvement. However, a great deal remains to be done in order to maximize the use and distribution of current levels of sustainment. V. RECOMMENDATION: The numerous internal Marine Corps agencies should be redirected to a common goal of attaining, storing, maintaining, and distributing War Reserve assets in an equitable manner. WAR RESERVE STOCKS AND MARINE CORPS SUSTAINABILITY Thesis Statement. While the foundation of the Marine Corps War Reserve Policy is sound, the weakensses associated with the acquisition, storage, maintenance, and ability to deliver these assets represents a long-standing, complex problem. I. The Marine Corps War Reserve Program A. Historical precedence B. The need for sustainment II. Storage/Location of War Reserve Stocks A. MEF held stocks B. Externally held stocks C. Pitfalls associated with non MEF held War Reserve Stocks D. Withdrawal/Delivery of stocks III. Acquisition and Issue of War Reserve Stocks A. Responsibilities B. Combat Active Replacement Factors C. Acquisition priorities D. Drawdown and reconstitution of War Reserve Stocks IV. Industrial Base Problems V. Current Levels of Sustainment A. Funding levels B. MPF and NALM offsets Resupply is certainly not a new concept. As long as there have been wars, the ability to resupply and reconstitute forces on the battlefield has been an important and often decisive combat force multiplier. As General E. G. Thibault points out in The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, "For the Russian campaign, the Wehrmacth never had sufficient means available and this was even more true of raw materials, reserve stocks and means of transportation than it was of combat forces. It has been estimated that in order to reach Moscow--not to mention the line, still further away, from Archangelsk to the Volga--by means of motor transport alone, at least ten times the number of vehicles actually available would have been needed."1 This, and countless other historical examples illustrate the need for a viable method of acquiring, storing, and providing sustainment to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The tempo and lethality of future battles and the resultant rapid equipment losses are likely to magnify the criticality of an effective and appropriate level of War Reserve Stocks. The Marine Corps' War Reserve Policy for ground supplies is based on current Defense Guidance which requires the Marine Corps to maintain a 60-day level of sustainment. As a result, the Marine Corps War Reserve Policy is to stock and position a 60-day level of supplies with the active MEFs to the maximum extent possible. Since it is not always practical to physically position these supplies at a MEF location, the policy permits supplies to be positioned elsewhere under the condition that operational planning schedules can be met. While the foundation of the Marine Corps Reserve Policy is sound, the weaknesses associated with the acquisition, storage. maintenance and ability to deliver these assets represents a long-standing and complex problem. This is particularly true in light of our frequent claim that a unique capability of a MAGTF is its ability to project and sustain power ashore for up to 60 days. This is a unique characteristic that only Marine forces possess. Army special forces are unable to match this capability. Marine Corps War Reserve Stocks are held in a number of different locations. As previously mentioned, the active MEFs hold their own War Reserve Stocks to the maximum extent practical. Due to the normal availability of many items through commercial sources such as lumber, packaged POL, construction supplies, etc., MEFs often opt not to hold these items. This is also true for a large variety of shelf life items. Obvious examples are food items, batteries, some types of medical supplies and some types of ammunition. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) also holds a large portion of Marine Corps War Reserve Stocks. The ability of the Marine Corps to hold an adequate level of subsistence items, either MREs or "B" rations (soon to be replaced by Tray "T" rations), is directly related to shelf life and stock rotation policies. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Defence Personnel Support Center has been arranged for "B" rations. Basically, this MOA earmarks a portion of total DLA stocks for Marine Corps use. The Marine Corps pays for this service and agrees to assist in the rotation of these stocks by using "B" rations in training exercises. The DLA also holds the entire War Reserve Requirement for medical supplies for the Marine Corps Reserve component. Batteries, a critical War Reserve commodity, are held and managed by a separate DoD Integrated Material Manager (IMM). These items are held based on a funded, Interservice Support Agreement with an army material manager. The largest holders of War Reserve Stocks for the MEFs are the Marine Corps Logistics Bases at Albany, GA and Barstow, CA. The MCLBs hold and maintain portions of Class II (Individual equipment), Class III (POL) Class IV (Fortification and Barrier Materials), Class VII (PEIs), Class VIII (medical supplies) and Class IX (repair parts). A key reason that the MCLBs hold such a large portion of the MEFs' War Reserve Stocks is because of Marine Corps War Reserve Policy which states: "MEF commanders may roll back requirements when: (1) Requirements are for minimally manned/cadred units (these stocks will be identified in the store's system as purpose Code C, initial issue T/E requirements). (2) Maintenance-significant items are beyond the force(s) care-in-stores capability. (3) Items can be provided to the FMF, as specified in the withdrawal