Security Assistance Forces (SAF): A US Military Option For Counterinsurgency AUTHOR Major Philip T. Klapakis, USA CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: Security Assistance Forces (SAF): A US Military Option For Counterinsurgency THESIS: The Security Assistance Forces (SAF) Concept must be reinstated as an primary US military option for counterinsurgency in order for the United States to successfully conduct Low Intensity Conflicts operations in the Third World in the future. ISSUE: The most likely challenge to US national interests in the future will be the Low Intensity Conflicts in the Third World. While the US has had varying degrees of LIC success in three of the four broad categories -- combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations; insurgency and counterinsurgency operations have not fared as well. This situation will continue until some adjustments are made in military doctrine, national strategy, and at the operational levels. Unless these adjustments are made the US government and military will remain functionally unable to plan and conduct effective operations in insurgency affected friendly and allied nations in the future. Nearly three decades ago the US was faced with this same situation. The solution was a counterinsurgency strategy that used all the elements of national power through an indirect approach based on assistance programs. The US military support for this strategy was the Security Action Forces Concept (SAFs are now called Security Assistance Forces). Although the SAF never eliminated insurgency anywhere it did reduce the insurgent threat in many nations. It appeared the US had found a viable strategy for the future, but the concept was never allowed to mature. In an effort to cast out the pain of Vietnam, the US stopped executing a successful FID program that was aimed at countering insurgency in the Third World. CONCLUSION: So if it is true that the lessons of the past provide a window to the future, then it is time that our civilian and military leaders look back to the past for the solution to the future. In order to regain the operational capability to counter insurgent threats in the Third World in the future, the National Command Authority and the military must revive and update the old counterinsurgency SAF concept of operations. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (SAF): THE US MILITARY OPTION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: The Security Assistance Forces (SAF) Concept must be reinstated as an primary US military option for counterinsurgency in order for the United States to successfully conduct Low Intensity Conflicts operations in the Third World in the future. I. SAF A BEGINNING-THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE A. CONCEPT B. ORGANIZATION C. MISSION D. ACCOMPLISHMENTS E. THE BUGLE BLOWS LAST CALL II. SHIFTING STRATEGIC REALITIES AND A RENEWED INTEREST A. US GOVERNMENT OPTIONS TO SUPPORT FID B. US MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUPPORT C. US MILITARY SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY III. SAF IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE A. PRIOR TO REVISION B. AFTER REVISION IV. SAF IN THE FUTURE A. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS B. STRATEGICAL ANALYSIS C. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS V. CONCLUSIONS SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (SAF): A US MILITARY OPTION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY Prologue In the 1960s, faced with mounting insurgency threats from within the Third World, the United States sought to find a new strategy that would effectively ensure the collective security of affected allied and friendly nations. Having learned that the roots of insurgency resided often in the political, economic, and societal failures of a country, the US intended to use assistance programs as a means to help counter these failures. This was to be done by using an indirect approach instead of overt force through military confrontation. For the military, this indirect approach led to a counterinsurgency strategy that centered on the Special Action Forces (SAF is now called Security Assistance Forces) Concept. (5) This concept significantly increased the US military's ability to plan and conduct US Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations in insurgency affected nations. SAFs became the "hands-on" tool at the operational level (theater and in-country). It became the in-country bridge that linked the military and State Department together as the US Country Team (USCT). This organization provided the catalyst that was needed to tie all the FID assistance programs into a workable campaign plan. The genius behind the concept was that it insured a unity of effort and a proactive response between civilian, government, and military organizations. For the first time the US could employ all the elements of national power against the threat posed by an insurgency. The United States appeared to be on the road to a continuous and viable strategy that would alleviate insurgency threats to US national interests in the Third World. This ended in the mid-1970s when SAFs were no longer deployed as an operational strategy against insurgency. The loss of the SAFs caused the entire indirect approach to falter. With the bridge missing, the US could no longer effectively apply all the elements of national power to counter the threat of insurgency. The real damage was done to the country teams. They were left impotent without a complete organization to implement the "hands-on" assistance. Today, the US faces the same