Surface Warfare On Wings AUTHOR LCdr Brian T. McCann, USN CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: Surface Warfare on Wings THESIS: The US Navy needs to procure more PHMs. ISSUE: The Navy has entered an era of blue dollar and manning reductions, yet there has been no appreciable change in maritime strategy--only the enemy. As a maritime nation, the US relies on a strong Navy to maintain freedom of the seas. Loss of trade lanes and SLOC's because of Third World contingencies could adversely effect US economic growth, particularly in the areas of raw materials and petroleum. The US Navy has been tasked with this mission of SLOC protection, taking the fight to the enemy (via power projection and forward deployment),and, most recently, with a defined role in the war against drugs. Can the Navy reduce its manning and capital ships, and fight a coastal drug war, in the years to come, while still fulfilling the politically directed projection of power, naval presence, and alliance solidarity? CONCLUSION: The US Navy can continue its maritime strategy and reduce both manpower and blue dollar requirements by procuring more PHMs. These vessels, at present, project an enormous quantity and quality of power against hostile surface threats. The PHM costs one half to one third the cost of a capital ship (DDG-51 or CG-47 class) and requires one tenth (about 21 men) the crew of a capital ship. With some adaptations of off-the-shelf technology, the PHM platform could perform the total surface warfare mission and bring speed and firepower to a deployed battlegroup. The PHM platform, with its 48(+)knot speed, is ideally suited for drug interdiction and, with its 76mm Oto Melara gun and Harpoon missiles , is highly effective against the FPB-heavy Third World navies. Surface Warfare on Wings OUTLINE I. Introduction A. Soviet threat reduction B. New US military contingencies C. DoD drug interdiction msn D. Future applicability of maritime strategy 1. the strategy 2. the weakness E. PHM history II. Capabilities A. prplsn B. hull C. fcs D. 76mm gun 1. limitations 2. Israeli use of gun 3. ammo E. electronics F. hrpn/ascm 1. eqmt 2. ascm defense III. Support ship/tactical mobility A. present baggage B. proposed baggage C. prpd tacsup ships 1. amphibs 2. FFG-7 D. msn of PHM IV. Cost and Improvements A. electronic B. asw/asuw C. synergism D. aaw V. Conclusion SURFACE WARFARE ON WINGS With peace breaking out all around us, many believe that the war machines of the military are no longer needed. Following that belief, many government factions espousing huge military budget reductions. One has only to read the newspapers about "perestroika", "glasnost", and the Soviet Union's internal problems to be thoroughly convinced that we really should reduce and redirect our defense dollars. With the Soviet Union's new government and internal disharmony, how it possibly be a viable foe? But before we celebrate and spend all the money, is the USSR-vs-US the only reason the military exists? The US military has been tasked with being able to respond across the wide spectrum of conflict. The wide spectrum of conflict can be simplistically reduced to three basic categories: high intensity conflict (HIC), medium intensity conflict (MIC), and low intensity conflict (LIC). War with the Soviet Union falls into the first and most massive category--HIC. Logically, that means that the military has two other areas it has to take care of and, at the same time, reduce its budget. It is important to be mindful that these other two areas, MIC and LIC, were, and are, most probably the types of conflicts to which the United States would have to react. That means, we still need the war machines. On 29 September 1988, even before prerestroika, Congress passed legislation that authorized [read, "directed"] the Department of Defense's (DOD) drug mission1--yet another task for the military. This mission focuses on drug interdiction--finding, closing, chasing, and catching drug smugglers before they can reach the US coast. Generally, these smugglers use air or sea as the means of transportation to the United States. Interdiction of the drug sea lines of communication (SLOC), within DOD, falls to the Navy; so the war machine still needs ships. Even before 29 September 1988, the Navy had begun assisting the US Coast Guard in this drug SLOC interdiction mission. One such combination of effort occurred on the night of 7 April 1987. ...the Coast Guard Cutter...was being left behind while in pursuit of a 31-foot Midnight Express offshore powerboat suspected of smuggling drugs from the Bahamas to Florida. Fortunately, the USS Gemini was patrolling th Florida Straits with USCG LEDET Two