United States Power Projection Capability: A Time For Change AUTHOR Major Henry W. Mauer, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Operations Executive Summary TITLE: UNITED STATES POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITY: A TIME FOR CHANGE THESIS: As the United States seeks to redesign its strategy for military power projection in the face of a rapidly changing domestic and international political environment, it should restructure its military forces with an emphasis on strategic and operational mobility. ISSUE: In a rapidly changing world, the time has come for the United States to consider fundamental changes to the structure of its power projection forces. The force structure that exists today is limited by shortfalls in strategic lift capacity and hampered by agreements governing the use of United States forces forward based overseas. The changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, coupled with fiscal problems in the United States are proving a catalyst for change in the United States defense establishment. At the same time, the future of forward basing for United States military forces is becoming more and more uncertain. The American people and their political leaders have embraced the idea that the time is now for major cuts in the country's defense establishment. It is paramount that the nation's military leaders take an active role in this debate with more than just an eye toward defending the status quo. Military leaders need to provide a viable, strategically sound blueprint for change which not only ensures the nation's security but also provides for an improvement in power projection capabilities. CONCLUSION: A restructuring of United States' power projection forces is necessary. Strategic and operational mobility should be the basis for the force structure and a realignment of air and ground forces would best satisfy that requirement. United States Power Projection Capability: Time for a Change Outline Thesis Statement. As the United States seeks to redesign its strategy for military power projection in the face of a rapidly changing domestic and international political environment, it should restructure its military forces with an emphasis on strategic and operational mobility I. Factors Affecting the Current Debate A. Change in Europe B. U.S. Budgetary Problems C. Uncertainty over Forward Basing II. Present Power Projection Force: Structure and Limitations A. Threat Basis B. Forward Basing C. Shortfall in Lift Capability III. The Need for Restructuring and How to Accomplish It A. Restatement of the issues B. Need for military leadership on the issue C. A proposal for change D. How to pay for it IV. Conclusion United States Power Projection Capability A Time for Change Introduction Anyone who watched the headlines in 1989 could not help but notice that the world was changing in a very dramatic fashion. The face of Eastern Europe changed almost overnight with the collapse of the Berlin Wall on XX Oct and the emergence of non-communist governments in the majority of previously communist eastern European countries. This "outbreak of peace" has led many countries, including the United States, to a serious reevaluation of domestic and international political priorities. Foremost among these considerations in the United States has been fiscal priorities which, in turn, have focused attention on the nation's large military budget. Over the past year pressure has steadily increased for a major reduction in US defense expenditures. Recognizing that the defense budget will not be funded to the levels of past years, Department of Defense planners have sought to "plan down" the force structure over a period of the next several years to bring it in line with current political and fiscal realities. 1 As the United States seeks to redesign its strategy for military power projection in the face of a rapidly changing domestic and international political environment, it should restructure its military forces with an emphasis on strategic and operational mobility. In this paper I will first discuss how the changing international and domestic political environment has affected the debate over the size and structure of the U.S. military. I will then address the reasons for our present power projection force structure and the shortfalls that currently exist. Finally, I will cover why the force structure needs to be changed, what emphasis that restructuring should take, and how it can be accomplished. Influences on the Force Structure and Strategy Debate For over 40 years the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact have faced each other across the borders of central Europe. Tension between the two alliances has usually been a reflection of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. If relations between the two superpowers warmed, the tension lessened and vice versa. Efforts at the bargaining table to reduce the tension by reducing the military threat, bore little fruit until the late 1980s when Mikhial Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev came to power with a different point of view toward both the Soviet Union's internal political situation and toward the international community. After almost five years in power, Gorbachev's reforms have resulted in an almost complete restructuring of the political face of eastern Europe. Every member of the Warsaw Pact, save the Soviet Union, has seen the demise of their communist government in the past year. The emerging non-communist governments are seeking closer ties to the west and many have already asked the Soviet Union to remove their forward deployed troops. These changes have led many experts in the United States, both in and out of military circles, to the conclusion that, at least for the present and foreseeable future, the Warsaw pact is defunct as a military alliance. 