El Dorado Canyon: Strategic Strike, National Objectives AUTHOR Major Ralph J. Jodice II, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES THESIS: El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national security objectives of the United States. ISSUES: State sponsored terrorism was on the rise in the early to mid 1980's. Leading the attack was Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and the country of Libya. Solely, Qaddafi singled out the United States and was determined to undermine its influence around the globe. Training, funding, equipping, and diplomatically supporting international terrorist organizations became the norm for Qaddafi. The potential for hijackings and bombings put the United States, its allies and friends in danger anywhere in the world. The United States attempted to counter Qaddafi's state sponsored terrorism with economic, political, and diplomatic elements of power. However, none proved effective leaving innocent people as victims. El Dorado Canyon was the United States' answer to employing its military element of power. By using a joint precise, powerful, night, surprise attack, President Reagan unleashed the military might of the United States. Destruction of the infrastructure of state sponsored terrorism inside Libya was the military objective. However, the national security objectives were to give credibility, clarity, and consistency to the remaining elements of power. What had been futilely attempted prior to El Dorado Canyon was successfully achieved on 15 April 1986. El Dorado Canyon, and the events surrounding it, showed all terrorist that the United States was determined to, and capable of, combating terrorism worldwide. CONCLUSION: A military airstrike like El Dorado Canyon is not the answer to combating every terrorist situation. Rather, El Dorado Canyon is a prime example that for the political, economic, and diplomatic elements of power to be effective there must be, as a minimum, the threat of a significant military element of power. Any country must closely coordinate all its elements of power in order to effectively counter state sponsored terrorism. EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national security objectives of the United States. I. The continual increase of terrorism in the 1980s A. Employing the elements of power B. State sponsored terrorism defined II. The role of Libya A. Funding, equipping, and training terrorists B. Operations supported by Qaddafi III. Events leading up to El Dorado Canyon A. Terrorism against the United States B. Events prior to March and April 1986 1. Line of death 2. More terrorism - the Berlin disco bombing IV. The joint airstrike - Operation El Dorado Canyon A. Short and long term objectives 1. National security objectives 2. Military objectives B. Selection of forces and targets 1. Rules of Engagement 2. Execution C. Initial strike results V. Short term results A. American public, media, and congressional responses B. Libyan, Soviet, and Arab responses C. World opinion 1. Western Europe VI. What did El Dorado Canyon accomplish? A. Credibility, clarity, and consistency B. National security objectives achieved VII. National objectives and the military element of power EL DORADO CANYON: STRATEGIC STRIKE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES In the early to mid 1980's, the United States was at war. The "war" was not a conventional war as thought of in today's modern society nor in the classical Clausewitzen sense. Rather, it was a very unconventional "war". The "war" was declared upon the U.S. and many western nations by state sponsored terrorists. Spearheading the terrorist's effort was the nation of Libya and its radical, irrational leader -- Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Since his overthrow of the Sanusi government and assumption of power in 1969, Qaddafi continually confronted the U.S. The new Libyan leader was determined to declare "victory" over the "capitalist" superpower. Whether smuggling weapons into Sudan, supporting Black September terrorists, desiring the assassination of Henry Kissinger during the Middle East peace accords, or attempting subversion of the White House, labor unions, black organizations, oil companies, and politically influential individuals, Colonel Qaddafi made his realities of state sponsored terrorism felt worldwide.1 By 1986, the terrorist activities of Libya, specifically aimed at the United States, were at an all time high. The hijackings of TWA Flight 847, the cruise ship the Achille 1 Focus On Libya; February 1984 to June 1989. A Resource Compendium, PEMCON Ltd. Washington D.C., 1989, p. 5. Laro, and Egypt Air Flight 648, followed by the Rome and Vienna Airport massacres, and the Berlin Disco bombing, all inflicted numerous, unnecessary deaths to American and international citizens. Leading the charge against state sponsored terrorism was the United States under President Ronald Reagan. In an attempt to influence terrorist states and to achieve the United States' national security objectives, diplomatic, economic, and political elements of power were put in motion. However, none proved effective, and Qaddafi's violent activities continued unabated. Following