embarked. When called to assist, the Gemini intercepted the suspect vessel, pursued it for more than 30 minutes at classified speeds in excess of 40 knots, and successfully apprehended the vessel. Sixty-five bales of marijuana, a total of 2,250 pounds, were prevented from reaching the United States...2 It should be obvious that with MIC, LIC, and drug interdiction around, some parts of the war machine are still needed, and in particular, a Navy. Even without the above discussion, the fact that the United States is a maritime nation whose economic base depends on freedom of the seas and protection of the SLOC's, demands we have a Navy. The oceans are literally our economy's lifeblood; we must guarantee access to them. The point to be made is that as we reduce the naval war machine, we must ensure we spend dollars wisely to procure and preserve the proper ship mix. The US Navy's maritime strategy of power projection, forward deployment, naval presence, and alliance solidarity remains sound. Though geared toward a Soviet enemy, the strategy possesses flexibility to deal with any spectrum of conflict. But as we look to more to the MIC, LIC, and drug interdiction roles, can our ships support the strategy? For the most part the answer is yes; however, there are three notable weak areas. The first, our amphibious capability, is being corrected with the introduction of the LHD-1 class, the LSD-41 and LSD-41(CV) classes, and the LCAC. The second, our mine warfare capability, could be corrected with the acceleration of the MCM-1 class countermeasures ship and the building of the MHC-51 (coastal mine hunter) class. Both programs have been slowed by contract problems.3 We need to get both programs moving more smartly. The third,our fast patrol boat (FPB) capability, has received a lot of rhetoric and some research and development dollars, but remains unfunded while the Navy serves "the blue-water Navy first."4 When one considers our maritime strategy, MIC, LIC, and drug interdiction, our FPB/patrol craft (PXM) capability is the one that needs to be pursued. Consider that almost every Third World navy has FPB's capable of 35-37 knots. Consider that drug smugglers have cigarette-type offshore powerboats that cruise at 40-60 knots. Consider that few of the Navy's blue-water ships can make over 35 knots. Consider that the USN will need to be able to conduct surface choke point operations to ensure freedom of the seas. Consider that reduced manning will require smaller crews on USN ships. Consider that fewer dollars will mean fewer ships and less expensive ships. Consider that fewer ships available will require greater capabilities--more "bang for the buck--on those ships. Consider that the Navy wants a patrol craft 110-140 feet long and a full load draft of no more than eight feet for coastal patrol, naval special warfare support, and interdiction operations.5 And, consider finally, that the Navy already possesses a 132-ft 9-in craft capable of 48 (+) knots with an 8-ft draft designed for surface interdiction and choke point operations armed with ship killing missiles. What craft could possibly fill all these considerations???-- the PHM (patrol combatant missile [hydrofoil]). The apparent solution fades when it is pointed out that the Navy has only SIX PHMs--hardly enough to simultaneously facilitate the above considerations. Notwithstanding its present numbers, the PHM is the platform that can carry the Navy into the future with the appropriate high-low ship mix. As such, the US Navy needs to procure more PHMs. The merits of this platform and its role in present and future naval operations will be seen in the following discussion Perhaps the first question that comes to mind is, "If the PHM is so capable, why didn't the Navy buy more initially?" A valid question with a less than simple answer. As mentioned above, the US Navy is a blue- water navy. Many saw (and still see) no place in the Navy for patrol crafts or PHMs. The PHMs shaky birth was funded in FY 1973. Originally the Navy planned to procure 30 PHMs over FY 73-77. The PHM was a NATO/US project that suffered partner bailouts and increased costs. Under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the PHM program saw numerical reductions and near cancellation. In his FY 1979 Annual Report, Secretary of Defense Brown wrote, "Contracts have been awarded for completion of the second through sixth PHM. I continue to think the program is of very limited value, but will consider what operational experience the six ships may be able to provide for further evaluation."6 Thus, the last four PHMs received funding and the program was put on the shelf. Later, attempts were made to reallocate the