2 These rapid and dramatic changes have led to unexpected concessions by the Soviet Union in the Central Forces Europe (CFE) talks which are aimed at reducing the size of US and Soviet forces stationed in central Europe. 3 It matters not whether this new flexibility on the Soviet's part is simply recognition that the new governments of the Warsaw Pact nations will likely ask them to leave, or that they truly seek to reduce the tension level that has prevailed in central Europe for decades. The result is the same: the Warsaw Pact no longer presents the level of threat to western Europe that it once did and its probability of launching a credible surprise attack against NATO is almost nil. These events, and how they will and should affect US military requirements, have dominated the recent political debate over military spending within the United States. This debate has covered the entire spectrum of viewpoints, from those who feel there is no longer any need for large standing military forces to those who plead for caution in down-sizing the force structure until we can be sure of long term Soviet intentions. The debate is further fueled by those who seek the "peace dividend" that would supposedly result from dramatic cuts in the United States' military budget as force size is reduced. According to its proponents, this dividend would be used for everything from reducing the national debt to funding social programs long- delayed due to fiscal restraints. An issue overshadowed by the events in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but which holds as much potential for dramatically affecting United States' military strategy in the future, is that of forward basing. Notwithstanding the uncertain future of United States bases in NATO, US hold on forward bases elsewhere in the world is tenuous at best. At present, negotiations are underway, and not going well, concerning the continued use of bases in the Philippines. 4 Over the past three years the United States has encountered tremendous difficulty in negotiations with Portugal, Turkey, and Spain. 5 In each instance the issue has been tied to demands for increased monetary aid and in at least two nations, the Philippines and Spain, internal political pressures have forced the governments to seek a lowered level of U.S. presence. 6 The issues of monetary aid and internal political stability are ones not easily addressed by the United States. Present U.S. budgetary problems make increases in foreign monetary aid almost prohibitive and any attempt to affect the internal political environment in countries already experiencing anti-U.S. sentiment would be laden with dangers. The changing domestic and international political environments of the 1990s offer many challenges to United States' military strategists and national policy makers. As they seek to reach a consensus on U.S. military needs in the decade ahead and into the next century, they will have to carefully balance the potential threats to national security against the present-day military structure and blend them with present day political realities to both protect the nation and see it prosper. Present U.S. Power Projection Force Structure: Its Emphasis and Limitations The threat postured by the Warsaw Pact is the primary basis for the present structure of United States' military forces. The majority of US forces stationed overseas are in NATO nations (over 300,000 military personnel presently in central Europe alone) 7 and US military strategy has centered on how to first deter, then, if necessary, win a war against the Soviet-led alliance. This standoff in Europe has provided the stimulus for shaping US military strategic policy over the past four decades and has served as the justification for a large standing military and the hardware to give it the necessary firepower. Though not of the same magnitude, the ongoing problem on the Korean peninsula has occupied United States' military attention almost as long as the Warsaw Pact. As a result, a sizable US military force is also permanently stationed in South Korea with the mission of defending that country in the event of a North Korean invasion. While Europe and Korea are not the only two places in the world that US military forces maintain a presence, they are the best examples of the cornerstone of United States power projection strategy - forward basing against the threat. The United States is heavily dependent on forward basing to confer credibility to its pledge to deter Soviet aggression, both in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The basing of powerful and mobile ground troops, along with tactical aircraft, close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) have served to overcome the formidable obstacles presented by both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The permanent presence of troops and equipment have not only underscored U.S. commitment to its alliances, but they have also greatly reduced response time in the event of a crisis. While it can be successfully argued, judging from the recent events in eastern Europe, that this strategy has been an overwhelming success, the luxury of forward basing does not come without problems. With nearly half-a-million troops based outside its borders, 8 the United States' capability for strategic military power projection is still limited outside Europe and parts of Southeast Asia. This limited capability is the result of several factors. The first of these involves