threat to its national interests in the Third World that existed nearly three decades ago. It never really went away. Even though a national policy and strategy now exist, the articulation of these concepts and the mechanism for implementation remain incomplete. (20:1) In an effort to cast out the pain of Vietnam, the US stopped executing a successful FID program that was aimed at countering insurgency in the Third World--SAF. To regain the operational capability to counter these insurgency threats in the future, the US government and military must build on the old SAF concept and it must actively employ it in insurgency affected friendly and allied nations. SAF A Beginning-The Historical Perspective Concept. In March of 1963, the US Army published its concept for SAF--National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 182. (5) NSAM 182 was used for strategic policy guidance to determine FID activities. NSAM No. 182 was comprehensive and not only addressed the threat, objectives and strategy, it addressed a plan for strategy implementation. Methods of support for Third World nations in LIC environments were outlined to include intelligence, land reform, civic action, community development, education, leader groups, police etc. The role of multilateral organizations was covered as well as the specific roles and missions of: Special Group (C.I.), State Department, AID, DoD, CIA, and USIA. A model country internal defense plan was even included as an annex. (19:2-6) The SAF concept called for USCTs to develop FID plans that would guide the Department of Defense (DOD) in planning for future Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) activities. Under the SAF concept, USCTs received military resources from unified commands to support the military aspects of a host country's FID plan. Military resourcing for FID operations was managed through the in-country Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG). Even though a MAAG was part of the USCT, it came under the command of unified commands (CINC) to which it was assigned. MAAGs were responsible for providing the military planning, training and advice, assistance, and equipment to host countries. (17) Organization. SAF units were organized by the Army under the command and control of a Special Forces Group (SFG) as follows: Built around the basic 1500 man Special Forces Group organization with its thirty-six A detachments, nine B detachments, and three C teams, the SAF became a task force of specialized health, education, sanitation, civil administration, public works, and forestry. A Psychological Operations Battalion had experts in radio and leaflet propaganda, public information, entertainment, and education all backed up by sophisticated mobile equipment. The Engineer Detachment provided professional experience in all kinds of construction, maintenance, road building, water purification, and well drilling. The all purpose A team "docs" were now backed up by a Medical Detachment of experts in preventive medicine, dentistry, hygiene, sanitation, and public health, as well as general medicine and surgery. An Intelligence Detachment brought professionals for photo interpretation, agent handling and nets, counterintelligence lie detection, lock picking, wiretapping, bugging, and debugging, and even more exotic enterprises. Some SAFs . . . even had Military Police Detachments, skilled in riot control, investigative procedures, and population and traffic control. All SAFs had an Army Security Agency unit, with classified capabilities and mobile and man-portable equipment in the field of electronic intelligence. (14:69) Mission. When deployed these ready forces would support commanders of a unified command in the execution of FID missions. When SAFs were employed by the CINC in their IDAD role it was to assist the MAAG's FID plan. They provided training, operational advice, and assistance to host country forces. (19:3-7) Accomplishments. In the early 1960s the US military deployed four SAF units to gain control of emerging insurgencies that continued to effect US national interests in the Third World. These SAFs were built around 1st Special Forces Group (SAFASIA) on Okinawa, 8th Special Forces Group for Latin America in Panama, and the other two were established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as part of 3rd and 6th Groups for Africa and the Middle East. (14:69-70) Between these four SAF Groups, thousands of security assistance missions were successfully conducted in support of friendly host governments that were besieged by the threat of insurgency. Although insurgency was never truly eliminated anywhere, there was a great reduction in the effectiveness of rural insurgency in many nations. The Bugle Blows Last Call. The SAF concept appeared to be working; yet, the effectiveness was difficult to measure because the concept was never allowed to mature. In the mid-1970s United States Special Forces (USSF) was not only withdrawn from its role in Vietnam, but all the forces were redeployed back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina into a "retired on active duty" status. Given an aversion by some segments of the Pentagon leadership to Special Forces (SF) operations, this state of affairs was not surprising. This phobia was caused by a fear that using any "elite" type of force to deal with problems that could not be resolved by conventional military methods would lead to a criticism of the conventional military. Therefore, elite forces of any type were viewed as a threat by conventional military hierarchies. In the aftermath of Vietnam, Special Forces (SF) were not considered