Terrorism: Challenges For The Marine Corps AUTHOR Major William M. Meade, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS THESIS: The Marine Corps has made progress combatting terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have caused problems which still require a solution. ISSUE: The advent of terrorism in the modern age has had a profound and far-reaching impact on the Marine Corps. Our national policy regarding terrorism is clear in its mandate to take both proactive and reactive measures to ensure the safety of Americans everywhere. The Marine Corps has translated this mandate into changes in force structure, organization, equipment, training, and doctrine. As a result of the scope and pace of these changes, some significant problems have arisen to complicate mission accomplishment. Most significant of these problems is the lack of standardized training for the special skills required in counterterrorism operations. The nature of these skills is such that their diversity, coupled with their sustainment requirements, often results in the degradation of the Marine's ability to perform his original tasks. Cooperation between the services is hindered by the duality and overlapping of missions. Finally, the issue of where the Marine Corps should place its emphasis in combatting terrorism remains in contention. CONCLUSION: Terrorism is a plague which has no foreseeable cure. Recent events strongly indicate that terrorism will be present throughout the spectrum of conflict. Even though the Marine Corps' capabilities to combat terrorism have increased dramatically, the challenges for the future will not diminish. TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS Outline Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps has made progress in combatting terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have caused problems which still require a solution. I. Impact A. Beirut Bombing B. Other Acts Against Marines II. Policy A. National B. Marine Corps III. Progress A. Structure B. Equipment C. Training D. Directives IV. Problems A. Standardization B. Skill Diversity C. Service Rivalry D. Focus TERRORISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE MARINE CORPS The sight of the smoking, collapsed building which had housed the headquarters of the Marine Battalion in Beirut, Lebanon was an unforgettable one. The TV screen in our house was filled with the horrified and dazed faces of wounded, young Marines. As I sat in stunned silence, I could sense my own body beginning to go into a state of shock. This was my reaction, along with thousands of other Marines, to the news of the terrorist bombing on that 23rd day of October 1983. For me, it was a very personal and compelling event. I was stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC, and my Battalion was due to assume the mission of Airlift Alert Battalion in the near future. As the days unfolded, the details of the bombing became clearer, but they could shed no light on the one question which haunted all of us who were so close to the tragedy: Why did over 240 Marines and sailors die while performing a mission described as peacekeeping and non-combatant? The answer is both simple and complex at the same time. Terrorism defies the normal application of logic and reason. It transcends the bounds of human decency and makes a mockery of any semblance of morality. It respects no laws, beliefs, or norms. It is ruthless, mindless violence designed to shock and horrify both its victims and its audience. It is effective. It is here to stay. The Beirut bombing was a galvanizing event for all Marines. The report from the Long Commission illustrated the magnitude of the bombing by reminding the Corps that the last time it suffered that many dead in one day was on D-Day on Iwo Jima in World War II. (9:183). Beirut, however, is only one in a growing list of Terrorist attacks involving Marines. A list of terrorist attacks against Marines during this past decade includes: (1) A Marine embassy guard killed at his post in Kabul, Afghanistan (2) Marine embassy guards kidnapped and held with other employees in Teheran, Iran (3) Two Marines killed while on liberty in Tel Aviv, Israel (4) Several beatings and an assassination of a Marine Corporal in the Philippines (5) The killing of three Marines at an outdoor cafe in El Salvador (6) The kidnapping and video-taped hanging of LtCol Higgins in Lebanon. The above is not a list compiled from painstaking research done in a forgotten corner of a library. All are incidents which were described in varying degrees of detail by newspapers and television and have become part of a collective consciousness for individual Marines and the Corps as an institution. Just what all of this means is to be the thrust of this paper. The Marine Corps has made progress in combatting terrorism, but the challenges of terrorism have caused problems which still require a solution. Before we delve into Marine Corps policy regarding terrorism, we will briefly discuss the subject of terrorism from a national perspective. I hardly think it necessary to build a case in this paper that terrorism is an issue of national