Maritime Support Force - Is The S.O.S. Too Late? AUTHOR Major Thomas A. Heffner, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE - IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE? The U.S., as a maritime power, has long recognized and depended on the dual functions of its maritime support force as it relates to contributing to national security. In peace, we rely upon the merchant marine for economic viability and support; in war we turn to this force to transport military reinforcements and sustenance. This connectivity was cited by General Eisenhower who stated, "When final victory is ours, there is no organization that will share the credit more deservedly then the American merchant marine." However, even though various government programs have been implemented in an attempt to maintain a healthy support force, the results have been poor. Today's maritime force has declined to a point where its existence is threatened. Though the U.S. is still the largest economic trader, only four percent of the material is carried by U.S. flag ships. Today the U.S. ranks 10th in the world in size of fleets and has no ships under construction. Recognizing the potential of a dwindling maritime force, the government , via the Military Sealift Command, created a reserve force of merchant ships for recall in an emergency. While the National Defense Reserve Fleet and The Ready Reserve Force have acquired ships, they are plagued with a fleet of near obsolete ships, in poor condition, and which in all probability could not mobilize as planned or needed. But the current condition of both the government owned fleet and the commercial fleet did not happen over night. The maritime industry has long been troubled by: the elimination of government subsidies, the closing of shipyards, the loss of guaranteed cargo hauling programs, and a shrinking pool of mariners. These problems, when coupled with the degraded reliability of the reserve fleet, produce a serious challenge for the nation. The challenge facing the nation is what size/shape the merchant marine support force should be. Unfortunately, though establishing a connection between the support force and the nation's well being, it is the fiscal constraint which will influence the size of the force. In today's deficit reduction atmosphere, the likelihood of the government spending $2.0 billion annually to rescue the maritime support force is dim. Therefore, though many recognize the historical and contemporary role of the maritime support force, both to the economy and the larger maritime strategy pursued by the nation, the condition continues to worsen. Consequently, the deteriorated maritime support capability may very well prove to be the "Achilles Heel" to the nation's defense. THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE: IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE? OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The national security in recent years of the U.S. is directly linked to the ability of its maritime support forces, (i.e. naval strategic fleet, merchant marine fleet, and shipbuilding base) to project and sustain combat forces overseas; however careful analysis reveals the current maritime situation to be an "Achilles Heel" to the national defense. I. INTRODUCTION A. National Security And Maritime Policy B. U.S. Merchant Marine: Past And Present II. ORIENTATION OF FEDERAL MARITIME FLEET A. Military Sealift Command B. National Defense Reserve Fleet C. Ready Reserve Force III. PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE MARITIME FORCES A. Government Financial Support Programs B. Shipyard Reduction C. Military Useful Ships D. Cargo Preference Legislation E. Manning Deficits IV. SIZING U.S. MARITIME FLEET FOR DEFENSE A. Current Level B. Epansion C. Maintenance Of Existing Capability D. Planned Shrinkage THE MARITIME SUPPORT FORCE - IS THE S.O.S. TOO LATE? In a 1984 memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral James D. Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated "it is timely that Strategic Sealift be formally recognized as a distinct Navy function along with Sea Control and Power Projection."1 The Strategic Sealift Planning and Operations Doctrine of the U.S. Navy defines Strategic Sealift as "the capability to deploy and sustain military forces wherever needed through afloat prepositioning, sea movement, and delivery ashore of ammunition, equipment, supplies, petroleum products, and personnel."2 The preceding reveals one of the less glamorous, but very important elements of the big picture of the U.S. Maritime Strategy --- STRATEGIC SEALIFT. It does not involve very many uniformed naval personnel, compared with the other naval unions: sealift shipping is crewed by civilians, either civil servants in the case of many Military Sealift Command(MSC) nucleus fleet ships or employees of commercial firms(i.e. Merchant Marines). Every president since World War II has asserted his support of a strong U.S. sealift capability, but for the most part such statements have been little more than rhetoric. The problems plaguing the nation's Merchant Marine fleet are not new. However, in an environment where contingency plans have as a premise "come as you are," the lack of a viable merchant fleet becomes more sensitive. The national security in recent years of the U.S. is directly linked to the ability of its maritime support forces,(i.e. naval strategic fleet, merchant marine fleet, and shipbuilding base) to project and sustain combat forces overseas; however careful analysis reveals the current maritime situation to be an "Achilles Heel" to the national defense. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MARITIME POLICY. America's security is tied to its military strategy which is designed: to retain U.S. political identity; to protect the U.S., including its allies; to enhance economic security; and to encourage international stability supportive of the vital interests of this country and its allies. A supporting foundation to this strategy is a maritime infrastructure capable of providing global strategic mobility. America has long recognized the ability to reinforce and resupply forward deployed forces is essential to execution of its military strategy. Further, that while airlift is the quickest and most flexible of our mobility assets, it is strategic sealift which will inevitably carry the bulk of our reinforcement and resupply in any crisis. This position is supported by the experiences of the Korea and Vietnam wars in which "97 percent of all equipment, ammunition, and other supplies and consumables used by the U.S. was carried to the combat zone by ships."3 Accordingly, the U.S. has had a long track record of implementing legislation in an attempt to more clearly alighn its maritime policy with the security role such policies are designed to support. This was first seen with the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which formally recognized the auxiliary role of merchant ships in wartime and during emergencies. The act stated that "the U.S. shall have a merchant marine capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war."4 This same legislation created a construction loan fund which made available low-interest capital, in the hope of stimulating shipbuilding. It did not. Some years later President Roosevelt incorporated in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 a more comprehensive set of initiatives to develop and encourage the maintenance of the merchant marine force through favorable tax laws. Through a series of special non-taxable capital reserve funds, operators of merchant ships were encouraged to deposit earnings to ensure that monies were available for vessel replacement. Thereby attempting to ensure long-term viability of the subsidized fleet. More recently the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, and later amendments, consolidated the special reserve funds into a single capital construction fund which served the same purpose as earlier accounts. The 1970 act also made most segments of the merchant marine fleet eligible for tax treatment previously only accorded to subsidized operators. In an effort to control the high cost of supporting a merchant marine fleet, the act also indexed wages; set upper limits on subsidizes; and established new crew limits for vessels. The act envisioned the results being a 300 ship building program over a ten year period. However, fewer than 200 ships were built by 1980. U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: PAST AND PRESENT. In the past, as trade prospered, the various sectors of the maritime community were tied together on the basis of profitability. Since 1936, this profitability has been based on the government's decision to attempt to maintain the maritime industry through subsidization. For decades, as the industry was challenged by overseas competitors, U.S. government subsidies continued to cushion and insulate the well being of the operators. With the Construction Differential Subsidy(CDS) in force, U.S. shipping purchased new ships that were constructed in U.S. yards. Similarly, Operating Differential Subsidies(ODS) have been provided to certain U.S. flag flying ships. Thereby reducing the wage costs encountered by owners of U.S. ships. However, the trend has been a gradual decline in the effectiveness of these subsidies in the last few decades, with a marked drop-off during the Reagan administration. Entering into office with policies favoring both strong national security and free trade, his administration sought to reduce or eliminate subsidies to U.S. industries that otherwise could not compete. Specifically, in the maritime area, the CDS for private shipyards was deleted in 1982. The ODS continues, but in reduced form. Thus, as a result of market features and current policies, U.S. commercial capabilities, both shipping and shipbuilding,continue to decline. For most Americans however, there is little appreciation of the continued decline of the U.S. maritime industries and the larger implication of this decline for the national defense. In part this perception is due to the un-glamorous nature associated with this industry and the support role it does. Yet, a quick review of the following facts highlight just how severe the current situation is. * In 1970 the U.S. had 18 major shipping companies. Each operated five or more ships with a total of more than 430 ships in service. Today by contrast, there are four major companies, with a total of 88 ships that operate in the foreign trade. * U.S. is the largest trading nation in the world, yet "our merchant marine only