Strategic Mobility: The Crumbling Cornerstone? AUTHOR Major Paul L. Ladd, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Training EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE? THESIS: Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone of both current and future U.S. policy. BACKGROUND: The United States is a maritime power, placing heavy reliance on forward-deployed Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units stationed world wide. When called on for either combat or peace keeping missions, these forces have been augmented by a combination of prepositioned equipment and supplies, strategic airlift of troops and critical supplies, and strategic sealift for the heavy equipment, ammunition, fuel, and supplies needed to sustain a military power projection. ISSUE: As a result of the sweeping changes taking place in the world political arena, United States leaders are facing mounting pressure to reduce military expenditures to parallel a perceived reduction of the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Allies. In the face of this pressure, both political and military leaders are struggling to identify where the military budget will be cut and by how much. The major cuts will certainly be in equipment and personnel. However, our leaders must remember that the remaining forces must be transported overseas if needed, and to accomplish that, the country needs strategic lift assets. CONCLUSION: Regardless of how many divisions, ships, and aircraft squadrons are eventual victims of budget cuts, the requirements for highway, railroad, airlift, and sealift assets to deploy the remaining forces will become ever more critical. Separately, each of these transportation modes must be considered as a strategic asset, essential in its own right, but absolutely critical to the survival of our nation when combined with the other three. STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE ? OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone of both current and future U.S. policy. I. Changes sweeping the world political arena A. Recent initiatives by Gorbachev B. Emergence of Third World nationa C. Interdependence of international economies D. Rise of Nationalism II. Pressure applied to U.S. leaders to reduce military spending A. Perceived reduction in Warsaw Pact Threat B. Proposed reductions in U.S. military budget 1. by 1991 2. by 1995 3. by 2000 III. Need to maintain strategic mobility A. Combination of: 1. Highway 2. Railroad 3. Airlift 4. Sealift B. Interdependence of each with regard to the other IV. Recent declines by transportation mode A. Railroad tracks and facilities B. Airlift (with emphasis on C-17) C. OMB memo on merchant marine and maritime industry V. Potential for future improvements A. STRACNET for railroads B. STRAHNET for highways C. C-17 aircraft fleet D. Designation of sealift as a third mission for the Navy E. President's Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense F. Creation of CINCUSTRANSCOM STRATEGIC MOBILITY: THE CRUMBLING CORNERSTONE ? In his 1988 statement of America's National Security Strategy, President Reagan outlined the values that we, as a nation, prize: human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights, the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosperity. He continued by stating that these values lead us to seek an international order encouraging self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development, and human rights. (1) By careful and skillful use of the elements of national power, our leaders attempt to combine diplomatic, informational, and economic measures to promote our values peacefully and avert using the final element of national power, the military. America's values and interests are likely to remain consistent throughout the foreseeable future. However, the threats to these values and interests are changing. Recent initiatives by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, continued emergence of Third World nations, the increasing interdependence of the international economic system, and the rise of nationalism around the globe all present clear challenges to American leaders. As a direct result of these global political changes, United States leadership is attempting to come to grips with the apparent reduction in the Warsaw Pact military capabilities. A recent offer by President Bush to the leaders of the Soviet Union to cut both U.S. and Soviet presence in Central Europe to 195,000 troops and 4,700 aircraft for each side seems to bear out the desire to reduce America's military. (2) In Congress, economics have combined with the perception of a reduced Soviet threat, resulting in bitter fights to resolve the question of how much defense is enough, and how should America's defense be structured. Respected military analysts argue that if the changes in the Soviet Union continue (under best case projections), the military can make far deeper cuts without endangering Western security. Harvard University's William Kaufman contends that the Pentagon budget be reduced to save as much as 10% in 1991, 25% by 1995, and up to 50% by the year 2000. (3) Even though it is unclear where the political and military changes will lead, pressure is being brought to bear simultaneously on political leaders to significantly reduce United States military expenditures and on military leaders to restructure the Armed Forces to parallel the perception of a declining threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As one defense analyst phrases it, "The Warsaw Pact, for all practical purposes, is dead as a military alliance. Soviet troops might have to fight their way through Warsaw, Prague, and even Berlin before getting anywhere near the Fulda Gap, much less Bonn, Rotterdam, or Paris." (4) Given a reduction in Soviet threat, whether perceived or real, the time may well have arrived for significant reduction and restructuring of our Armed Forces. However, our leaders must remain cognizant of the warning issued by former Secretary of Defense Carlucci in his Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1990: The key to continuing America's security successes is to recognize the pivotal importance of strength. United States military strength remains essential to ensure our survival, protect our interests abroad, and encourage diplomatic initiatives to reduce and resolve conflict. (5) Regardless of changes brought about by reducing and restructuring America's Armed Forces, the capability for strategic deployment of military power must remain a strong cornerstone of both current and future U.S. policy. The United States is a maritime power, traditionally placing heavy reliance on forward-deployed elements of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. If necessary, these forward-deployed elements can be quickly augmented by a combination of prepositioned equipment, airlift of troops and critical supplies, and sealift for heavy equipment, bulk fuel, ammunition, and other supplies necessary to sustain a power projection of military force. An example of this reinforcement capability is the United States' commitment to supply NATO with six additional Army divisions, sixty additional fighter aircraft squadrons, and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) within ten days of a decision to do so. (6) The airlifted troops would fall in on prepositioned equipment and supplies, while the sixty aircraft squadrons would fly over from bases located in the United States. In Southwest Asia, America is committed to deployment of a non- specific sized force within six weeks of receipt of a request for assistance by a friendly government in that region. (7) As in Europe, heavy reliance is placed on prepositioned equipment, munitions, and sustaining supplies. Unlike Europe, where the prepositioned equipment is housed in warehouses and depots, the prepositioned equipment for Southwest Asia is primarily afloat in three separate Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons of ships, each squadron containing enough equipment to outfit and sustain a MEB for up to sixty days of combat operations. The key decisions regarding force structure of the military will, and probably should, be made to reduce overall size of active duty Armed Forces. Yet, it must be recognized that any deployment of military forces, regardless of size, has a common thread; nothing happens until something moves, and nothing moves without transportation. Transportation requirements necessary for deployment of a military force are very similar in both training and combat operations. There are four separate, yet directly related, transportation modes: rail, highway, airlift, and sealift. Each is critical to the deployment and sustainment of military combat power. It does no good to have ships and aircraft available if there is no way to move personnel and equipment to the point of embarkation. Conversely, a viable rail and highway network is worthless, from a military view, if sufficient ships and aircraft are not available to move troops and equipment overseas once they arrive at the domestic ports and airfields. A closer look at each transportation mode follows. RAIL: The military places heavy and direct reliance on railroads to integrate bases and connect installations to predominantly maritime ports of embarkation. Mainlines, connectors, and clearance lines must all combine to support movement of heavy and/or oversized equipment. To ensure that military needs are factored into railroad industry decisions that may impact on national defense, the Department of Defense relies on the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). In this capacity, MTMC identifies facilities of the railroad infrastructure important to national defense, informs the commercial and civil sectors of Defense needs, and encourages the retention and upkeep of railroad assets vital to support military movements. To ensure this continuity and coordination, MTMC has created the Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET). To date, STRACNET has identified 32,500 miles of rail line critical for movement of essential military equipment to ports located around the country as well as another 5,000 miles of track essential to connect one facility to another. (8) In addition to identifying key lines and facilities, MTMC also conducts analysis of potential railroad industry construction, mergers, bankruptcies, and abandonments to determine how any of these actions may affect DOD mobility capabilities. Since 1976, MTMC has reviewed more than 2,100 abandonments affecting 33,000 miles of track, as well as eight bankruptcies affecting more 1/3 of the nation's railroad network. (9) MTMC analysis and reviews are the main source of DOD input to the railroad industry in attempts to preclude the loss of a critical section of track or facility that is essential to effective movement of heavy military lift requirements. HIGHWAY: During the Spanish-American War and World War I, the United States discovered the inadequacy of its road network with regard to military mobilization. Prior to these conflicts, the primary use for roads was mostly local or regional traffic. When the country moved to a wartime mobilization base, it found that perishable supplies often spoiled in transit and that delivery of large amounts of personnel and equipment to ports of embarkation was unreliable and usually late. The Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 initiated federal and state cooperation to improve farm-to- market roads, but it was not until the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 that the problem was truly addressed and resolved on a national level with the creation of the Interstate System. (10) Drawing on lessons he had learned during World War II, President Eisenhower established the Highway Trust Fund to create a funding mechanism that enabled the United States to build a national road network similar to the German Autobahn. From the outset of construction of the Interstate System, the DOD has monitored its progress closely, ensuring direct military input to all phases of construction. Now nearly 97% complete, the