The "Army 2000", Today's Effects, Tomorrow's Technology and Future Strategy AUTHOR Major David H. Schock, USA CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE "ARMY 2000", TODAY'S EFFECTS, TOMORROW'S TECHNOLOGY AND FUTURE STRATEGY. THESIS: These powerful combinations of political, social, and economic forces will impact greatly on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next decade. In direct correlation with this reduction will come structural changes and personnel reductions. Combined with the rapid advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be a smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand Battle doctrine. ISSUES: The unbelievable events that have occurred in the WARSAW Pact and within the political structure of the Soviet Union has led a strong Congressional push at home to reduce the Armed Forces. Additional social problems with drugs, the homeless, the poor and our education system have further increased the demand for cutbacks in DOD spending. Economic factors, primarily the budget deficit, are another plank in the platform to drastically reduce the services. It appears that the Army, being the largest service, will be hit by most of the budgetary cutbacks. The President and Secretary Cheney of the Defense Department have proposed gradual, systematic reductions in the Army that will still retain our warfighting ability without hollowing out the Army. On the positive side of the coin, the rapid advancement of weapon technology will allow the Army to cutback on it's personnel and equipment without losing the ability to win on the next battlefield. That is if the Congressional leaders do not total gut the Army. These technological advances will effect the look of the future structure of the Army. Needing less and less people to perform the same mission, the division strengths could be cut by as much as one-third. Once we have this new structure, will the Army doctrine of AirLand Battle and it's predecessors give the leadership of the Army the right doctrine in which to fight and win? The doctrine is sound and not predicated on numbers of personnel or structure, but on abilities of the leadership to apply it's techniques. CONCLUSIONS: The political, economical and social ramifications of the present will effect the DOD budget. That in turn will definitely effect the Army's force structure and procurement during the next decade. Together with modern technology and the AirLand Battle doctrine, the "Army 2000" will be able to meet our commitments to our allies and to the nation in the 21st century. THE "ARMY 2000" THESIS STATEMENT. These powerful combinations of political, social, and economic forces will impact greatly on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next decade. In direct correlation with this reduction, will come structural changes and personnel reductions. Combined with the rapid advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be a smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand Battle doctrine. I. PRESENT DAY POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS A. POLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. B. SOCIO/ECONOMIC BATTLES TO FIGHT C. PRECEDENTS D. PRESENT POLICY II. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY A. ROBOTIC B. DIRECTED ENERGY, LASERS C. SMART MUNITIONS D. STATE-OF-THE-ART MATERIALS III. THE AIRLAND BATTLE A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES B. THE PRESENT CONCEPT C. AIRLAND BATTLE-FUTURE IV. POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF THE "ARMY 2000" A. INFANTRY DIVISIONS B. AVIATION, DISCOM, ARTILLERY V. CONCLUSION THE "ARMY 2000" Today's Effects, Tomorrow's Weapons, and Future Strategy In the event that you have just returned from a year long, solo excursion around the world in your sailboat, here are some of the headlines you may have missed. SOVIET UNION ON THE DECLINE! EAST AND WEST GERMANY TO UNITE! EASTERN EUROPE FREE AT LAST! THE COLD WAR IS OVER! DRUG CZARS THREATEN PRESIDENT BUSH! CONGRESS CALLS FOR A CUT IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY $10-20 BILLION! For the last year, the unraveling of the WARSAW Pact, causing several satellites of the USSR to spin from orbit, have dominated all facets of the news. Poland became the first Soviet bloc country to begin the march away from the Kremlin. Next, in the seemingly never-ending exodus of WARSAW Pact countries, came Czechoslovakia, followed by Hungary, East Germany and Romania. Now even Lithuania has declared it's independence from Mother Russia. While the rest of the world has been going through it's evolution, socio/economic problems at home have caused all levels of society to call for less military spending. The dominant reasons are the attempt to reduce the budget deficit, and the desire to spend more on the social ailments of the United States, such as drugs, the plight of the homeless, the poor, and education. These powerful combinations of political, social, and economic forces will impact greatly on the budget of the U.S. Army in the next decade. In direct correlation with this reduction will come structural changes and personnel reductions. Combined with the rapid advancement of technology, the "Army 2000" will be a smaller, decidedly different force in appearance, yet will still follow an enhanced version of the present day AirLand Battle doctrine. Politicians