funds, but under Nixon the funds went as originally intended. In annual reports to follow FY 79, none of the other SecDef's really addressed the PHM issue; it was dead. The last of the six PHMs was commissioned in early 1983. So what did the Navy buy? The PHM is a very capable and maneuverable ship. It has two methods of propulsion. The single LM-2500, used for foilborne operations and the twin Mercedes Benz 8V331TC80 diesel engines, used when hullborne. The LM-2500 has a the potential to deliver 30,000hp; however, the PHM uses only 17,000hp (PHM-1 uses 16,200hp). The LM-2500 is attached via two sets of reduction gears to a waterpump rated at 90,000 gallons per minute (gpm). Each Mercedes diesel is rated at 800hp and is connected to a waterpump which operates at 30,000 gpm, thus providing 1600hp at 60,000 gpm for hullborne operations. Whether hullborne or foilborne, the pumps discharge water through waterjets which physically move the PHM through the water. The PHM uses the diesels and two hullborne waterjets to attain 11 knots (hullborne) and uses the LM-2500 and a single waterjet to attain speeds in excess of 50 knots.7 Exactly what speed the PHM can make is classified, however, PHM-1 was observed at 55 knots during her sea trials.8 The PHM's hull and superstructures aluminum (AL 5456 alloy). The foils and struts are constructed of hardened stainless steel and designed to allow foilborne speeds of 40 knots in 10-12 foot seas. Some feel the PHM's weak link or "Achilles heel" is the foil assembly. However, the foil assembly incorporates a titanium shock absorber bolt system that has actually incurred the striking of a 25 ton object without losing foil capability9--laying spoil to this "fragile" myth. The PHM obtains approximately 31.8 per cent of its lift from the front foil and 68.2 per cent from the aft foil. Through a system of flaps, rotating foil struts, and an automatic control system, the PHM achieves its maneuverability and foil stability. The PHM ride has been compared to that of a train.10 The PHM uses two gas turbine powered Ships Service Power Units (SSPU) to supply electrical power to the ship. A 3000 psi hydraulic system is used for foil control and extension/retraction of the foils. The Mk92 fire control system (FCS) mod 1 is used to control the 76mm (Mk75) dual purpose gun. This lethal combination can place up to 80 rounds per minute on an unfortunate enemy. The Mk92 mod 1 is a modified version of the Dutch-made Hollandse Signaalaparaten WM-28 FCS. The system allows simultaneous multiple target tracking and is effective against both surface and air threats.11 It is through this FCS that the PHM derives some degree of antiair defense, though slight. The SPS-63 radar of the Mk92 FCS can also be used for surface search and navigation. The 76mm (Mk75) gun weighs 7.5 tons and is one piece of equipment that both the PHM squadron and Boeing personnel have mentioned removing in favor of a 40mm or lesser caliber weapon. The squadron spokesman contends that the 76mm gun is not the weapon of choice against an enemy FPB when fighting inside 5000 yds (2.5 nm) because of its rate of fire. Enemy FPBs are usually armed with a gun that can fire between 120-400 rpm. He further stated that because of the 76mm's rate of fire, the PHM has to stand off (outside of 5000 yds) to safely kill a hostile FPB.12 While the 76mm gun does have a slower rate of fire, it should be noted that it can be used for shore bombardment and that it has a maximum range of 8.7 nm (17,400 yds).13 Though its maximum effective range is around 7 nm, note it is still well outside the gun engagement zone of enemy FPBs (ex.-Soviet Nanuchka class 76mm gun's maximum range is 3.8 nm).14 The PHM usually carries between 320-400 rounds for its 76mm gun. Before moving on, it is important to note that the PHM squadron spokesman (and Boeing) might view this gun differently if the PHM's 76mm gun were combat tested. While the spokesman advocates a different weapon, the Israelis had this to say about the 76mm's performance during the 73 Arab-Israeli War. On their way north, about 40 miles from the Syrian port of Latakia, the Sa'ars detected a small radar target, later identified as a P-4 class Syrian torpedo boat on patrol. The P-4 tried to escape, but the Sa'ars destroyed her with gunfire. The chase drew the Sa'ars closer to the Syrian Coast, and another target was detected and identified as an ex-Soviet T-43 minesweeper, about ten miles from Latakia. But as the Sa'ars closed the T-43, three Osa boats poised near the coast south of Latakia fired a salvo of Styx missiles....The Styx missiles did not score one hit. The Sa'ars quickly closed the gap in firing range and began shooting