plan, in sufficient time to meet assault and assault follow-on embarkation schedules. (4) Adequate warehousing space is not available.2" This policy is designed to relieve MEF commanders from the burdens of unreasonable storage and maintenance responsibilities, but in fact over reliance on the the MCLBs for sustainment is dangerous. There are several reasons that MEFs should exercise caution before relinquishing custody of their War Reserve assets to the MCLBs. First and most important is that when an item, regardless of class, becomes a part of the MCLB's stocks, visibility with regard to MEF ownership is lost. In other words, a War Reserve asset obtained from II MEF by MCLB Albany would simply be subsumed into Albany's on-hand stocks. To facilitate rotation and repair, Albany manages these stocks by using various purpose and condition codes. In theory, either the original asset or a like item should be available at a later date, but for a variety of reasons which will be covered in subsequent paragraphs, this is not always true. The key point is that the MCLBs do not "fence" War Reserve Stocks for a specific MEF; therefore, there is no guarantee that the MCLBs will be able to provide a fixed number of items to a MEF upon request. The lesson to be learned by force planners, particularly Logisticians, is that when a MEF chooses not to hold the full 60-day level of War Reserve Stocks it should be based on a careful analysis and determination that maintenance and storage is truly beyond its capabilities. The temptation to relegate the rather mundane, time consuming tasks associated with custody of large amounts of War Reserve Stocks should be resisted. Based on a review of current War Reserve Class VII asset posture, II MEF appears to be particularly guilty of an over reliance on MCLB, Albany, GA for the storage and maintenance of its Class VII War Reserve Stocks. Continuously citing inadequate storage and maintenance capabilities, II MEF has become dependent on MCLB Albany to a point that Camp Lejeune based Class VII levels of War Reserve Stocks are almost nil (this does not consider MPS and/or NACM stocks). Withdrawal of MCLB held War Reserve Stocks is primarily a push system. Each MEF is required to preregister all deliberate planning requirements in support of its OPLANs. This is an annual requirement and changes whenever the MEF's structure or equipment is modified. In the event of a contingency (i.e., OPLAN execution) MCLB Albany will direct the preparation of materials to the appropriate Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) or the Port/Aerial Port of Embarkation (POE/APOE). Materials not held by the MCLBs will be requisitioned from the appropriate Intermediate Materiel Manager (IMM) per previously established MOUs/ISSAs. The mobilization Branch at MCLB Albany has the responsibility for administering the War Reserve System which supports these withdrawal procedures. The above procedures are currently in place and have been tested on numerous occasions with regard to the systems ability to electronically submit requisitions to the appropriate source and/or push MCLB held War Reserve Stocks to a specific MEF; however, actual physical withdrawal of assets has never occurred. The transportation requirements associated with conducting a full withdrawal in sufficient time to meet most OPLAN execution schedules is simply not available. This problem is exacerbated when the fact that mobilization of Marine forces is most likely to occur at a time when other services will be competing for the same transportation assets. Since there is not a suitable airport for military transport aircraft larger than a C130, in or near Albany or Barstow, it is probable that rail and truck transportation systems will quickly become overloaded. The acquisition process for war reserve materials varies depending on the class of supply. The mixture of funding responsibilities are as follows: CLASS OF SUPPLY ENDING RESPONSIBILITY I (Subsistence) HQMC II (Individual equipment) MCRDAC for new acquisitions, MEFs for replenishment III (POL) MEFs submit requirements to the applicable fleet CINC for funding IV (STAP items, construc- MCRDAC for new acquisition tion materials, barrier of STAP, MEFS for replenish- ment of STAP & purchase of other items V Ammunition MCRDAC VII Principal End Items MCRDC VIII MEDICAL SUPPLIES MEFs IX Repair Parts MEFs "Acquisition should be a complementary, two-way process. Especially for the long term, the process must identify combat requirements and develop equipment to satisfy these require- ments. We should base these requirements on an analysis of critical enemy vulnerabilities."3 Generally the acquisition process follows the preceding advice and is based on actual FMF requirements. However, a notable exception to this rule exists in the procedures used for procurement of some class II and IV equipment and most class VII equipment. The application of a Combat Active Replacement Factor (CARF) to these classes of supplies is the mathematical tool used to calculate anticipated equipment losses when operating in a combat/hostile environment. The CARF is simply a percentage applied to the density of individual items of equipment. The most recent Marine Corps order on CARFs requires the newly formed Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) assisted by (Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) to establish CARFs for new items entering the inventory. "Replacement factors are determined by applying military judgement to determine a probable loss rate based on the following: a. The scenario, to include the expected enemy threat and the concomitant employment concept. b. FMF