Training Infantry To Win In The Deadly Battlefield Of The Future AUTHOR Major Paul D. Refling, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TRAINING INFANTRY TO WIN IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE THESIS: All through the infantry training process, the Marine Corps must refocus and refine its practices if victory in battle is to be ensured and exploitation of its training weaknesses is to be avoided. THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY TRAINING: Individual training of infantry is conducted in fairly strict accordance with the Individual Training Skills Manual ("ITSM"). Such training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, School of Infan- tray and at the infantry units is generally excellent. The few areas in which improvement is required are better weapons cleaning practices, adequate ammunition allowances and mainte- nance of individual ITSM skills following SOI graduation. THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR SMALL UNIT INFANTRY TRAINING: Small infantry units, those below the Battalion level, are to be trained in accordance with the Marine Corps Combat Readiness System ("MCCRES"). In practice, however, several factors dilute the effectiveness of the standards represented by MCCRES. Per- sonnel turbulence, varying experience levels of junior leaders, small unit training preemption by larger unit exercises and the current Division training system's orders all combine to defeat the goals set forth by MCCRES and the orders therefrom. The solution to the problems presented is to return to a step- by step building block approach to training in stricter conformance with MCCRES' well-stated goals. THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR LARGE UNIT INFANTRY TRAINING: Larger units, Battalions and beyond, rely on large exercises to train. But, because the exercises neither require the making of difficult decisions nor the realistic expenditure of ammuni- tion, these exercises fall far short of their training potential. One must train to learn, not train to avoid learning until con- fronted with a real battle situation. THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR INFANTRY STAFF TRAINING: Like the larger units, Division staffs rely on large exercises for training. Similarly, these exercises fail to live up to their full learning potential. Staffs must avoid the temptation to take advantage of the "exercise-only" atmosphere and must, instead, move to the field and train in the field. TRAINING INFANTRY TO WIN IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: All through the infantry training process, the Marine Corps must refocus and refine its practices if victory on the battlefield is to be ensured and exploitation of its training weaknesses is to be avoided. I. The Problems and Solutions for Individual Infantry Training A. At the Marine Corps Recruit Depot B. At the School of Infantry C. At the Infantry Units II. The Problems and Solutions for Small Unit Infantry Training A. The Problems 1. The Problem of Personnel Turbulence 2. The Problem of Varying Experience Levels Among Junior Leaders 3. The Problem of Small Unit Training Preemption 4. The Problem of the Division Training System's Orders B. The Solution III. The Problems and Solutions for the Large Unit Infantry Training A. Failing to Make Hard Decisions and "Training to Learn" B. Practicing Unrealistic Ammunition Expenditures and "Training to Learn" IV. The Problems and Solutions for Staff Training: Training as We Will Fight TRAINING THE INFANTRY TO WIN IN THE DEADLY BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE INTRODUCTION The Marine Corps' sole reason for existence is to win bat- tles. From the perspective of a Marine whose occupational specialty is infantry, the chief vehicle through which the Corps attains this goal is training. Training in the Marine Corps can be broken down into four areas: (1) Individual training; (2) small unit training (Company and below); (3) large unit training (Battalion and above); and (4) staff training. The Corps espouses a logical building block approach to training. This approach is represented by two materials. First, individuals are trained to the standards set forth in the Indivi- dual Training Skills Manual ("ITSM"). Second, these individuals are integrated into small units which are trained to the standards of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System ("MCCRES"). The building block approach to training continues as these small units are integrated into larger units which conduct large field exercises. The exercises are conducted, not only to learn how to maneuver and fight, but to solve the additional problems of logistics, engineering and administration. Staff training seeks to meld these units into a synergistic whole for winning in battle. All through the training process, however, the Marine Corps commits errors through lack of focus on its goal--winnning in bat- tle. These errors, however small and insignificant, create gaps which, if exploited, could lead to our defeat. This paper will focus on finding some of the problems and on proposing workable solutions. