The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Deterrence In Decline AUTHOR Major Matt R. Morrison, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Professional Military Education (PME) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: DETERRENCE IN DECLINE THESIS: The U.S. defense industrial base, a key ingredient to deterrence and national security, is deteriotating. ISSUE: Once the industrial base and economic might of the U.S. was unsurpassed. However, the industrial base has slipped from its pre-eminent status. The Department of Defense (DoD) has noticed this slippage and is concerned with its impact on the ability of the defense industrial base to provide essential support for the military in the event of a crisis. The fact that the DoD purchases items from more than a quarter million firms, within two hundred fifteen distinct industries, indicates that the vitality of the defense industrial base is undeniably linked to the health of the U.S. industrial base. A strong defense industrial base not only provides the military might to wage war but the capability it represents also helps deter aggression. A policy of deterrence has been the defense policy of the U.S. since the end of World War II. Consequently, our deterrence strategy, and ultimately the national security, depend upon a strong defense industrial base. A number of problems have been identified with the defense industrial base. A decline in the number of DoD suppliers, a lack of surge capability, a dependence on foreign sources of supply, and a low productivity growth rate in some important industries provide examples of the types of current problems with the defense industrial base. Initiatives to correct some of the problems have been taken by the DoD and by other agencies within the government. However, a comprehensive, integrated approach to solving the problems does not seem to exist. CONCLUSION: Recent events in the world have not reduced the importance of a strong defense industrial base. Rather, the reduction of nuclear arms, and potential reduction of U.S. and Soviet conventional forces, will increase our dependence upon mobilization of reserve forces and the industrial base to meet crises. Our leaders must consider this fact as defense funding is cut in the future; the defense industrial base must not be allowed to slide further. So too our leaders must consider that the problem is a complicated issue, recovery from which requires action in many areas in government and the private sector. The DoD cannot do it alone. A sustained, coordinated effort is required for recovery from a problem that has built over a number of years. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: DETERRENCE IN DECLINE OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The U.S. defense industrial base, a key ingredient to deterrence and national security, is deteriotating. I. Importance of a strong U.S. industrial base A. Effect on vitality of U.S. defense industrial base B. Defense industrial base importance to national security II. What is the defense industrial base? A. Definition B. Integration with the larger U.S. industrial base III. The history of industrial preparedness in the U.S. A. World War I B. World War II C. Korea D. Vietnam IV. Current problems with the defense industrial base A. As cited in general by the Secretary of Defense in 1989 B. As cited by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1985 1. Declining numbers of suppliers 2. Lack of surge capability 3. Dependence on foreign sources of supply 4. Low productivity growth rates 5. No comprehensive plans addressing industrial base preparedness issues C. Elaboration on GAOs concerns D. Other current defense industrial base concerns 1. Lack of U.S. industrial competitiveness 2. Foreign acquisition of U.S. firms 3. Slippage of U.S. technological advantage V. Examples of government initiatives to improve the defense industrial base A. Graduated Mobilization Response concept B. North American Defense Industrial Base Organization VI. Examples of DoD initiatives to improve the defense industrial base A. New Deputy Under Secretary of Defense office established B. Defense Manufacturing Board C. Total Quality Management program D. Defense Industrial Network E. Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process VII. Conclusions A. Strong defense industrial base is even more important in the changing world today B. Recovery of strong capability will require focused effort and time THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: DETERRENCE IN DECLINE The American public, and others in the world, have been witnessing a decline in the economic might and industrial strength of the United States (U.S.). At a macro level in the U.S., this is demonstrated by increasing trade imbalances with developing nations, an out-of-control budget deficit, a devaluation of the dollar, and a shift from a manufacturing oriented to a service based economy. At a lower level, the U.S. consumer sees the effects of this economic shift in the increasing amount of foreign products he purchases, most of which he believes provide more value for the money or are simply superior in quality to domestic products. The Department of Defense (DoD) has also noticed this slippage of economic and industrial strength. The DoD is interested with the impact of the slide on the