equipment density. c. Function in combat. d. Requirements for a peculiar or special application. e. Type and mission of units which will use item. f. Vulnerability under combat use. g. Durability of the item, to include environmental effects. h. Experience data (past history of losses, similarity to like items in use, judgemental adequacy of previously assigned factors, etc.) i. Factors assigned by other services to identical or similar items. j. Life expectancy in combat. k. Estimated operating hours per month under each category of use, mean time between failure, mean time to repair, total down time, lead time to replacement, test results and research studies, as well as tactical effects and experienced judgement."4 Once fully implemented these considerations will require an extensive effort and will undoubtedly improve the validity of the CARF assignment process; however, conversation with several different Acquisition Project Managers (APMs) within MCRDAC indicates the need for increased interest and focus on this effort. For example, presently, when a new Principal End Item is to be purchased, the APM is allocated a finite funding level. Frequently, this amount is less than the total requirement. In these cases first priority normally goes to the active forces T/Es, second to reserve forces, then MPS, NALM, etc. The remainder goes to War Reserve. This sequence is an understandable and unfortunate fiscal reality, but instead of a system which earmarks these deficiencies for out-year funding and procurement, the CARF is often adjusted down to meet the funding level. This reverse engineering process not only causes the lack of a method to identify War Reserve deficiencies, it establishes an artificially low CARF which is then coded on the Marine Corps' official Item Data File (IDF). The IDF which replaced the more familiar Table of Authorized Material (TAM) is the source document for future reference to both the item and it's CARF. In other words, this process creates a permanent, erroneous CARF for a substantial number of Class II, IV and VII items of equipment. This process may be gradually improving due to the recent publication of a new CARF order. An interview with the Head, Material Policy Section, Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters Marine Corps seems to support this optimism. During this interview, it was pointed out that approximately 50 CARF changes/updates based on the new Marine Corps order had recently been submitted for inclusion to the IDF by the MCCDC.5 Copies of these changes were obtained and reviewed and indicated progress on the proper selection of CARFs. Once acquired, a number of factors contribute to a drawdown of War Reserve Stocks. This is particularly true for those War Reserve Stocks held at either Albany or Barstow where, as previously mentioned, items are not "fenced" for a particular MEF. The Marine Corps policy requires that any War Reserve Stocks which are issued must be supported by a reconstitution plan. But what constitutes a plan, and what is considered prompt? The intentional vagueness of this policy was designed to permit flexibility with regard to total asset usage. Flexibility has certainly been achieved, but the drawdown of critical War Reserve assets has been an undesirable by-product. Two of the more frequent justifications cited for using War Reserve Stocks are to fill deficiencies in either MPS or NALM stocks. Perhaps a more prominent problem has been the recent reorganizations directed by the Commandant which were not supported by increases in funding; consequently, the equipment necessary to support these activations also came from existing War Reserve Stocks. Yet another factor is a policy that permits the MCLBs to issue War Reserve Stocks when a MEF fails to maintain a C-2 level of readiness in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) measured resource area for equipment or supplies on hand. This particular problem is exacerbated by the submission and subsequent approval of the T/E increases from MEF units. The Marine Corps also supports research projects by providing a variety of items to civilian contractors as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) or Government Loaned Equipment (GFL). In either case the major source for this equipment is War Reserve Stocks. All of these factors are valid and require support; however, the required reconstitution effort normally consists of listing shortages as unfunded deficiencies for competition in future budgets, hardly a viable reconstitution plan. Can the Industrial Base make up for our shortages in War Reserve Stocks? Based on an interview with Mr. Nick Linkowitz, the Marine Corps representative on industrial base issues, the answer is no.6 He cites a number of reasons, the most prominent is that so many critical items are out of production that manufacturer's "tool up" would simply take too long. This problem is more complex than it may seem when subcontracting, including numerous second and third tier producers, is considered. For example, first production of Amphibious Assault Vehicles (NAVs) would take approximately 18 months and M60 tanks are out of production completely. Many precision guided munitions contain unique types of batteries manufactured by Eagle Picture Battery Company, a sole source small business with a limited surge capability. Additionally, an increasing number of items, and an even greater number of components, are foreign made which obviously restricts the U.S. ability to direct a surge in production. This is especially true for micro- electronics and computers. These are only a few examples of the lack of responsive industrial base for wartime