in the revision of US military doctrine, force posturing, or contingency planning. The non-military instruments for conducting special operations were largely dismantled. Ultimately, this decision would lead the US down the path of unpreparedness for the type of conflicts that it would most likely encounter in the future in the Third World--Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). By 1981, the ability of the US to conduct LIC operations was almost nonexistent. (3:6) Shifting Strategic Realities and a Renewed Interest Since the early 1980s US policymakers and military leaders have come to accept that as the US moves inextricably into the 21st Century, our concerns and national interests will continue to be challenged by events, actions, and conflicts that are generated in developing Third World nations. (4:3) To meet these Third World challenges the United States embarked on a complex and comprehensive program throughout the 1980s to revitalize efforts that had nearly stopped after Vietnam. The source of these efforts stemmed from a combined realization by US government officials and the US military that the conditions under which policy and strategy had developed were maligned for the following reasons: The U.S. response to the crisis in Southeast Asia was indecisive and imprudent, and became focused on a one-dimensional military solution to the multi-dimensional problem. Policy, doctrine, and ideas regarding LIC already established did not seem to influence the U.S. response. The U.S. overestimated its capabilities and underestimated those of the enemy. Military force as an element of national power was misapplied. (19:2-7) Because of this view, substantial changes have occurred in LIC policy, strategy, doctrine, and force structuring. The revitalization of Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements from 1986 to 1990 has in many ways significantly increased the US government's capability to conduct LIC operations. While this is true in three of the four broad categories of LIC--combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations; the United States' counterinsurgency capability still needs some major revisions. Without this, US FID operations will be nothing more than a bandaid. Current US Government Options to Support FID. At the national level, the National Command Authority (NCA) has two fundamental courses of action to assist an ally in defending itself against a potential or actual threat to its internal security. One of these is the deployment of US combat forces to assist an ally in varying degrees. This may range from providing a more secure and stable environment through continued development or helping to defeat an internal threat through large scale combat operations. (7:1-2) The other of these fundamental courses of action is the application of a wide variety of programs executed by different US government agencies. These programs aid developing nations to make economic, political, humanitarian, and military improvements and are defined under the broad title of US Foreign Assistance Programs. The US Foreign Assistance Programs are divided into three major categories: Development Assistance Programs, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs, and Security Assistance Programs.(7:103) While the US military may participate in development and humanitarian assistance, the primary response is directed through Security Assistance Programs (SAP). US Military SAP Support. The US military provides security assistance to a host nation's (HN) operations in the context of FID. This US security assistance includes: . . . a variety of programs used to assist friendly and allied countries in the establishment and maintenance of an adequate defense posture. This support is intended to insure internal security and resistance to external aggression. The reason for US assistance is based on the belief that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign countries is essential to the security of the United States. Security Assistance Programs are designed to provide allied and friendly nations with the capability to resist aggression in accordance with regional defense agreements and US contingency plans. (7:104) Based on the above situation, the US military provides material, advisors, trainers, and SAFs to support the HN's counterinsurgency operations through Security Assistance Organizations (SAO is the new acronym for MAAG). Us Military Support for Counterinsurgency. Initially, US efforts will be directed toward an assessment of the threat to a host government and to US national interests. It is the country team's responsibility, normally under the Ambassador, to assess the situation in-country and recommend what level of US assistance is required. If a host country requests assistance and US national interests are involved, the NCA may direct the US military to participate in FID operations. When a Phase I level of insurgency is reached in a HN the US may assist through a variety of SAPs. These SAPs are designed to strengthen the HN's ability to handle the insurgency threat. In this phase of insurgency SAO officials can advise and assist, if requested and approved by the US government, on the military aspects of internal defense. If the SAOs do not have the expertise Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) may be called upon to fulfill mission requirements. Generally US troops are not employed to assist a HN unless the level of insurgency appears to threaten the stability of that HN. Usually this occurs after the level of insurgency intensifies to Phase II or Phase III. After the USCT has assessed the