Gabriels. They hit two of the Osas. A third Osa ran aground and was then set on fire by the 76mm guns. Gabriels sank the T-43 as well.15 The distance to Alexandria was too great for the Osas to evade the much faster Sa'ars. The Osas ran for shore to avoid radar detection, but the Sa'ars closed on their fleeing prey. The first Osa to come within range was hit by four Gabriels from three different Sa'ars. A third went aground and was destroyed by 76mm gunfire. The fourth managed to break radar contact and escape along the coast.16 The Sa'ars' gunnery capability was employed differently than originally had been intended. The Gabriel missile proved effective against the Komar and Osas, and the guns were employed to destroy Gabriel-damaged targets, plus smaller vessels and targets ashore. The Sa'ars also provided gunfire support for ground forces in the Sinai. The Sa'ars also harassed radar installations, surface-to-air missile batteries, and transportation networks....17 The Israelis used the 76mm gun to stand off and destroy the Syrian and Egyptian FPBs. Additionally, as the last account depicts, they used the gun for harassing fires. From the above accounts, it would seem that the 76mm Oto Melara (the above 76mm and the one installed on the PHM) might be worth keeping. One last point about the 76mm gun concerns its ammunition. The USN uses PD and VT fuses on its 76mm HE rounds. The ammunition does pose limitations on employment of the 76mm gun and, as such, could be a reason for the less than favorable endorsement of the weapon. Italy has been developing different types of ammunition for the 76mm gun. Two developed rounds are the MOM and the SAPOM. The MOM ammunition is a pre-fragment tungsten projectile fitted with a proximity fuze that is effective against sea skimmer missiles and aircraft. During shore bombardment, the MOM round can be used in an antipersonnel capacity. The SAPOM antiship munition is a semi-armor piercing projectile with a base detonating fuze for use against hard surface targets. Additionally, the Italians are working on a guided projectile and a round with an extended range.18 Procurement of the aforementioned ordnance would greatly enhance the US Navy's 76mm gun capability. The PHM's electronics package incorporates an array of UHF, VHF, and HF radios. At present the Navy is equipping the PHM with Link 11 (naval tactical data system-NTDS).19 Once this system is fully operable, the PHM's ability to follow the battle picture and to strike the enemy without using own ship sensors will be drastically increased. The ESM (electronic support measures) capability on the PHM is only adequate and could be substantially upgraded. The present system, the AN/ALR-66, is an automatic classification device installed for hostile missile warning and to assist in over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting of enemy units.20 To round out the PHM's capabilities, it is fitted with eight all weather, surface-to-surface RGM-84 Harpoon missiles. This 60(+)nm antiship missile is the principal ship killer in the US Navy arsenal. The missile incorporates a frequency agile active radar homing system with a turbojet cruise engine to fly a payload of HE (blast penetrating) down rang and into its target. Initial launch data is passed to the missile via the onboard Harpoon data processor (AN/SWG-1A(V)4). The initial data can be inputted from own ship sensors or from a third party targeting source to facilitate an OTH launch. The US Navy has successfully combat tested the Harpoon missile against the Libyans.21 The PHM squadron of six ships could theoretically saturate a critical area with 48 missiles in a relatively short time span--a truly awesome display of firepower. To counter incoming enemy antiship capable missiles (ASCM), the PHM ascribes to the concept that "speed is life", and relies on quickly executed maneuvers and bursts of speed to dodge the threat. In addition, the PHM is equipped with IR flares and chaff to decoy the hostile missile. It should be evident by the above that the PHM possesses a formidable weapons suit. In order to use these offensive weapons' platforms properly, the PHM must be tactically mobile. Forward land- basing is possible in a benigned environment, but otherwise poses severe security problems. As we continue to reduce manning, it is doubtful that bodies will exist for the security of land bases. The most practical and effective method of employment parallels that of the Navy's capital ships; finite deployments from a known friendly port (Japan, Italy, the US), at sea replenishment, and naval presence (and crew rest) via port visits. The PHM community does not embrace this concept. They