and world leaders, inspired by these heady times of possible peace, are calling for a drastic reduction in the military forces in NATO and total troop pullouts in some WARSAW Pact countries. Never to be accused of being shrinking violets, U.S. Congressional leaders are joining the optimists on the peace bandwagon, calling for immediate withdrawals from Europe and massive reductions in the military budget. These pronouncements of Soviet dominance declining throughout the world, are leading our policy- makers into formulating sympathetic reductions in equipment, manpower, research and development of our armed forces, most particularly in the Army. The so called "peace initiative" that Congress is looking for, is to be carved directly out of the military budgets of the Armed Forces over the next few years. The largest portion to be cut will be that of the Army. The high side estimate is $200 billion over the next five years, with the low side being $180 billion over the same period.(8-14) Apparently the vocal majority of the populace is supporting this reduction in budget with its corresponding effect on force structure of the "Army 2000". The call for reductions in the Pentagon budget is not only coming from the liberals in Congress, but from some of the military's staunchest supporters. For example, this statement appeared recently in a local newspaper, (Senator Sam)Nunn critized Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney for what he said was Cheney's refusal to formally accept an intelligence community finding that the Soviet army is now far less threatening than in the years preceding the ascendance of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.(11-1) He used this fact to demand reductions in U.S. forces and corresponding budget cutbacks due to this supposed lack of threat. Another part of this equation that is still unanswered is the attempt to reduce the military spending in order to bring the budget deficit under control. This problem has been identified many times before, most recently in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings congressional bill, with little effect on the upward spiral of the deficit. Congressional leaders feel that extensive reductions in military spending can effectively help in the solution of this problem. Additionally, many people want the expected monetary savings to be used to fight the many social ailments in the U.S. society. Some want to spend money on the tremendous "drug war" that is ongoing. Some, however foolishly, want to have the military actually fight the war itself. The drug war is not the only area that Congress is looking to spend this "peace initiative". The homeless, the poor, our education system are a few of several social programs in need of money. With the prospect of peace in Europe, combined with major socio/economic problems at home, popular opinion is calling for action to reduce the spending on the military. There is a definite precedent set by previous leaders of the United States, who have had effects on the force structure of the Army. They too were swayed by popular opinion. Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's policies returned the United States to it's previous position of isolationism and reduced the overall strength of the Army drastically. President Harry Truman, along with his Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, reduced the defense budget in land forces and thereby created the position the U.S. found itself in on June 24, 1950. When North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea, the United States had limited forces available to counter the attack. President Truman and the post World War II reduction was not the only historical example that should be cited. More recent history gives another example of troop reduction and cutbacks in equipment and procurement during the Carter presidency. The lack of planned and controlled reductions caused problems even into the late 1980's. Succumbing to the pressures from abroad and from within the United States Congress, President Bush and Secretary Cheney have no choice but to make reductions in the force. The policy from the White House and the Defense Department is to gradually reduce the Army forces over the next five years, so as not to make a hollow shell of the Army and be unable to meet our commitments. At this time, there is a proposal to deactivate two to three divisions, but Congress is looking hard at the possibility of deactivating over half of the eighteen divisions by the year 2000.(5:19) Additionally, the Secretary of Defense has proposed reduction in the AH-64 procurement, elimination of the AHIP (Advance OH-58), cost cutting with the M1 Abrams tank and a total re-look on the new LHX helicopter. Another thought process of restructuring the Army that must be addressed, is the problem of identifying the challenges the Army will be facing in the next century. Not only must Department of Defense policymakers and Congressional committees agree on the appropriate reduction in the Army budget, the curtailment must be done in concert with a forward look at the next possible threat environment. Mr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., professor of internal security studies at Tufts University and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc. wrote an article in which he stated, By the end of the 1990's, we are likely to have witnessed the reduction of the forward deployed forces from NATO-Europe and the Asian-Pacific area. On the other hand, the formulation of additional power centers in possession of a range of military capabilities associated with low to high-intensity conflict will have important consequences for all states, including the U.S.