ability of the country to provide essential support for our military, particularly in the event of a conflict. The DoD, as a matter of fact, has been concerned for the last decade. The Defense Science Board first raised a concern in a 1980 industrial responsiveness report. The board concluded in a report about a year ago that the industrial and technology base has deteriorated further. (1:13) Quite simply, the strength of the defense industrial base is derived from the strength of the U.S. industrial base, and there-in lies the concern. The U.S. defense industrial base, a key ingredient to deterrence and national security, is deteriotating. Why is the DoD concerned with the vitality and technological leadership of the U.S. industrial base? Simply stated, a strong defense industrial base deters aggression, and in the absence of deterrence it provides the means to wage war and defeat our enemies. The National Security Strategy of the United States specifies that the defense policy since the end of World War II has been aimed at deterring aggression against both the United States and its allies. This deterrence policy is the military strategy against both conventional and nuclear aggression. Deterrence presumably works by persuading potential adversaries that the costs of aggression will be outweighed by any probable gains. (16:13) An effective mobilization base, of both manpower and industrial resources, is not only essential to support our military capabilities, but also in providing a clear means for the United States to communicate resolve to potential adversaries in periods of tension or crisis. The maintenance of a broad, responsive, technologically superior industrial base is fundamental to the United States defense policy. (16:21) The deterrence strategy, and ultimately the national security, depend upon the continued productive capacity of the defense industrial base. What is the defense industrial base? It can be defined as "that part of the total privately-owned and Government-owned industrial production in the U.S. and Canada that is or should be made available in an emergency for the manufacture of items required by the U.S. Armed Forces and selected allies." (4:3-5) Within the defense industrial base there are three categories of firms producing supplies and equipment for the DoD. The government owns and operates some facilities. These facilities produce products that are somewhat specialized and for which there is not a commercial application, i.e. munitions, missiles, etc. A government-owned and contractor-operated facility represents a second category of supplier. There are relatively few government-owned firms however, as current policy dictates that a minimum number of facilities be government-owned. The third category, the largest supplier to the DoD, consists of contractor-owned and operated facilities. As previously stated, the defense industrial base receives its strength from the broader U.S. national industrial base. Military and civilian demands tap the same industries and production inputs such as capital, technology, scientific and skilled manpower, and management. Consequently, the nation's capability to satisfy military needs rests upon the same foundation as its ability to produce goods for the civilian sector. (17:37) The fact that the DoD purchases manufactured items from more than a quarter million firms representing more than two hundred fifteen distinct industries, further demonstrates that the defense industrial base is inseparable from the U.S. industrial base as a whole. (1:13) Prior to turning to specific problems regarding the defense industrial base, it is useful to briefly examine the history of military industrial preparedness for major conflicts in this century. In World War I, the U.S. was basically unprepared to support the effort with weapons and supplies due to a lack of adequate prior planning. Consequently, U.S. troops were mainly equipped with British and French weapons. The overall industrial mobilization effort did not become well organized until the end of the war, at which time U.S. industry was expanding rapidly. However, the overall effort was generally disappointing. The military had not anticipated the requirements of modern warfare, industry was not ready to rapidly surge, and no good national control mechanism was in effect. (5:4) Several years prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, U.S. allies ordered large quantities of U.S. war supplies. In effect, this gave U.S. industrial mobilization a head start prior to entry into the war. This proved beneficial as industrial preparedness again had not been given much attention. A review of the numbers of weapons the U.S was able to produce is truly impressive. However, even with the early warning of war, and the demand to supply the allies with weapons, U.S. industry had problems expanding output of war materiels. It took one and one-half to three and one-half years to reach full-scale production and peak production of munitions was not reached until early 1944, nearly five years after the increased need had begun. (5:7) The country did not mobilize for the Korean war. Rather, the U.S. conducted a limited mobilization designed for the long haul. Therefore, industrial preparedness measures were designed to address the threat of a third world war, not simply the Korean