National Security Strategy: The Threat Is As Great As Ever AUTHOR Major Duane V. Hegna, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT AS EVER I. PURPOSE: To discuss the current and projected threat that the Soviet Union will present to the United States. II. PROBLEM: The Soviets have been the focus of U.S. Na- tional Security Strategy for over 40 years due to their strategic nuclear force capability. Today, however, the Soviet Union is attempting to convince the U.S. that they no longer possess hostile intentions and therefore are no longer a threat to U.S. national interests. While the Soviets are trying to convince the U.S. of their non- hostile intentions, their actions would lead one to think otherwise as they are continuing to modernize their stra- tegic and theater nuclear forces, as well as their conven- tional forces, at an alarming rate. It is therefore clear that despite what the Soviets want the U.S. to believe, they remain the most significant threat to U.S. security interests. III. DATA: General Secretary Gorbachev is conducting a public relations campaign to change Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are doing a superb job at convincing the American people and the West that they are indeed serious about their political reform-Glasnost-and their economic reform-Perestroika. However, despite Gor- bachev's stated commitment to a military doctrine that is defensive in nature, the Soviet Union continues to modernize its forces and improve their capabilities. Although some military units and equipment have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will remain the world's largest military power even if Gorbachev's promised re- ductions take place. It is therefore clear that even with the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership's declarations of non-hostile inten- tions toward the U.S. and our Western allies, the Soviet military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat to the security of the U.S. and our allies. IV. CONCLUSION: The Soviet Union confronts the U.S. with a large, modern, conventional air, ground, and sea military force that has a powerful strategic and theater nuclear arsenal. The U.S. must therefore continue to modernize its strategic and conventional weapon systems and use technol- ogy to its fullest to ensure the U.S. retains its strategic edge over the Soviet Union. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT AS EVER OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. Although the Soviets current National Security Strategy appears to reflect a "new thinking" in terms of its outlook towards the United States and its allies, the Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever been. I. National Security Strategy from a historical perspective A. U.S. national interests and national objectives B. Evolution of U.S. National Security Strategy C. Soviet National Security Strategy and objectives D. Evolution of Soviet National Security Strategy II. Budgetary trends and their impact on: A. U.S. National Security Strategy B. Makeup of U.S. military forces III. Future initiatives in the military modernization process A. Soviet modernization initiatives B. U.S. modernization initiatives IV. Key elements to an effective National Security Strategy A. U.S. must deal from a position of strength B. U.S. must pursue high-technology weapons NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: THE THREAT IS AS GREAT AS EVER There has been much talk about the Soviets and their "new thinking" towards the United States and the impact this "new thinking" will have on the U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated in his January 1990 Annual Report to the President and the Congress that the events of 1989 have reduced the threat of a sudden Soviet attack in Europe. He further stated that these changes in the Soviet strategy "clearly call for a review of U.S. defense policy priorities for the 1990's."1 The changes occurring in the Soviet Union and the implications of such changes in terms of the Soviet mili- tary capabilities must be looked at very carefully. General Secretary Gorbachev seems to have taken far-reaching ini- tiatives in the domestic, foreign, and military policy arena that appear to mark a significant change in the Soviet Union's strategy and tactics used for achieving its national goals. Robert Schuller, the well known evan- gelist, was even invited by Soviet officials to deliver a sermon on prime-time Soviet TV, which represents the first appearance ever by a foreign minister on Soviet soil.2 The Soviets' public relations campaign to change Western per- ceptions of the Soviet Union has demonstrated their keen understanding of the influence that the media has on the American people. The Soviets appear to be doing a superb job of convincing the American people that they are indeed serious about their political reform-Glasnost-and their economic reform-Perestroika. However, despite Gorbachev's stated commitment to a military doctrine that is defensive in nature, the Soviet Union continues to modernize its forces and improve their capabilities. Although some mili- tary units and equipment have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union remains the world's largest mili- tary power, and will remain so even if Gorbachev's promised reductions take place. It is therefore clear that even with the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership's declarations of non-hostile inten- tions