The MAGTF's Approach To Logistics In Maneuver Warfare AUTHOR Major Paul J. Pisano, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER WARFARE THESIS: Unless the MAGTF makes some major adjustments in its approach to logistics/CSS operations, the logistics wars that have plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style of warfare. DATA: The ability of an army to sustain itself has always been a problem since they took to the field to fight their enemies. Contributing to this problem is the lack of transportation, the ability to procure the needed amount of supplies to sustain troops, the affects of Clausewitzian friction on logistics/CSS operations, the problem of high consumption rates in repairs parts, and their affect on maintenance production. The fathers of kesselschlacht and blitzkrieg developed a radical doctrine that was logistics intensive, but didn't take into account the logistics wars past armies had endured when developing and prosecuting this doctrine. Consequently, logistics and all of its intricacies played a major role in the failure of blitzkrieg. The MAGTF is in the unique position of learning to cope with the logistics wars for they will never eliminate them, but they have the chance to minimize their affect on the MAGTF'S style of maneuver warfare. CONCLUSION: The MAGTF can minimize the affects of the logistics wars by divorcing the traditional approach to logistics and adopting a multi-dimensional approach to logistics operations. THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER THESIS: Unless the MAGTF makes some major adjustments in its approach to logistics/CSS operations, the logistics wars that have plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style of warfare. I. Historical problems of logistics A. Sustainment B. Transportation C. Clausewitzian factor of friction II. Historical case study A. Kesselschlacht B. Blitzkrieg III. MAGTF'S problems A. Sustainment routine B. Transportation limitations C. Maintenance and supply constraints D. Clausewitzian friction IV. MAGTF'S approach to the logistics problems A. Doctrinal approach B. Multi-dimensional approach C. Solutions THE MAGTF'S APPROACH TO LOGISTICS IN MANEUVER WARFARE Logistics as defined by Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 "is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces". It encompasses the total scope of activity needed to form. equip, sustain. move. engage, disengage, and disestablish military forces. "Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics".1 The above definitions suggest that logisticians should have no difficulties sustaining a maneuver style of warfare. A style which depends upon operational speed, tactical mobility, flexibility, an expanded battlefield, the avoidance of surfaces, and the exploitation of gaps regardless of time and space".2 Yet our military forces have a hellish time trying to provide 3000 calories per day to Marines and Soldiers in uncomplicated attrition warfare, let alone a style of warfare whose philosophy is to "exploit fleeting opportunities".3 The above difficulty is nothing new. Armies have fought this logistics' war since they took to the battlefield. Yet with historical accounts of past armies, and the technological advances, advantages available to present day military forces, our armed 1 George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics, (Washington D. C: National Defense University Press, 1986), p. XVIII 2 MCCDC, USMC, Ground Combat Operations, OH 6-1 (Quantico, 1988), pp. 1-5 - 1-7 3 MCCDC, USMC, Warfighting, FMFM 1 (Quantico, 1989), p. 31 forces still find it difficult, and sometimes impossible to sustain their forces in combat operations. The question of military forces being bound by the "umbilical cord of supply"4, however, is not the one that is of issue. For past armies, and future armies alike will always be tied to that umbilical cord. By what degree, however will our military forces be affected by the proverbial tail of logistics in the conduction of maneuver warfare is the question that should be asked. For unless the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) makes some_major adjustments in its approach to logistics/combat services support (CSS) operations, the logistics wars that have plagued armies of the past regardless of the style of warfare will burden the MAGTF of the 90's in their execution of a maneuver style of warfare. To begin with a distinction must be made between the role of logistics on the three levels of war, and its impact on the MAGTF. At the strategic level of war, logistics is concerned with the national assets available to the military forces. For instance, the availability of raw materials; the capacity to process those materials into the means of war via the industrial output capability of this nation. Strategic level logistics also concerns itself with those agencies that provide strategic mobility, such as Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to the operating forces, and their materials to the theater of operations. 