Redefining Aviation Support Concepts AUTHOR Major Phillip L. Newman, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The face of Marine Aviation has been constantly changing since its inception in WWI. The organization and concept of employment prior to WWII made it possible for aviation to expand rapidly to meet the needs of the Southern Pacific campaign. In order to meet aviation support requirements, the concept for aviation support in WWII made use of supply echelons, a flexible organization, and the ability to be mobile and task organize as required. As the face of aviation changed during the 1950's, 60's, and into the 80's, the planners for aviation support had to constantly reevaluate and refine the concept for aviation support. The future of Marine Aviation for the year 2010 again seems to be changing its concept of employment. It is now time to review the aviation support concepts of the past, take the lessons learned, and apply them to a new support concept for the future. REDEFINING AVIATION SUPPORT CONCEPTS Thesis Statement: As the employment of Marine Aviation changed from WWII, through the 1960s and into the 1980s, the aviation concepts which supported it also changed. As the employment of Marine aviation now seems to be making a drastic change by the year 2010, it is again time to reevaluate the concepts which support it. I. Aviation Support Concepts during World War II A. squadron organization B. support base echelons C. mobile service squadrons D. escort carriers II. Present Aviation Support Concept A. 1960s composite units B. 1970s type units C. MALSC D. equipment and automation III.Problem A. size B. automation C. expeditionery--once IV. Aviation Employment in the Future A. mobility and lift B. all VSTOL C. rear area defense V. Redefining Support Concepts A. echeloning support B. squadron organization C. mobile equipment On South Pacific islands during World War II, Marine aviation was employed for the first time in its ground support role as we know it today. Aviation squadrons operating from forward, land-based airfields and off of escort carriers (CVEs) supported the Marine war effort against the Japanese from Guadalcanal and Wake Island all the way to its climax at Okinawa. Marine aviation provided close air support to "mud Marines", flew long-range interdiction missions against Japanese rear facilities and airfields, attacked Japanese shipping on the high seas, and most notably, decimated the Japanese air forces in the skies over the Pacific. This tremendous achievement was even more remarkable when compared to the status of Marine aviation prior to December 1941. In the years prior to WWII, Marine aviation consisted of only two Marine Air Groups (MAGS). Each of these MAGs, one on the east coast of the United States and the other on the west coast, consisted of four squadrons each. Though there were not enough aircraft and personnel to fill out one Marine air wing (MAW), the organizational structure making it possible to expand to several air wings was in place. The foresight of Marine aviation organizers prior to WWII enabled these two MAGs to expand from 2 MAGs of 900 personnel to 4 MAWs of over 39,000 personnel in the years December 1941 to December 1944. 1 Prior to WWII the single west coast MAG consisted of only four squadrons, but was stretched from Wake to Midway to Hawaii with the headquarters and one squadron in San Diego. 2 Spread out over the Pacific as they were, these squadrons had to be capable of independent, sustained operations. The ability of these units to defend Wake Island almost single-handedly, to provide air support at Guadalcanal against Japanese air, naval and infantry units, and then later to advance incrementally across the Pacific was also due in part to its concept of aviation support. Just as the planners of aviation prior to WWII had the foresight to envision the type of support required for that campaign, aviation support planners today must have the foresight to envision the type of support required for future campaigns. By applying the successes and lessons learned from WWII, the present organization, structure and concept of support can be analyzed and its capabilities predicted. As stated by RADM Carter in his book, Beans, Bullets and Black Oil: While fighting is at times the deciding factor in warfare, it is possible only when the logistics needs of the fighters have been anticipated and met. From Napoleon at Waterloo to the German failure in the drive against Russia, history is full of trajedies and every operations planner should realize his utter dependence upon logistics. 