toward the U.S. and our Western allies, the Soviet military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat to the security of the U.S. and our allies. One can there- fore conclude that although the Soviets current National Security Strategy appears to reflect a "new thinking" in terms of its outlook towards the U.S. and its allies, the Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever been. U.S. National Interests and Objectives To fully understand the U.S. National Security Strat- egy, we must first understand the ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy which is to protect our key national interests. These national interests are defined by the President and represent the foundation from which our National Security Strategy is based. These national interests include the following: 1. The survival of the U.S. as a free and inde- pendent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. 2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a re- source base for our national endeavors. 3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests. 4. The growth of human freedom, democratic in- stitutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system. 5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.3 In support of our national interests, the President has identified major U.S. national security objectives. These objectives provide a general guide for strategy in situations which call for the exercise of either the dip- lomatic, political, or military instrument of national power. These national security objectives are as follows: 1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies. 2. To respond to the challenges of the global economy. 3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world. 4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. interests in troubled regions of the world. 5. To build effective and friendly relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern.4 Evolution of U.S. National Security Strategy Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has sought to prevent the Soviet Union from capitalizing on its geo- strategic advantage to dominate its neighbors in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. We have endeavored to prevent the Soviets from achieving their fundamental goal of altering the global balance of power in their favor.5 The U.S. national strategy that counters this Soviet goal has focused on the objective of containment of communism. Some Administrations have differed over which instruments of national power-diplomatic, economic, or military-to use in their containment strategy; however, every Admin- istration since the end of World War II has endorsed the idea that the U.S., in concert with its allies, must pre- vent the Soviet Union from dominating the great concentra- tions of industrial power and the human capability that are available in Western Europe and East Asia.6 Thus, after World War II, the U.S. drafted the Marshall plan as the guide to help rebuild the war-ravaged economies of Europe, with the objective of limiting Soviet opportunities to exploit Europe's economic distress. The U.S. also forward- deployed military forces to help deter and contain Soviet military expansionism. As the Soviet capabilities increased, our security strategy required a larger strategic nuclear force to augment the forward-deployed conventional forces and to reinforce our deterrence of both nuclear and conven- tional attacks on the U.S. and our allies.7 With the advent of nuclear weapons and their inter- continental delivery systems, another dimension was added to our National Security Strategy as these weapons became the major threat to our survival. Consequently, for over forty years, the deterrence of nuclear war and the reduc- tion of the threat of nuclear war have become the primary goals of U.S. National Security Strategy. Soviet National Security Strategy The Soviet National Security Strategy has maintained relatively consistent national goals and objectives since the end of World War II. These goals and objectives are based on the concept that the Soviet Union must expand both their military and political influence beyond their borders to reinforce their security requirements and to satisfy their imperialistic urge. Accordingly, the Soviet National Security Strategy has evolved around the following objectives: 1. To strengthen the Soviet political system and preserve rule by the communist party of the Soviet Union. 2. To extend and enhance Soviet influence world- wide. 3. To defend the Soviet homeland and state against potential aggression. 4. To maintain dominance over the land and sea areas adjacent to Soviet borders.8 Although the Soviets would like us to believe that they wish to pursue their objectives by peaceful means, the current Soviet military posture would lead one to think otherwise. This is based on the fact that the Soviet Union has had a steady increase in its military capability, very much in excess of what is required for the defense of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, as was demonstrated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, will not hesitate to use military force to advance their interests if intimidation or diplomatic pressure fail to achieve their desires. Although the Soviet leadership recognizes the devas- tation that nuclear weapons can cause, their military doc- trine stresses the flexibility to achieve victory both in a limited conventional war