4 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, 10th ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 57 It also concerns itself with the allocation of resources to the military services via agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The MAGTF has little, if any, control of logistics at the strategic level of war. (Most decisions at the strategic level are made by senior government officials.) The Marine Corps like its sister services, submits its requirements to the various national agencies for its logistics support.5 Logistics at the operational level of war is both an art, and a science. For it involves planning, the science of logistics, and timing, the art of logistics -- the timing of logistics is critical when supporting the tactical level of war.6 It also includes inter and intra theater logistics concepts such as coordinating Host Nation Support (HNS), Inter-service support agreements (ISSAs), and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). Some of the many logistics responsibilities in which the CINC has purview include transportation, air and water facilities, civil engineering support, and procurement planning The MAGTF'S role with logistics at the operational level of war is situational dependent. For instance, if the MAGTF commander's role is that of the CINC, or JTF Commander, the MAGTF commander will be responsible for the logistics pipeline to the theater or area of responsibility (AOR). If the he fills the role 5 See chapter 3, "Logistics in the National Defense", for a detailed explanation. 6 See chapter 9, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941", for the affects of poor logistics timing at the operational and tactical levels of war. of the Ground Component Commander (GCC), his purview of logistics will encompass all ground forces in the AOR. However, if the commander's role is that of service component commander, he will rely upon established ISSAs, MOUs, and his organic capabilities, which for the MAGTF is thirty to sixty days. Logistics at the tactical level of war is also known as CSS. Logistics at the tactical level is concerned with sustaining forces in combat. It deals with the fueling, arming, and maintaining of troops and machines. Tactical logistics involves the actual CSS functions with immediately or imminently available usually resident in the combat trains.7 At this level, the MAGTF commander's concerns are his units' organic assets, and his logistics capabilities: supplies, equipment and services for the Marines, and the tactical timing of CSS. Although strategic level logistics provides the means to war. It is the operational and tactical levels of logistics that will affect the MAGTF'S ability to prosecute maneuver warfare. "The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around".8 The above statement depicts the sustainment problems that have always plagued armies. In fact, 7 MCCDC, USMC, Campaigning, FMFM 1-1 (Quantico, 1990), p. 78 8 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart, tr. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), p. 328 when one examines the means and methods of providing CSS to the MAGTF, one sees them fighting the same logistics' wars past armies have fought. These `wars' will affect the MAGTF'S ability to exploit those fleeting opportunities. To further illustrate these logistics wars an examination of the historical problems in logistics is in order. Whether or not the logistician plans to use horse drawn wagons, motor driven vehicles, or high capacity, high speed cargo jets, providing sustainment will always be a constant battle. The logistics trains or field trains' concept of sustainment, for instance, dates back to Pre-Napoleonic warfare. And except for the technological difference in equipment and transportation, it still practiced today by the MAGTF and other military organizations. Although there is some merit to the above mentioned system, there are some inherent difficulties which past armies have experienced as well as the MAGTF. For example, adequate amounts of fuel to support maneuver whether it is fodder or petrol. Timely maintenance production: whether it's replacing a wooden wagon wheel, or a sophisticated tank track; adequate repair parts to support the above and other types of maintenance. And adequate transportation assets: whether it is horse drawn or motor driven - - there is never enough. That the present logistics' wars stem from historical approaches to sustainment is no coincidence. There is no simple method of providing sustainment. Another historical problem that continues to stymie logistics/CSS operations is the state of main supply routes (MSRs). As recent as World War II, unimproved roads used as MSRs were the standard in rural and isolated areas as well as secondary and tertiary roads. A problem not in itself; however, as weather patterns changed with the various seasons, so did the conditions of the roads. During the rainy season, for instance, roads became untrafficable quagmires.9 And more often than not, trucks carrying supplies never reached their destinations: In the autumn of 1941, armored spare parts were scarce in the Russian theater. The supply lines were over-extended at the time the muddy season set in. Most roads in Russia became impassable, and truck columns were not able to move up armored spare parts, and other supplies.10 The MAGTF seldom experiences the likes of the above in present day exercises. However, with emphasis placed on low intensity conflict (LIC) in third world countries, the MAGTF may experience similar difficulties in overcoming untrafficable roads as did the Germans in operation Barbarossa. The last historical logistics' problem for discussion obstructs logistics', and tactical operations as well: the Clausewitzian factor of friction. "As long as we have no personal knowledge of war, we cannot conceive where the difficulties lie. . . everything is so simple in war, but the simplest thing 9 See chapter 9, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941", for detailed explanation. 