many discussions with advisors and international leaders, President Reagan concluded that Qaddafi would only understand the reprisal of military might. The U.S. had not yet employed its military element of power aimed specifically at the heart of state sponsored terrorism. Shooting down a few MIGs and sinking some patrol boats had no impact on Qaddafi's actions and was only a prelude of things to come. Consequently, in late 1985, the U.S. began planning for a strategic strike intended to inflict significant damage to the heart of the terrorist's infrastructure. The concept for El Dorado Canyon was born. El Dorado Canyon was designed to be a strategic airstrike aimed at achieving the national security objectives of the United States. Libya's role amongst the terrorist's camps was very influential. It was time to topple the Libyan leader's reign of fear on citizens worldwide. State sponsored terrorism poses a unique problem to any nation. A state that makes its resources -- financial, logistic, training, intelligence, and political -- available for terrorism vastly enhances the striking power of terrorists. Of even more profound concern is the damage done by state sponsored terrorism to the fragile international order. State support is what helps to transform terrorism from an intelligence and law enforcement problem into the international political threat.2 This was the position of Libya and the regime of Qaddafi by the mid 1980's. To Muammar Qaddafi, terrorism is a means to an end -- his "victory". He sees himself as having the sole responsibility of uniting the Arab world and ridding it of the state of Israel. To achieve these objectives, Qaddafi has pursued a foreign policy with four purposes: to weaken the role of Western (Christian) Democracies in the Middle East, to destroy Israel, to attack Israeli supporters, and to expand Libya's role in the Middle East and Africa.3 With limited economic and political capability to achieve these goals, Libya has relied on a revolutionary armed struggle. Through the use of state sponsored terrorism, Qaddafi possessed the 2 Levitt, Geoffrey M. Democracies Against Terror; The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism, The Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington D.C., Praeger 1988, p. 1. 3 Parks, Hays W., Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. "Crossing the Line." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1986, pp. 40-52. capability to influence the world without being a world leader. As early as 1977, Libya was listed in the annual report to the U.S. Department of Defense as the fourth major threat to the U.S. behind the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. Cuba was ranked fifth.4 During this period, Qaddafi's support of terrorism was total. Through the use of East Germans, Syrians, Palestinians, Soviets, and their corresponding nation's support, Libya was capable of training, equipping, funding, and diplomatically supporting a host of international terrorist organizations. Qaddafi made Libya the most visible participant in terrorism. He acquired the much needed publicity to meet his own internal requirements of legitimacy and to demonstrate his effectiveness. Qaddafi's tool of using state sponsored terrorism to accomplish his goals was working. He was successfully eroding Western influence in the Middle East while striking directly at the foremost superpower in the world. The events leading to the potential employment of a strategic strike against the heart of state sponsored terrorism was continually rising, especially in 1984 and 1985. Regardless of the economic and political measures by the United States, Americans were the targets of terrorism in all corners of the world. In June 1985, the hijacking of TWA 4 Focus On Libya, p. 5. Flight 847 resulted in the death on an off duty Navy diver. During the process, 37 American men were taken hostage and subsequently dispersed throughout Southern Beirut. As the summer progressed, two attacks linked to the Abu Nidal terrorist organization resulted in the injury of nine Americans. On 7 October, the Achille Laro was hijacked and a 69 year old disabled American was killed. Shortly thereafter, the Abu Nidal struck again and hijacked Egypt Air Flight 684. Immediately, Americans and Israelis were singled out. The last and most deadly act of 1985 occurred on 27 December. The Abu Nidal attacked at the TWA and El Al ticket counters in the Rome and Vienna Airports. Eighteen people were killed -- five were Americans. In all cases, the "fingerprints" of Qaddafi and his "strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes, and squalid criminals"5 were clearly on the deaths of many innocent people. Again, the United States answered these attacks with more unilateral political and economic measures. On 7 January 1986, the President declared a "national emergency" and issued an Executive Order to deal with the immediate threat to U.S. national security.6 Libyan assets in the 5 Reagan, Ronald. "The New Network of Terrorist States." Terrorism, Volume 9, Number 2, 1987, pp. 101-112. 6 Trebon, Gregory L., Major, U.S. Air Force. "Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism -- What Did Operation El Dorado Canyon Accomplish?" Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 1988, p. 15. U.S. were frozen. All remaining economic ties were severed. Any Americans still in Libya were ordered to leave immediately. Also, the U.S. attempted to get further support from its European Allies, with little avail. President Reagan and the American people were tired of waiting for economic sanctions to work. As each day passed, the prospects for employing the military element of power grew larger. The events that followed in March 1986 were essential to the execution of El Dorado Canyon. The United States was employing its strong military arm through a Freedom of Navigation exercise challenging Qaddafi's "line of death" in the Gulf of Sidra. During the exercise, Libyan patrol boats and surface-to-air missiles sites were attacked as they presented a potential threat to the Navy's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Qaddafi reacted by sending a message to the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin directing them "...to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties."7 The interception of this message was essential to accelerating the on-going planning for a punitive strike against Qaddafi's terrorism. Before the President could react with a well planned strike, terrorists struck twice within three days. On 2 7 "Reagan Ordered Air Strikes to Preempt Libyan Terrorists." Aviation Week and Space Technoloay, April 27, 1987, pp. 22-23. April, a bomb exploded aboard TWA Flight 840 enroute to Athens. Four Americans were killed. Although the attack appeared to be Syrian sponsored, Qaddafi was quick to congratulate the terrorists and warned of continued escalation of violent acts toward Americans around the world.8 Intelligence data from the Berlin Disco bombing on 5 April clearly showed Libyan knowledge and support of the attack. Again, Qaddafi was full of congratulatory comments to the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin on its success. This event finally triggered the Administration. President Reagan was determined to retaliate and had built a dossier with substantial evidence against the Qaddafi regime. Contrary to the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency, the President decided to use military force. He was determined to destroy the infrastructure of state sponsored terrorism in Libya. There were five primary national security objectives that the United States wanted to accomplish with El Dorado Canyon. First, the U.S. wanted to deter Qaddafi from continued support of state sponsored terrorism. Second, the President wanted people in power in Libya to see that Qaddafi's positions on state sponsored terrorism would be detrimental to their country. Possibly, this could force a change in Libyan leadership. Third, the U.S. wanted to prove to the world its commitment to fighting state sponsored 8 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism," p. 18. terrorism. Fourth, this would be a warning shot to terrorists. Finally, the U.S. hoped to gather tougher support from its allies and friends in the combined effort in deterring terrorism.9 On 15 April 1986, the United States Air Force and Navy launched Operation El Dorado Canyon aimed at destroying Qaddafi's terrorist infrastructure. The military goals of the raid were to destroy the terrorist training and command and control facilities. However, the national objective was to impose the will of the United States over the will of the terrorist activities stemming from Libya. In classic Clausewitzian terms, the U.S. was using its military element of power to accomplish its political will. Wishing to deter future terrorist activities, the U.S. was showing terrorists worldwide that they would pay the price for conducting such aggressive acts. President Reagan stated the purpose of the attack was to "...not only diminish Colonel Qaddafi's ability to export terror; it will provide him with incentives and reason to alter his criminal behavior."10 Additionally, the President hoped the attack would provide significant impetus to the Libyan people to force Qaddafi from power. The raid was designed to strike directly at the heart of Qaddafi's ability to export terrorism. The final targets 9 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrprism," p. 31. 10 Ibid, p. 22. were selected at the National Security Council level and within the circle of the President's advisors. Ultimately, five targets were selected: 1. The command and control headquarters for Libyan terrorism at the Aziziyah barracks, 2. The military facilities at Tripoli's main airport, 3. The underwater sabotage training facility at Side Bilal, 4. Another terrorist command post at the Jamahiriyah military barracks in Benghazi, and 5. The Benina Air Base southeast of Benghazi.11 The first four targets were selected because of their direct connection to terrorist activities. The Benina airfield was attacked to preempt Libyan fighter aircraft from intercepting the incoming strike package. In order to accomplish the desired political and military objectives, the selected forces needed the capability to strike all five targets simultaneously with pinpoint accuracy, carry enough