attention and concern. The creation of scores of new agencies and departments designed to combat terrorism is evidence of its impact. It has affected all three branches of government, as well as the military and civilian law enforcement agencies. The media has also played prominently in this phenomenon. In fact, the media is a key player in both promoting and combatting terrorism. (11:233) To a large degree, terrorism is so effective, because it is such a perfect paradox. The more a country reacts to a terrorist event on a national or international level, the more effective the terrorist act becomes. However, in order to strike back at the terrorist (outside the U.S. anyway), we must use national assets in the international arena. This was summarized by Noel Koch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, who was responsible for counterterrorism under Caspar Weinberger. Koch said that from a national perspective, much of the damage done by terrorism is self-inflicted. Terrorism depends for its power, on our reaction to it. (10:365) To better understand our specific national policy regarding terrorism, the following three principles are listed. (5:B-3) (1) All terrorist actions are criminal and intolerable whatever their motivation, and should be condemned. (2) All lawful measures to prevent such acts and to bring to justice those who commit them will be taken. (3) No concessions to terrorist blackmail will be made, because to do so will merely invite further demands. At the national level, the Department of State is the lead agency for response to terrorist incidents that take place outside the United States. The Department of Justice is the lead agency for domestic terrorism. (5:B-3) It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the issues of posse comitatus and the specifics of jurisdiction. With that caveat, all discussions of the use of military force in this paper will assume that competent civilian/military authority has authorized such action. Having painted a very broad brush stroke at U.S. policy regarding terrorism, we can turn to the discussion of Marine Corps policy and the meat of this paper. Marine Corps Order 3302.1A specifically addresses the official policy. It states that combatting terrorism encompasses those actions taken to prevent or neutralize terrorist activity. Antiterrorism measures are proactive and designed to reduce vulnerability to terrorism. Counterterrorism actions are those reactive measures taken in response to terrorist threats of acts. Commanders must develop an operational capability that provides a defense in depth against this threat. (3:1) It is clear that our current Commandant's intent is to place the responsibility for combatting terrorism on his commanders. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps, as an institution, has made some significant strides over the past decade in this endeavor. Some of these capabilities take the form of enhanced equipment, specialized training, organization changes, and doctrine development. We will examine in greater detail, the more far-reaching and permanent of these developments. The change with the greatest impact on the Corps has unquestionably been the development and designation of the MAU (now MEU) SOC (Special Operations Capable) units. This concept was formulated and implemented during the Commandancy of General P.X. Kelley. In a 1985 Marine Corps Gazette article, General Kelley described the MEU (SOC) as: ... not our intention to duplicate the capabilities of any existing Special Operations Force organizations, but, rather, to provide a complementary capability based on the introduction of forces from the sea--our specialty. (7:23) In general, the MEU (SOC) has enhanced capabilities and equipment for intelligence gathering and direct action missions. The fourteenth and final direct action mission listed is hostage rescue. (7:23) Unquestionably, it is this mission which has caused the most controversy within and outside the Marine Corps. We will address this specific controversy later in the paper. A second structural change resulting specifically from a perceived need to counter the terrorist threat is the formation of a Marine Corps Security Force Battalion on each coast. These Battalions are tasked with providing the specialized training required for Marines destined to Marine Detachments aboard ships, as well as those Marines assigned to guard vital Naval bases and installations in CONUS and abroad. Additionally, these battalions are tasked with the training and operational control of the Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Team (FAST) Company. This is a 300 man unit which is trained and equipped to rapidly deploy to any Naval Base, ship, or installation at the direction of the fleet commander. Their equipment and weapons are of the latest design, and their training is both highly specialized and rigorous. Included in their missions are hostage rescue and recapture of our country's most sensitive materials and facilities. Another enhancement in our Corps' capabilities results from upgraded equipment and better training. Although a laundry list of special weapons and