(9- 22) The reduction in personnel in the Army by the year 2000 will not only be a reflection of the previously mentioned politically generated budget reductions. The rapid advance of technology that will occur during the next decade will allow a more potent force with less personnel. There are innumerable areas that will be explored and enhanced by technologies of the next decade, providing the Army with increased projection of force with reduced manpower. Robotics, lasers, state-of-the-art materials, and smart munitions are just a few of the advances that the Army will use in the reduction of the force, while still maintaining the same or better capabilities of winning on the battlefield. One of the most exciting concepts that is just beginning to emerge is that of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). In the present day utilization of the AirLand Battle concept, intelligence acquisition is essential to the force commander so that he may detect larger forces, maneuver to avoid their surfaces, find the gaps and position for the first strike. In the twentyfirst century, the need for real time intelligence requirements will be critical. The most desirable will be the ability to point to the enemy location for a first strike capability. As a penetrating airborne collection system with loiter capability, the UAV is uniquely capable of conducting a detailed search for hard-to-find and non-emitting targets.(4:45) Although the Joint Services are in the development stages of the future UAV for the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, this concept will be used in concert with the new iteration of ground sensors. This combination of advanced technology will greatly enhance the field commanders capability to identify locations, surfaces and gaps of the future enemy. "The UAV will be small, require less personnel to operate and maintain, and cost much less than currently manned aerial vehicles."(3:26) One of the most exciting of the proposed UAVs is the Condor from Boeing. This aircraft has a wingspan of 200 feet, is powered by a 6 cylinder piston engine, flies at altitudes well above normal aircraft and its loiter time is days, instead of hours.(3:28) Additionally, there are several developments in the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV). These remotely operated platforms will be capable of a wide range of observation and weapon- like activities that will increase the intelligence gathering capabilities and security of the ground force commander. These future robotics of the "Army 2000" will help reduce the manpower requirements of the intelligence gathering units and provide real time intel with zero risk to ground personnel. Another concept that is presently in the inventory, but will become more influential on the future structure of the Army, is the laser. The directed energy weapons of the next decade will be utilized to spot and track targets from distant and safe locations. They will then pinpoint that location for aerial delivered smart munitions and land/aerial fired missiles. Additionally, weapons like the stingray, a low-energy weapons system designed to blind the optics of threat surveillance and target acquisition systems, will become prevalent on the battlefield and will be very difficult to counteract.(1:37) This technology is the prototype of future weapon systems that will provide the U.S. Army with "soft kill" capabilities on the future battlefield. These developments will reduce the number of forward observers, increase the lethality of the artillery firepower and protect against enemy threat acquisition. These gains in technology will reduce the manpower requirements for the "Army 2000". Not only will the soldiers of the future will be armed like a space warrior of television fame, but they will also look futuristic with a helmet made of high-impact-resistant Kevlar that covers the ears and provides a short range radio. They will have visors to protect eyes from lasers and be equipped to identify toxic chemicals. These soldiers will wear night vision, infrared lenses to see through the smoke and dark. Knowing where you are at all times will be as simple as checking the watch sized indicator on your uniform connected with the Global Position System that will pin-point your exact location. This will assist in night navigation. Hand held weapons will have self-contained rounds which will fire dart-like objects that will penetrate better than bullets. Shoulder-fired laser weapons will have the capability to destroy enemy equipment and the optical senses of their personnel. Chameleon-like clothing will be worn over lightweight shielding to protect against hostile fire/lasers.