3 Support for Marine aviation during WWII was based on four principles: a flexible squadron organization, echelons of support bases, mobile service squadrons, and utilization of escort carriers. The doctrine then, as it is now, was for squadrons to be the lowest aviation organization capable of independent operations. Each squadron was so organized to be able, not only to repair its aircraft, but also to materially support these aircraft from whereever they were located. Squadrons contained their own supply personnel whose task it was to obtain material support for the squadron's maintenance effort. These supply personnel drew their support from three sources operating in the rear. Forward support bases were constructed near the front line units as they pressed forward against the Japanese. As American lines advanced, numerous support bases were built. Upon initiation of a new island operation, support would be pushed forward fron the previous base. As more and more units secured larger areas on the new island, a new forward support base would be constructed. Transfer of supplies fron the rear, to amphibious forces, and then to the new forward support base was the task of the Navy's mobile service squadrons. Mobile service squadrons were the invention of RADM Carter. 4 Early in the Pacific campaign, the speed at which forces advanced and the requirement to support the large, fast-attack carrier battle groups necessitated the need for a mobile support unit. The mobile service squadrons were formed to draw materials, mainly water, food, fuel and ammunition, and then to resupply the carrier battle groups and the forward support bases. This enabled Army and Marine units to have supplies available at the nearest support base in their rear and enabled carrier groups to sustain themselves on extended deployments. Initially these Naval squadrons consisted of whatever type of ship could be found. Any ship that could carry supplies was pressed into service. Later in the war, ships of specific designs were constructed to perform the various resupply tasks. Ocean-going oilers, food service ships, ammunitions ships and various types of powered and non-powered barges were built to fill out the growing mobile service squadrons. From less than 200 auxiliary ships, this support fleet eventually grew to over 1100 ships by the invasion of Okinawa. 5 Another source from which Marine aviation drew support was from the many escort carriers (CVEs). CVEs played many roles in the South Pacific during the war, but their major role in support of the Marines was in supplying replacement aircraft while taking on aircraft requiring extended depot maintenance. The role of escort carriers was best summed up by RADM Carter: Fighting results in something more than the mere necessity for replacing exhausted supplies. Battle damage ... was a major concern. 6 From the end of WWII until the late 1950's, Marine aviaiton organization remained virtually untouched. Squadrons were still fully capable of independent action. These squadrons were grouped together into composite MAGs with several MAGs forming a Marine Air Wing (MAW), of which the Marine Corps was authorized three. Composite MAGs placed several different types of aircraft within a single unit. Fighters, tankers and attack asircraft were grouped together, as well as, transport and assault helicopters together. The MAG headquarters squadrons were capable of providing supply and intermediate maintenance to all assigned aircraft, which gave the MAG the capability to deploy as a unit and be totally self-sustaining. 7 In the early 1960's, due to declining budgets the organization of Marine aviation changed drastically. In order to take advantage of equipment economies of scale and to optimize operating funds, all like types of aircraft within a MAW were grouped together within a single MAG. 8 For example, all fighter aircraft were placed in one MAG; all attack aircraft were placed in another; all transport helicopters were placed in another, and all assault helicopters in another. This reorganization made it possible for aviation to remain operationally existent, but MAWs were no longer organized for combat. In the mid- 1970's a restructuring of personnel drastically changed the organization of aviation again. The Operational Logistics Concept (OLC) removed all supply personnel from each squadron and placed them at the MAG level. This movement of personnel was another change necessitated by decling budgets and the need to provide more training and technical knowledge to supply personnel earlier in their careers. While this restructuring provided for greater efficiency, it became the second big step in ensuring that squadrons were no longer capable of independent actions. In order for Marine aviation to support ground forces, a major restructuring of personnel and equipment would be required to comprise an aviation unit smaller than a MAW. In 1983 the Marine Corps officially adopted the MAGTF concept. This concept officially stated that Marines would be structured to deploy for combat differently than they are structured during peacetime. The Marine Corps would deploy as MEBs and be employed as MEFs. Again, the concept for support of aviation changed. The new support concept (Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept or MALSC) adopted involved taking each MAG headquarters (now Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron or MALS) squadron and breaking it down into several building blocks. Each building block, or contingency support package (CSP), of a MAG would consist of the personnel, equipment and spare parts to support an individual squadron. By this means, a task-organized aviation unit of any size could be built by drawing separate blocks from several