and in a strategic nuclear war. The Soviets define victory both in the conventional and nuclear sense, as either defeating or neutralizing the U.S. or its NATO allies and the survival of the party- dominated politico-economic structure on their homeland.9 Evolution of Soviet National Security Strategy Soviet National Security Strategy and military doc- trine have become more sophisticated over the years in response to technological advances and changes in the political environment. Although some tenets of the Soviet doctrine have remained consistent over the years, others have been modified to compete with the current and pro- jected status of the east-west competition. Until 1964, the Soviet leadership expected the next world war to start with nuclear weapons and believed that conventional forces would be used to seize enemy territory thus exploiting the success brought about by the nuclear strikes. However, starting in the mid-196Os the Soviet doctrine began discussing the possibility of a short con- ventional phase of warfare. In response to this change in strategy, the Soviets, in addition to their nuclear build- up, undertook a wide-range of conventional force moderniza- tion programs to ensure they could fight effectively both on a nuclear and conventional battlefield. The Soviets began to modify their strategy again in the late 1970s because of the nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They began to think more in terms of an extended conventional war, and that the possi- bility existed that war between the superpowers might not escalate into the nuclear arena. This doctrinal shift was due in part to the technological developments in advanced conventional weaponry, and also to the NATO strategy of "flexible response." The Soviet emphasis on conventional warfare can also be seen in their force modernization effort as well as their training programs. During the 1980s, the Soviet strategy began to in- clude defensive operations into an overall offensive stra- tegy. This was done in response to not only NATO's offen- sive concepts of Follow-on Forces Attack, and Air-Land Battle, but also to NATO's improved conventional forces.10 Under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have attempted to project a strategy that is defen- sive in nature, however, in reality, Soviet training con- tinues to stress the conventional battlefield and a pro- trated period of conventional warfare within an overall offensive context. The Soviet strategy also continues to stress the importance of emerging victorious in all phases of warfare, including a protracted nuclear war. Soviet military doctrine presently recognizes that neither strategic nuclear nor conventional forces are alone decisive in any future war, but that they must be used together to realize their maximum effectiveness.11 The Soviets have spent much of their defense dollars on the modernization and expansion of both conventional forces and strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, emphasizing their ability to fight under both nuclear and conventional conditions. To date, there is great uncertainty as to the actual intentions of Soviet strategy. Gorbachev and his allies are aware, as were their predecessors, that the Soviet Union's superpower status and its ability to achieve its strategic objectives must be built on the strength of its military. The Soviet commitment to modernizing both its nuclear and conventional forces would seem to bear this out. Thus, the U.S. must not plan its strategy on Soviet pronouncements, but must guide its strategy by Soviet actions. Budgetary Trends and Their Impact The headlines for Defense News, 8 January 1990 edi- tion read "Cheney Orders Reassessment of DOD Strategy, Weapons Systems." The U.S. News & World Report for Decem- ber 11, 1989 featured an article that posed the question "Does America Need an Army?" The tantalizing prospect of an end to the cold war is generating political pressure to bring our forward deployed forces in Europe and Korea home and to slash the nations $300 billion defense budget. Yet, at a time when the fast paced world events would seem to recommend caution, political and budgetary forces are pushing Congress and the Pentagon to make some fast deci- sions on what our military will look like and what our "new" National Security Strategy will consist of. In concert with the defense budget cuts, Secretary of Defense Cheney has ordered the services to plan for $150 billion in cuts from projected spending over the next five years.12 The various services are making some tough decisions in regards to their future procurement strategy and what military technology they will seek to possess for future warfare. The Army is considering elimi- nating at least 135,000 troops, and reducing its active- duty divisions by one sixth; the Navy has proposed abandon- ing its long cherished goal of a 600 ship fleet, eliminat- ing three aircraft carriers and approximately 60 other vessels; the Air Force is reviewing its B-2 stealth bomber, the C-17 cargo aircraft, and its Advanced Tactical Fighter aircraft; and the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which was to be a key player in the Marine Corps future warfighting strategy, will undoubtedly be cut in the future defense budget reductions.13 Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass) puts the budget reduction and its implications on the military budget succinctly when he stated, "We're going to cut the hell out of