equipment could be included as a table, the following more powerfully makes the point. While commanding the Marine Security Force Company, Diego Garcia, I was scheduled to have a command visit from my Battalion Commander and his Operations Officer in August 1988. I received a call from the Operations Officer cancelling the visit at the last minute. He explained that he had just received authorization to spend an additional $575,000.00 for the purchase of special weapons, equipment, and sophisticated communications gear for FAST Company. He also explained that authorization was granted to purchase everything from the manufacturer directly, without going through the normal supply procurement cycle. Training has always been the benchmark of any consistently superior military organization. Since terrorism counteraction is a relatively new field, it is understandable that there are not a lot of qualified instructors or training programs available. SSgt. R.P. Newman, survival-evasion-resistance-escape (SERE) instructor at the U.S. Navy SERE school, puts it this way "A training program is only as effective as its instructors." (12:21) In this regard, the Marine Corps recognizes the need to send Marines to established, accredited joint-service schools to receive the best training possible. Additionally, a newly released Marine Corps Order has specifically identified particular billets with mandated schooling. (4:3,3) To further support the training and education process, the Marine Corps has begun utilizing the following schools within the last 5 years: (1) Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification, JFK Special Warfare Center, FT. Bragg, NC (2) Terrorism Counteraction on Military Installations, U.S. Army Military Police School, FT. McClellan, AL (3) Defensive Driving, Summit Point, WV (4) Terrorism in Low Intensity Conflict, JFK Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, NC (5) Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, JFK Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, NC (6) Terrorism Counteraction Instructor Training, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KY (7) Dynamics of International Terrorism, USAF, Hurlburt Field, FL (3:2,1) The last area that we will address in our discussion of Marine Corps capabilities to combat terrorism is directives and publications. In addition to the two recent Marine Corps Orders which have already been identified, a draft copy of a new order on the Code of Conduct has been approved. Marine Corps Order 3460.1A addresses training and education to support the Code of Conduct. What makes it unique is its guidance for instruction to assist U.S. military personnel in captivity or hostile detention during peacetime. (6:2,2) In an interview with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command officer responsible for terrorism counteraction programs, I was told that both the Army and the Air Force intend to use our order as a model for their own. In terms of publications, OH 7-14, Terrorism Counteraction, is the Corps' most comprehensive publication dedicated to countering the terrorist threat. It is a tool designed for both the individual and the commander. FMFRP 7-14A, The Individual's Guide for Understanding and Surviving Terrorism is a brand new reference publication aimed at decreasing an individual's chance to become a target, and increasing his chance for survival, if captured. The last publication is the Marine Corps Institute (MCI) self-paced course 02.10, Terrorism Counteraction for Marines. This course is also designed to teach the individual Marine how to avoid becoming a target. Successful completion of an MCI course earns a Marine points toward promotion. As can be seen from the foregoing, the Marine Corps has moved out smartly in the war against terrorism. It has reorganized its structure, purchased upgraded equipment, specialized its training, and disseminated a new policy. Although these measures are on target and commendable, significant problems still remain. As it is not the intent of this paper to criticize or identify minor problems, the following areas are considered to be the most critical. The lack of standardized training, techniques, and procedures among the various units which have specialized missions is the one overarching problem. I found this to be a recurring theme in both the literature and during conversations I conducted with action officers at HQMC, MCCDC, and Security Force Battalions. Because so much of this is evolving in terms of both tactics and technology, it is difficult to come up with quantifiable standards which are recognized and accredited by the other services and Departments of State and Justice. This problem is greatly exacerbated by two factors. First, because the requirements were developed by several different type units (MEU (SOC) , Security Force Bns, SOTGs) tactics began to take on peculiarities associated with the different units. This is understandable, because only some of the missions overlapped in these units and their T/Os and T/Es were not similar. Secondly, the familiar East Coast versus West Coast mentality surfaced between the MEUs and the