Assume The Best: The North Korean Campaign Of 1950 AUTHOR Major Richard P. Mills, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Leadership EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE : ASSUME THE BEST : THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950 THESIS : The American High Command made several critical assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty assumptions that assured defeat. BACKGROUND : On 25 June , 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. The North Koreans rapidly defeated the South's forces. The United Nations approved military intervention General Douglas MacArthur led a United States force to Korea to restore the country . MacArthur conducted the Inchon operation and turned the tide of the war . By September 1950 , the UN/US war aims were complete . The US then decided to invade North Korea to reunite the peninsula. DISCUSSION : In planning the campaign into North Korea , MacArthur made 4 critical assumptions . Those were : (1) The Chinese would not enter the war, (2) The North's army was destroyed, (3) American troop performance was improved , and (4) Total victory was possible . Historical study proves that none of those assumptions were correct . The planners of the campaign should have based their assumptions on the intelligence and operational information they had available. The incorrect assumptions led to military disaster. CONCLUSION : The assumptions covered factors that were crucial to the campaign . By failing to recognize the true risks of the invasion , the planners invited military disaster . The campaign failed because commanders and staffs failed to live up to their responsibilities. ASSUME THE BEST: THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950 OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT . The American High Command made several critical assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty assumptions that assured defeat . I. The Korean War A. The first modern war B. The North Korean Invasion of 25 June, 1950 1. Early success by the North 2. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) C. The United Nations' response II. The Inchon / Seoul Campaign A. Turns the tide of the war B. Liberates South Korea C. Leads to a decision to invade North Korea III. The Campaign in North Korea A. Planning was based on four faulty assumptions B. Chinese issued warnings about their intentions C. The Rebirth of the NKPA D. US performance E. Concept of total victory IV. The Blame A. Other factors were not critical B. Commanders' and staffs' responsibilities C. Consequences ASSUME THE BEST: THE NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF 1950 The Korean War stands as a milestone in American military history . It divides the wars of the past from modern wars . In retrospect , warfare prior to 1950 seems almost simple and straight forward with a clear sense of national purpose . Beginning with the Korean conflict warfare has become a political event with cloudy goals and muddy strategy . Korea almost defines modern wars . There was never a declaration of war by the United States government . It was the first war fought under the deadly consideration of atomic weapons . The war was fought over a Third World country , for purely political reasons against a Soviet equipped and trained enemy . There were many military successes in the field , although the American troops had quite ambivilant feelings about the war . Finally , the war became unpopular at home , brought down a presidential administration and has never really been resolved. Unfortunately , America would see its like again . The Korean War began on 25 June , 1950 when the North Korean People's Army ( NKPA ) swept into South Korea across the 38th Parallel . Their rapid and overwhelming success startled the Western World . In a matter of days , the NKPA had captured the South's capital of Seoul . Using seven divisions in its first echelon and five more in its second echelon , the NKPA swept south pushing the Republic of Korea ( ROK ) forces before it .( 8: 4 ) Without outside intervention it seemed inevitable that the entire Korean peninsula would be united under the communist leader , Kim Il Sung . Western military experts were stunned by the NKPA . It was not what they had expected . The American intelligence network knew very little about North Korea or its military . There was no American intelligence network in North Korea prior to the war . ( 5: 13 ) In fact , prior to 25 June , America had paid very little attention to North Korea at all. If they had , it would have been frightening . The NKPA was a well trained and modern force carefully constructed along Soviet lines . For over two years hundreds of Soviet advisers had molded the army . The Russians had also generously supplied it with arms . Each NKPA division , for example , was equipped with 12 122mm howitzers , 24 76mm guns , and 12 45mm antitank guns . All were recent World War II vintage . The Soviets also provided the NKPA with tanks . Each infantry division had organic tanks and there was also a separate tank division . The 105th Armored Division boasted 120 modern T-34 main battle tanks .