carries four percent of our ocean going trade."5 * In 1980 "142 ocean going ships were being built in 19 different U.S. shipyards. Today there are only nine shipyards in business - all for the Navy."6 Presently there are no ocean going commercial ships under construction in the U.S. * The U.S. merchant fleet now ranks 10th in world wide ships owned - the Soviets are number two. * The average age of an American merchant marine is 50 years, and rising. Further, projections are that the decline in U.S. maritime industries will continue. While arguments can be made regarding the impact of this decline, U.S. history has shown "the well established need for American flag shipping to serve as a reliable vehicle in meeting the nation's economic and security needs."7 The preceding briefly addressed the national security aspect of the maritime force and the current state of the industry. Though recognizing that during the Reagan administration the active duty USN fleet grew significantly, it must be remembered that the bulk of the sealift required to sustain contingency war plans consist of other government owned/merchant marine shipping. The U.S. government owns an active and a inactive maritime fleet. The active fleet is controlled by the MSC, while the inactive fleet is managed by the Maritime Administration(MARAD). Accordingly, a proper orientation of the federal maritime fleet must include a detailed discussion of the MSC, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), and the Ready Reserve Force(RRF). MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND. The MSC was established in 1949. Its primary mission is to "meet the sealift requirements of the armed forces in a national emergency and a nonmobilization contingency, as well as in peacetime."8 An ancillary MSC mission is management of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, comprised of dedicated sealift assets of the MSC force that provide direct support for power projection of the U.S. Examples are: oilers; stores ships; and ocean surveillance ships. The MSC executes its mission through the employment of sealift forces originating from two principal sources: the U.S. government owned ships and the U.S. merchant marine fleet. The Navy's sealift program attempts to complement, rather than compete with the civilian maritime industry. The MSC contracts for commercial services, hires merchant crews, and maintains support vessels that are not available in the private sector. This program as defined by the Navy is "to ensure that sufficient assets are available to meet pre-positioned, surge and resupply requirements."9 In summary, the MSC force is those ships on duty on a daily basis, supplying U.S. forces around the world. NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET. In reserve to the MSC is the NDRF. "The NDRF was created at the end of World War II by mothballing a large number of Liberty and Victory ships."10 The MARAD acquired these ships after the war, ultimately reaching a level of "2,277 vessels in 1950."11 However, over time, older Liberty and Victory ships were sold for scrap or other non-transportation purposes. By "October 1986 approximately 272 ships"12 remained in the NDRF. The original idea was to preserve them all in a operational state to allow a speedy reactivation in time of national emergency. Accordingly, NDRF ships are outfitted with dehumidification and anti-corrosion equipment, and are presumed to take no more than 20 days to activate. However, MARAD conducted a study in 1976 that concluded these ships are in such poor condition that it would take a minimum of 30-40 days to activate. Compounding the physical deterioration of the NDRF ships is the lack of repair capacity available to fix these ships. Most of the vessels in the NDRF as well as requiring activation maintenance, undoubtedly need significant upgrades to handle today's cargoes. However, a Congressional committee stated "the base of shipyards, repair facilities, and industrial suppliers is currently inadequate to meet the needs envisioned in a outbreak of conflict."13 Thus, it is very reasonable to assume that it would take much longer than the 40 days estimated by the 1976 study to mobilize the fleet, if at all. Because something had to be done, the RRF was created in 1976. READY RESERVE FORCE. The RRF, composed of post World War II ships, is a portion of the NDRF that is maintained in a higher state of readiness than the rest of the NDRF. The force consists of ships that are to be ready to embark cargo 5,10, or 20 days from notification. These ships are also managed by MARAD, but the difference is that overhaul and major maintenance has been done and continues, to ensure rapid deployment. The RRF includes many ship types, including tankers, freighters, container ships, barge carriers, and roll-on/roll-off(RO/RO) ships. Notable new additions to the RRF are the T-AVB aviation logistics ship, the T-ACS auxiliary crane ship, and the T-AH hospital ship. In total the RRF contains 78 of the 272 ships within the NDRF. While the development of the RRF would appear to have brighten an otherwise dark picture, there remain many problems plaguing the maritime support force. The MSC and its subordinate agencies, NDRF and RRF, are charged with the responsibility of providing sealift as part of the strategic