MAGs. For example, the MALS for a transport helicopter squadron could be chosen as a base unit, and building blocks of assault helo squadrons, attack squadrons, and fighter squadrons could be drawn from other MAGs. These blocks would then be put together, forming a new MALS, capable of providing aviation support to a new composite MAG for 90 days at a combat rate. This building block method was also incorporated into new aircraft procurements. Each squadron of CH53E and AV8B aircraft was procured with equipment and spare parts in three separate packages. Each support package capable of being separated from the parent MALS, attached to another MALS, and able to support that aircraft detachment in combat operations for 90 days. The MALSC method has made it possible to deploy squadrons to support MEUs, composite MAGs to support MEBs, and MAWs to support MEFs. Each of these units capable of deploying in two echelons, a fly-in echelon which is very heavy in spare parts, and a follow-on echelon with the test and repair equipment. Though the MALSC concept would seem to be capable of supporting many different organizational structures of Marine aviation in a myriad of situations, it is not without its weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Due to the complexity of modern aircraft, the number of repair parts, pieces and types of support and test equipment required to maintain these aircraft is phenomenal. The CH53E, for example, requires approximately 1800 separate line items of supply and two mobile maintenance facilities (MMFs) just to support one four plane detachment. The value of each of these CSPs is over 16 million dollars. The CSP to support one four plane detachment of AV8B aircraft consists of 8 MMFs, contains over 3000 line items and costs over 30 million dollars. In order for a MALS supply department to be able to manage the transfer of these CSPs and to do the daily accounting for repair parts bought and expended, each owns a large computer with over 20 separate input terminals. The computer itself is housed in three MMFs, and when relocated to an expeditionary site, must have a 20 KVA generator to provide power and air conditioning. The costs associated with support of these aircraft also requires the use of an extensive information system, another large computer with all of its input terminals. This computer system allows all attached squadrons to order replacement parts directly from the MALS supply department, tracks the repair of each large repair part, accounts for the funds expended in aircraft repair, maintains the status of various aircraft, and reorders the repair parts expended during the repair process. This system also is housed in five MMFs and must have miles of fiber-optic cabling to link the system with each squadron. Each MALS also has an avionics repair complex that grows in size proportional to the complexity of the aircraft supported. Because of the complexity of onboard communications, electronic warfare jammers, radar suppressors and onboard computers, the equipment to repair these systems is extremely delicate and extensive. This equipment also is housed in MMFs which also require air conditioning and generators to provide uninterrupted power. The MALSC concept has also produced new problems of its own. For example, the MMFs and ancilliary equipment associated with each MALS produces a large and immobile signature such that this complex cannot be concealed or covered. Each of the computer systems previously mentioned is housed in MMFs as are many of the CSPs. The deployment and mobility requirements for each MALS surpasses the capabilities of the Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) within each MAG. For example, if MALS-16 were to deploy, it would take approximately 40 MMFs to its airfield, while MALS-11 would deploy with over 100 MMFs to its airfield site. The mobility requirements of a MALS ensures that it will be expeditionery only once--from CONUS to its deployed airfield. 9 Upon reaching its destination, the size, weight, complexity and immobility of the MALS ensures that it will be unable to redeploy. A large, immobile, and highly critical complex as this makes it a prime target for enemy air and special forces attacks. In a recent Armed Forces Journal article, LTGEN Pitman, Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, states his vision for Marine aviaiton of the future to be all VSTOL. He envisions VSTOL aircraft operating from mobile airfields without fixed-site operations. 