( 9: 17 ) The Chinese also lent a hand . They released 16,000 Koreans from their army to join the NKPA . The men had fought for the communists during the Chinese Civil War . These battle hardened troops became the core of the NKPA . ( 9: 18 ) The ROK forces were no match for the North Koreans . The ROK army was intended to be only an internal security force . It was trained and equipped by the United States for that mission . They had neither the weaponry nor the training to stand up to armored forces . Their retreat quickly dissolved into a rout. World reaction to the invasion was surprisingly swift . On 27 June , the United Nations called on its members to help South Korea " repel the attack and to restore international peace and security in the area . " .( 2: 60 ) On the 7th of July , with the North Korean attack reaching deep into South Korea , the United Nations approved a second resolution authorizing the United States to form a combined military force and appoint a Supreme Allied Commander to fight in Korea . On 8 July , President Truman named General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief , United Nations Forces ( CINCUN ) . ( 8: 1 ) Armed with the UN resolution , the United States immediately rushed troops to the aide of South Korea . The only troops available were those on occupation duty in Japan. Pushed into a rapidly deteriorating situation , they proved to be ill trained and mentally and physically unprepared for combat . They were no match for the North Koreans . By the middle of July the United Nations forces were pushed back to the southern end of the Korean peninsula. As the troops huddled inside the Pusan Perimeter, the war seemed lost. In August , General MacArthur in a single stroke of strategic brilliance , turned the war around . His World War II experience had shown him the value of amphibious warfare and the indirect approach . The Inchon amphibious landing routed the North Koreans . This operation , hundreds of miles to the rear of the North Koreans , cut their supply lines and forced their withdrawal . By the end of September the capital of Seoul was liberated and the border of South Korea restored . MacArthur was hailed as a hero . President Truman and his administration were applauded for their stand against communist aggression . The conditions called for by the original United Nations resolution were satisfied . The war should have been over . Unfortunately , success produced greater expectations . The United Nations forces launched an invasion of North Korea . The intent of the campaign was to destroy the NKPA and unite the peninsula under the democratic auspices of the South . It was one of the most disastrous and ill conceived campaigns in American military history . CINCUN's plan was simple . It envisioned a giant pincer movement up both sides of North Korea . These pincers , Eight Army on the west and X Corps on the east , would meet at the Yalu River . This double envelopment would trap the remaining NKPA in the mountainous terrain in the center of the country . ( 10: 9 ) To support the maneuver , a massive air interdiction effort would be made to isolate North Korea from her sources of supply across the Yalu in Russia and China . The plan ended in disaster . The attack was launched in October against a disorganized and fleeing enemy . By early December , the situation was entirely reversed . The United Nations forces were in full retreat with four full Chinese field armies in pursuit . Seoul fell once again . There would be years of tough , bloody combat before the Americans fought their way back to the 38th parallel . All campaign plans are based upon assumptions . They represent vital pieces of missing information , predictions of future conditions or possible third party actions that could have a crucial effect upon the plan . The high command made several critical assumptions prior to the fall/winter campaign of 1950 and those assumptions were wrong : It was those faulty assumptions that assured defeat in the cold , icy hills of North Korea . Those assumptions were contrary to the indications contained in operational and intelligence reports . Only General MacArthur really accepted them , but his opinion was sufficient . His impact was such that despite their misgivings , some of the best minds in the American government and military approved in his plan . By this point in the war , as General Matthew Ridgeway pointed out : Even his superiors ,it seemed ,began to doubt if they should question any of MacArthur's decisions and as a result he was deprived of the advantage of forthright and informed criticism , such as every commander should have ... ( 1: 232 ) General MacArthur made four basic assumptions in the fall of 1950 . They were : (1) The Chinese Communists would not enter the war ; (2) The North Korean People's Army was finished as a fighting force ; (3) The caliber of the average United States fighting unit had dramatically improved since the start of the war ; and (4) Only total victory was an acceptable conclusion . Each