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING Marines receive individual training at the Marine Corps Re- cruit Depots, at the School of Infantry and at the first infantry units to which the Marines are then assigned. 1. Training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depots The individual training received at the Marine Corps Recruit Depots is very good. While a Company Commander, and later, a Chief Instructor at the Infantry Training School, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, I observed that the Marines given into our care are almost universally motivated and eager to learn. The Marines are disciplined, hard-working and squared-away. They have an almost perfect base on which to build the knowledge necessary to be Infantry Marines. Despite this near perfect resource to train, I did observe one continued problem. Invariably, I would find part of the Com- pany trying to use unauthorized weapons cleaning methods and materi- als, from carburetor cleaner to Tide, from bleach to Easy-Off Oven Cleaner. When asked why, students would state that it was how their Drill Instructors had prepared them for final inspection. An overemphasis on spotlessly clean, overly dry weapons for final inspection has caused Drill Instructors to find an expedi- ent method of achieving the requested results. This practice, if not stopped, will not only harm the weapons themselves. It will place the lives of those using the weapons at risk in battle. The solution is to allow only authorized cleaning materials and methods to be used. The weapons should be inspected with an understanding of just how clean and oil-free they can be using only the materials and methods allowed. 2. Training at the School of Infantry As we follow the individual Marine to the School of Infantry, we will again find the training to be of good quality. The School of Infantry, or "SOI," graduates a Marine Infantryman who can ef- fectively employ his MOS weapon and who has been physically hard- ened by the strenuous outdoor training. The keys to SOI's success are: 1. ITSM which provides a level of skill for Marines to at- tain and an ammunition allowance with which to train; 2. The building block training approach, followed by both written and practical examinations, which assures that the stan- dards addressed by ITSM are met or exceeded; and 3. A long lead-time training schedule which allows the logistics, ranges and instructors to all come together in con- cert at the required time and place to cover the required objec- tives. These keys to success are followed by all the infantry, entry level schools. The individual technical skills of the Privates, PFCs, Lance Corporals and Second Lieutenants are uniformly very good. My experiences as a Platoon Commander and as a Company Commander bear out this conclusion. 3. Training at the Infantry Unit When a Marine joins his first infantry unit, is the know- ledge he receives in individual training built upon in a uniform, consistent and progressive manner? Unfortunately, I believe the answer is no for the following three reasons. The first problem is that an infantry unit's training allowance for ammunition does not support either the training or the testing of individual Marines to the ITSM standards. In the area of anti- tank weapons, for example, an individual must engage a series of moving and stationary targets with a sub-caliber LAAW or its up- dated successor. Obtaining six of eight hits with the sub-caliber device and one hit with a live LAAW qualifies the individual by ITSM standards. Even though all Marines are required to be trained to this standard, my Company's allowance for sub-caliber LAAWS was set by the Division at 128, enough only to test my thirteen- man assault section. The Division ammunition allocation thus eviscerates that Marine Corps order. If we believe the ITSM requirements are valid, then we must give the units the ammunition to both train and test to the standards demanded by ITSM. If the cost of ammunition is too great to test every year, then we must set up an alternative, systematic approach to test the individual Marine. One alterna- tive is to test at longer intervals. Another is to develop training devices that will train and test the Marine without the large ammunition expenditure. The second problem with training at the first infantry unit is that the current Marine Corps promotion system has no direct relation to the individual skills required by ITSM. For example, a Marine Infantryman assigned to duty outside his MOS is given no direct incentive to work on his MOS skills while in the unrelated billet. Thus, when he arrives back at an infantry unit, his indi- vidual skills have usually not kept pace with his current rank. One solution to this problem is to institute a system of practical exams, MOS specific, prior to each promotion. This not only gives Marines an incentive for continued MOS study, but provides better Marines back into the infantry units. The third problem is related to the second. The unit