international agreements allowing the U.S. to base forces in other nations. While the agreements normally allow the use of U.S. military forces in actions to defend and protect the host nation or its alliance partners, they rarely allow for unrestricted use of these same bases and forces for military action outside these parameters. The operations to resupply the Israeli government during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Libyan air strike of 1986 provide excellent examples of how these agreements can hamper U.S. efforts to project military power from forward bases. In both cases, most European governments denied the United States the use of NATO facilities to conduct operations, even though these facilities were manned and maintained by US forces. These denials even extended to aircraft overflight rights. The notable exceptions were Portugal during the 1973 war, allowing the use of the Azores, and Great Britain in 1986, allowing the use of bases there for launching the Libyan raid. Even with these exceptions, US forces had to resort to extraordinary measures to accomplish their mission. Without the cooperation of these two foreign governments, it is likely that neither operation could have succeeded on the scale that they did. Negotiations with foreign nations over the past several years indicate that the United States will run into increased opposition to its continued presence, the Philippines being only the most recent example. It is also likely that nations which continue to allow the stationing of US forces within their borders will be very reluctant to permit the use of those forces for actions outside the defense of the host nation. The increased interdependence of nations for raw materials and finished products, coupled with emerging Third World alliances among nations sympathetic to one another's causes, make it increasingly difficult for a country to take unilateral actions which might offend a nation or group of nations. The most widely recognized problem with United States forward basing strategy is an insufficient number of strategic lift assets to reinforce and supply already deployed forces. 9 Forward deployed forces have been maintained at levels thought sufficient to counter the initial assault by Warsaw Pact forces against NATO. It is an accepted fact that these forces will have to be rapidly reinforced if NATO is to drive back and defeat a Soviet-led invasion. 10 The United States has committed to increasing its force commitment to 10 divisions on the ground in Western Europe 10 days after any conflict with Warsaw Pact nations begins. To accomplish this, U.S. plans call for airlift assets to bring in the initial wave of reinforcements, followed closely thereafter by sealift assets bringing in the bulk of the equipment. Clearly, the United States' plan to accomplish reinforcement hinges on strategic airlift and sealift assets. 11 At present, even with U.S. forces forward deployed to NATO at FY 89 levels (approximately 350,O00), the U.S. does not have enough airlift or sealift assets to carry out its stated reinforcement plan. The lack of sufficient strategic lift assets is the definitive shortfall in U.S. power projection capabilities and the shortfall has existed for a long time. In 1978 the Department of Defense conducted an exercise called Nifty Nugget to simulate a mass mobilization of forces. 12 The results were unimpressive--the United States was not capable of mobilizing or sustaining the forces required to support its own war plans. 13 One result of that exercise was a Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) issued in 1981. The CMMS concluded that the U.S. should establish an airlift capacity goal of 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) (the ability to move one ton of cargo by air a distance of one mile in one day) in order to fulfill its mobility commitments. Though the CMMS looked at four world-wide scenarios, determining that actual requirements ranged between 73 and 125 MTM/D, the study's authors settled on 66 MTM/D as the fiscally possible one. To put this in perspective, consider that to move a mechanized Army division to Europe would require about 150 ton miles to make it there. 14 In other words, it would require all US airlift assets (see chart), over two days to move one mechanized division to Europe if the United States were capable of moving 66 MTM in one day which it is not. In 1989, a full eight years after the study was published, the United States was capable of airlifting only 46 MTM/D even after adding 50 more C-5B aircraft to their aircraft inventory and stretching the entire C-141 fleet gaining the equivalent of 30 more aircrafte. 15 Using the present capacity to move 150 ton miles worth of equipment would take over three days. The plan for finally attaining the 66 MTM/D goal by the turn of the century is the acquisition of 210 C-17 aircraft. The program, however, is almost two years behind schedule however and is the subject of intense scrutiny by congressional lawmakers looking to trim the defense budget. 16 Airlift is not the only strategic lift asset employed by the United States to move forces and equipment forward to the battle. Sealift is, in fact, the primary mover of the vast quantities of supplies and equipment necessary to sustain the forward deployed forces. Sea convoys can deliver a much greater quantity of supplies for the time expended than can airlift because of a ship's much larger volume. While airlift is critical in the first ten days after mobilization begins, sealift will carry the lion's share of the load after the ten day point. 