it."14 Out of all this discussion, emerges a concern that if the nation is to avoid a dangerous military collapse, the inevitable budget cuts must be accomplished by a cau- tious redefinition of America's National Security Strategy and what that strategy expects its military to achieve. The key question that must be answered is how should our military forces be structured to deal with the current and future threats to our national security in an era of limit- ed resources; however, the following specific questions also need to be addressed by our policy makers. --If strategic nuclear weapons are cut on each side under the new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), how should the smaller U.S. nuclear forces be modernized and restructured to retain a credible deterrence? --How large should the conventional forces of the U.S. be that remain in Europe, and how should they be equipped and organized? I will now address each of the above questions sepa- rately and discuss the implications that they have on our National Security Strategy and the makeup of our future military forces that must carry out our national strategy. Strategic Nuclear Weapons The most important task of the U.S. military is to prevent a nuclear war through deterrence. The goal of the U.S. nuclear strategy is to maintain an ability to survive a surprise-bolt out of the blue-nuclear attack and still be able to execute the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) (which is the plan that launches our strategic bomb- ers and missiles) with enough nuclear weapons to conduct a counterattack on militarily significant targets in the Soviet Union. The goal of our nuclear strategy is there- fore to maintain a balance between reductions of our force structure and missile inventory, add still maintain a credible deterrence towards the Soviet Union. Conventional Forces in Europe The strategic nuclear forces will be shaped by the START agreement; however, the conventional forces in Europe will be shaped by a re-evaluation of the Soviet military threat. The Soviets are in the process of withdrawing 240,000 of their 600,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and at least 10,000 more could be pulled out based on the Con- ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement which is slash- ing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.15 Exactly how many U.S. and NATO forces will be cut is unknown; however, we must carefully plan our force reductions as NATO's longtime strategy of "forward defense" could be jeopardized if we reduce our forces too much. If we have too few forces in Europe, there will simply be too few soldiers to fill gaps in our defenses and guard the East-West frontier, even against a smaller, less heavily armored attack. It is therefore essential that our strategy for conventional forces in Europe focus on maintaining the credibility of the NATO alliance. New Threats There are a multitude of challenges that our nation will confront in the upcoming years. These threats include terrorist attacks, threats to the oil supplies that flow through the Persian Gulf, and other local and regional conflicts in Third World countries. Some say that these threats will replace the single "evil empire" threat and that containing communism is no longer the overriding pur- pose of U.S. national strategy. Those that support this belief would lean towards a smaller and lighter military, which would be on line with the smaller defense budget that we will face. However, in redefining the threat in these terms, will our national strategy be focused on the real threat? I say no, as the Soviet Union still posesses the greatest threat to the U.S. and our way of life because of its strategic nuclear capability. Yes, we will need to protect and guard our national interests in the low inten- sity conflict arena; however, the Soviet Union with its massive military machine is still public enemy number one, no-matter how many lesser threats present themselves. The bottom line is that no other nation poses a military threat to the U.S. and its allies even remotely comparable to that posed by the Soviet Union. Soviet Military Modernization Initiatives Although General Secretary Gorbachev has announced that the Soviets will reduce their defense budget by 14.2 percent over the next two years, Soviet defense expendi- tures have increased by an average of 3 percent per year in real terms. This is in contrast to U.S. defense spending which has declined in real terms by over 11 percent during the same period and with present budget reductions will decline much further.16 Therefore, the Soviets confront the U.S. with a large, modern, conventional air, ground, and sea military force that has a powerful strategic and theater nuclear arsenal. The most impressive feature of Soviet military power today is the rapid pace by which its offensive strategic nuclear forces are being modernized. This modernization includes the new silo-based SS-18 Mod 5 heavy Interconti- nental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which has at least ten nuclear warheads, and provides greater accuracy then pre- vious versions of the missile, and increases the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces' capability to destroy targets such as U.S. based ICBM silos.17 The Soviets are also upgrading their mobile ICBM's. They have approximately 170 SS-25 road-mobile missiles and about eighteen rail-mobile SS-24s. Each version of the mo- bile