conflict. The industrial expansion was greatly aided by assets remaining from the second World War. Notwithstanding those residual assets, the U.S. had some problems with industrial expansion. Over two years after the beginning of the war, two-thirds of the number of major items ordered, i.e. aircraft, tanks, ammunition, etc., had still not been produced. A new concept of industrial preparedness, the mobilization base, evolved from the experience of the war, however. (5:10 to 12) During the Vietnam War, the country again did not mobilize. The demands on the industrial base were not really tested because the U.S. controlled the escalation of participation in the war. (5:15) As recent history indicates, traditionally the U.S. industrial base has been largely ignored in times of peace and geared up as rapidly as possible during a crisis. The U.S., for the most part, has been successful with this reactive approach. However, those who cite the performance of the U.S. industrial base during World War II and the Korean War as examples of its responsiveness under pressure must consider the conditions which aided its responsiveness. Early warning during World War II, and surplus assets during Korea, assisted this responsiveness, and are conditions that do not apply today. The industrial base too, is not what it was. The current condition of the defense industrial base of the United States, as viewed by the DoD, was probably best expressed by the Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, in his annual report to Congress on January 17, 1989, when he stated: In the 1980s we are witnessing an erosion in this critical defense foundation [industrial machines Today our once self-sufficient military supply base has become vulnerable. We have become dependent on offshore suppliers for critical components of our weapons systems. Our technological superiority has declined and in some cases vanished. Acquisition policy complexities and instability, coupled with changes in trade, tax, environmental protection, socioeconomic and foreign policies, have decreased defense-industry profits, risk-taking and technological advance. The price-earnings ratios on military company stocks are at a 25-year low. Many military contractors are not willing to take the increased financial risk and are abandoning the defense business altogether. Many others are protecting short-term results by reducing their investment in new technologies. These are serious challenges which must be addressed now. Our strategy of deterrence and ultimately our national security depend upon the continued productive capability of our industrial base. (14:119) What are some of the problems facing the defense industrial base? A good summary was provided by a 1985 General Accounting Office (GAO) study which listed the following five concerns: (13:12 to 16) 1. The current defense industrial base is unbalanced. This issue concerned the severe problems at the subcontractor and supplier, specifically the declining number of those suppliers. 2. The current industrial base is incapable of surging production rates in a timely fashion. 3. The U.S. has become increasingly dependent on foreign sources of supply. 4. Productivity growth rates for the U.S. manufacturing sector are among the lowest in the free world, with productivity growth for the defense sector lower than the manufacturing sector. 5. There are no current programs to address the efficient use of industrial resources to support the peacetime defense program. There are no comprehensive plans to address industrial base preparedness issues. Elaboration on those five concerns will provide further insight into the deterioration of the defense industrial base. The first GAO issue, the declining number of U.S. firms conducting business with the DoD, signals a decline in the power of the U.S. defense industrial base. A report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in early 1989 entitled Deterrence in Decay-The Future of the U.S. Industrial Base found that the number of U.S. companies doing business with the DoD had declined sharply. The report indicated that in 1987 there were about eighty thousand less firms selling to DoD than in 1982. The report did not specify how many of the firms which stopped doing business with the DoD simply merged with other defense companies, or whether the number of firms in 1987 was a more optimum, efficient number than in 1982 (qualitative ability versus quantitative capacity). However, the CSIS found that while eighty thousand firms dropped out of defense, an increase of about thirty thousand firms conducting business in the U.S. occurred. This seems to indicate that the commercial sector of the economy was growing while the defense sector was shrinking. (7:10) The second GAO issue, the ability of the industrial base to adequately surge has been a concern for some time. A number of factors have contributed to this situation. Military weapons have become so dependent on technology that large quantities are not only difficult to produce in a short period but expeditious startup and production is more difficult. Long leadtime contracts and increased dependence upon foreign sources for supplies and materiels have also contributed to the sluggish expansion potential of the industrial base. The lack of ability to rapidly expand production was recently commented upon