mobility for the armed forces. But, total reliance upon the government owned portion of the maritime force is not feasible. Former MSC commander, Vice Admiral Piotti estimates "that 95 percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of the liquid cargo needed to sustain land combat must go by sea."14 Yet, over the last decade or more, scores of articles and reports have been written regarding the ailing U.S. flag merchant marine fleet. To better grasp the present condition of this fleet, an overview of the significant problems plaguing the merchant force is detailed GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS. The financing of ship construction and their operation is a long standing problem. Various financial incentives, designed to promote the merchant marine fleet have been played with since the creation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Soon after President Reagan took office in 1981 he directed a review of the two major subsidy programs, the Operating Differential Subsidy(ODS) and the Construction Differential Subsidy(CDS). The ODS was designed to subsidize the higher prices of ships built in U.S. shipyards. Though honoring existing long term ODS contracts, the President's review directed that no new applications for ODS be approved. Additionally, neither of the Reagan/Bush administrations earmarked any funds in their budgets for the CDS program. Another important incentive the government has eliminated is the favorable tax laws previously enacted to assist U.S. flag shipping. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 substantially increased the tax burden of U.S. vessels engaged in foreign commerce. Specifically, "depreciation periods were doubled from 5 to 10 years"15, investment tax credit rules became more restrictive, foreign sourcing of income rules were narrowed, and the alternative minimum tax law was applied. Most foreign countries do not impose a tax on their ships involved in international commerce. Thus, to impose additional taxes on U.S. operators involved in foreign commerce is to handicap their efforts to accumulate capital needed for ship replacement. It is somewhat difficult to quantify the impact resulting from discontinuation of the preceding incentives. However, one tangible benefit from the CDS program was the work generated in commercial U.S. shipyards. Additionally, CDS resulted in a shipbuilding base being maintained above a level associated with "Navy only" construction, and thus available to serve the national security. Likewise, the benefit derived from the ODS program may have come from the continued existence of companies now in business, that might have gone bankrupt if ODS had not been in force. SHIPYARD REDUCTION. Concurrent with the elimination of incentives has been the decline in U.S. shipyards and ship repair facilities. The last eight years has seen the loss of "75 shipbuilding/repair firms, the loss of approximately 52,000 skilled shipyard workers"16, and the contraction of shipyard suppliers. Retired Rear Admiral Denton, former U.S. Senator, testified "that based on recent studies of our industrial base the nation's shipbuilders will never be able to effectively offset the sealift losses which will invariably occur during combat."17 Specifically, at the end of 1989 there were no merchant ships under construction in American shipyards and only nine yards building ships greater than 400 feet in length - all for the U.S. Navy. The general impact has been the reduced capabilIty of the shipbuilding industry to support mobilization in time of a national emergency. MILITARY USEFUL SHIPS. Closely associated with the lack of shipyards is that many of the ships being procured by U.S. operators are not military useful in their present form. Ship types and their design are as important as ship numbers for strategic sealift. However, recent trends in the shipping industry have led to increased containerization of cargoes for intermodal transport. This standardization of cargo containers and the container ships built to handle them has caused problems for military sealift planners. Specifically, "container ships are built with cells rather than with holds and decks as in freighters of the past."18 These cells enable containers to be stacked and unstacked by automatic cranes. Cargo loading or unloading which used to take days using pallets and stevedores, now takes hours. Unfortunately, a large portion of military cargo is not containerized. Within the limited inventory of U.S. commercial shipping, there exists nearly 100 container ships. These ships lack the older cargo handling gear, and would be incapable of offloading such military items as helicopters, trucks, tanks, artillery pieces, and other unique outsized equipment. CARGO PREFERENCE LEGISLATION. Because of inequities in the world shipping market and in an effort to ensure adequate shipping existed on U.S. flag vessels, The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established cargo preference policies. In general, these policies were applicable to all military shipments, "50 percent of Export-Import Bank shipments, and 50 percent of U.S. aid shipments."19 However, in recent years one factor has significantly reduced the success of this incentive. Specifically, the allocation of cargo was dependent upon the