ICBM has multiple warheads to increase its devasta- tion. The Soviets strategy of deploying these weapons in large numbers has improved the survivability of the Soviets Strategic Rocket Forces significantly.18 The Soviets have also augmented their strategic bal- listic missile forces by launching upgraded versions of their Typhoon and Delta class submarines, and have contin- ued to upgrade their strategic bomber forces. New versions of the Bear H and supersonic Blackjack bombers have pro- duced strategic bombers that have a launch platform for their 3,000 kilometer-range, air-launched nuclear cruise missiles.19 The Soviet's modernization of their ground forces is also continuing at a fast pace. New tanks such as the T-64, T-72 and T-80 are entering the ground forces inven- tory at numbers so great that in another year or two they will more than offset the Soviets' announced tank reduc- tions for Eastern Europe.20 The Soviets are also moderniz- ing their air forces with newer, more capable aircraft like the Su-27 Flanker and MIG-31 Foxhound.21 The Soviet Navy is also modernizing its fleet, scrap- ping older submarines, and producing more of the Akulu- class cruise missile submarines.22 New major surface com- batants, such as the Vdaloy and Sovremennyy-class guided missile destroyers, a Kirov-class nuclear powered cruiser, and a Kiev-class aircraft carrier, have also recently joined the Soviet fleet. Furthermore, Soviet naval force reduction initiatives have made no mention of the two new Tbilisi-class carriers now being produced.23 It must therefore be clear that Soviet military plan- ning has yet to match Moscow's rhetoric. The Soviet Union should be encouraged to continue its initiatives, however, we cannot act unilaterally to Soviet initiatives that have not yet been implemented or to proposals by the Soviet leadership that could easily be reversed by the present or future leadership. The U.S. must therefore pursue a policy that will keep this country more effective militar- ily than the Soviet Union. The U.S. must pursue a strategy that allows us to bargain from a position of strength. This is the only thing the Soviets understand. U.S. Military Modernization Initiatives To offset the Soviet military modernization initia- tives, the U.S. strategy employs the competitive strategies approach to our defense initiatives. This method seeks to arrive at new or improved U.S. military capabilities de- rived from a combination of innovative operational and doctrinal concepts and superior weapon systems and technol- ogies. Competitive strategies aim at identifying, develop- ing, and prioritizing key U.S. defense efforts that can shape the pace and direction of the superpower military competition. The objective is not to bankrupt the Soviet Union or undermine its economy. Instead, the U.S. strategy strives to get the most from our defense resources, and influence the way the Soviets allocate theirs by forcing the Soviets to react to our technology.24 The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is considered by our current Administration to be the centerpiece of our strategic defense forces.25 The potential for the various programs that fall under the SDI umbrella include rocket interceptors, and laser, particle beam directed energy weapons. These options are integral to the SDI program's success in combating the Soviet offensive and defensive programs that include countermeasures against strategic defenses. In concert with the competitive strategies approach, the U.S. has steadily modernized both its nuclear forces and its strategic defenses in order for it to possess the most current, capable weapon's systems available. For exam- ple, the Peacekeepeer missile system, which is replacing the Minuteman missile system, carries more nuclear warheads and is much more accurate than the Minuteman system.26 Furthermore, by removing the Peacekeeper missiles from their silos and placing them on specially configured rail- road cars, the U.S. will improve the survivability of its ICBM force.27 The survivability and flexibility created by rail basing will greatly strengthen deterrence by com- plicating the Soviets' ability to attack these missiles through their targeting process, thereby reducing their confidence in being able to strike our forces successfully. The U.S. is also pursuing the development of the new small ICBM. This lightweight, road-mobile, single-weapon missile has the ability to move rapidly in response to attack warning. Its high degree of resistance to the effects of even a nearby nuclear explosion makes it a highly surviv- able weapon.28 The modernization of our strategic submarine force is also strengthening the overall contribution of the force to nuclear deterrence. Specifically, the Trident II subma- rines will soon be armed with the D-5 missile, which offers improved accuracy and greater range for equivalent pay- loads than our current Submarine Launched Ballistic Mis- siles (SLBMs) and can also carry higher yield warheads.29 The U.S. strategic bomber forces have also been mod- ernized. The installation of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) on the B-52, the deployment of the B-1B bomber, and the development of an advanced technology bomber (B-2) are among the key strategic bomber force modernization efforts.30 Improvements to aircraft navigation systems have also lead to an overall increase in the accuracy of bomber-delivered systems. To complement these strategic bomber improvements, programs