material production. Even in an ideal situation in which the Marine Corps has its full 60 days of sustainability there is a dangerous gap between the point that industrial production begins to provide replacements. According to Mr. Linkowite, DoD estimates for any appreciable results for major end items from industry range from 12 to 18 months. Despite the myriad of problems associated with maintaining acceptable levels of sustainment, current levels of War Reserve Stocks are probably higher than ever. During a recent lecture/ question and answer session at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Lieutenant General Carson, the Director of the Installations and Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps indicated that, logistically speaking, sustainment capabilities are higher now than at any other time in our history. These relative high levels vary from one Class of Supply to the next.(In several critical classes such as Ammunition (Class V), Subsistence (Class I), Petroleum (Class III), and Principal End Items (Class VII) shortages still remain.) Lieutenant General Carson attributes these relatively high levels (normally expressed in Days of Supply (DOS)) to three primary reasons. First, and most obvious, is the high funding levels enjoyed by all U.S. forces over the past decade. Until recently the steady increase in funding for War Reserve deficiencies has enabled a rise in the DOS in all Classes of Supply. In some cases, the fall 60 DOS requirement was actually attained or exceeded for selected items. Another primary reason cited by the General was the advent of Near Term Prepositioned Forces, subsequently renamed Maritime Prepositioned Forces (MPF). Third, was the establishment of the Norway Air Land MEB (NALM). Between the three MPS squadrons and the NALM the Marine Corps gained 30 DOS for 4 MEBs, a significant increase in the total level of sustainment. From an accountant's perspective as well as the U.S. taxpayer's, both MPF and NALM stocks should be considered as a part of the Marine Corps' War Reserve Stocks, but will these stocks actually be available in the event of a contingency? In reality MPF stocks are national assets which may be diverted to another service component or even another nation in the event of a contingency. In any case, the Marine Corps does not necessarily have exclusive ownership of these assets and inclusion of MPF into sustainability DOS computations may paint an inflated and unrealistic level of preparedness. The NALM stocks are Marine Corps owned; however, their use is obviously geographically restricted to the defense of NATO's northern flank. The Marine Corps' well advertised capability to project and sustain forces ashore is diluted when we count MPF and NALM assets as part of our available sustainment. The purpose for maintaining War Reserve Stocks is to ensure that acceptable levels of materials are available to the forces during combat operations. The problems which have been discussed are complex, involve a great number of internal and external agencies, and are not easily solved. In many instances additional funding is the only answer, but centralization of War Reserve management would also greatly improve the overall effectiveness of the War Reserve Program. Presently, War Reserve policymakers reside at HQMC, requirements are determined at Quantico, Virginia, and the War Reserve System is administered by the Mobilization Branch at Albany, Georgia. While there is no absolute solution for all problems related to War Reserve management, a single manager for this essential program seems basic. Petty rivalry between agencies, misunderstanding and misguided loyalty must be eliminated before the myriad of problems associated with this important element of our combat readiness can be solved. ENDNOTES 1 George E. Thibault, The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984) p. 489. 2 U.S. Marine Corps, War Reserve Policy Manual (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1989) pp. 4-7. 3 FMFM 1: Warfighting (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1989) p. 52. 4 U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Active Replacement Factors, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1989) Encl. 1, p. 1. 5 Lieutenant Colonel B. G. Ramey, Head, LPP-2, Installations and Logistics Department, HQMC, personal interview about Combat Active Replacement Factors, March 10, 1990. 6 Mr. Nick Linkowitz, Project Officer, LPO Branch, Installations and Logistics Department, HQMC, personal interview about U.S. Industrial Base, March 22, 1990. BIBLIOGRAPHY Atwood, Donald J. "Industrial Base: Vital to Defense." Defense 90, (January/February 1990). Johnson, Thomas E. "Reconstitution A Combat Force Multiplier." Military Review, LXIX (September 1989). Linkowitz, Nick, Industrial Base Project Officer, HQMC. Personal interview about the U.S. Industrial Base, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1990. Ramey, B. G. Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Head, LPP-2 Section, I&L, HQMC. Personal interview about Combat Active Replacement Factors, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1990. Thibault, George E. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy. National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Combat Active Replacement Factors, MCO 5420.20. Washington, D.C., 24 August 1989. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, D.C., 6 March 1989. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations, OH 7-6. Quantico, VA, June 987. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. War Reserve Policy Manual, MCO P4400.39F. Washington, D.C., May 17, 1989.