availability of U.S. ships, at reasonable rates. With that loophole, policymakers have been inclined not to enforce the existing policy because of its high cost. MANNING DEFICITS. The preceding problems dealt with issues which could through a combination of legislation and proper procurement, be corrected, albeit at a cost. However, the manning of ships is a problem which perhaps cannot be so easily corrected. As was shown earlier, the MARAD working closely with the U.S. Navy's sealift planners has been acquiring many of the older type ships for the NDRF/RRF. These ships are less modern and require a pool of mariners experienced in equipment no longer used on today's ships. Thus, as the size of the NDRF/RRF grows, the number of qualified seamen to man these ships decreases and their average age increases. The seriousness of this situation was summed up by Senator Stevens(D-AK) who wrote "that manning is the most serious challenge facing sealift strategy."20 Recently the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense documented the manning shortage. Specifically, the number of mariners dropped from "48,000 in 1960 to 13,400 in 1987."21 Still further, The Commission discovered that there would be a mobilization shortfall of "1,400 merchant seamen to meet the total sealift requirement in a single-theater conflict today."22 Possibly even more frightening is the projection made by the Transportation Institute, a maritime industry research and education organization, which estimates "by the year 1992 a seafarer deficit after mobilization of 15,000."23 The bottom line is that even if sufficient shipping existed "DOD's limited policy objectives may not be met."24 Given the linkage of strategic sealift to the nation's security, the composition of the force, and the problems plaguing the industry, let us turn to addressing the size of the maritime force. The current Defense Guidance for 1990-1994 specifies "that the U.S. strategic mobility assets must continue to meet the requirements of a global conventional war."25 And as indicated previously, the bulk of the lift will come via sealift. CURRENT LEVEL. At the outset it must be recognized that the current inventory of government owned and merchant marine ships will not be adequate to fill the sealift needs of the nation at war. "In 1950 the privately owned U.S. merchant fleet consisted of 1,170 ships, the largest fleet in the world."26 Owing to a variety of political and economic conditions the U.S. fleet has steadily declined to a "1987 level of 369 active ships."27 Further the President's Commission has stated "that an additional 455 ships would be required just to support a Southeast Asia theater conflict."28 In sizing a maritime force it is perhaps better to view the choices based on levels of capability the various provide. These levels include expansion, maintenance of existing capability, and managing a planned shrinkage. Regardless of the option pursued, the key elements should ensure efficiency, effectiveness, and feasibility. EXPANSION. The idea of expanding the merchant marine force is in all likelihood, unfeasible because of political and budgetary limits. This would require a major effort to gain support from all sectors of the U.S., as the structural realities that put the maritime industries in their present condition would have to be altered. Furthermore, the constraints imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollands deficit reduction law make significant budget initiatives virtually out of the question. Additionally, in the absence of a major threat(i.e. Russia) or a military conflict, policies that would expand U.S. maritime capacity are likewise not feasible. MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING CAPABILITY. The concept of maintaing the existing level of capability is becoming a more difficult proposition than in past years. With a general consensus that the industry is in a decline, the cost variable again plays a significant role in this option. The Congressional Budget Office(CBO) assigns a average "ODS value of $2.3 million per ship per year."29 For 15-20 ships, the annual cost for this policy ranges from $34.5 to $46 million. For a construction subsidy, whether in a CDS type package or direct procurement(i.e. purchase of ships by MSC), the CBO has estimated the cost to range from "$60 to $100 million per ship."30 Total costs to sustain a shipbuilding program at this level range from $1.2 to $1.6 billion. Based on these approximations, in aggregate, direct financial policies to maintain current capabilities will cost between $1.5 to $2.0 billion annually. The question which must again be asked is whether it is efficient, effective, feasible, or in the interest of national security to pay this cost in sizing the fleet at this level. PLANNED SHRINKAGE. Because a decline in the maritime industries seems inevitable, this broad option of managing a planned shrinkage is perhaps the only realistic one. That is, a smaller maritime base, consisting of the most viable sectors of the maritime industry, should survive. As with the other options, the elements used could include direct and indirect subsidizes, cargo preference reform, reform of tax laws, and direct government ship procurement. Suffice it to say the general costs outlined under the preceding option are