have been undertaken to develop an advanced cruise missile (ACM) and a short-range attack missile (SRAM) to be carried by the bomber force.31 Finally, our modernization effort includes improvements to the tanker force that sup- ports our strategic bombers. The Air Force has continued to modernize its tacti- cal aircraft to maintain a qualitative superiority over the Soviets. This modernization effort includes the modern F-15Es and F-16s which are replacing the F-4s, and also includes the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA). Additionally, the U.S. frontline aircraft are being upgraded with more advanced systems, such as the Airborne-Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) on the F-16 and the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night (LANTIRN) on the F-15E and F-16, all designed to keep pace with the Soviets current technology.32 The ability to project our forces by sea to strate- gically critical areas of the world is paramount to our modernization effort. Accordingly, a strong Navy is required to meet the commitments that our global alliance system establishes and to deter the growing challenges posed by the Soviet navy, as well as Third World countries. We must have forces that are not only ready for war, but forces that can be sustained while operating across the entire spectrum of contingencies ranging from forces routinely deployed in forward areas in peacetime, to crisis management forces sent to trouble spots to deter aggression, to fully mobilized forces capable of undertaking a variety of maritime missions if deterrence fails. Accordingly, during the period from 1980 to 1988 our Navy's deployable battle ship force in- creased from 479 to 565 ships.33 Our future goals for sur- face combatants calls for building 120 multi-mission (battle force capable) ships.34 This new ship category combines the two previous categories of antiair warfare (AAW) cruiser/ destroyer and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) destroyers. These ships will be assigned as battle force combatants while the Navy builds towards its multi-mission ship goal. The Navy also has a goal of maintaining its present air- craft carrier level at fourteen and its battleship level at four.35 Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft modernization efforts affect active squadrons which are being upgraded with new F/A-18s, AV-8Bs, and F-14Ds, and their reserve squadrons which are receiving the A-6s, F-14s, and F/A-18s.36 The modernization effort for our land forces is also continuing and on pace with our air and naval forces. The Army has upgraded its tank fleet with the deployment of the M-1 Abrams tank, fielded the Bradley fighting vehicle, and initiated a development program to keep its anti-armor weap- ons competitive with advances in Soviet armor. The Army has also improved its attack helicopter inventory with the de- ployment of the Apache (AH-64) helicopter, while assault helicopter forces have been modernized with the Blackhawk (VH-60) aircraft.37 Additionally, the Marine Corps has added the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), as well as the F/A-18 fix- ed-wing aircraft, and the AH-1W and CH-53E helicopters to its inventory.38 Key Elements to an Effective National Security Strategy To deter Soviet aggression, the U.S. must be strong enough militarily to convince Moscow that aggression either would not succeed, or would involve unacceptable costs. To do this requires not only a strong military, but also strong alliance relationships with our allies, since only our combined strength can achieve the necessary level of deterrence. There is no substitute for strength. Although we should work towards better relations with the Soviets, the security of the U.S. cannot be based on Soviet pro- nouncements or Soviet intentions. Yet some in the West ignore lessons of the past and advocate a policy that we lower our defense preparations to encourage the Soviets to continue their reforms. Still others believe that technol- ogy transfers will give Moscow the incentive to prefer peace. History clearly shows that none of these alternatives can replace a strong defense posture. Stanislov Levchenko, a former KGB officer who defected to the West in 1979, stated the following when asked the question if there was any sub- stitute for the U.S. possessing a strong military and de- fense posture in dealing with the Soviets: No, no, no. There is no substitute at all. I don't mean we need to have a dramatic increase in all kinds of weapon systems in this country. But America de- finitely has to pursue a policy that will keep this country more effective militarily than the Soviet Union. That is the only way to talk to the Soviets. That is what they understand.39 To keep a strong military, high technology weapon systems must be maintained. Regardless of improved U.S.