17 All that said however, one must note that US sealift is suffering from the same shortfall in assets that is affecting the airlift force and in many respects sealift is in much worse straits. Compared to forty years ago the United States' merchant fleet is 70% smaller, the nations National Defense reserve fleet has declined by 85%, US ships carry over 80% less of the country's ocean-borne foreign cargo and there are less than 14,500 personnel engaged in the maritime industry, down from more than 60,000. In the same time frame the nation's fleet has declined from first in the world to tenth. The actual carrying capacity of the fleet has increased by 25 percent due to the addition of large tankers and container ships, however the military usefulness of the fleet has declined significantly. 18 A thorough discussion of the problems faced by the U.S. merchant fleet and the efforts to correct them are outside the scope of this paper. It is necessary however to briefly touch on the current outlook for merchant shipping to provide the proper perspective for the present discussion. The sealift goal for the United States is one million short- tons and the nation is presently capable of moving only 797,000 -- 20 percent short of that goal. The most recent effort to increase that capability to 839.8 million short tons failed to receive congressional and DOD support. 19 The sealift portion of the nation's deployment planning relies, in part, on World War II cargo vessels now over 50 years old and on substantial use of foreign flagged commercial vessels that are expected to be made available by U.S. allies. Presently, these foreign flagged vessels are in no way controlled by the United States' government. 20 To further aggravate the situation, there are no shipyards in the United States actively engaged in building merchant ships. 21 As of this writing there is no concrete plan, such as the C-17 for airlift, for correcting the myriad problems suffered by the maritime industry. Several proposals are under consideration by the current session of Congress, but nothing has become law. Consider the above in light of a former Military Sealift Commander's estimate in 1987 that 95 percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of the liquid cargo needed to sustain land combat must go by sea. 22 The bottom line is this--the shortfall in present United States' sealift capacity adversely affects the nation's capability for power projection and there is no consensus on how to solve the problem. While airlift and sealift are vital components of the United States' force projection strategy, they are virtually impotent without seaports and airports to conduct operations. The present United States' strategy of forward basing assures, at least initially, the availability and use of air and seaports should the U.S. have to come to the defense of an ally. Clearly the luxury of a forward base in or near areas of vital interest to the United States greatly simplifies force projection problems. When this is not the case however, i.e, no friendly port or airfield available, a forced entry would be required to establish a forward base to support the introduction of follow-on forces and their supplies. Since World War II, the United States has had very few occasions to conduct forcible entry operations, which I define as landing forces in a foreign country against armed opposition. In fact, of the three major operations since 1945, all of which were successful, none of the three matched the magnitude of the landings against the Japanese during the Pacific war. Inchon, in Korea, was conducted against light defenses, due in great part to McArthur's ability to tactically and operationally surprise the enemy. 23 While the invasions of both Grenada and Panama were forced entries, neither was a formidable test of U.S. capability to conduct forcible entry operations. In fact, in Panama the United States actually had forward deployed forces in the invaded country. Any real test of U.S. ability to launch a major forced entry operation would highlight many of the problems already touched upon in the discussion of sealift and airlift. Both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps possess capabilities to conduct such operations. The Army's likely scenario is an airborne invasion subject to the limitations of airlift and forward basing operations already discussed (over 3 days to move 1 mechanized division with present lift capacity). It is difficult to imagine Army forces being able to rapidly mass the firepower required under such a scenario given these restraints. The Marine Corp's scenario is a landing from the sea -- a "Normandy" type invasion -- for which they have trained for decades. Once again however, the lack of assets to accomplish the mission bring into question the Corps ability to successfully prosecute a forced entry operation against a potent opposing force. Marine Corps doctrine states that the force will fight as a Marine Expeditionary Force or MEF. The notional makeup of such a force consists of one division of infantry, with associated tanks and artillery, plus an air arm which adds a potent source of offensive firepower. A report on Strategic mobility published in December 1989, by the Association of the United States Army points out that under the very best conditions the Navy could lift only the assault echelon of 1 and a third MEF. The remaining portions of the assault follow on echelon would have to be moved by commercial shipping and the last elements would not leave home ports until the 14th day. While this would provide a landing force capable of an amphibious assault with 60 days of supplies and ammunition it is still relatively light, in terms of firepower, when you consider