to which the individual Marine is assigned has no current requirement to test if all Marines can pass ITSM standards on a continuing basis. Therefore, in a battle for scarce time and resources, the individual training usually falls victim to unit training goals. The obvious error is that no unit is better than the sum of its individual Marines. A solution is to require units to requalify Marines up to ITSM standards on a recurring basis. This solution not only builds up the skills level of all individual Marines, but increases the total unit's skill level. The individual training received by Marines at the Depot, SOI and at the infantry units is well calculated to achieve the goal to win battles. We should, however, correct the weapons cleaning practices, provide ammunition allowances consistent with ITSM standards and assure that Infantrymen maintain ITSM skills acquired at the Depot and SOI. SMALL UNIT TRAINING Small units, for the purposes of this paper, are those units below the Battalion level. The current standards for training small units are contained in the MCCRES orders. If we take those standards as being fundamentally sound, are our current small units effectively trained for battle? I would say yes, but only marginally so. Personnel turbulence, the varying infantry experi- ence levels of junior leaders, small unit training preemption and division training errors all lead to this marginal level of training. 1. Personnel Turbulence The personnel turbulence at the squad and fire team level is critical. In order to be an effective unit, the squad or fire team must train as a unit and be treated as a unit. Personnel turbulence is best defined by the following illustration. Imagine a Battalion, the strength of which varies from week to week from three Companies to two Companies to even only one Company. The Battalion's effectiveness is severely ham- pered and the Regimental Commander who permits this would pro- bably be relieved. Yet, at the most inexperienced level of leadership, this attrition and flux in strength is almost always in effect. To illustrate the problem at the squad and fire team level, consider an average Rifle Company on a non-SOC unit deployment training schedule. By table of organization, the unit has 176 enlisted Marines. If the manning level by HQMC is 90%, the unit's actual strength is 158 Marines. These losses effectively reduce the thirteen-man squads to eleven-man squads. Those losses are further compounded by the Fleet Assistance Program ("FAP"). Since no Battalion Commander is going to send his unit diary clerk or motor transport mechanic to FAP, the Rifle Companies bear that burden. The average, resulting squad strength is now ten Marines. In addition, there are school quotas, leave and sickness which further deplete the original thirteen-man squad to a field strength of seven to nine Marines. This flux may be acceptable at the Company and Platoon levels. It is a serious impediment at the squad, and especially, at the fire team levels. 2. Junior Leaders' Varied Infantry Experience Levels Another training inhibitor is the experience levels of the junior leaders. At first blush, this is a questionable problem until you realize that anywhere from one-third to one-half of a typical SOI graduating class is assigned to non-FMF duty. Approximately half of a given Rifle Company's NCOs, while squared-away and intelligent, have never practiced their trade at the entry level. It is especially hard on the mortar and machine gun MOS's. These skills require large firing ranges and the actual weapons on which to practice. The ranges and weapons are unavailable except in FMF units. Thus, junior leaders--Corporals and Ser- geants--are often called upon to train and lead Marines whose MOS skill levels are greater than their own. This skill level deficiency causes not only training problems but undermines our entire leadership rationale. 3. Small Unit Training Preemption Another serious training problem at the small unit level is, for lack of a better term, small unit training preemption; that is, Division, Regiment and Battalion level exercises conducted without regard to the effect of such exercises on small unit training. To illustrate the problems presented by small unit training preemption, let us consider, in turn, both the Combined Arms Operations ("CAO") and the Combined Arms Exercises ("CAX"). These exericses were the largest and most visible ones during my tenure as a Company Commander while at the Second Marine Division. These exericses are undoubtedly important at the large unit level; they do, however, have serious consequences at the small unit level. The typical CAO exercise lasts a week or more. The time is divided into several 36 to 48 hour mini-exercises. The time alloted to the small units inbetween the mini-exercises is devoted to force list changes, changes in transportation modes and large geographical movements. The first mini-exercise is usually a good learning experience at all levels. This is because adequate time has been allocated to issue orders, carry out defensive/offensive engineering