10 German Tank Maintenance in World War II (Washington D. C: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), p. 23 is difficult".11 So as in the Russian campaign, the simplest task of moving supplies from the source in theater to the front became impossible because simple factors like the affects of inclement weather on unimproved roads were not expected, and not fully considered. As one can see the above logistics support problems have stymied tactical operations from Wallenstein to the present. Whether or not these problems can be eliminated with current technology is rather doubtful because modern technology requires sophisticated support which only compounds the above problems. However, this isn't the issue to consider. Instead the discussion will focus upon logistics in maneuver warfare. And since maneuver warfare is in its infancy in the Marine Corps, the opportunity to develop an approach to CSS that is in consonance with maneuver warfare at the operational and tactical levels of war is prime. For the MAGTF'S present approach to logistics/CSS is not compatible with this style of warfare. To do this, an examination of the manner in which past armies have managed -- if they were capable of managing -- the above logistics problems when they executed a maneuver style of warfare. The application of the above lessons to present operations will not eliminate the logistics' wars the MAGTF has to endure. However, the lessons will provide knowledge which in turn will minimize the impact of the above constraints caused by these wars when MAGTF 11 Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, tr. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington D. C: Combat Force Press, 1953), p. 53 executes its maneuver style of warfare. There are several historical examples one could glean data which may identify, and perhaps minimize the aforementioned logistics problems in the operational and tactical levels of war. However, German kesselschlacht, and blitzkrieg doctrine will be examined. For the Marine Corps' style of maneuver warfare is based on the above ideology. And the German example offers some excellent illustrations of logistics miscalculations which may serve as a platform to re-evaluate the MAGTF'S approach to logistics and CSS operations. Kesselschlacht -- the art of encircling the enemy -- was developed by Von Moltke circa 1866-1870, and was the prelude to blitzkrieg doctrine.12 In his issuance of The Regulations for the Higher Troops Commanders, Von Moltke stressed deep encirclements. He did not mention anything about logistics support: He warned against the futility of frontal attacks, and urged whenever possible that Prussian troops should attack the flanks of the enemy position. The Regulation stressed movement to get better firing advantage; and flanking became a key element in Prussian doctrine.13 Von Moltke was successful in the conduct of both the 1866, and the 1870 campaigns against the Austrians, and French respectively. 12 See chapter 1, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941", for a more detailed account. 13 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p. 6 However, it was during these campaigns that he realized his "army's logistical limits, and how those limits might govern the success or failure of the kesselschlacht doctrine for the future".14 For instance, the logistics problem Von Moltke encountered -- maintaining a line of communication (LOC) __ stemmed from incompatible transportation: steam driven trains, and horse drawn wagons. At the operational level, the trains could push supplies as far as the rail system allowed. However, the rail system did not go to the front. Instead, the supplies were transferred from the railhead to horse drawn wagon trains which were supposed to deliver the supplies to the front. And for the most part they did. The lack of speed inherent to horse drawn wagon technology, however, created bottlenecks at the railhead which reduced the flow of supplies to the front. Such was the case in "1866 when supplies had been rushed to the railhead in such abundance that they quite overwhelmed the capacity of the old-fashioned horse- drawn wagons to move them quickly to where the marching armies needed them".15 The obvious solution to the above problem was to procure more transportation assets to support railhead operations. However, this only compounded the problem because additional horses and wagons demanded more logistics support: fuel and maintenance. Additionally, the technology of the time did not provide the speed 14 Addington, p. 9 15 Addington, p. 9 needed to support kesselschlacht doctrine. The quandary that Von Moltke found himself in caused him to have a better appreciation for logistics. Accordingly, "the 1866 and 1870 campaigns left Von Moltke with an enlarged understanding of the relatively short striking range, the limited endurance, the logistical inflexibility of the German Army beyond the railhead, and the need to tailor doctrine and strategy to logistical limitations".16 An interesting parallel to the above is the breakout at Normandy during Operation Overlord. During the lodgement phase of the operation, there was a massive build-up of supplies on the coast. Adequate in quantities, these supplies were to sustain the operation during the breakout. So the allies went racing across France in pursuit of their enemy. However, they encountered many obstacles in their logistics operations. The major one being the large amount of time trucking units required to complete round trips between Normandy depots and front-line units. As a result, logistical support became more frantic in nature, "the needs of the combat forces being met almost wholly on a hand-to-mouth basis".17 The above was a contributing factor in the eventual decision to slow the pace of operations. In blitzkrieg doctrine the concept of kesselschlacht is applied to mechanized and motorized forces. A formal definition 16 Addington, p. 10 17 Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World War II, Logistical