Interstate System provides the key road links for both civilian and military users. (11) The DOD uses MTMC for continuous monitoring of the Interstate System. Using the Strategic Highway Corridor Network (STRAHNET), MTMC ensures that the entire Interstate System, and an additional 11,000 miles of other essential highways, is capable of supporting the massive personnel and equipment movements required for full mobilization. AIRLIFT: Strategic airlift of military personnel and equipment is coordinated by the Military Airlift Command (MAC), United States Air Force. Although only 5% of the military supplies and equipment requiring overseas shipment are transported by MAC, the current DOD target for strategic airlift of 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) is still not being met. It is anticipated that the shortfall will not be corrected until the new C-17 aircraft fleet is fully fielded in 1998. (12) The proposed, but politically endangered quantity of 210 aircraft will lift 27.3 MTM/D, augmenting the current fleets of C-5s, KC-10s, and C-141s. (13) In the event of mobilization, MAC would be augmented with 238 commercial aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF program identifies aircraft that would be converted to haul personnel and high priority military cargo. CRAF represents virtually all wartime passenger airlift capabilities as well as 25% of wartime cargo airlift capacity. (14) SEALIFT: From the end of World War II through the late 1960s, the United States reigned as the foremost maritime power in the world. Yet, though unchallenged in sea control and power projection, decay of our ability to deploy military forces had already set in. By the late 1970s, our Navy was in shambles. The 10 year period between 1968 and 1978 had seen the number of active ships decrease by over 50%. (15) Qualitative improvements had off-set many of these losses, but the actual reduction in ships resulted in a higher deployment tempo for those that remained. Higher deployment tempo resulted in more sea time which caused personnel to leave the Navy at dangerously high rates, further eroding the United States' sea control and power projection capabilities. By 1980, the United Stated had recognized the disastrous decline of the Navy and embarked on an unprecedented peacetime expansion and modernization effort. The goal of this massive buildup, commonly referred to as the 600-Ship Navy, was to rebuild America's ability to respond to the rising challenge of the Soviet Navy and to support treaty relationships that bind us to over 40 mutual defense coalitions with nations scattered around the world. While the total quantity of ships fell short of the original 600-Ship Fleet, few would argue that the United States Navy was restored to a status of at least equal, if not superior, to the Soviet Navy. (16) While the U.S. Navy was surviving decline and subsequent resurgence, the other traditional key to American maritime power projection, the Merchant Marine Fleet continued in a downward spiral that had begun almost immediately following the ending of World War II. U.S. strategic objective for sealift are simple: transport assault troops to combat zones, resupply those troops, and reinforce allied nations. The importance of strategic sealift was best emphasized by General of the Army Eisenhower in 1944 in his statement, "When final victory is ours, there is no organization that will share more deservedly than the American merchant marine." (17) The United States emerged from the war as the world's largest merchant marine, boasting a fleet of over 3,000 merchant ships. However, by the late 1980s, the U.S. merchant fleet had lost its dominance and declined to an eleventh place fleet consisting of mostly old and outdated ships. (18) The decline of the merchant marine fleet can be blamed on a combination of many factors: failure of American ship yards to compete effectively with foreign ship builders subsidized by their government, increased use of containerized cargo, and American businesses using readily available and cheaper foreign flagged ships. The decrease in physical numbers of merchant marine hulls has been accompanied in proportional decreases in shipbuilding facilities. In 1982, there were 110 privately owned shipyards in the country, employing 112,000 people. By the end of 1987, the number of active yards had dropped to 69 (11 of which are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy) and employment had fallen to 80,000 workers. (19) Former Commander of the Military Sealift Command (MSC), Vice Adm W.T. Piotti, estimates that approximately 95% of the supplies and 99% of the fuel necessary to fight a war will be transported by strategic sealift. (20) This would tend to make almost anyone aware of the need for a sound merchant marine. Yet, benign neglect by the U.S. government has allowed its strategic sealift assets to evaporate to dangerously low levels. The actual death blow of the merchant marine appeared to have been delivered by a May 1987 memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB): National Security arguments do not provide a strong justification for the provision of public assistance to the [maritime] industries. Navy ship construction and private ship overhaul and repair work are sufficient to maintain the shipbuilding mobilization base determined to be required in a national emergency... (21) Proponents of a viable U.S. merchant marine fleet were quick to respond to the OMB memorandum. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), Yice Admiral Hughes responded, "The merchant marine is absolutely essential to our forward collective defense [and] the national military strategy of the United States." (22) Similar views were expressed by Congressman Bennett (D-FL), Chairman of the Seapower Committee of the House Armed Services Committee, "The only readily apparent alternative to reversing the decline of our maritime industries is to change basic U.S. military strategy by ruling out military responses requiring sealift. This, however, is a price this nation cannot afford to pay if it wishes to remain a leader of the Free World and to determine its own political and economic destiny." (23) While the current picture of strategic lift certainly appears to be bleak, there are significant bright spots. The first of these bright spots is a 1984 decision by (then) Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, that established strategic sealift as a third primary mission for the U.S. Navy, making sealift co-equal with traditional missions of sea control and power projection. (24) While no concrete evidence of Navy's commitment to this new mission has surfaced, the formal identification of a need for strategic sealift is promising. The second bright spot was the release of the President's Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, urging the President and Congress to initiate prompt action to resurrect the maritime industry. Headed by former Senator (and Admiral) Jeremiah Denton, the Commission recommended: 1. that the President issue an Executive Order establishing a National Maritime Policy. 2. that the 50 year old subsidy laws regarding shiplines be re- written. 3. that an average of twelve ships a year be built by the U.S. government and chartered to private U.S. flag operators. 4. that the shipment of all government cargo, both defense and non-defense goods, be moved to U.S. flag ships. (25) Finally, and of greatest significance, was the April 1987 creation of the Unified Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). (26) The creation of TRANSCOM finally identified the importance of transportation to the military. Empowered to speak as the the single voice for defense transportation, TRANSCOM speaks as both the sole DOD proponent of strategic lift and as the owner of all assets belonging to MTMC, MSC, and MAC, ensuring integration of all modes of transportation under a unified Commander in Chief with the authority to use them. In summary, it is safe to say that current and future political changes are going to drive military changes at speeds not seen in recent decades. Regardless of how many tank divisions, infantry divisions, aircraft carriers, or fighter aircraft are cut, it is expected that a viable force commensurate with America's role as a world power will remain. We must hope that our leaders, both military and civilian, recognize the need for strategic deployment of these restructured forces and ensure the survival of the strategic lift combinations necessary to deploy them. In this era of change, the cornerstones on which America defense rests will be tested as never before. They must not be allowed to crumble. ENDNOTES 1. President Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 1988, p. 1. 2. Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Concessions on Tanks, Aircraft Could Speed CFE Talks," Defense News, 12 February 1990, p. 23. 3. Jay Peterzell and Bruce van Voorst, "How Much Is Too Much?" Time, 12 February 1990, p. 19. 4. Ibid., p. 17. 5. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Annual Report to the President and the Congress for Fiscal Year 1990, Department of Defense, p. 2. 6. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1990, Department of Defense, p. 49. 7. Ibid. 8. Duke Niebur, "Railroads for National Defense," TRANSLOG August 1987, p. 9. 9. Ibid., p. 10. 10. Joseph Bonfiglio, "Highways for National defense," TRANSLOG August 1987, p. 11. 11. Ibid. 12. Jeffrey Rhodes, "The First C-17," Air Force Magazine, August 1988, p. 54. 13. Ibid., p. 56. 14. Ibid., p. 54. 15. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 188. 16. Major Bradley Smith, "Maritime Challenge to Sustaining the Force," Military Review, September 1989, p. 28. 17. Ibid., p. 29. 18. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 189. 19. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World in 1987," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 184. 20. Representative Charles Bennett, "A Merchant Marine Strategy," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 187. 21. John Aquilino and James Sanders, "Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff College Handout, p. 1-2. 22. Ibid. 23. Representative Charles Bennett, "A Merchant Marine Strategy," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 187. 24. John Aquilino and James Sanders, "Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff College Handout, p. 1-3. 25. James Asher, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and Maritime World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 188. 26. Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1988, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA 23511-6097, p. 55. BIBILOGRAPHY Aquilino, John and Sanders, James, "Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Heel of America's Defense," USMC Command and Staff Handout, p. 1-2 - 1-3. Asher, James, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World in 1987," Proceedings, May 1988, p. 184 -185. Asher, James, "The U.S. Merchant Marine and the Maritime World in 1988," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 188 - 193. Bennett, Charles, "A Merchant Marine Strategy," Proceedings, May 1989, p. 187-188. Bonfiglio, Joseph, "Highways for National Defense," TRANSLOG, August, 1987, p. 11. Carlucci, Frank, Annual Report to the President and the Congress for Fiscal year 1989, Department of Defense. Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 1990, p. 49. Hitchens, Theresa, "NATO Concessions on Tanks, Aircraft Could Speed CFE Talks," Defense News, 12 February 1990, p. 23. Joint Staff Officer's Guide, July 1988, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 23511-6097, p. 55. Niebur, Duke, "Railroads for National Defense," TRANSLOG, August 1987, p. 9-10. Peterzell, Jay and van Voorst, Bruce, "How Much Is Too Much?" Time, 12 February 1990, p. 16-21. Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, 1988, p. 1. Rhodes, Jeffrey, "The First C-17," Air Force Magazine, August, 1988, p. 54. Smith, Bradley, "Maritime Challenges to Sustaining the Force," Military Review, September 1989, p. 28.