and carry out reconnaissance. Small unit training preemption begins with the second and subsequent exercises. These exercises usually follow the preceding exercise by twelve hour breaks. During this time at the higher levels, the Regiment and Battalion staffs are brought together, debriefed and a new operation order is issued. This procedure calls for the Regiment and the Battalions to think of solutions, write frag orders and then issue orders to the units below. At the Company level, small unit training preemption evolves rapidly. The first two hours are spent getting the Company assem- bled and moved to a new assembly area. The third hour is usually spent distributing or redistributing ammunition, chow and water. The next six to seven hours are spent cleaning weapons, eating and sleeping. The sleep is particularly important because the operations plans have kept the Company moving all during the first 48 hour mini-exercise. The Battalion frag order is usually issued no sooner than one to two hours prior to Start-Ex. If you have a smart Company Com- mander, he can formulate a plan, do a map reconnaissance and write a frag order while driving back to the assembly area. This acti- vity leaves an hour, usually less, for the Company Commander to issue his order to his Platoon Commanders. The Platoon Comman- ders, Squad Leaders and Fire Team Leaders usually have hardly enough time to get their Marines ready to move out much less to issue orders. This exercise has, obviously, less than optimal training value for the small units. The value is less than optimal because the junior leaders are unable to follow the basic troop learning steps. Marines are thrown into the back of darkened AAVs, not knowing the enemy situation, their own mission or their own concept of operations. A typical CAX is set up as a fire support planning and fire support execution exercise at the Battalion level. Prior to the exercise itself, small unit live fire training is available. This training is excellent, especially the 400 series of ranges. But, does the Battalion exercise itself build on and add to the small unit's tactical abilities? The question is best an- swered through the eyes of a Corporal. First, the Corporal sees his Company go into the attack up a valley with no flank security and with no attempt to secure the obvious dominating high ground on either flank. The Corporal's next impression is of unlimited fire support to cover his advance and to clear his assigned objectives. The Corporal then digs in a linear defense on the valley floor against a mechanized enemy counterattack. He later fires his final protective fires to defeat the enemy. The Corporal has a vivid impression as he looks down on an enemy strong point that is clearly dominated by the high ground of which he is in possession. Yet, he eagerly assaults it with his clear firepower superiority. The third morning, the Corporal is again in a mostly linear defense and he again fires a final protective fire to defeat the enemy mechanized attack. Clearly, these are not the lessons the Marine Corps wants to teach small units. Yet, the discussion of both CAO and CAX illustrates that neither helps small unit training. To the con- trary, the experiences hurt it by providing bad examples to fol- low in the future. 4. Division Training System The final small unit training problem consists of the division training system itself. First, the typical division training order is not results-oriented. It does not give ammunition, live fire ranges and instructional packages and then demand results in ac- cordance with ITSM or MCCRES orders. Instead, the typical division training order commonly con- tains statements such as, "50% of your training must be at night," or "each Marine is to receive two hours of dining facility appre- ciation per quarter." Second, the division training system provides ineffectual inspections. The training inspection team ordinarily consists of a Master Sergeant and his clerk. They inspect the Company's training records. They do not inspect the training; they do not inspect the results of the training. They do not have any standards with which to compare the training which they should observe. Third, the division training system fails to require that each fire team, squad, platoon and company to pass a separate MCCRES test on its readiness. This clearly should be required in order to insure victory in battle. The above discussion of problems with small unit infantry training demonstrates amply my opinion that the training is replete with errors. These errors in training and logistics might easily be exploited and result in our defeat. The problems associated with personnel turbulence, experi- ence levels, small unit training preemption and the division training system can be addressed by returning to a step-by-step, building block approach to training. I propose just such an approach in the following four steps, the end result of which is a new, division-wide, deployment training cycle. The first step is to take the current Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System, from