firepower to do significant damage, and employ the element of surprise. The current Naval aviation assets in the Mediterranean could not perform 11 Anno, Stephen E., Colonel, U.S. Air Force, and Einspahr, William E., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force. "Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid." The Air War College, Air University, 1988, pp. 49-50. the mission alone. Therefore, the United States Air Force's F-111F's stationed in the United Kingdom were added. Between the Air Force's F-111F's and the Navy's A-6E's, the President had the aircraft necessary to conduct a precise, damaging night attack. Overall, approximately 100 aircraft (including the EF-111, KC-10, KC-135, A-7, F/A-18, F-14, and E-2C) were employed to achieve the desired results.12 Target area deconfliction between the services was accomplished by assigning the Navy the Benghazi targets and the Air Force the Tripoli targets. This insured each service had its own area of operations and decreased the need for extensive interservice planning within this joint operation. Destroying the targets, reducing the probability of collateral damage and casualties, and minimizing the possible loss of American aircraft were the foundation for the rules of engagement (ROE) developed for El Dorado Canyon. The mission ROE required that the aircrews make only one pass over the target (no reattacks), weapon systems be fully operational, and the targets be positively identified on radar prior to bomb release. With the concept of operations 12 Anno and Einspahr, "Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned," p. 51. developed, targets identified, forces selected, and the mission ROE established, there only remained obtaining diplomatic approval for staging the overflight.13 Prime Minister Thatcher approved the staging of Air Force refueling aircraft and F/EF-111's from bases within England. However, overflight permission from France and Spain was not granted. This added approximately 1300 nautical miles each way to the route of flight (equating to six to seven hours of additional flight time for the Air Force aircraft), not to mention the additional air refueling support requirement. At 0200 (local Libyan time) on 15 April i986, the devastating might of the United States' military element of power fell on the leader of state sponsored terrorism with overpowering success. Tactical surprise was achieved, and the required damage to all targets accomplished. Collateral damage was kept to a minimum (even though the French Embassy was damaged), while the Air Force lost one F-111F. The military objectives of the U.S. were achieved, but only time would tell if the full effect of U.S. political goals would be accomplished. The reaction on the home front was extremely positive. The American people responded with overwhelming support. Well over 70% of the people agreed with the President's 13 Trebon, "Libyan State Sponsored Terrorism," p. 25. actions and would back him again, if necessary. The media reaction was also in favor of the strike, while reaction in the political arena was mixed. Some politicians were afraid that even though the U.S. used military force this would not deter Qaddafi. Rather, this would strengthen his position and further increase his use of terrorism. The European community was generally critical and bitter. As allies, most felt excluded by not being consulted in the ultimate decision to use military force. The European Economic Community (EEC) was harsh. They felt "up-staged" by the U.S. because they had finally decided in the previous few days to exert tougher sanctions on Libya. They were also afraid the strike would bring increased terrorism' to Europe. The United States offered plenty of opportunities to the Europeans for a collective response prior to the strike. However, none were fully accepted. President Reagan and the American people were pushed to the limit. As far as both were concerned, the U.S. military successfully completed their assigned task. Response from the Soviets was critital. They claimed it was just another attempt by the United States to bring the world closer to a global conflict. The Arab reaction was mixed. They had to back a fellow Arab nation but were slow to condemn the American raid. Furthermore, they did not want to join in unilateral economic sanctions called for by Qaddafi against the U.S.. The mild reaction by the Arab states showed how Qaddafi was isolating himself, and his country, from the rest of the world. On the negative side, El Dorado Canyon did not immediately stop terrorism aimed at the United States. Two days after the raid an American and two British hostages in Lebanon were killed. A note on one of the bodies said the killings were in retaliation for the U.S. airstrikes. On the same day, the communications officer at the U.S. Embassy in Sudan was shot and seriously wounded. On 19 April 1986, four Libyan terrorists attempting to bomb the U.S. Armed Forces Officer's Club in Ankara were arrested by Turkish police. Meanwhile, bomb threats were received by U.S. airlines, government, and military installations around the world.14 In all cases, Libyan involvement was evident. For the political, economic, diplomatic, and