Support of the Armies, (Washington D. C: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970) pp. 489-490 that grasps the concept of blitzkrieg can be found in the American Heritage Desk Dictionary: "Blitzkrieg is any swift, concerted effort". Concerted effort means all elements -- including the logistics arm -- not just traditional maneuver elements. And this is where the Germans made their mistake: when they didn't consider logistics operations as an equal arm to maneuver at both the operational and tactical levels of war. Guderian, the father of blitzkrieg, conceived of the Panzer Division. "It was an armored-mechanized, motorized task force, one in which mobile infantry, artillery, engineers, and supply units were combined with a brigade of tanks in order to allow the tanks to fight with full effect".18 "He was thinking of breakthroughs and deep strategic penetrations unhindered by logistical limits of the past".19 By the eve of World War II, the German concept of blitzkrieg doctrine centered around "fast moving and long range armored and motorized units which would spearhead the attack, breakthrough the enemy's front and move to counter the encirclement of escape, and sever his communications"20-- similar to the philosophy of the new Marine Corps doctrine. 18 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 164 19 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971) , p. 34 20 Addington, p. 42 There was little, if any, mention of logistics operations during the development of this doctrine. Accordingly, the Germans were to rely upon the sustainment system of the past with current technology. They believed that motor-driven transportation would eliminate the bottlenecks at the railroad stations created by archaic modes of transportation. The Germans didn't take into account the effects of new technology on their logistics operations. For instance, the maintenance and fuel requirements of tracked and wheeled vehicles, the effects of poor roads, and other Clausewitzian factors that affect all operations. During the initial stages of the war the Germans did not come to this realization for their prosecution of blitzkrieg proved to be successful in several of their campaigns. Most notable were the Poland and French campaigns. Not to say the Germans didn't run into logistics problems during these campaigns, for they did. "However, the Germans were able to overcome their logistical constraints because of the ideal conditions of weather, roads, rail and range".21 The Germans travelled relatively short distances during the initial stages of the war. In contrast to the above, however, the Germans were not able to overcome the historical logistics problems they encountered in Operation Barbarossa. In fact the largest single military operation of all time, proved to be such a logistical nightmare 21 Addington, p. 173 that it "staggered the imagination".22 For instance, in addition to the historical logistics' problems which plagued the German army during the above campaign, performing additional tasks such as converting rail from Russian to German size track required additional logistics efforts not fully considered prior to the campaign. The affects weather had on both the scarce unimproved road network, and transportation assets: both horse, and motor driven. And the fact the Germans couldn't get winter clothing to their troops were symptoms of their poor logistics network. The fact they "did not possess the industry nor manpower for a prolonged contest",23 also contributed to the logistics failure of the operation. It must be noted that limited industrial output was first experienced in the French campaign where production in motor transport, and spare parts could not keep pace with blitz doctrine. The Germans didn't experience the full effects of limited industrial output until the Russian campaign, however. There were more significant factors which caused the Germans to lose in Russia as well as the war. For instance, their lack of strategic depth, and of course Hitler. However, logistics was a contributing factor for their failure at the operational, and tactical levels of war. 22 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, 10th ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 175 23 Larry H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971) p. 182 What was the nature of their logistics' problems ? As stated earlier in the paper, one of the difficulties was they failed to recognize, and incorporate the logistics' arm into their development of blitzkrieg. Although it's implied that Guderian was concerned about logistics, -- supply units were part of his Panzer Division -- there is no indication that he gave any new thought to logistics at the operational level -- the pipeline from the source of supply in theater to front-line units. Instead, the Germans subordinated logistics to maneuver, and never shifted their focus of effort to logistics. Accordingly, when the Panzer divisions depleted their supplies, they were forced to stop their pursuit of the Russians. Subsequently, the Russians were able to avoid the encirclement at the critical juncture of the battle, and escape further into their homeland. The Germans did achieve some tactical victories; however, these victories did nothing except prolong the inevitable. Although the above campaign was both a logistical and operational failure, the doctrine of kesselschlacht, and blitzkrieg must not be judged by the logistical implications of Barbarossa. For as mentioned the Germans did achieve operational and tactical success during their prosecution of blitz. However the Germans failed to realize that the art of sustainment requires the same effort as the art of