Security Force Battalions. HQMC had a difficult time addressing this due to the political pressure to develop units and capabilities to meet this insidious new threat of terrorism. Consequently, what we have now is both like and unlike units using different equipment and different procedures to accomplish missions which require the highest degrees of specialization and repetitive skills. Where this problem is beginning to have the most effect, is the loss of credibility among the other service SOC forces and agencies like the FBI. For instance, Delta Force and Seal Team 6 both have routinely conducted joint exercises in the Mediterranean, but Seal Team 6 cancelled a recent exercise due to training incompatibilities. Another training related problem is the diversity of specialized skills which Marines are required to know. An example of this is the degradation of primary skills when Marines must spend all their training time to meet the required amount of sustainment training to stay certified in a SOC skill. Force Reconnaissance Marines are particularly susceptible to this. The Army studied this problem in 1986 during operation Brave Eagle. During this exercise, Special Forces teams conducted 24 hour surveillance operations of remote airfields in search of drug traffickers. State and Federal law officials praised this action and requested it be continued. The Army, however, found the overall training benefits minimal, and the Special Forces unit's wartime mission tasks declined. (8:56) Inter-service rivalry is a fact, and it is not surprising that it should be involved in an area with as much funding and as much notoriety as Counterterrorism. The problem, as explained to me by an action officer, relates to designation of skills, funding, and control of forces. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is allocated the majority of training slots and funding for SOC skills. If Marines want to use those training slots and funds for SOC skills, then the Marines will fall under the operational control of JSOC vice the Commandant. However, for Marines to participate in the joint SOC exercises, they must have the requisite training. This is a particularly thorny problem and it ties in with the standardization of skills dilemma discussed earlier. I see another problem becoming worse as the Marine Corps focuses more on the counterterrorism aspect of SOC forces. This very simply means that the antiterrorism aspect of deterrence will receive a reduced emphasis. Maneuver Warfare philosophy tells us that we should not focus on two areas simultaneously. There is a finite amount of assets that require one area to be our main effort, while the other is an economy of force affair. A recent Marine Corps Gazette article speaks eloquently on the subject. Antiterrorism training has characteristics of defensiveness and caution that make it unattractive. It involves tedious attention to detail and nobody believes it could happen to them. But in today's world, terrorism remains a constant threat and training to overcome it is crucial to readiness. (12:20) As I reflected on the words of that article, I was once again reminded of the Beirut bombing and my tour in Camp Lejeune. This time, however, I thought about the phrase that says nobody believes it could happen to them. Three weeks after the bombing, we deployed to Central America for an exercise. Prior to leaving Camp Lejeune, we all received a two hour extensive briefing on the terrorist threat. During our voyage down, we received an additional two briefings on the terrorist threat, both general and specific to our unit. As we prepared to go ashore, all the officers and SNCOs were issued live ammunition for their sidearms in case of a terrorist attack in Honduras, our destination. There was no terrorist attack. Eighteen months later, my Battalion deployed to Korea for Team Spirit. The Stars and Stripes newspaper reported growing student unrest over the exercise and North Korean threats to retaliate against the U.S. "aggression". We received no terrorist threat briefings prior to deploying or during our eight week stay. One week before departing, our Battalion hosted an officer's call in one of the local Korean bars we had rented for the evening. We had advertised the affair in the local camp paper. It was a wonderful time and we eventually stuffed over fifty officers into the tiny bar. There was no terrorist attack. Personal anecdotes are not necessarily the best method to use in a research paper, but I believe that this one accurately illustrates the problems associated with maintaining an effective antiterrorism program. When both the individual Marine and the Corps itself believe that it can't happen again--it will! The final problem is one of philosophy, of attitude, of perspective. We began this discussion of problems combatting terrorism with the concrete, succinct example of training. How have we managed to end with the ethereal world of philosophy? We have because it is critical to an understanding of the problem of terrorism as a whole. FMFRP 7-14A gives us a clue to the problem in a chapter appropriately titled, Perspectives. It says that the phrase "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is overused because it is true. (2:1-3) Contrast that to what Senator Henry Jackson says on the subject: The idea that one person's terrorist is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned..."freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do...It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word of freedom to be associated with acts of terrorists. (11:18-19) This is not a question of semantics, but a question of perspective. Along these same lines, here is another description which aptly fits the terrorist. The law treats terrorists as criminals and helps strip the veneer of martyrdom and heroism from their crimes. (10:367) The more we as Marines speak of waging war on the terrorist with all means at our disposal, the more we risk legitimizing his cause and politicizing his fight. We also need to closely examine what our payoff may be in terms of our risk. It could prove most beneficial to heed the words of Marine Capt. T. F. Western "I am excited about our new SOC capability...I have doubts because of a dangerous gap between perceived and actual capabilities." (13:40) The trend to seek out the terrorist and attack him has become the current vogue in many of the more recent articles written for the Gazette and other publications. The following idea is taken from an article written by then LtCol (now BGEN Select) Ray Zinni. Zinni talks about the key to defeating terrorism is a sound command security program coupled with well-trained, alert Marines. (14:65) That we will be faced with dealing with terrorism across the entire spectrum of conflict has already been foreshadowed by recent events in Central America. The rebel attack in San Salvador, El Salvador last year is renowned for the unrelenting TV coverage afforded several Green Berets who were barricaded in their hotel room and surrounded by rebel forces. But even this media event was dwarfed by television's frenetic coverage during the Panama invasion. Who could forget the hand-wringing of several of TVs' Morning show hosts who railed at the Army for not stopping the operation to rescue hostage journalists? The specter of terrorism becoming commonplace in military operations across the spectrum of conflict is a reality. The probability of terrorism does not go down, as some would contend, as the level of conflict goes up. (1:85) In this paper, we have described the effect of terrorism on both individual Marines and on the Corps as a whole. Although a relatively recent threat to our Corps, the changes it has caused are enormous, when one considers the magnitude of all missions the Marine Corps must stand ready to perform. There have been changes in the organization, training, equipment, and doctrine, solely to better prepare the Corps for this unique challenge. As a result of the pace required to implement these changes, there are some significant problems which still demand solutions. Some of the problems are easily identified, but are complex in their resolution. These problems tend to be made of issues of equipment, funds and other material things. Other problems are of a more nebulous form. They are generally a result of human nature, and consist of those human attributes which are not so easily quantifiable. Regardless of the nature of these problems, they exist today and pose a very real challenge for our Corps. The reward for their solution will be a safer, richer quality of life for individual Marines and their families, while the Marine Corps will be a better prepared combat force. The prospects for terrorism to scourge itself from our world are bleak. The challenge of defeating terrorism is one that we must heartily embrace as Marines. Bibliography 1. Berrong, Larry B., Lieutenant Colonel and Gerard, Jr., Paul T. Lieutenant Colonel, "Combatting the Terrorist Threat." Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1985. 2. HQMC, USMC, FMFRP 7-14A, 31 Oct 1989, (HQMC, Washington, DC). 3. HQMC, USMC, MCO 3302.1A, POS-43, 6 Jan 1988, (HQMC, Washington, DC). 4. HQMC, USMC, MC0 1500.49, POS, 5 Oct 1989, (HQMC, Washington, DC). 5. HQMC, USMC, OH 7-14, 17 Dec 1984, (MCDEC, Quantico, VA). 6. HQMC, USMC, Draft MCO 3460.1A TE 341, undtd, (HQMC, Washington, DC). 7. Kelley, Paul X., General, U.S. Marine Corps, "The Marine Corps and Special Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, (Oct 1985) 8. Kolton, Randy J., Major, U.S. Army, "Combatting the Columbian Drug Cartel," Military Review, (Mar 1990) 9. Long Report, Department of Defense Commission on Beirut Airport Terrorist Act, Oct 1983, (Washington, DC) 10. Martin, David C. and Walcot, John, Best Laid Plans, Harper & Row, New York, 1988. 11. Netanyahu, Benjamin, Terrorism - How The West Can Win, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1986. 12. Newman, Robert P., SSgt, U.S. Marine Corps, "Making Marines Terror Resistant, Marine Corps Gazette, (Jan 1990). 13. Western, T.F., Capt, U.S. Marine Corps, "Countering Terrorism With the MAU," Marine Corps Gazette, (Mar 1986). 14. Zinni, A.C., Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, "The Key to Defeating Terrorism," Marine Corps Gazette, (Apr 1985)