seem to suffer from a prima donna syndrome that proclaims a "we do it our way" mentality. This outlook has clouded the way they view assuming a mission--though the smallest, lightest, and fastest ship in the fleet, they are burdened by more logistical baggage than any other ship. The question is, why? Whenever PHMs deploy, they bring along a mobile logistics support group (MLSG). Much of this support entails spare parts, workshops, and crew habitability items--because of their size, PHMs have little room for extras. When asked if the PHM has a greater than average break-down rate, the squadron spokesman, the Boeing personnel, and numerous authors, all reported that the PHM is a highly reliable platform. Why then, does the PHM squadron deploy with its own "ship tender" (repair shops)? The point of this question is that the PHM squadron deployment becomes a major exercise in workshop container (vans) movement. Few ships in the fleet, aside from LSTs, LSDs, and other amphibs, are capable of carrying all the vans the squadron wants to bring. Amphibious ships have a different task, and generally require escorts for protection--so let's re-think this. It is true that PHMs need extra parts--things do break. Bringing your own spare parts is an old navy idea that works well. What is not true is that the PHM squadron needs to bring along its own workshops. No squadron in the fleet, aside from the PHM squadron, brings its own repair ship when it deploys. The PHMs could use the fleet tenders during scheduled maintenance periods within a deployment--just like the rest of the Navy! This seemingly small point is really large, as removal of workshop vans would increase the number and types of ships that could deploy with (and sustain) a PHM squadron. The fact of the matter is that PHMs, to be tactically mobile, need some form of support ship. Aside from logistical support, these ships provide crew comforts like medical care, food, places to sleep, and rest. The issue of what type of ship to use as the mobile base for PHMs has been a long debated one. The PHM squadron advocates using an amphibious ship--because it has the room for all the vans and fuel storage space to sustain the PHM squadron. While PHMs do need to refuel more often than most other ships, they do not need their own floating fuel farms. Again, the rest of the fleet uses oilers or takes a "drink" from a larger capital ship (like a CV). The fuel receiving rate of the PHM is such that it could take drinks from almost any capital ship of opportunity. How could this be accomplished? When queried about fuel replenishment characteristics, the squadron spokesman indicated that the PHM could refuel via the standard 3 inch hose or through a smaller (HIFR--helo in flight refueling) hose. Almost every capital ship in the US Navy is HIFR capable; therefore, almost any USN ship could refuel a PHM. This, in turn, means that the support ship really doesn't have to carry all the fuel required by the PHMs. When one removes the crew comfort vans, the workshop vans, and the total refueling responsibility from the support ship, we can start to look at a truly tactical (self-defending) support ship/PHM team. The PHM's present antiair capability is limited. The antiair capability of an amphib is also limited. The synergistic sum of the two is still a limited antiair capability. As air attack is the PHM's worst enemy, the choice of an amphib as a support ship is not a good one. But, if the support ship were an FFG-7 class equipped with an SM-1 surface-to-air missile (approximate 25 nm range), a 20mm Vulcan phalanx for ASCM defense, a spare hanger for spare parts, a helo (SH-60F), an antisubmarine (ASW) weapon (Mk46 torpedo), an ASCM (Harpoon), a medium range sonar (SQS-56), an NTDS package, an ESM capability (AN/SLQ- 32(V)2), a 51 platform choice, a little room for extra bodies, and a speed of 28 (+) knots--we really are talking tactical employment. Using a FFG-7 platform reduces some of the parts support details because the PHM and FFG-7 share similar equipment. Both vessels use F76 for propulsion fuel, 76mm ammo, 76mm guns, Harpoon missiles, Mk92 FCSs, and LM-2500 propulsion turbines. The PHM does have unique part requirements and some metric components, but that's what the supply vans are for. Additionally, the PHMs can safely come alongside the FFG-7 to refuel, change crews, or hook up to a towing hawser because of the FFG- 7's antiair umbrella and its antisubmarine sensor screen. With this beautiful match-up, why is there still a problem? It resides in community ego. The PHM community wants its own way of life and the FFG-7 community doesn't like being a support ship while being tactically employed. Both