by two officers familiar with the situation. General Robert T. Marsh, retired Commander of the Air Force Systems Command and chairman of the Air Force Association's Science and Technology Committee stated in 1988 that: The defense industry has no real capacity for surge production. About all that's possible is to up your rates a little bit for things that are already in the pipeline, and then wait for eighteen months to two years to build up. The nation needs an industrial base that can respond much faster than that to a call for mobilization or surge production. (2:81) General Charles C. McDonald, Commander, Air Force Logistics Command, recently validated General Marsh's opinion in an interview in January 1990. When questioned about Air Force sustainability and spares he stated that, "in the area of spares, typically the leadtime is two to two-and-a-half years." (6:76) Recent war game simulations also indicate problems with industrial base capacity and surge capability. One such example is Global War Game 39, conducted by the Naval War College during July, 1989. Several comments in the summary indicated the problems encountered during the exercise. A disturbing aspect of game play was the surprise, even shock, expressed by many senior political and military declsionmakers (remembering back to past times) at the extent of the decline in U.S. industrial capacity and the long timelines required for even limited amelioration of sustainability problems. (10:1, Section III) The game amply illustrated that sustainability was and is unarguably a very serious concern, even in a limited conflict. Dispute over the details--are there 30 or 60 or even 100 days of supply?--is beside the point. The industrial base clearly is not what it was at the end of World War II. Serious thought needs to be continued on how to address the present and future shortfalls in sustainability and industrial mobilization. (10:27, Section III) The decline of certain basic manufacturing industries critical to defense has potentially threatened the ability of U.S. industry to respond to national emergencies. Industries in areas such as machine tools, precision optics, and bearings are examples. (3:33) The decline of basic metalworking industries, without which it is impossible to produce realistic volumes of aircraft, naval vessels, trucks and ammunition, provides another example of industrial base decline directly impacting upon the defense industrial base. Regarding GAOs third concern, one reason for increased dependence on foreign sources of supply is the decline of U.S. industries important to defense. Their decline normally causes increased dependence upon foreign sources of supply. The machine tool industry is an example. As a matter of background, machine tools manufacture the machines that produce both equipment for civilian use and defense related equipment, i.e. tanks, missiles, vehicles, planes, etc. It is estimated that companies in the U.S. have lost two-thirds of the domestic market for machining centers since about 1973. The U.S. currently has less than half the share of the world machine tool market that it enjoyed in 1980. (1:13) Additionally, over one-half of the computer-controlled machining centers sold in the U.S. in the middle of the last decade were imported from Japan. The fact that Japan's manufacturing base is 99 percent dependent upon imported resources places the U.S. in an even more tenuous situation in this area. (13:13) While Japan may be willing to provide the U.S. with these items, circumstances arising beyond their control may preclude their ability to do so in a crisis situation. The dependence of the U.S. upon foreign suppliers is most notable at the weapon system component level, as opposed to the finished system level. However, there are some notable deficiencies in the ability of the U.S. industrial base to produce larger items as well. The fact that we no longer have the capability of casting tank hulls or turrets in this country is one example. (2:81) The extent to which U.S. manufacturers depend on foreign suppliers is illustrated in the events that took place after Toshiba and Kongsberg sold naval technology to the Soviet Union in 1986. The immediate reaction by the Congress was to punish both companies through a ban on sales of their products in this country. However, members of Congress later learned how much a ban would affect weapons components manufactured primarily by U.S. companies, but contain Toshiba components. The economic impact was determined to be so widespread that a ban could not be applied without layoff of U.S. workers. (8:92) Historical statistics validate GAOs fourth concern by indicating a decline of U.S. industrial productivity in a number of areas. One example is within the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing capability in the U.S. increased 4.5 percent during the period 1977 and 1981. Japan's and Germany's, in comparison, increased 29.4 percent and 12.8 percent respectively. (13:16) Overall, U.S. productively shows a similar downward trend. The U.S. experienced an average productivity growth rate of 1.2 percent from 1960 to 1983, which was lower than all of its major trading partners. Japan and Germany experienced a 5.9 and 3.4 percentage annual growth rate respectively during the period, while South Korea's was 5.3 percent, France's was 3.7 