the potential size and capabilities of opposing forces, such as the Soviets or Soviet trained and well-equipped third world nations. The assets necessary to provide for a favorable force ratio against a well-armed enemy are not available now and don't look to be available in the foreseeable future. The facts speak for themselves. The United States does not have the strategic or operational assets to make its present power projection strategy a credible one. The threat upon which the strategy is based has changed. The foundation of that strategy, the forward basing of forces, faces a very uncertain future. A change is coming and the only question left to answer is how much impact United States' military leadership will have on the final outcome. The Need for Restructuring and How to Accomplish It As the United States enters into this period of uncertainty, defense planners and national policy makers alike must come to grips with the idea that a change in the structure of U.S. military forces is going to take place. For now, the United States' military force structure is out of sync with the perceived threat. The most likely scenario against which US forces might be deployed is widely recognized, even in military circles, as one involving Third World nations in a Low Intensity Conflict. War with the Soviet Union and Warsaw pact is considered unlikely and troop reductions, both forward deployed and overall, are just a matter of time. Uncertainty surrounding forward basing, the political realities in Eastern Europe today and the fiscal constraints in the United States are providing the justification for the proponents of change. Whether the result of a mis-perception of the threat by the American public and its political leadership or a real, fundamental reduction in the threat to the nation's security, change is inevitable. Now is the time for U.S. military leadership to take the initiative in developing a new structural framework for the nation's defense forces. The task cannot be left solely in the hands of political leaders. The military must make an input and it must be a viable one that addresses the world as it is, politically, strategically, and fiscally. What follows is an outline for that structure which emphasizes mobility and fire power while seeking to take into account the limitations already addressed in this paper. The United States military of the 1990s and into the next century should be one capable of projecting forces to areas of vital national interest with enough combat power to ensure these areas can be protected and defended. This military structure must continue to have powerful air, sea, and ground forces. As a prerequisite, these forces must have minimal dependence on forward basing and equipment, with maximum flexibility in terms of roles and missions. A single, mobile, yet powerful ground combat force, trained in both airdrop and amphibious operations for forced entry missions, capable of conducting sustained operations once deployed, is absolutely essential. Such a combat force would be strategically sound and fiscally viable, ensuring a potent force projection capability, while eliminating redundancies in capabilities and weapons systems. This ground combat force would be complemented by an air arm that would also undergo a change in structure. Air power in the future must have the same mobility as the ground forces it works with. If this is to happen, the United States must reduce its dependence the forward basing of tactical aircraft. The only feasible way of doing so, while still maintaining a credible force, is to centralize US tactical air capability under the Navy. U.S. Air Force tactical air assets should be limited to that required to defend the continental United States. All other tactical air assets, including any limited forces committed to overseas alliances, should be under the command of the Navy. Such a structure would require more carriers and modified aircraft. At the same time however, it would dramatically reduces U.S. dependence on forward basing in foreign nations. It also centralizes command of US tactical air assets outside the United States under one service -- the one most capable of operationally positioning the assets to affect the outcome of a conflict. Its mobility would ensure support for the ground combat arm while still being able to carry the deep air battle to the enemy. As the battle progressed, air assets could be moved ashore to disperse potential targets, but such a structure would ensure their presence, in force, from the beginning of the conflict. The primary reason behind such a move is that Air Force tactical air is heavily dependent on forward basing, without which it faces formidable obstacles to reaching the battle. The majority of areas throughout the world that the United States looks upon as vital interests cannot be reached by U.S. based tactical aircraft without air refueling. Such areas are beyond the physical capabilities of even the best Tactical Air Command pilots. All other aircraft in the U.S. military inventory would be under the control of the U.S. Air Force. The key to this force structure will be the procurement of the lift assets, both sea and air, essential to ensure the forces and equipment can get to where they are needed. This will require a realistic consensus on the size force the nation needs to ensure its security and protect its vital interests, as well as a commitment to see that the necessary lift assets are built quickly. It is not all that unlikely that, at least in terms of airlift, the assets to do the job are either available or in production. In terms of sealift however, a consensus for action will have to be