was wrong . MacArthur was America's expert on the oriental psyche. He believed that , as did most people inside and outside the United States government . This belief was based upon a rather superficial look at his career . He had spent the majority of his time in the Far East , but mainly in the Phillipines . His victories over the Japanese during the Second World War and his handling of them during the occupation were magnificent . These accomplishments , however , did not make him an expert on the Chinese . His dealings with the Chinese were exclusively with Chiang Kai Shek and the Nationalists . He had never dealt with the Chinese Communists , did not know their leaders , yet would constantly insist that he could accurately predict their behavior . ( 2: 66 ) The Chinese never attempted to conceal their intentions. Author William Hopkins took part in the campaign near the Chosin Reservoir . A Marine infantry officer , he commented that " no commander in American history had received more warnings of impending disaster , yet failed to heed those warnings than had MacArthur in North Korea . ". ( 4: 13 ) That quote should have included both MacArthur and the American government . The Chinese were careful to issue warnings both diplomatically and militarily. The Chinese political leadership made the decision to prepare for war in Korea in midsummer of 1950 . Their decision was based on the assumption that the NKPA had over extended itself logistically during its campaign in the south. The Chinese leaders were sure that the Americans would successfully counterattack and the North Koreans would have to retreat. General Peng Dehuai , the Commander in Chief of the Chinese forces in Manchuria , told his staff in September " My instructions are to intervene if the Americans cross into the Democratic Peoples Republic ". ( 9: 78 ) The Chinese strength in Manchuria climbed as the Americans approached the 38th parallel . In July , American intelligence estimated their strength at about 115,000 . By the end of August that had increased to 246,000 . By mid September there were reports of 450,000 Chinese troops massed in Manchuria . ( 8: 9) In September , Chinese warnings about their intentions came from numerous sources . In New Delhi , the Indian Foreign Minister informed the American ambassador that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel in Korea , China would enter the war . The British ambassador to the United States told the State Department that he had seen messages between the Chinese leaders and President Nehru of India , indicating the Chinese willingness to fight if North Korea was invaded . The American ambassador to Russia received the same warning from the Dutch and British ambassadors in Moscow . ( 5: 198 ) On the 27th of September , American airplanes strayed over the Yalu River and attacked a Chinese airfield in Manchuria . The American Government immediately issued an apology ; however the Chinese Government regarded the incident as a true indication of American intent . ( 5: 226) The Chinese became more specific in their warnings to the United States in October . On the 3rd of October , the Chinese Foreign Minister , Chou En-lai summoned the Indian ambassador to his office . Chou warned Mr. Panikkar that if American or other United Nation troops crossed the 38th parallel the Chinese would be compelled to come to the North's defense. If only South Korean troops entered the North then China would not get involved . This message was relayed to Washington within 24 hours . ( 5: 211 ) General MacArthur was told about the various Chinese warnings but his strategy remained unchanged. He continued to assure everyone that the Chinese would not dare to intervene in Korea . On 7 October the first American units began to probe into North Korea . The probes quickly became a general advance . On the 9th of October, Chou En lai issued another warning . " The American War of Invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start." . ( 5: 215 ) President Truman and General MacArthur met on Wake Island in the Pacific on the 15th of October . The President wanted to hear the general's opinion of the Chinese threat in person. General MacArthur reassured the President that, in his opinion , the Chinese would not enter the war . In fact, one day earlier General Peng's troops had begun to cross the Yalu . ( 9: 117 ) The 25th of October brought a remarkable event . South Korean troops reported capturing Chinese prisoners . By the end of the month , 55 Chinese prisoners were in American hands . Each talked quite candidly about a massive Chinese crossing of the Yalu River . ( 9: 160 ) Early November brought more ominous developments . American pilots returning from missions over North Korea reported seeing masses of Chinese troops and vehicles crossing the Yalu River bridges . ( 6: 70 ) The evidence had become too overwhelming to ignore . By the 6th of November CINCUN Headquarters in Tokyo began to speak of limited and low level Chinese involvement in the war . Although the most critical assumption of the strategy had been radically altered , the