- Soviet relations and potential arms control agreements, the Soviet ability to initiate strategic warfare against the United States will persist, and a crisis or political change in the Soviet Union could occur faster than we could rebuild our strategic forces. As discussed earlier, the Soviet Union is presently pursuing a major strategic mod- ernization program. We therefore must continue with the modernization of U.S. strategic forces and pursue such programs as SDI, both because of Soviet strategic capabil- ities and because of the spread of ballistic technology to other countries. We must maintain that qualitative su- periority, so that the next breakthrough in weapons tech- nology comes from the West not from the Soviet Union. The modernization of both our strategic and conventional weap- on systems is therefore essential to ensure the credibility of deterrence and the effectiveness of our flexible re- sponse strategy. Conclusion While the Soviets have been on a steady course of expanding their military capabilities, they realize that the high-technology programs of the West could widen the technological gap between them and the West and thereby hinder their plans for future strategies. The Soviets have therefore pursued broad-based political and economic ini- tiatives meant to slow the West's high technology military buildup/modernization effort and gain time for them to ac- quire a more modern industrial base and a healthier econ- omy. While obviously trying to change Western perceptions, the Soviet Union has not yet shown any evidence of chang- ing their long-term goals or their long standing ambition to become the dominant global power. In the upcoming years there will be much uncertainty about Soviet intentions. The current leadership's ultimate goals are known only to them, and the duration of their present initiatives are uncertain. Furthermore, the Soviet regime is inherently capable of sudden policy shifts. In January 1988, former President Reagan stated Soviet inten- tions best when he concluded, "Their goal has been, and remains, an effective disarming first strike capability."40 I submit that the Soviets have changed their strategy by which they are pursuing their goals, but they have not changed their goals. This can be easily substantiated when one looks at Soviet actions and their rapid military mod- ernization effort. When one looks at the verifiable facts, its easy to conclude that the Soviet threat is as great today as it has ever been. ENDNOTES 1Cheney, Dick, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress," (U.S. Government Print- ing Office, January 1990), preface. 2Schuller, Robert, "Schuller Preaches on Soviet Television," Washington Times, (December 31, 1989), p. 10. 3Reagan, Ronald, "National Security Strategy of the United States," (The White House Printing Office, January 1988), p. 3. 4Reagan, p. 3 and 4. 5Reagan, p. 1. 6Reagan, p. 1. 7Reagan, p. 1. 8Carlucci, Frank C., "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat-1988," (U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1988), p. 8. 9Carlucci (April 1988), p. 11. 10Carlucci (April 1988), p. 12. 11Carlucci (April 1988), p. 11. 12Walcott, John, "Does America Need An Army?," U.S. News & World Report, (December 11, 1989), p. 22. 13Scarborough, Rowan, "Arms Crunch Cometh," Washington Times, (January 30, 1990), p. 6. 14Walcott, p. 22. 15Walcott, p. 24. 16Cheney, Richard B., "Soviet Military Power: Prospects For Change-1989," (U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep- tember 1989), preface. 17Cheney, (September 1989), p. 45-47. 18Cheney, (September 1989), p. 44 and 45. 19Cheney, (September 1989), p. 46. 20Cheney, (September 1989), p. 66. 21Cheney, (September 1989), p. 51. 22Cheney, (September 1989), p. 47. 23Cheney, (September 1989), p. 78. 24Carlucci, Frank C., "Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress," (U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1989), p. 47. 25Cheney, (January 1990), p. 33 and 35. 26Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32. 27Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32. 28Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32. 29Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32. 30Cheney, (January 1990), p. 32. 31Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 189. 32Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 160. 33Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 141. 34Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 141. 35Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 144. 36Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 163. 37Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 127. 38Carlucci, (January 1989), p. 128. 39Levchenko, Stanislov, "Lies Behind The Smiles," American Legion Magazine, (December 1989), p. 51. 40Reagan, Ronald, Public Papers of President Reagan, Book 1 for 1988, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 20. BIBLIOGRAPHY Carlucci, Frank C., "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of The Threat-1988," (U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1988), p. 1-17. Carlucci, Frank C., "Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress," (U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1989), p. 3-189. Cheney, Richard B., "Soviet Military Power: Prospects For Change-1989," (U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep- tember 1989), p. 1-78. Cheney, Dick, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress," (U.S. Government Print- ing Office, January 1990), p. 1-35. Levchenko, Stanislov, "Lies Behind The Smiles," American Legion Magazine, (December 1989), p. 51. Reagan, Ronald, "National Security Strategy of The United States," (The White House Printing Office, January 1988), p. 1-24. Reagan, Ronald, Public Papers of President Reagan, Book 1 for 1988, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 20. Scarborough, Rowan, "Arms Crunch Cometh," Washington Times, (January 30, 1990), p. 1 and 6. Schuller, Robert, "Schuller Preaches on Soviet Television," Washington Times, (December 31, 1989), p. 10.