insurgency to be at a Phase II level, then US assistance will most probably increase to a much higher level. The SAO would request and provide equipment, training, and in very limited cases advisors to legitimate HN forces. Resourcing could come from a specially trained SAF. It is possible that a commitment of this size may cause the CINC to employ a subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to take over command and control from the SAO. The reason for using a JTF headquarters is that usually there is more than a one service involved in providing security assistance. If the insurgency threat reaches a Phase III level (a situation where insurgent forces may forcibly take over the host country), the US response may be to employ combat forces. This would be done only to support HN forces. At this time the CINC would have to insure the establishment of a combined forces headquarters to direct the campaign plan. However, US forces would remain under the command and control of either a unified command or a subordinate JTF command. (7:16-17) While the US may provide security assistance based upon a long term insurgency threat that escalates slowly to the point of combat operations it may happen in the reverse. In other words, the US may send in combat forces to help reduce an immediate threat and then follow this action up with a SAF to stabilize the situation. Despite the level of insurgency or the time frame, the US must be able to respond quickly with the appropriate level of assistance to help the HN gain the psychological, political, military, and economic edge over the threat. Because SAFs provide such a versatile capability, they should be used both in long and short term security assistance operations. SAF in foreign Internal Defense. Prior to Revision. The original SAF concept was stratified to support a counterinsurgency doctrine. The precepts under which this program was to work are as follows: . . . [SAF] elements engaged in FID are primarily oriented toward the development and training of foreign military and paramilitary organizations. The purpose of this training is to improve the tactical proficiency of the foreign military forces and to inculcate in them the idea that all types of activities must be conducted to diminish the credibility of the insurgencies among the population. These additional activities include civic action, civil assistance, and humanitarian- type programs. (9:7) To accomplish this diverse program, a SAF had to be augmented by resources and units that could assist a host country in developing internal defense programs. These assets and resources were to be provided by civilian and military organizations tied to the combined effort. This augmentation even included backup forces that were organized under a US Army Brigade, specially trained to perform FID assistance to the SAF. When ready the SAF would support the in-country FID plan by employing task organized MTTs. The mission of these MTTs was to organize, train, and advise host country military and paramilitary forces. When necessary a SAF, in conjunction with host country forces, could conduct the following missions: * Operations against insurgent base areas to separate the insurgent from his support and to destroy his facilities. * Operations against interior infiltration routes to deny or limit insurgent movement. * Remote area operations in contested areas or areas under insurgent control populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. * Urban operations to assist local governments in neutralizing the insurgent political leadership and infrastructure. * Border operations to provide surveillance and control over possible infiltration routes. * Civic action operations designed to improve the quality of life of the host nation population and to mobilize and motivate them to support their government. * Humanitarian relief operations, such as distribution of food and medical supplies, security and sanitation services, to provide assistance to host country population and refugees following natural or man made disasters. * Liaison tasks upon the commitment of US conventional forces. (9:8) This counterinsurgency SAF package provided no only the host country, but the US government and military an effective campaign plan that could deter the effects of insurgency. Prior to the December 1989 revision of FM 100-20, SAF's were a composite organization of units organized under a Special Forces Group headquarters. Figure 1 depicts the SAF organization and its command relationships. Figure 2 shows the composite organizations within the SAF. Click here to view image After Revision. Since the revision, which is now a joint Army and Air Force manual, SAFs will no longer be just organized around Special Forces Groups and counterinsurgency operations. The Army now envisions the SAF as a diverse organization that will be tailored to meet the requirements of one of the four broad categories of LIC. Figure 3 depicts a generic SAF organization that will consist of either a joint or single service headquarters element with assets from combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. Special Forces, CA, PSYOP, engineer, medical, and military police are just some units that may be included in the organization. The revised concept still has a backup force requirement, but this no longer comes from the US Army brigade size force structure. The SAF backup organization will now come from ground, air, and sea forces. The mixture will be determined again based on mission. (7:2-35) The change in doctrine and force organization was an attempt to give greater organizational flexibility to the