executing tactics. For if the Germans applied blitzkrieg philosophy to their sustainment operations at the operational level of war, they might not have traveled any great distances, but they would have minimized the logistics' war of sustainment. The above describes some of the reasons the Germans were not capable of sustaining themselves during the prosecution of their Blitzkrieg doctrine. The thought that comes to mind is the commonalty of the German's and MAGTF'S difficulties. For instance, there is a transportation shortage in the MAGTF which will affect the ability to sustain their employment at the operational, and tactical levels of war. "A comparative analysis of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) lift capabilities and lift requirements indicates that there is a substantial shortage in medium and heavy motor transport assets to support maneuver combat units in a sustained mid-intensity conflict, unless major augmentation is received from outside sources".24 Figure 1 further illustrates this. Click here to view image It's true the MAGTF has an advantage over the Germans in that the MAGTF has two available methods of aerial delivery in addition to ground transportation: (1), fixed wing air delivery, and (2), 24 LtCol Robert L. Bailey and Maj Leslie Stein, "Transporting the Marine Corps into the Future", Marine Corps Gazette, 73 (October 1989), 60. 25 Bailey and Stein, p. 60 external helicopter resupply.26 Aerial delivery,however, is not a dependable means of transportation for it is weather dependent. Besides fixed wing air delivery is dependent upon limited airplanes such as the C-130 and the C-141 which will be in high demand for logistics at the operational level during combat operations. The helicopters could make up the difference depicted in figure 1, however, one can't rely upon them as a primary means of transportation for providing logistics support. The reasons for this is the external factors that dictate the use of them in the logistic support role such as the superiority in the air, the weather, and the maintenance requirements. The functional areas of maintenance and supply offers another similarity between the German army, and the MAGTF. Unlike the German army who could not keep up with their maintenance because of fast paced operations: a la blitzkrieg, or mismanaged spare parts' production and distribution; the MAGTF imposes on themselves its own maintenance and supply constraints. To begin with, one has to accept the fact that the MAGTF will never win the maintenance war. Equipment is going to break whether or not it wears out, or becomes a casualty of battle. And broken equipment will affect tactical speed, a necessity in maneuver 26 The Germans did use the Luftwaffe for aerial resupply, but unlike our concept of it the Luftwaffe needed a runway to land their planes to deliver their supplies. See Chapter 8, "The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941", for further discussion warfare. Therefore, the goal of maintenance production must be to minimize the affects of broken equipment on combat operations. However the practices that govern maintenance production are not in consonance with the flavor of maneuver warfare. For instance, maintenance production in the MAGTF requires that repairs be classified into one of three categories: organizational (user level), direct support (intermediate level), and depot level repairs. Each category has its own maintenance tasks, yet some tasks overlap one another. However, all repairs have to fixed by the appropriate level technician. Therefore, Marines who are potentially capable of conducting the repairs on their unit's equipment cannot because of inflexible procedures. This in turn imposes logistics constraints on the maneuver element. Marines at the user level, for instance, can't ignore these practices because the three categories of maintenance require different manuals and tools not available to all maintenance personnel. So if equipment breaks, and its beyond the prescribed level of maintenance, it must be evacuated to the rear for repairs. Both the inability to repair, and the evacuation process become a logistical burden in combat operations. It also becomes a time consuming process not in consonance, as stated, with the idealogy of maneuver warfare -- broken equipment is pushed rearward. Couple the above with inadequate amounts of critical repair parts and you have a logistics' war that will cripple a unit, and disrupt the operational tempo. "One of the biggest problems facing Marine Corps' repairmen and technicians today is a lack of a ready supply of repair parts at the organizational level".27 Whenever a technician requires repairs parts, he submits requisitions to a source of supply outside his unit. The using unit is not allowed to hold any A-stocks of critical repair parts because of superfluous regulations. Like evacuating equipment to the rear, units requiring critical repairs parts have to push rearward, instead of forward for support. This negates the forward push concept of logistics which is required to support maneuver warfare. The above mentioned constraints are of a physical nature: bound by the equipment and materials of war. There is another constraint that does more to inhibit present day logistics/CSS operations that the aforementioned physical constraints -- that of mental constraints, attitude, the psychological umbilical cord to consumptions rates. Although logisticians are probably the most realistic planners in the MAGTF, they are at times slaves to the consumptions rates and tables. Day of supply (DOS), for instance, is a planning factor that contains a quantity of supplies including ammunition. Accordingly, most of their