merely scaled down. CONSTRAINT. As was indicated earlier the most pressing constraint in selecting what option to choose in sizing the force is the fiscal constraint. With the deficit a real issue, there is little likelihood that new spending policies will be approved. This is especially true because past and present policies, such as ODS and CDS, have done little to prevent the current condition from developing. It has been stated that "the greater the percentage of the gross national product that an industry comprises, the more clout it is likely to have."31 According to Data Resources Inc., shipbuilding will "constitute less than 0.5 percent of GNP in 1987."32 Further, the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed "overall shipyard employment in 1985 at 159 thousand versus 875 thousand in the automotive industry."33 Thus, until such time as the maritime industry generates enough economic or political clout(i.e. through its number), the fiscal reality of attempting to significantly change the present situation will remain the primary constraint. The interdependence between a viable maritime support force capability and the national defense was reaffirmed by President Reagan who in May 1986 stated "the dual roles of the merchant marine in trade and defense remain crucial to our national interests."32 Yet rhetoric aside, the actual status of our sealift capacity is being eroded by the elimination of government support programs, the dwindling capacity of the shipbuilding base, the demise of military useful ships, and the ever shrinking pool of seafarers. Accordingly, the deficient condition of our maritime strategic sealift capability, may very well prove to be the "Achilles Heel" to the nation's defense. ENDNOTES 1. Captain Wayne P. Wilcox, "Strategic Sealift: A Nayy Function," Proceedings. (April 1987), p.99 2. Wilcox, (April 1987). p.99 3. Edgar L. Prina, "The Possibility of Military Defeat," Seapower, (December 1987), p.26 4. Clinton H. Whitehurst, The U.S. Merchant Marine, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983), p.26 5. General Duane H. Cassidy, "United States Transporta- tion Command," Defense Transportation Journal, (April 1989), p.31 6. Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, "SOS For The Merchant Marine," Defense 89, (March/April 1989), p.115 7. Prina, (December 1987), p.29 8. Whitehurst, (1983), p.115 9. Major Bradley E. Smith, "Maritime Challenges To Sus- taining The Force," Military Review (September 1989), p.25 10. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100 11. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100 12. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100 13. Prina, (December 1987), p.26 14. Smith, (September 1989), p.21 15. Peter J. Finnerty, "Maritime: U.S. Merchant Marine Still Sliding," Seapower, (January 1989), p.84 16. Prina, (December 1987), p.34 17. Prina, (December 1987), p.34 18. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.102 19. Whitehurst, (1983), p.108 20. Commander Paul L. Higgins, "Manning The Future," Proceedingsų (February 1989), p.36 21. Finnerty, (January 1989), p.81 22. Higgins, (February 1989), p.36 23. Rodney W. Carlisle, Sovereignty For Sale. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1985), p.58 24. Captain Russell S. Hall, "United States Merchant Marine, Past, Press and Future," Logistics Spectrum, (Winter 1989) p.21 25. Third Report of The Commission on Merchant Marine And Defense: Findings of Fact And Conclusions, U.S. Government Printing Office (September 30, 1988) p. 9 26. Wilcox, (April 1987), p.100 27. Prina, (December 1987), p.33 28. Prina, (December 1987), p.33 29. Robert Hilton, Paula J. Pettavino and Harlan K. Ullman, U.S. Maritime Industries: Down For The Third Time?, (Center For Strategic And Inter- national Studies, Washington, D.C., 1987), p.24 30. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.24 31. Whitehurst, (December 1987), p.158 32. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.18 33. Hilton, Pettavino and Ullman, (1987), p.l9 BIBLIOGRAPHY Carlisle, Rodney W., Sovereignty For Sale, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1985) Cassidy, Duane H., "United Transportation Command," Defense Transportation Journal, (April 1989) Finnerty, Peter J., "Maritime: U.S. Merchant Marine Still Sliding," Seapower, (January 1989) Hall, Russell S., "United States Merchant Marine, Past, Present and Future," Logistics Spectrum, (Winter 1989) Higgins, Paul L., "Manning The Future," Proceedings, (February 1989) Hilton, Robert; Pettavino, Paula J., and Ullman, Harlan K., U.S. Maritime Industries: Down For The Third Time?, (Center For Strategic And International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1987) Prina, Edgar L., "The Possibility of Military Defeat," Seapower, (December 1987) Smith, Bradley E., "Maritime Challenges To Sustaining The Force," Military Review, (September 1989) Third Report of The Commission on Merchant Marine And Defense: Findings of Fact And Conclusions, U.S. Government Printing Office, (September 1988) Trost, Carlisle A., "SOS For The Merchant Marine," Defense 89, (March/April 1989) Whitehurst, Clinton H., The U.S. Merchant Marine, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983) Wilcox, Wayne P., "Strategic Sealift: A Navy Function," Proceedings, (April 1987)