groups must swallow their egos and get with the program. The PHM (if the Navy had more) is ideally suited for choke point operations, operations against enemy patrol boats (the best weapon against an FPB is another FPB), LCAC escort operations, sonobuoy laying endeavors, stealth insertion and withdrawal of special operations teams, drug interdiction, and anti-surface ship operations. The caveat is that the PHM must be mobile and requires a support ship to perform these missions...enter the FFG-7 class. In this day of budget cuts and reductions in shipping and manning, our Navy must have deployable power projection teams (PHM/FFG-7, DDG- 51/CG47/CV/DD-963, SSN/SSBN). The Navy cannot support prima donnas or communities that envision a single mission for themselves.22 The PHM is a less expensive (about $100 million a copy), lightly crewed (about 21 men), power packing offensive alternative. It is an excellent ship for forward deployment, projecting power, dealing with manning reductions, and dealing with reductions in ship building dollars (ball parking it, you can build 2 or 3 PHMs for 1 DDG-51, and the PHM is constructed from off-the-shelf technology--sparing new research and development dollars). Does this mean that the answer to the Navy's future is the PHM? Of course not; however, it does provide an avenue to preserve offensive capability while suffering losses in manning and blue dollars. What's the problem then? The problem is that the PHM has not received the support it needs from the upper echelon. Many believe that the PHM's mission is too narrow, even though when viewed objectively, it supports countering the most probable US military contingencies (Third World MIC or LIC engagements) and, is aptly suited for drug interdiction (along with its already stated ability to take the fight to the enemy and to strangle surface operations at choke points). The issue becomes, then, what can be done to give the PHM program the support it needs from the upper echelon and Congress? In answering this, one must keep in mind that a minimum of development cost should be incurred and that it must be rapidly implemented. Basically, we're talking off-the-shelf technology. In reality, there are a number of items that could be added to the six existing platforms and subsequent production models. one must be mindful, when adding equipment, that ships require stability, that stability is related to total weight, and that equipment has weight. Before going further, it should be noted that the addition of equipment to subsequent models would not throw off the production scheme at Boeing. For all intents and purposes, Boeing is out of the boat building business. The company has not been re-tooling or gearing up for PHM production. With regard to PHMs, Boeing sees its present and future role as one of providing systems managers to the various shipyards that are awarded the PHM building contracts.23 The most intelligent approach to the equipment issue would be a modular change-out. The PHMs could bolt in "black boxes" to fit a particular mission. This would enable any PHM to be configured as required. The modular changes would have to be quick and fairly light weight so that extensive lift equipment would not be required. All PHMs would have to be pre-wired to facilitate installation. Items which lend themselves to this concept are communications packages (radios), ESM gear, sonobuoy monitoring equipment, and global positioning system (GPS) gear. With some lifting gear, the PHM's fantail could be fitted with bolt-on/bolt-off torpedo tubes or an AN/AQS-18 dipping sonar, wench, and processor (a 538 lbs ASW capability used in helicopters) could be brought aboard and bolted in. Of the aforementioned, the torpedo tubes (and the subsequent torpedos) would be the most lift intensive. The equipment above would enhance the PHM's ASW value, increase its ESM exploitation ability, and pinpoint its location (with GPS, the units location is known within 16 meters and, of the receivers available, the one channel model can be carried by one man in a backpack, i.e.,it's small and light weight24). The GPS and sonobuoy monitoring equipment/processor would work in concert when plotting sonobuoy locations for ASW prosecutions, allowing precise charting of the receivers of lines of bearing from the target of interest. The GPS would also be extremely useful with Link 11 (NTDS), ESM triangulations, and coordinated Harpoon shots. Thus far, the antisurface and the antisubmarine enhancements have been looked at. As mentioned before, the antiair aspect is a great limitation. Ideally, a close in weapon system (CIWS) like the Vulcan phalanx would correct this limitation; however, the