percent, and England's was 2.3 percent. During the period the U.S. created thirty-three million jobs, while Europe experienced a net loss. However, the new jobs were created without investment in productivity enhancement tools necessary to provide the work force a competitive advantage. The decline of real rates of return on manufacturing over the last several decades has also hurt as it has kept investors from putting funds into the manufacturing base. (17:40) A recent examination of the problems facing the U.S. defense industrial base was completed by the DoD on July 15, 1988 and provides insight into the status of productivity in the defense sector. The final product of this effort, entitled Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness, provided some general conclusions regarding the overall strength of defense- critical industries, to include productivity growth within the defense sector. A definition of critical industries was established as those in which the majority of the DoD budget was spent, directly and indirectly, as well as industries vital to defense production. Thus, two hundred fifteen individual industries were identified, accounting for about ninety-five percent of Department purchases from the manufacturing sector. Six indicators were then developed and applied to each industry. Comparisons, based on those indicators, were then drawn between the defense-critical industries and the overall U.S. manufacturing sector for the period 1980 through 1985. The results indicated that critical defense industries did no worse in maintaining a domestic market share in the face of import growth and achieved average or above average profitability. However, forty-seven percent of critical defense industries had below average productivity growth, while the majority did worse than the overall manufacturing sector in terms of real shipments growth, capital expenditures, and adding productive capacity. The DoD stated that the resultant trends "while not definitive, are disturbing, particularly with respect to future productivity and competitiveness." (15:25 to 26) In addition to those problems noted by the GAO regarding the industrial base, several other areas are currently of concern. The general lack of U.S. competitiveness in world markets in industries cited earlier, such as semiconductors, bearings, machine tools and precision optics, indicates a fundamental deterioration of manufacturing capability in this country. Numerous factors have contributed to industry erosion. The foreign acquisition of U.S. firms is cited as one factor. The extent of foreign ownership of U.S. defense industries is hard to determine since no systematic data base exists to determine this. However, the trend indicates that foreign purchases of U.S. defense firms is increasing. (11:32) In the semiconductor industry, as an example, some believe that the Japanese acquisition of U.S. manufacturers lead to the demise of the domestic industry. They believe that subsequent to gaining a foothold in the U.S. market, aggressive Japanese pricing of memory devices, including dumping of some products, eventually drove all but two domestic firms out of the market. (11:31) The U.S., for a number of years, has depended upon its technological superiority to counter the numerical strength of its adversaries. Therefore, there is a concern that the U.S. is losing its advantage in this area also. The flow of technology from foreign acquisition of U.S. firms is cited as one factor detrimental to maintaining a technological advantage and competitiveness in the world. (11:31) The fact that some U.S. industries do not invest in sufficient research to maintain an advantage is another factor cited. In the field of microelectronics, a field pioneered by U.S. industry, the U.S. has slipped over the last two decades from a position of pre- eminence. The Japanese, on the other hand, are quickly moving to the front and the U.S. is losing ground rapidly in a growing number of related microelectronics fabrication technologies. The fact that U.S. firms spend fifteen percent of their sales on semiconductor research, while the Japanese spend approximately twice that amount, is considered a large factor in this shift of industry leadership. Thus it is estimated that by the year 2000, the U.S. may be completely dependent on the Japanese for key electronic components and equipment. (1:13) Are there no comprehensive plans to address industrial preparedness issues, as raised by the GAOs fifth concern? Within the government as a total, coordinated effort, perhaps not. However, several initiatives have been taken within the government in an attempt to ensure that the industrial base will be more responsive when needed. The Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept and the North American Defense Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO) are two such efforts. The GMR concept is under development in the DoD and other agencies having mobilization responsibilities. The concept was initiated in 1987. At the national level, GMR actions are developed under the auspices of the National Security Emergency Planning Senior Interagency Group. The National Security Council provides the management structure to suffuse the concept throughout the government. Mobilization is inherently an expensive, disruptive process. Consequently, the