SAF organization by drawing from a wider base of US military forces. Click here to view image SAF in the Future Since the real core of LIC is insurgency and counterinsurgency, it is essential that the US focus on reviving this type of SAF. While the US has had varying degrees of LIC success with forces employed in three of the four categories, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations have not fared as well. This situation will continue until some adjustments are made in military doctrine, national strategy, and at the operational levels. Unless these adjustments are made the US government and military will remain functionally unable to plan and conduct effective FID operations in insurgency affected friendly or allied nations for the foreseeable future. Doctrinal Analysis. There is no doubt that the US military believes that the SAF concept is still viable as a solution for FID operations. Doctrinally, the SAF concept and organization have stayed on the books (FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development, November 1974; FM 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, January 1981; and FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft), June 1988) even though it was deleted as an operational mission in 1973. The basic problem with the doctrine and concept throughout all revisions is that there is an illusion that the SAF has been or will be a part of counterinsurgency LIC operations. The truth is that for nearly twenty years SAFs have not been employed in this type of mission. This reality explains why both US government and military leaders have a difficult time articulating and implementing a total LIC strategy that works. Between the first two military field manuals there is almost no difference in the doctrinal SAF concept because it was based solely on counterinsurgency. In the final draft there are substantial changes that are cause for concern. First, the SAF concept and organizations of the future are generic and ill-defined based on each LIC type of mission. When this occurs in military doctrine it causes confusion not only at the operational and tactical level for military units and USCTs, but at the strategic level for policymakers. While there is a real need to update the SAF concept and organization of the 1960s, current doctrine fails to define clearly the who, what, when, how, and why for each specific "hands-on" SAF organization. Before revision, the doctrine defined in detail how a SAF would support counterinsurgency operations. Revised doctrine must provide the same in-depth guidance, only now it must do this for each broad category of LIC. Secondly, revised military doctrine does not explain the special requirements of each SAF headquarters based on mission. This gives the impression that a generic SAF headquarters in the future could handle each diverse LIC mission. The problem with this is that generic headquarters tend to be led and staffed by elements that neither understand the multidimensional LIC "phenomena" nor are they trained to handle its diverse relationships. While this is true for all LIC missions it is even more so for insurgency and counterinsurgency. This situation is one of the primary reasons that US FID operations have failed to successfully counter insurgency in the Third World over the last 15 years. The SAF supporting counterinsurgency operations can best be commanded and controlled by the organization that has always been trained for the mission--Special forces. The counterinsurgency SAF must be wrapped around this type of organization if the US intends to successfully counter future insurgent threats in the Third World. Most of the current rhetoric written about the revitalization of SOF validates the idea that Special Forces' units are the force of choice for counterinsurgency operations. They are trained in the techniques of "nation building", which is the best indirect way to counter insurgent threats. This does not mean that this type of SAF is just one service because it must be joint to be effective. The headquarters must be a "purple suit" organization -- staffed by trained SOF assets from each service, but led by US Special Forces. The last substantial difference is in the organization of backup forces. While the older field manuals provided a detailed concept and organization, the final draft details very little other than there is a need for ground, air, and sea forces to backup the SAF. It is essential that these backup forces be identified and designated for this type of mission to develop forces that are partially language qualified, area-oriented, and trained in IDAD. When trained they must be able to supplement a SAF with operational units consistent with mission requirements. Strategical Analysis. While the SAF option provides the best solution for counterinsurgency operations, implementation will remain elusive without a definitive national LIC strategy. The inability of the National Command Authority (NCA) to establish an Umbrella Concept for LIC that focuses on insurgency stems from the problem of altering core policy-making systems. (19:3-2) This has been a difficult task to accomplish because: traditionally the processes, habits and educational means of systems which are involved in defense and foreign affairs policy-making are entrenched in thinking based on conventional Soviet/East-West terms. (19:2-21) While this situation is changing, the NCA has not been able to incorporate the political, economic, and military instruments of power into a "work-together-without-rivalry" package beyond support for crisis or ad-hoc situations. In other words, the long term