physical weight prohibits its use. Use of Stinger missiles has been experimented with, but the accuracy and the field of vision are not totally acceptable. While the antiair capability appears to be the "Achilles heel", vice the foil assembly, there are three possible solutions. The first, and least desirable, would be to replace some of the 76mm gun mounts with Mk15 CIWS mounts and enable the CIWS with a surface engagement mode. The CIWS would degrade the ASUW capability for gun engagements. The second, which would also degrade grade the ASUW capability, but not as severely, would be to replace the 76mm gun with a 40mm Bofors (or US equivalent). Finally, the third and most desirable, would be to adapt a mini-gun found on aircraft, like the AH-1W Cobra, to a port and starboard placement on the PHM. The Mk92 FCS could designate its air channel to these mini-guns or to the 76mm gun. This solution would give the PHM a defensive antiair capability commiserate to that of many USN warships. The above ideas would broaden the combat power already inherent in the PHM. Should cost constraints dictate that no further armament be allocated to the PHM platforms, the PHM still remains an awesome fighting machine. The US Navy does need this blue-water patrol craft to enhance the Navy's adaptability in future threat contingencies. We have the technology and the resources. With some innovation, a little ingenuity, and almost no budgetary increases, the Navy could project power in the true Surface Warfare fashion (up, out, and down) on the wings of the PHM warriors. ENDNOTES 1 James C. Irwin, "DOD Now Becoming a Major Player in National Undertaking," Sea Power, January 1990,p.75. 2 Jonathan R. M. Coile, Commentary, Proceedings, December 1988,p.20. 3 Scott C. Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet," Proceedings, May 1989, p.311. 4 Ibid.,p.308. 5 Ibid. 6 U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1978),p. 173. 7 Jane's High-Speed Marine Craft and Air Cushion Vehicles 1986 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1986),p.167. 8 A.D. Baker III, Editor, Combat Fleets of the World 1982/1983, English Language Edition (Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press,1982),p.897. 9 Jonathan R.M. Coile, Commentary, Proceedings, December 1988,p.20. 10 Ibid. 11 Jane's Weapons Systems 1983-84 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1984),p.316. 12 Interview with Marvin E. Butcher, PHMron Two COS, (PHONCON), Quantico, Va., 22 March 1990 13 Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-90 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1990),p.740. 14 Ibid.,p.601. 15 Eli Rahhav, "Missile Boat Warfare: Israeli Style," Proceedings, March 1986,p.112. 16 Ibid.,p.113. 17 Ibid. 18 Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1988),p.520. 19 Interview with Marvin E. Butcher, PHMron Two COS, (PHONCON), Quantico, Va., 22 March 1990. 20 Jane's High-Speed Marine Craft and Air Cushion Vehicles 1986 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1986),p.167. 21 Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88 (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1988),p.485. 22 Marvin E. Butcher, "Fighting the PHMs," Proceedings, April 1989,p. 107. 23 Interview with Robert Feutz, Boeing Marine,Project Manager, (PHONCON), Quantico, Va., 21 March 1990 24 J.S. Graczyk, "Global Positioning System for the MAGTF," Proceeedings, November 1989, pp. 116-117 BIBLIOGRAPHY Baker III, A.D., ed. Combat Fleets of the World, 1982/1983, English Language Edition. Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982. Butcher, Marvin E. "Fighting the PHMs." Proceedings, April 1989, pp.104-107. Coile,Jonathan R.M. Commentary, Proceedings, December 1988, pp.19-20. Graczyk, J.S. "Global Positioning System for the MAGTF," Proceeedings. November 1989. pp.116-117 Irwin, James C. "DOD Now Becoming a Major Player in National Undertaking." Sea Power. January 1990. pp.75- 81. Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-90. London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1990. Jane's High-Speed Marine Craft and Air Cushion Vehicles 1986. London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1986. Jane's Weapons Systems 1983-84. London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1984. Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88. London: Jane's Publishing Ltd, 1988. Rahhav, Eli. "Missile Boat Warfare: Israeli Style," Proceedings. March 1986. pp.107-112. Truver, Scott C. "Tomorrow's Fleet." Proceedings. May 1989. pp. 301-316. U.S., Department of Defense. Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978.
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