GMR concept is based on a graduated response, or a pump priming approach to mobilization. It is expected that this approach is not only less disruptive and expensive, but would enable the U.S. to mobilize more quickly and efficiently than a policy of mobilizing from a standing start. The following is the purpose of GMR: The purpose of GMR is to provide the National Command Authorities a range of political, economic, and military options that will assist in the management of a national security crisis. These options are designed with two goals in mind: first, to improve deterrence and avoid war; and second, to prepare for war should it come. (12:ii) A number of preparatory actions could be taken under the GMR concept to not only start a gradual mobilization process if a crisis begins to worsen, but to send a strong foreign policy signal to a potential adversary. The accelerated purchase of overseas raw materials required for mobilization, the placement of orders for long leadtime items, and the preparation to convert flexible manufacturing systems from commercial to defense production are all examples. (9:39) The NADIBO was formed in 1987 with the signing of a Charter by the governments of the U.S. and Canada. It is an effort by both countries to take advantage of the complimentary nature of their defense industries. The Canadian defense industrial base is highly specialized, fragmented and reliant on U.S. industry in order to meet many operational requirements of the Canadian Forces. As has been discussed previously, the U.S. industrial base, although large and technologically diverse, is highly dependent on foreign sources of supply for many critical materials, components and end items. Thus both nations, faced with a challenge to meet industrial preparedness demands independently, recognized that enhanced integration of their defense industrial bases could take advantage of the complementary nature of their defense industries to provide both countries increased security and economic gain. Among other things, the NADIBO strives to promote the development and administration of coordinated industrial preparedness programs, and a mutually effective industrial base. At the DoD a number of steps have been taken in an attempt to invigorate the defense industrial base and increase its responsiveness. Several examples will provide a flavor for the types of efforts being made. A new Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial and International Programs) has recently been established. In part, the DoD's recognition that a worldwide interdependence of industrial bases exists, which cannot be treated as separate entities, led to the creation of this new position. In addition to building a co-operative relationship with industry, the office will strive to enhance the DoD's ability to leverage buying power through more cooperation with U.S. allies. It is hoped that improved U.S. access to Allied markets and enhancement of the U.S. technology base can be achieved. (3:34) A number of studies found that an adversarial relationship existed between the DoD and industry contributed to erosion of the defense industrial base. Consequently, the DoD has established a Defense Manufacturing Board to help improve communication and interaction with industry. Acting as an advisory board similar to the Defense Science Board, experts from labor, academia and industry focus on how the DoD can improve quality and manufacturing effectiveness. The lack of quality in domestic products is often cited as a reason foreign sources are utilized. The DoD has attempted to increase the quality of products produced by defense firms, thereby increasing their competitiveness and the quality of products provided to the DoD. An effort in this direction is the establishment of the DoD's Total Quality Management (TQM) program. The TQM program takes the approach that quality must be designed and manufactured in a product, not simply "inspected in" it. The program integrates basic management techniques, improvement efforts, and technical tools into an approach aimed at continuous process improvement. It is expected that improved performance will increase quality, reduce cost, assure production on schedule, and meet mission needs. (3:35) Development of a system called the Defense Industrial Network is partially completed. When operational it will provide the DoD data necessary to monitor trends affecting the responsiveness of the U.S. industrial base. It is anticipated that the system will be merged with another DoD data base, Project Socrates, which enables the planning of technological strategies for U.S. economic and military competitiveness. The DoD anticipates that together these systems will greatly enhance the ability to evaluate and analyze U.S. manufacturing capabilities. (3:34) Another development, initiated in 1987 by the Joint Staff (of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), is the Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP). Portions of the system are finished, with completion projected for fiscal year 1991. The JIMPP will be used by the Services, Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff. The JIMPP will provide a baseline for establishing national industrial capability goals, tied to potential military demands, required by the national military strategy. The system will