reached and then acted upon quickly. The force structure as presented above will require an elimination of service distinctions over roles and missions and a consolidation of the nation's Army and Marine Corps forces into a single ground combat force. It is necessary that military leaders recognize that interservice rivalries over who should have what role or capability can be detrimental to the nation's defense effort. Often times such fights end up blurring the real issues involved and often lead to a duplication of efforts and weapon systems. The nation can no longer afford such luxuries. Our leaders need the courage to put country ahead of service and agree upon a force structure that best meets the needs of the nation. A proposal to restructure the military would be incomplete without addressing the funding requirements such a plan would generate. The plan presented above assumes that overall funding for defense will be reduced as the force grows smaller and certain weapons systems, both present and planned, are cut from the budget. The plan also assumes that personnel costs will decline as the size of the force does the same. Eliminations of redundancies in weapons systems and capabilities will also free up funds. The key to success of the proposed force structure is for the nation's military leaders to convince national policy makers that not all of the savings from these cuts be invested elsewhere. It is critical that enough of the savings be invested in improving the mobility and flexibility of the forces remaining, ensuring a powerful and rapid force projection capability. The first step should be an investment of this "peace dividend" in improving the nations sealift capability by funding a revitalization of the merchant marine. Such a program would be aimed at providing the subsidies necessary to encourage private industry investment in rebuilding the country's merchant fleet. In return, private industry would build military capabilities into the ships, yet use them for commercial ventures in peacetime. Secondly, the nation should fund an increase the Navy's amphibious assault assets, thus providing for a larger and more powerful assault echelon and reducing dependence on commercial and foreign shipping. Finally, the C-17 should be procured as rapidly as possible. This single asset will raise the nation's airlift capacity by almost 30 percent and provide a critical source of mobility to United States power projection forces. The end result could be that the nation's military force, though smaller, would be more capable of defending the nation and its vital interests. Conclusion Change is coming to the United States military. The pace of world events has overtaken even the most forward thinking national policymakers and military strategists. Threats that once were are no more -- at least to some. Threats that were once considered minor, given the possibility of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, are now moving to the forefront. The structure and the necessity for a large military force are being questioned. Defense needs will have to fight harder and smarter for funding priorities. The only questions yet unanswered regarding changes in the United States military are what nature and form will the changes take. The nation's military leaders must be the driving force behind providing viable, realistic and strategically sound answers. The result should be a potent and credible power projection force founded on proven strategic and operational mobility. Endnotes 1. Peterzell, Jay and van Voorst, Bruce. "How Much Is Too Much?" Time Magazine. (12 February 1990). p 19. 2. Chain, John T., Jr. "The Revolution in Europe." Air Force Times. (5 March 1990). p. 21. 3. Summers, Harry. "U.S. Could Ease Reunification Jitters." Air Force Times. (5 March 1990). p. 21. 4. Doerner, William R. "Trouble For Overseas Bases" Time. (1 February 1988). p. 33. 5. Doerner, p. 33. 6. Doerner, p. 34. 7. Summers, Harry. "U.S. Could Ease Reunification Jitters." Air Force Times. (5 March 1990). p. 21. 8. Carlucci, Frank C. "Annual Report to the Congress" U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington D.C. (1989) p. 227. 9. Special Report - Strategic Mobility: Getting There Is The Big Problem." Association of the United States Army, Arlington, VA (December 1989). p. 19. 10. Correll, John T. "Power Projection Shortfall." Air Force Magazine. (August 1988). p. 38. 11. Correll, p.38. 12. Correll, p.38. 13. Kitfield, James. "Cassidy: Putting The Pieces Together." Military Forum. (September 1988). p. 30. 14. Special Report -- Strategic Mobility: Getting There Is The Big Problem, p. 11. 15. Special Report - Strategic Mobility: Getting There Is The Big Problem, p. 11. 16. Special Report - Strategic Mobility: Getting There Is The Big Problem, p. 11. 17. Adams, John A. "Balancing Strategic Mobility and Tactical Capability." Military Review. (August 1988). p. 12. 18. Adams, p. 12. 19. Adams, p. 13. 20. Perry, John W. "The U.S. Merchant Marine and Our National Defense." Defense Transportation Journal. (June 1989). p. 17. 21. Finnerty, Peter J. "U.S. Merchant Marine Sitll Sliding As Its High-Seas Competition Stiffens" Maritime. Excerpted, Oerational Art Selected Readings, USMC Command and Staff College Academic Year 1989-1990. p. 153 22. Special Report - Strategic Mobility: Getting There Is The Big Problem, p. 13. 23. Mortensen, Roger W. "Inchon and the Strategy of the Indirect Approach." Air University Press. Maxwell AFB Alabama, (1977) p. 36. Bibliography Adams, John A. "Balancing Strategic Mobility and Tactical Capability." Military Review. (August 1988). pp. 9-23. 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