campaign plan remained unchanged . The second pillar of the campaign strategy was the assumption that the NKPA had been destroyed as a viable fighting force . There was no doubt that they were in full retreat , but they still retained a dangerous capacity to resist . The counterstroke at Inchon was brilliant but also lucky . The Seoul / Inchon area was lightly defended by second rate troops . All of North Korea's front line troops and their strategic reserve had been pushed south for their culminating attack against the Pusan Perimeter . The American counterattack struck directly into a gap held by weak , rear area units . ( 9: 96 ) The Chinese assumption about the North Korean attack had been correct . The North Korean advance had outrun its supply lines . Their supply system was never any better than primitive and it collapsed under the American counterattack . Exhausted by the effort of their successful attack , their supply lines cut and in danger of being caught between two American forces , the North Koreans retreated . The Americans superior mobility and firepower and the NKPA's lack of supplies turned the retreat into a rout . The North Koreans raced north counting on the rugged terrain , coming winter and possible Chinese support to save them . General MacArthur's frequent calls for surrender went unanswered . On October 20th General MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo issued this statement : Organized resistance on any large scale has ceased to be an enemy capability . Indications are that the North Korean military and political headquarters may have fled to Manchuria . ( 2: 124 ) This declaration was premature . Two months later " The most evident troops ( attacking the Americans ) were North Koreans , who seemed to have regained their morale and strength ." . ( 6: 198 ) The third assumption was closely tied to the second . The rapid North Korean collapse convinced the American commanders that they had achieved superiority at the tactical level . They were convinced that the American forces had overcome the peacetime mentality and lack of training responsible for their initial defeats . This assumption was also wrong . The brunt of the difficult fighting during the counterattacks was borne by selected American units . General MacArthur said that the Inchon operation was only possible " . .. if I had the First Marine Division..." . ( 1: 185 ) He knew that the troops currently in Korea were not up to the task . The Inchon / Seoul operation was mainly the work of the First Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division . The remainder of the American forces was involved in pursuit operations that summer and fall against a disorganized and retreating enemy . The rapid advance back to the 38th parallel was not a true indication of improvement among the American troops . This became only too evident when they were subjected to the Chinese attacks . A private in the 8th Cavalry spoke of his unit's reaction to being attacked by the Chinese : There was just hysteria on the position. It was everyman for himself.... In the end, I just ran with the crowd . We just ran and ran until the bugles grew fainter. ( 2: 128 ) The disintegration of the NKPA produced a degree of arrogance by the Americans . The early North Korean victories had been shocking , but now the slumbering American giant was aroused . The American High Command were all veterans of World War II . They seem to recognize the scenario . There would be three phases. .Phase one was a blinding sneak attack by crafty orientals that failed to deliver a knockout punch . Phase two was a slow and disappointing American response . Those two phases were behind them . Now came phase three ; a devastating counteroffensive that culminated in total victory. The American distain for the capability of the oriental soldier was evident even after the Chinese entered the war . On November 28th the American lines reeled from massive Chinese attacks . Lieutenant General Almond , the Commander of the X Corps , addressed the members of task Force Faith , an army unit rushed forward to stem the attacks : We're still attacking and we're still going all the way to the Yalu . Don't let a bunch of chinese laundrymen stop you . ( 2: 154 ) Within twentyfour hours Task Force Faith was destroyed and its commanding officer dead . These laundrymen could fight . America had convinced itself that total victory was possible . The fourth fatal assumption was that the entire peninsula could be liberated from communism. In 1950 , President Truman and his Democratic Administration were being blamed in the United States for the worldwide spread of communism and , in particular , the loss of China . Now Truman saw an opportunity to roll back overt communist aggression and actually eliminate a soviet client state . On 1 September , President Truman approved and issued a National Security Council Study ( NSC 81 ) that declared that all Koreans " had the right to be free , independent and united" and directed the United States to work toward that goal . ( 1: 236 ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new mission statement to General MacArthur on the 27th of September: Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces . In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations ... north of the 38th Parallel in Korea ... as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border . ( 1: 237 ) On the 29th of September the new Secretary of Defense , George C. Marshall sent personal guidance to MacArthur." We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel .".( 1: 237 ) MacArthur certainly felt unhampered . He declared that " This so called buffer zone ... would bankrupt our political , military and psychological position in the Far East . " . ( 6: 72 ) He never really paid attention to it . On the 24th of November Lt General Almond flew to the very border of China and gazed across the Yalu . The press cameras captured the moment for the world . General MacArthur made his intentions perfectly clear . The day before his forces commenced their final push to the Yalu he published this proclamation: If successful , this should for all practical purposes end the war , restore peace and unity to Korea , enable the prompt withdrawal of the United Nations military forces , and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality . It is that for which we fight . ( 6: 78) The reasons for the defeat of the American forces in North Korea in 1950 are still debated . After the war, all of the major American participants published reasons why they were not to blame . All of them saw the defeat caused by reasons beyond their span of control . There is no doubt that some factors were beyond the American span of control . Certainly the weather of that Korean winter had an impact on the campaign . Temperatures dropped to record lows and both sides suffered horribly from frostbite . The rough ,mountainous terrain of North Korea also played a part in the defeat . The Marines , however , overcame these obstacles during the Chosin Reservoir battles and were victorious . These factors were not the crucial ones . America's allies maintained their support of the war . The United States was not left alone to fight during this part of the war . The British , the Turks and numerous other allied armies fought along side the Americans and South Koreans during the fall and winter of 1950 . The campaign failed because the foundation of its planning was based on hope rather than reality. In order for the plan to be successful the assumptions behind it had to be realistic predictions of future conditions . These were not . The Americans planned assuming the best and the plan fell to pieces. It is clear that the key assumption was the one concerning the Chinese entry into the war . The Chinese intentions were so clear and their impact on the plan so enormous that it is difficult to understand how the planners could have dismissed them so easily . The power of the MacArthur personality certainly played a major part in the acceptance of the assumptions. His impact may have been overstated, however . The President ,the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all had a clear picture of the Chinese intentions and had the authority to disapprove the plan . Each expressed concern with the plan but deferred to the commander on the ground . Certainly CINCUN's staff and subordinate commanders share responsibility for the fiasco . Each of them was aware of the weaknesses of the plan . Most of them were convinced that the Chinese would intervene eventually , yet none of them chose to challenge MacArthur .It is the responsibility of staff officers and subordinate commanders to ensure plans correlate capabilities with goals. Telling a superior officer that he is wrong is an act that requires enormous moral courage ( "laying your commission on the line " was the phase ...by General George Marshall ). But a good officer does so ... when he feels a serious mistake is about to be made, and lives lost as a result. ( 1: 232) In the end there is a simple lesson in all this . Military planners must assume the worst . Military plans can't be based on what we hope is true, but rather must be based on what we hope isn't true . The cost is too high to do otherwise BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Goulden , Joseph C. Korea , The Untold Story of the War. New York , New York . McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982 2. Hastings , Max . The Korean War . New York , New York Simon & Schuster Inc , 1987 3. Heinl , Robert D., Jr. Victory At High Tide . Washington D.C. . The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America , 1979 4. Hopkins , William B. One Bugle No Drums . New York , New York . Avon Books , 1986 5. Hoyt , Edwin P. On To The Yalu . New York , New York Stein and Day , 1984 6. Hoyt , Edwin P. The Bloody Road To Panmunjon . New York , New York . Stein and Day , 1985 7. Manchester , William . American Caesar . Boston , Mass Little , Brown and Company , 1978 8. One Year in Korea . General Headquarters , United Nations Command , 1951 9. Spurr , Russell . Enter The Dragon . 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