fire team through Battalion, and determine how long a particular event should take. Assume that the time required to train and to test a fire team to MCCRES standards is one month. When this planning sequence is repeated for each larger unit up to the Battalion level, it results in a Battalion training cycle. The numbers in the graph below are less important than is my proposal that the training of each larger unit will not start until the smaller units have completed their training. This will result in solving small unit training preemption. Click here to view image The second step to more effective small unit training is to cut down on personnel turbulence. Marines should only be trans- ferred in or out of a unit prior to the unit's starting its train- ing schedule. Assume this step adds three months to the original Battalion training schedule and the cycle now looks like this: Click here to view image Furthermore, individual schools should take place only during the receive and detach personnel portion of the cycle. Assume a peri- od of time sufficient to allow individual ITSM refresher train- ing, rifle range and individual NBC refresher training. The train- ing cycle now is: Click here to view image If you add a six-month deployment to the cycle, it becomes a training deployment cycle. A modified version of this system is, in fact, currently being used for the MEU-SOC Battalions. If this system were applied Division-wide, the results will be better training, reduced personnel turbulence and better range/ logistics utilizations. The third step to better small unit training is to make large unit exercises conform more to reality. If, in the CAX scenario mentioned earlier, you would not defend against a mechanized attack on the valley floor in a linear defense, then do not practice doing it in training. A fourth step to improved small unit training is to have the division training order reinforce the current ITSM and MCCRES orders by providing ammunition, firing ranges and training evalu- tions to meet the ITSM and MCCRES orders. Set your training standards for the most difficult mission and then train to meet them. If you want improved training then make the additions, not to the individual unit training, but to the Marine Corps as a whole by changes to the basic orders of ITSM and MCCRES. In this way, improvements will be felt throughout the Marine Corps. LARGE UNIT EXERCISES Are large unit exercises, as currently practiced, effective for training to win in battle? My answer is no! The problem is not that the Battalions cannot maneuver; the problem is not that the Regiments cannot issue proper orders and have them carried out. The problem is that we do not practice the "too-hard-to-do" things. 1. Failing to Make Hard Decisions At the large unit level, exercises which entail difficult decisions are avoided. To illustrate, imagine an exercise which focuses on a mass chemical attack. Such an exercise would force the Commander to decided whether to (a) reembark his force, decontaminating it onboard ship or (b) continue the attack, set- ting up decontamination sites for Regimental-sized units. A mass chemical attack presents an opportunity to practice the art of making hard decisions, an opportunity we should never pass up. I propose to solve this training deficiency by "training to learn." What I propose is not just to maneuver units on the battlefield but to also solve tactical problems identified prior to the exercise. "Training to learn" can be demonstrated by returning to our mass chemical attack illustration. First, a large scale chemical attack can be made as a subproblem for a Division landing exercise. The engineers will build mock-ups of the Frog missile on the Dragon Wagon. The four Transporter Erector Launcher ("TEL") mock-ups are then given to the Op For Commander. He may position them wherever he decides. But, if he fires them, they obviously must be within their estimated range of 70 kilome- ters. This real-life tactical problem gives everyone problems to solve prior to the exercise. The Battalions and Regiments would be armed with knowledge of the enemy's capabilities. They would be required, under such circumstances, to not only practice the usual individual NBC protective measures, but to also study and solve the problem of how to implement large scale decontamina- tion procedures in a time sensitve environment. Failing to do so would be accompanied by large scale losses. This exercise provides the Division Commander with difficul- ties only someone at his level can solve. He would decide whether the landing be made as scheduled or whether to wait until the Air/Navy/Recon has the TELs targeted and destroyed. The scenario also drives the Navy to ponder and perhaps test a plan to do either a mass evaucation/decontamination exercise or to assist the Division with decontamination on the beach. The proposed exercise also challenges the reconnaissance assets--Air, Navy, Recon and national assets--to do a more thorough and realistic job. If Generals and Admirals are holding up the landing exercise because of an inability to find the high value target and destroy it, then the training exercise has come close to providing a realistic environment and to providing ample practice at making hard decisions. 