provide a view of the productive capacity of the U.S. industrial base from both a weapon system or munitions perspective, and the larger, aggregate capability of the industrial base to support mobilization. The system will compare these capabilities to military requirements and determine the time, funding, and specific improvements needed for the industrial base to adequately support a specific set of requirements. It is further expected that the JIMPP will provide a picture of material shortfalls, investment costs, and leadtime required by the GMR concept. (7:25) There is clear evidence, some of which was presented above, that the defense industrial base has been declining for a number of years. The issue has been documented and studied to death. The results indicate that the days of the U.S. industrial complex being able to mobilize and produce military requirements at the outset of a conflict are long gone. Only good industrial preparedness planning can assure that forces in future conflicts will be sustained with supplies and equipment required in war. It is also clear that during the past several years we have seen major changes throughout the world. Nuclear arms reduction agreements, a substantial easing of East-West relations, the rejection of Communism by many East bloc nations, and the potential for U.S. and Soviet conventional force reductions in the future have contributed to making the world a safer place in the view of most people. Does that mean the ability of the nation to mobilize and the defense industrial base to respond is now less important? I think just the opposite. As reliance on nuclear arms decreases, and conventional force reductions are achieved, we will become more dependent upon the ability to mobilize our reserve forces and the industrial base to meet crises. Our leaders must not lose sight of this as defense cutbacks occur; the defense industrial base should not be allowed to continue the slide. The ability to get the defense industrial base back on track is a large, complicated task which cuts across many areas in government and the private sector. The DoD cannot do it alone. Many essential elements for a robust industrial base are outside the DoD's direct responsibility and influence. Problem correction will require not only a focused effort by the DoD but also cooperation among other government activities, and the private sector. Actions are being taken, some of which were described previously. Is enough being done? That is of course debatable, and will only be determined in a future emergency. However, some believe that it will take a great amount of time to get to where we need to be. In 1988, General Marsh succinctly described the situation: "It took the nation thirty years to build the problem. Recovery will require a sustained effort, perhaps a decade of it, before the job is done." (2:81) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Atwood, Donald J., "Industrial Base: Vital to Defense." Defense 90, January/February 1990, 12-16. 2. Correll, John T., "Industry's Long Slide." Air Force Magazine, November 1988, 80-81. 3. Costello, Dr. Robert B., "Increasing Defense Industry's Competitiveness." The Military Engineer, July 1989, 33-35. 4. Defense Systems Management College. Integrating Industrial Preparedness into the Acquisition Process--A Handbook for Program Managers (Draft Edition), Fort Belvior, Virginia, July 1988. 5. Gill, Timothy D., Col, USAF. Industrial Preparedness. National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1984. 6. Goodman, Glenn W., "Interview With: General Charles C. McDonald, USAF." Armed Forces Journal International, January 1990, 75-78. 7. Industrial College of the Armed Forces 8th Annual Mobilization Conference Proceedings. National Mobilization: Current Status and Outlook, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 31-June 1, 1989. 8. Mecham, Michael, "Pentagon Recommends Action to Fight `Serious Decline' in Industrial Base." Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 1, 1988, 91-92. 9. Miskel, James and Muckerman, Joseph E., "Mobilization: Neglected Bulwark of National Security." National Defense, April 1989, 37-39. 10. Office of Mobilization Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Evaluations of Mobilization Plan in Global War Game 89, Washington, D.C., 1989. 11. Schwartz, Bernard L., "Foreign Ownership of U.S. Defense Companies: Where do we Draw the Line?" Army, August 1989, 29-34. 12. Taible, Paul E. Graduated Mobilization Response: A Key Element of National Deterrent Strategy. Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University, April 1988. 13. Tomlinson, M. T., LTC. Industrial Mobilization and the National Defense. How Ready Are We? U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 26, 1986. 14. United States Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress--Fiscal Year 1990, Washington, D.C., January 1990. 15. United States Department of Defense. Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness, Washington, D.C., July 1988. 16. United States Government. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C., January 1988. 17. Vawter, Roderick L. US Industrial Base Dependence- Vulnerability Phase I--Survey Literature. Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University, December 1986.
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