military elements of power to be effective, the United States had to establish comprehensive positions of credibility, clarity, and consistency from which it could further employ its national security policies. Credibility was important to demonstrate a determination by the U.S. to oppose terrorism and to help foster an atmosphere in which the prohibitions against state sponsored 14 Marineau, Charles R., Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy. "The 1986 U.S. Airstrikes on Libya: A Prototype for Future Military Action Against Terrorism?" The Naval War College, 1988, pp. 14-15. terrorism were taken seriously.15 It is fair to say, that the strength shown by the U.S. against Libya in 1986 has played some role in the marked decrease in Libyan supported terrorism. The combined effect of the U.S. military action, followed closely by a strong demonstration of united Western political opposition to Libyan terrorism, proved significant in the decrease of state sponsored terrorism against the U.S. and Western Europe. The attempt to achieve collective enforcement against terrorist activities from many allies and friends can fall apart when confronted with the complex and ambiguous realities of specific situations.16 Such was the case between the United States and Western Europe. Clearly, Qaddafi could see that the U.S. and Europe could not agree on economic and political sanctions prior to the raid. However, following El Dorado Canyon and the EEC's resolve to support collective sanctions, it became obvious to Qaddafi, and other terrorist states, that a united economic front can be hazardous to a nation's well being. The people of Libya would suffer because of Qaddafi's policies. Consequently, internal dissension from the Libyan people would pressure Qaddafi to stop his support of state sponsored terrorism. 15 Levitt, Democracies Against Terrors, pp. 98-99. 16 Ibid, pp. 100-101. The most difficult and important element of collective counterterrorism action was finding the proper balance between the requirements of economic and political sanctions and preserving the principles which a country represents.17 The element of consistency from the nations attempting to counter state sponsored terrorism needed to be established. When the European Community joined the U.S. with collective actions aimed at Libyan terrorism, the full effect of cooperative sanctions made their impact. Finally, Qaddafi felt the combined, consistent economic and political ramifications being inflicted upon his country. This proved to have more of a lasting effect on his support of terrorism than the short term military actions of El Dorado Canyon. Today, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi is still the leader of Libya and remains active in state sponsored terrorism. Was the United States' effort on 15 April 1986 in vain? El Dorado Canyon solidified the efforts to combat Libyan sponsored terrorism over a decade and a half in one single strike. It brought the democratic countries of the world together in a united front to allow significant sanctions against Libya. The most important outcome -- Americans are not being attacked by terrorists at the alarming rate of the early to mid 1980's. The President demonstrated his willingness to use military force, as a last resort, against 17 Levitt, Democracies Against Terror, pp. 101-104. state sponsored terrorism. Meanwhile, the American military proved its capability to deliver military might quickly, powerfully, and precisely at targets anywhere in the world. From the onset, the United States knew that El Dorado Canyon could not singularly bring a complete end to state sponsored terrorism. The U.S. wanted to reduce terrorism to a level where it no longer threatened the lives of American people or infringed upon the country's international affairs. In order to achieve these national security objective, the efforts of the economic, political, diplomatic, and military elements of power had to be coordinated. The U.S. learned that terrorism escalated when the military element was absent. As a minimum, there must be the threat of military reprisal to give credibility to the remaining elements of power. El Dorado Canyon did just that. It proved to terrorists, and their sponsoring states, that behind the economic and political actions stands the military power capable of inflicting an appropriate and timely response. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Anno, Stephen E., Colonel, U.S. Air Force, and Einspahr, William E., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force. "Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid." The Air War College, Air University, 1988. 2. Blundy, David and Lycett, Andrew. Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Ma. 1987. 3. Focus on Libya: February 1984 to June 1989. A Resource Compendium, PEMCON Ltd., Washington D.C. 1989. 4. Hewitt, Christopher. The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies'. University of America Press, Lanham, Md. 1984. 5. Jenkins, Brian M. Military Force May Not Be Ruled Out. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca. 1985. 6. Levitt, Geoffery M. 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