strategy requirements to support counterinsurgency have been left barren. Without a definitive Umbrella Concept that focuses all government agencies into a unity of effort, there is no thread that binds strategy to operations in an insurgency environment. (20:1) For the SAF concept to work even better than it did from 1962-1973 this unity of effort at the national level must be in place and it must be proactive. (20:16-18) Unless close interagency support exists between the civilian and military working groups, LIC environments cannot be effectively combat-managed. (20:3) Besides implementing a complete Umbrella Concept of LIC, the administration must get the mandated LIC Board going. Once established as an executive board with representation from all the key government and military departments, this organization should help straighten out the strategic entanglements that prevent a cohesive counterinsurgency strategy from being executed. Operational Analysis. The lack of a comprehensive National LIC Umbrella Concept and a SAF organization to support it impacts resoundingly at the operational levels. The net effect is that the CINC and USCT organizations who have to execute FID actions in an insurgent environment are impotent. They remain hollow without the expertise, resources, and guidance that allows them to develop effective FID campaign plans in their regional areas or countries of responsibility. Each CINC now has a Special Operations Command (SOC) Headquarters assigned in each theater. This subordinate organization is responsible for all in-theater LIC operations and it would become a JTF when required. Additionally, a Tactical Army Special Operations Command (TASOC) has been established (theoretically) under the SOC to command and control US Army operations in support of LIC. This organizational concept may be the beginning of the revitalization of the SAF organization. However, it is far from producing the "hands-on" forces and capabilities required to support the FID requirements of USCTs in insurgent affected countries. While the actions being taken at the theater level are encouraging, the in-country teams are still without the immediate help they need. A near term solution to this problem would be to assign SOF assets to the SAO. This would provide the SAO with capabilities essential to the support of FID counterinsurgency requirements, that do not currently exist in-country. The SOF assets must be a core of trained specialists in counterinsurgency operations, intelligence, logistics, engineering, medical, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPs. Addition specialties could be added based on requirements. The team must be joint and represent the SOF assets of each service. There also must be a liaison element on this team for any designated backup forces. This organization must be officially part of the in-country team, not a temporary Mobile Training Team. Temporary teams do not produce comprehensive results. This has been a large problem with FID programs. This action would insure not only immediate proactive support of the FID program, but it would give the SAO a permanent organization for the long term. This quick fix would put some "bite" back into the less than successful FID programs; at least until a counterinsurgency SAF concept becomes an active reality. Conclusions US military doctrine and national policy have remained vague and unresponsive when it comes to executing an effective counterinsurgency strategy in support of affected friendly or allied nations. Unless this deficiency is reversed the United States' ability to protect its national interests and the security interests of its friends and allies in the future will be difficult. Therefore, as the NCA lays out its National Umbrella Concept for LIC it must ensure the revitalization and modernization of a SAF concept of operations that will counter insurgency in the Third World in the future. While reviving this type of SAF concept is only part of the solution for a complex environment, it will restart a capability that should have never been lost. It will insure that the focus is returned to the operational level where the battle against insurgency is won or lost. SAF provides the means to focus results from the bottom up rather from the top down. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Baker, Caleb. "US Lacks Cohesive Third World Conflict Policy." Defense News, Vol. 4 No. 50, 11 December 1989, pp. 3 and 43. 2. Barnes, Rudolph C. Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, US Army Reserves. "The Politics of Low-Intensity Conflict," Military Review. February 1988, page 5. 3. Barnett, Frank R., and Shultz, Richard H., eds. Special Operations In US Strategy. 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Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 September 1988. 11. Klare, Michael T. and Kornbluh, Peter, eds. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency. Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties. 1988. 12. Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Commitment to Freedom, Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World (RCWG-2). May 1988. 13. Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict (RCWG-1). June 1988, pp. 1-87. 14. Simpson, Charles M. III. Inside the Green Berets, The First Thirty Years. California: Presido Press, 1983. 15. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Conference Report. 16. The White House. National Security Action Memorandum No. 124 (NSAM 124). 18 January 1962, declassified on 11 August 1978. 17. The White House. 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