2. Practicing Unrealistic Ammunition Expenditures The typical exercise, both in the field and in war games, does not restrict the amount of ammunition we expend. We prac- tice by firing on every target we see, think we see or have an inclination of seeing. With unlimited assets, it would be foolish to act otherwise. What Commanders really need to practice is not how to call fire missions but how to apply scarce and valuable firepower assets to critical battle areas in order to achieve victory. I again propose a "training to learn" solution to this problem. The solution is easy and realistic. At the beginning of each exercise, start with a basic allowance of ammunition. If a Commander chooses to fire his whole allowance prior to H-hour, that is his call. He will, however, receive no more until the next day. The losses he suffers are his problem. After a few such days, Commanders would become expert at fire- support allocation. STAFF TRAINING Is current staff training effective and will it enable the Marine Corps to win on the battlefield of the future? The cur- rent system is effective in issuing operations orders which are correctly formatted. It is effective in delivering food, water and medical care in field exercises. But, are current staffs trained to work and plan in the mobile, flexible and deadly battlefields of the future? My answer is no and the reason for my answer is simple: We will fight like we train. To illustrate how we do train, walk through a typical exer- cise. The staff planning begins months in advance of the exer- cise. The operations orders are typed, prepared and distributed. Good staff planning starts to fall apart. Either the exercise headquarters are prestaged in the field or, even worse, are not sent to the field. If the headquarters does go to the field, it is common for it not to move while in the field. Furthermore, the staff does not try to issue new orders or make major changes to orders al- ready written once they are in the field. While in the field, neither active nor passive defense mea- sures for the headquarters itself are practiced. When was the last time you saw a Division headquarters in the field where everyone had either a fighting hole or bunker in which to work or just survive in the event of enemy fire? In sum, either these examples or--better yet--your own experi- ences lead to the conclusion that we do not train as we will fight. If our observations are correct and staff training is ineffective, then how can we change it? The solution is to train. It does require large amounts of hard work and a new set of priorities. If we want to train our staffs to be mobile, flexible and survivable, we must train them to be that way. I propose we take a division staff to the field for one month. During that time, require the staff to displace every two days. After each displacement, inspect the new headquarters area to ensure each Marine has a protected position, bunker or fighting hole from which to carry out his tasks. During this month, require the staff to plan, type, pre- pare and distribute operations orders and overlays. At the end of this training period, the staff will be mobile, flexible and survivable. It would have found solutions to the problems of typing, preparing and distributing operations orders and overlays while in the field environment. Finally, the staff will have much less hesitancy in asking Regiments and Battalions to follow its example to train for solving the hard problems. CONCLUSION Winning in battle is the Marine Corps' only reason for exis- tence. Each and every Marine must rededicate himself to that goal and make it his first priority. Training, both realistic and difficult, is the vehicle by which victory will come. To be true to our heritage, we must train each day as if the battle will be tomorrow, for who can foresee when the next Pearl Harbor or Inchon will occur? BIBLIOGRAPHY Arnim, R. von, Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal, Hudson Kimberly Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo., 1897. Collins, Arthur S., Jr., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.), Common Sense Training, Presidio Press, Novato, Ca., 1981. English, John A., On Infantry, Praeger, New York, 1984. Faucitt, William, Regulations for the Prussian Infantry, Green- wood, _______________ , 1968. Liddell Hart, Basil H., A Science of Infantry Tactics, Simpli- fied, William Clowes, London, 1926. Morrison, John Frank, Training Infantry, U.S. Cavalry Ass., Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1914. Rommel, Erwin, Field Marshal, Attacks, Athena Press, Inc., Vienna, Va., 1979. Ross, Steven T., From Flint Lock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics 1740-1866, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, Rutherford, NJ, 1979. Verdy du Vernois, Julius A.F.W. von, Studies in the Leading of Troops, Hudson Press, Kansas City, Mo., 1906.