plans focus upon providing DOSs to units who expend their allotted supplies on a schedule. And if war was perfect, this system would be an efficient one. However, war is chaotic and inefficient, and maneuver elements may need more than the prescribed DOS to execute their mission. Therefore, rather than stopping the war with the phrase, I can't 27 Capt Peter R. Violette, "Critical Repair Parts for Maneuver Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (February 1990), 26. support them, logisticians are going to have to change their way of thinking. Logisticians, first of all, must look beyond the horizon of consumption rates and tables by placing these rates in proper perspective. For instance, the DOS concept is critical at the operational level of war where the supply pipeline from strategic, and/or inter-theater sources are required for intra-theater support. It is inflexible at the tactical level of war because maneuver elements may require more than the prescribed DOS. Logisticians must also understand the difference between the focus of effort and priority of effort at the tactical level when providing CSS to the MAGTF. The focus of effort infers that the main effort will be the unit the MAGTF commander designates. Accordingly, they become the priority of effort for logistics support operations. The main effort may change as the battlefield takes shape according to the will of MAGTF commander. So will the priority of support. If this means taking supplies from another unit then so be it. The MAGTF commander makes this decision when he re-designates the main effort. Therefore, the logistician provides the required support, and if necessary re-evaluates the re-order point (ROP) for sustainment at the operational level. Thus far the discussion has centered around the historical constraints of logistics, some self imposed constraints, the problems of sustainment, and their affects on combat operations. The question that comes to mind in the manner in which the MAGTF must approach these logistical constraints in the prosection of maneuver warfare. And rather than eliminating all the aforementioned constraints -- an impossible task -- the goal of this explanation is to re-emphasize the measures that will minimize the logistics' wars in maneuver warfare, and provide some new twists to ideas that may eliminate those self-imposed constraints. Of the seven principles of CSS, two of them -- flexibility, and responsiveness -- are directly pertinent to a maneuver style of warfare. Although all logistics efforts must focus around the seven principles, these two will be foremost in all CSS operations. Although these two principles are ideals used to guide planning, they do suggest eliminating self imposed constraints by decentralizing control at the lowest level possible. They also infer developing the concept of battlefield maintenance, and mission-oriented replenishment. FMFM 4, states that "centralized control and decentralized execution are ideals sought in CSS operations". It also goes on to say, that "CSS operations are as dynamic as the tactical operations which they support, and equally susceptible to changing conditions and situations".28 To maintain this type of flexibility, control must be decentralized whenever and where ever possible. Of the six functional areas of CSS, maintenance, and supply provide this opportunity. An example of this is the three categories of maintenance 28 MCCDC, USMC, Combat Service Support, FMFM 4 (Quantico 1987) pp. 7-2 - 7-3 previously discussed. As defined, these categories place a control on maintenance tasks that some believe should be managed at the highest level possible. This negates the principle of responsiveness. For units who need repairs beyond their capabilities as defined by superfluous procedures have to encounter a bureaucracy in order to get their equipment repaired. Battlefield maintenance would eliminate this burden for it implies repairing equipment as expeditiously as possible at the lowest level of maintenance production -- organizational level. Battlefield maintenance is a concept that will eliminate all the garrison constraints the Marine Corps places on this particular CSS function. For instance, it would eliminate the need to evacuate equipment to the rear for repairs, for the organizational unit will effect its own repairs. the concept of battlefield maintenance suggests eliminating the function of third echelon maintenance at direct support. And using those available technicians in either a supervisory capacity at the organizational level, or assigning them to fourth echelon maintenance to assist in the repairs of components. (Because of the intricacies of repairs, component rebuild would have to take place in the Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA).) It also suggests developing sound field expedient practices, practices not found in manuals, but proven practices from common sense and experience. The net result will be expeditious repairs. The Marine Corps already allows for decentralized maintenance on a temporary basis. MCO P4790.2B states that "force commanders are authorized to approve temporary (6 months or less) increases in the authorized echelon of maintenance". To implement the decentralized maintenance at the organizational level during a crisis may not be prudent, however. For a tremendous amount of logistics is required to initiate a program such as this. For example, repairs manuals not yet authorized by the table of allowance for publications (TAP) are required; special tools not yet authorized by the table of equipment (T/E) are needed; and additional training not allowed because of the limited amount of available time is needed as well. And if the MAGTF