10 This drastic change in aviaiton employment requires that aviation support again reevaluate its support concept. In order to efficiently and effectively support this new employment plan, the MALSC concept would require some revisions. The first is to adopt the support concept used by the MWSS in providing aviaiton fuels to aircraft. This concept provides for echelonlng of support from rear to the front. Large, immobile supply points are placed far to the rear, smaller and more mobile intermediate points are placed nearer the actual operating sites, while smaller and even more mobile support packages or packups are located directly with the operational forces. The MWSS concept provides for greater flexibility, quick response, and a greatly reduced requirement for rear area security. Applying this model to aviation, the MALS complex would remain far to the rear or even aboard amphibious shipping. These sites would need less defense and would not be required to be expeditionery more than once. A second level of supply, or intermediate supply point, would be located at the squadrons sites nearer to the fighting. This level would maintain supply packups and repair equipment to do daily aircraft trouble-shooting and repair. Located nearer to the front at Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP) sites, would be the frontline or first echelon of aircraft maintenance. Packups of major repair items, minimal repair equipment, all placed on the back of five ton trucks would comprise this first echelon. This echelon would be highly mobile, present little signature and would be extremely flexible and responsive to support requirements. Aviation support, then, would increase in complexity, size and depth from front to rear, but would also decrease in mobility. To further the echeloning concept, MALS and squadron maintenance personnel must be organized into echelons. The organization to accomplish this is actually practiced regularly by squadrons when deployed for desert or cold weather training. A small cadre of squadron maintenance personnel with five to ten personnel from the MALS would deploy with the aircraft--the first echelon. The remainder of the squadron remains at the home airfield site, maintains constant contact with the detachment, and sends additional support forward as required--the second echelon. The remainder of the MALS remains at the deployed site, provides assistance to the squadron as required, and performs all duties for repair and accounting for materials at its home site--the third echelon. In organizing for future employments, Marine aviation could easily institutionalize this concept already in practice. Finally, the equipment and materials to support the MALS in this echeloning concept must also be in place. Since the MALS complex need only be expeditionery from CONUS to one deployed site, and squadron and designated MALS personnel the only personnel required to deploy to austere sites, the only new equipment needed is that required to support the mobile first and second echelon. Equipment which emphasizes mobility, simplicity with a small signature is needed. Increased use of small embarkation boxes or portable containers, small, mobile vehicles to transport the first echelon, and hardened, mobile aircraft test equipment needs to be procured and placed in daily use. Additionally, portable bar-coders and bar-code readers should be used to facilitate repair accountability and aid in the resupply effort. All of these items are inexpensive and available off-the-shelf. Aviation support should always reevaluate its concept as the employment of aviation changes. The support concept for WWII was instrumental in aiding Marine aviation to leave its mark on that war. As times and circumstances changed in the 1950's and 60's, so did aviation support. In the 80's, as the Marine air-ground team adopted the MAGTF concept, aviation support again reevaluated its capabilities and adopted the MALSC concept. As Marine aviation employment in the year 2010 is expected to be markedly different, aviation support must again reevaluate its capabilities. The concept chosen must build on lessons learned from the past and always allow for flexibility and ingenuity. The solution provided allows for building on a proven conept with minimal revision; however, the key to the future success or failure of aviation support will always be in the willingness to constantly reevaluate and accept change. FOOTNOTES 1. Headquarters Marine Corps Historical Division, Marine Corps Aviation in WWII; A Chronology, May 1945, p. 10 2. Headquarters Marine Corps Historical Division, 2D MAW: Outline History. May 1945, p. 5 3. Carter, Worrall RADM, USN (RET), Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, Department of the Navy, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 49 4. IBID, p. 78 5. IBID,p. 110 6. IBID, p. 32 7. Interview Colonel D.D. Davis, USMC, 2D MAW ALD, 16 Jan 1990 8. IBID 9. Command and Staff College 1990, MAGTF Readings, Annex C, p. 16 10. IBID, Annex B, p. 15 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Beans, Bullets and Black Oil, RADM Worrall Carter, USN (RET), Dept. of the Navy, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1953 2. Flying Leathernecks, Harbler and Dechant, Doubleday and Doran Inc., Garden City N.Y., 1944 3. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present, Peter B. Mersky, The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Baltimore, Md, 1987 4. Marine Corps Aviation in WWII: A Chronology Headquarters Marine Corps Historical Division, May 1945 5. 1st MAW: Outline History, Headquarters Marine Corps Historical Division, May 1945 6. 2D MAW: Outline History, Headquarters Marine Corps Historical Division, May 1945 7. MAGTF Readings, Command and Staff College 1990, Annex B and C 8. Interview, Colonel D.D. Davis, USMC, 2D MAW ALD, 16 Jan 1990