(5:21) All in all, the soldier of the future may resemble the Predator, in the movie of the same name starring Arnold Scwartzenegger. Just in these areas of robotics, lasers, and state-of-the art materials alone, the force requirements of the Army can be adjusted downward. These and future technological innovations will increase our capabilities to acquire real time intelligence, locate the enemy, bring firepower to the target and protect our soldiers while reducing the force structure. As you have witnessed, not only do the effects of the rapidly changing face of the Eastern European countries effect the budget and structure of the "Army 2000", so will the technological advancements have a tremendous effect. If the peace of Western civilization causes reductions in the Army's budget and that causes drastic changes in the structure of the next decade, how will this effect the doctrine of how to fight? Present day strategy is built around the AirLand Battle concept. How can this doctrinal concept meet the new strategies of the year 2000? The Army's doctrinal concept of AirLand Battle, which originated in the 1970's, is a well thought out and major building block of National Security Strategy. It is adaptable to training the force regardless of future dimensions of the Army; not constricted to a preordained set of strategic military plans; and the focus is on training leaders to think independently and utilize all sources available to operate effectively in the fog of war. AirLand Battle gives all Army leaders the exact guidance to "conduct campaigns and major operations and for fighting battles and engagements".(12:2) In fact, the doctrinal strategy of the United States Army, the AirLand Battle concept, is applicable in situations of low, medium or high intensity conflict. By utilizing historically proven principles of war such as mass, economy of force and maneuver, the U.S. Army can train to fight at any level of force structure and expect to win the next battle. This doctrinal concept is a way of thinking and acting in war, not rigidly specified steps that must be taken in order to ensure victory. History has given us many examples of strategy based upon rigid and conforming doctrine that has affected the outcome of many battles and wars. In World War I the Schlieffen Plan, imposed by the Chief of Staff of the German General Staff years before, conformed to one central axis. Another historical example is France's preparation for World War II and the rigidity of the Maginot Line. A modern day example is the Soviet's basic principle to attack with a totally destructive force, using massive firepower, followed by echelons of tanks and mechanized vehicles to weaken or break gaps in your positions. In opposition, the AirLand Battle doctrine allows the forces of the United States to operate from a small training/logistical base, utilizing the simple tenets of AirLand Battle. The strength of the AirLand Battle concept is being adaptable to situations and to the force structure of the Army. However, the bonding agent of this entire concept is the training of the leaders to think independently within the concepts of the higher command, utilizing all the assets on hand. These are very critical skills that are discussed in FM100-5, In the final analysis and once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence of their training, the capability of their equipment, the soundness of their combined arms doctrine and above all the quality of their leadership.(12:14). Throughout the entire thought process of the AirLand Battle, the independent thinking of the on site leaders, making decisions within the broad overall scope of the mission, is stressed. Of the four dynamics of combat, consisting of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership, "The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership".(12:13) Independent leadership is emphasized and essential in the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. In addition, the AirLand Battle doctrine strengthens the utilization of all available assets on the battlefield with it's close, deep and rear battle concepts. Not only is combined arms important to U.S. Army doctrine, but the use of all joint assets and the latest technology is strongly enforced. In the 21st century the "Army 2000" will be able to accomplish it's deep and rear battle missions with the enhancement of future technology. However well this doctrine has worked in the past and present, the Army cannot stand still and expect today's doctrine and strategy to function in the year 2000 without some fine tuning. In fact, the determination of military strategy is an ongoing process for the leadership of the Army. General Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, will be making a study of a proposed Army war-fighting doctrine this summer. The title of this re-tooled strategy is called AirLand Battle-Future (ALBF) and it will state that future engagements will be fought in much greater areas of responsibility (AOR's), at a much increased tempo of warfare and finally as stated earlier, fought with less and less troops.