is preparing to deploy for combat, the required logistic support will not be available. So rather than wait, let's execute and practice what we need to know before the war starts. Recklessness is not being advocated. However, caution like in other military operations can act like a mental constraint that ties logisticians to consumption rates and tables -- a formula for inflexibility. Battlefield maintenance must also expand to include supply operations in the area of repair parts. This simply means expanding the present system beyond its limitations, specifically pre-expended bins (PEBs). The criteria for the PEB is low cost, fast moving items for organizational, and other levels of maintenance. However, repairs parts such as reflectors, firing pins , nuts, bolts, and screws, are the items found in a typical PEB. They do not, however, sustain the maintenance effort. So rather than requisitioning repair parts to sustain maintenance operations, why not build unit parts' blocks that would eliminate the time consuming process of requesting repair parts, and allow the unit to maintain their production level ? These unit part blocks, or unit packs would include secondary repairables, and repair parts that organizational, and direct support maintenance list as high usage items. Accordingly, organizational units would manage this block, and submit requirements for its replenishment to the SASSY Management Unit as required. The next area in need of adjustment is that of sustainment. When a combat service support detachment (CSSD) is built, its task organization, and table of equipment focus on the mission, but incorporates the six functions of CSS. The idea behind this premise is to provide flexible support to the maneuver element, and anticipate all their needs. Accordingly, the logistics requirements internal to the CSSD in support of this concept burdens itself with unnecessary equipment and tasks. Besides a CSSD can't anticipate all the requirements a maneuver element may develop in the course of combat -- war isn't perfect; besides the footprint required to support such a notion would be huge. Rather than trying to provide support to a unit in all the functional areas of CSS, whether or not that support is required, the combat service support element (CSSE) must develop the concept of mission-oriented replenishment -- the art of sustainment. In developing this concept, the CSSE would task organize themselves on two basic functional areas: rearming, and refueling. In addition to the stated tasks, the above mentioned function simply replenishing other classes of supply that are pertinent for survival: food, water, some repairs parts etc. It does not include maintenance because that will be decentralized to the lowest level possible. The other functions of CSS will not be included for they are not pertinent to replenishment. Besides they to create a large footprint. The mission-oriented replenishment concept would allow the CSSD to maneuver with the supported unit and create windows of logistic opportunities of support. Rather than being predictable, and waiting for the unit to assume a defensive posture before displacing to a position to provide support. It would also lessen the transportation requirement for the CSSD would not be hauling all that engineer equipment. The other functions of CSS will not be eliminated from logistics operations. Those functions, instead, will be conducted in general support of the supported unit, and in direct support of the supporting CSSD. This will allow the MAGTF commander to shift the focus of effort to logistics whenever necessary for shaping the battlefield. This also suggests that the CSSDs in support of the maneuver elements will be as streamlined as possible, which will enable them to provide flexible and responsive support. The above concepts are nothing new. However they will fall under the guise of a logistics manoeuver. And like maneuver warfare, logistics manoeuver changes its approach from the formulated technique of providing CSS, to streamline support. It suggests that the historical and traditional approaches to CSS be abandoned for concepts that incorporate the needs of the supported unit with the principles of flexibility and responsiveness. "A German general is once said to have remarked that blitzkrieg is paradise for the tactician but hell for the quartermaster".29 And perhaps in the days of Guderian it was. However, if the logistics manoeuver concept -- creating windows of opportunity for CSS support -- is pushed forward, maneuver elements will not become casualties of poor logistics like the Germans did in World War II. 29 Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World War II, Logistics Support of the Armies, (Washington D. C: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970) p.489 BIBLIOGRAPHY Addington, Larry H. The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Bailey, Robert L., LtCol, USMC. and Stein, Leslie, Maj, USMC. "Transporting the Marine Corps Into the Future". Marine Corps Gazette. 73 (October 1989) Eccles, Henry E. Logistics in the National Defense. 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Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Campaigning, FMFM 1-1. Quantico, 1990. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Quantico, 1989. U. S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. MIMMS Field Procedures Manual, MCO P4790.2B. Washington D. C. June, 1983. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Violette, Peter R. Capt. "Critical Parts for Maneuver Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (February 1990) Von Clausewitz, Karl. On War. Tr. O. J. Matthijs Jolles. Washington D. C: Combat Force Press, 1953.