(1-25) The ALBF will still align itself with the AirLand Battle tenets and not depend on strength of numbers, but on initiative in the attack or even in the defense. The new and improved version of the AirLand Battle-Future will improve our capabilities by utilizing the latest technology developed by the year 2000. But with the advent of technology, changes are sure to follow. A smaller force of soldiers, using the most modern, technologically developed weapons, will radically change the structure of the present day Army. The present day concept of the Mechanized Division could change to resemble the Marine's MPF, with the total reliance on equipment found in POMCUS stock locations in Europe. The need for several of these divisions will not be realized. The tried and true pure infantry division will be totally cut from the force due to the lack of a mission. The highly mobile airborne, air assault and light divisions, increased in capability by the Air Force C-17 aircraft, will be the basic structure of the "Army 2000". The present structure of the Army division has been used throughout the last several wars, but could be changed to something similar to that of the Marine Corps. All support units may be stripped out of the divisions, leaving only the infantry. Support requirements will be placed at another level so that the CORPS level Commander can tailor his forces more readily.(1-25) The actual strength of the fighting force of these divisions will be reduced due to increased lethality of weapons, the use of robotics in the support channels and the increased capabilities of the lasers, UAV's and materials of the future. In the infantry brigades, the total strength could be reduced by one-third to one-half the present day numbers. Smaller units with maximized firepower, using long range intelligence gathering innovations, will be the standard force. The aviation brigades will be able to reduce both pilots and support personnel due to the technological advances of the aircraft and UAV's. No longer will a manned aircraft have to be sent forward of the FEBA to locate and call fire on enemy positions. UAV,s with their ability to avoid detection by radar, infrared, and optics, will replace many pilots and Forward Observers (FO). The technological advancement of aircraft, with the increased use of replacement of black boxes and fly-by-optics, will scale back the support required personnel. Robotics and prepackage classes of supply can eliminate large numbers of support personnel in the DISCOM elements. Robots and automated supply movement equipment can make the supply channels much more responsive. Even the artillery can increase their proficiency by use of robotics and smart fire and forget munitions. This in turn will reduce the overall signature of the aviation brigade, the division support units and the artillery on the battlefield, thus decreasing vulnerabilities in the rear battle area. Therefore, the division of the "Army 2000" could be scaled back to at least one-third of the present day size and still be effective. The AirLand Battle has served the Army structure well since it was initiated in the 1970's, so will the next generation of the AirLand Battle-Future equip our forces with the appropriate maneuver doctrine for it's structure. Over the next decade, the United States Army will be reduced in structure, equipment and personnel through the time- honored political process and the need to address internal social ills. The permanency of peace and the effect on the fight against the social ailments of this country will make this a continual process. Where it will stop won't be known for a long time. Weapons research, development and procurement will continually be scaled back in line with reduction in personnel. However, the progress of technology will assist in maintaining the combat strength of the U.S. Army during these reductions. "Technologically, it is possible that a few soldiers could have the same battlefield effect as a current brigade."(6-6) Even so, the question will be asked if we will be able to meet the commitments of the 21st century with the "Army 2000". The answer is, that in the continual evolution of the AirLand Battle doctrine, the strategy to fight and win, in any level of conflict, will be there. This is a military strategy built of the strength of its leaders and soldiers, on their ability to process information rapidly, act quickly and yet correctly. It is not based on inflexible, physical requirements, such as a large standing Army. The AirLand Battle of the future will allow the "Army 2000" to fight and win on the future battlefield. Bibliography 1.Alexander, John B.,US Army Ret., "Antimaterial Technology." Military Review,10(October 1989), 29-41. 2.Baker, Caleb, "AirLand Battle - Future."Army Times,March 12, 1990,p25. 3.Biang, Thomas R.,CPT(P),USA, "Stealth and the UAV."Army Aviation,39,January 31, 1990,28-30. 4.Bornick, Bruce, CPT(P), USA,"Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Support. "Military Review,8,44-49. 5.Church, George J., "How Much Is Too Much?" Times Magazine, February 12, 1990, 16-21. 6.Drew, Dennis M.,COL.,Snow, Donald M., Dr.,_Making Strategy, An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems. Maxewell AFB: Air University Press, 1988. 7.Lind, William S., Nightengale, Keith M., COL, USA, et al.,"The Changing Face Of War Into The Fourth Generation. "Military Review,10(October 1989),6. 8.Ludvigsen, Eric C., "Army Takes Brunt Of `91 Budget Cuts." Army Magazine,40(March 1990)14-26. 9.Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr.,"The Army as a Strategic Force in 90s and Beyond."Army Magazine,40(February 1990)20- 26. 10.Rose, Kenneth H., LTC, USA, "Robotics: It's Time To Get Off Drawing Boards into the Field."Army Magazine,40(February 1990)29. 11.Tyler, Patrick B., "Nunn Calls Defense Plan Flawed." The Washington Post, December 13, 1989, 1,8. 12.United States Army. US Army CGSC. Operations, FM 100-5. Leavenworth, May 1986.
