A Need For A MAGTF FSCC AUTHOR Major Tommy S. Gray, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: A NEED FOR A MAGTF FSCC THESIS: Along with the responsibility to command, the MAGTF commander must coordinate the supporting arms for the complex structure of today's MAGTF, thus a need exists for a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) at the MEB and MEF level. ISSUE: Today's battlefield is more crowded and complicated than ever before. New technology, like the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) brings new dimensions to fire support control and coordination. In order to efficiently coordinate the supporting arms acquired by this system and others like it, the MAGTF command element must be involved. The MAGTF commander cannot expect harmony between MAGTF elements by merely stating his intent or designating a "focus of main effort". Priorities for fire support must be set and continuously shifted as the situation dictates. Systems under operational control of the MAGTF commander that can shape the battlefield should not all be piecemealed out. If all naval gunfire ships are in direct support of the GCE, or if the air element is used only for close air support, the MAGTF commander gives up flexibility. This concept lends credit to the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Group (SRIG), which is a MEF, not a division asset. With SRIG organized as it is, RPVs, Force Reconnaissance, and other units can provide support to the MAGTF as a whole instead of being divided equally among GCE units. The rear area for the MAGTF is vulnerable to threats from enemy air or ground attack. Plenty of fire support assets will be available to support the rear area and they must be coordinated. There is no FSCC currently in existence that can adequately perform that function, since they are all located in the GCE. Similar problems arise when there is more than a single command in the GCE. The senior GCE's FSCC is usually the answer to all fire support coordination tasks within the MAGTF. Yet the senior FSCC cannot function in support of the MAGTF as a whole for the same reason the MAGTF commander should not be dual-hatted as the GCE commander. The senior FSCC will be busy coordinating fires for its command and will not be able to do the same for others, much less the entire MAGTF. Fire support coordination for the MAGTF should be left to the MAGTF command element. CONCLUSION: There are challenges to be met in order for a MAGTF FSCC to operate, including a new T/O that will not be a burden or form just another bureaucracy. The MAGTF FSCC should be further tested, studied, and considered for adoption into Marine Corps doctrine if we are serious about fighting the MAGTF. If not, the Marine Corps will be back to fighting the GCE with the other elements in a support role only. A NEED FOR A MAGTF FSCC OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. Along with the responsibility to command, the MAGTF Commander must coordinate the supporting arms for the complex structure of today's MAGTF, thus a need exists for a FSCC at the MEB and MEF level. I. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION ORGANIZATION A. INFANTRY BATTALION, REGIMENT, DIVISION FSCC B. SUPPORTING ARMS SPECIAL STAFF C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION A. CROWDED AND COMPLICATED BATTLEFIELD B. MAGTF COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES C. WHY THE GCE COMMANDER CANNOT DO IT ALL D. NEW TECHNOLOGY III. NEW DOCTRINE AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION A. WHEN THE GCE IS NOT THE FOCUS OF MAIN EFFORT B. ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT C. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION IN THE REAR AREA D. DASC AND THE MAGTF FSCC E. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION FOR THE MEB IV. CHALLENGES A. MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES B. COMMUNICATING C. DUPLICATION OF EFFORT? V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A MAGTF FSCC A NEED FOR A MAGTF FSCC Currently, the Marine Corps has Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC) at the infantry battalion, regiment, and division levels. There is no FSCC at the MAGTF level, despite the size or composition of the MAGTF. There is a Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS) in the MAGTF command element that functions in a quasi fire support coordination role. FSCCs did exist in the Landing Force Headquarters element once, besides the FSCCs at the subordinate commands. Between the years 1967 to 1970, at least three students at Command and Staff College wrote staff studies analyzing the concept of a single Landing Force/Division FSCC. The consensus of those studies recommended a single FSCC for the Landing Force and Division unless the Landing Force has more than one ground maneuver element. The problems identified with the Landing Force or MAGTF FSCC were redundancy in coordination and a crunch on personnel and equipment; there was not a Table of Organization (T/O) for the Landing Force FSCC, so Marines identified for the landing force FSCC had to come from division personnel. The students further argued that the need for coordinating fires could be filled by the FSCC of the ground combat elements involved. (3) The FSCC at the Landing Force/MAGTF level was eliminated, but the caveat about a FSCC at the Landing Force level when there is more than one ground maneuver element seemed to have been disregarded. That leads to the problem that exists today in the MAGTF. The battlefield is getting more crowded and complicated with multiple ground maneuver elements (that may speak different languages) and new technology, increasing the importance for MAGTF commanders to command and not referee. Along with the responsibility to command, the MAGTF commander must coordinate the supporting arms for the complex structure of today's MAGTF, thus a need exists for a FSCC at the MEB and MEF level. For sake of simplicity and an obsession with triangular systems (three elements for every unit), the Marine Corps strives to keep the MAGTF limited to an air combat element (ACE), a combat service support element (CSSE), and a GCE. In reality though, the Marine Corps will more than likely find more than a single command in its GCE and many other "elements" in the MAGTF. The Marine Corps needs a separate FSCC in the MAGTF command element for the same reason the GCE commander should not be dual-hatted as the MAGTF commander. If there is more than one division in the MEF's GCE, for example, the division chosen to coordinate the fire support for the MAGTF will be very busy. That FSCC also will naturally spend more time coordinating its own fire support and possibly ignore what is happening in the larger picture. Even when there is only one division in the MEF, the GCE commander will be more concerned with fire support coordination in his own arena and put less emphasis on others. Examples such as separate maneuvers by the ACE and fire support coordination in the rear area are only part of the big picture the GCE will be responsible for if it acts as the MAGTF FSCC. Marine Corps policy calls for control being decentralized down to the lowest level possible. This is sound policy and the major reason each infantry battalion has its own FSCC. New technology might be changing that to a degree though. Consider the remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) that is already in operation. (8) Its use will be unlimited, providing commanders an enhanced reconnaissance capability, electronic countermeasures to protect close air support (CAS) missions, target acquisition/designation, communication relay and jamming, and may even provide a platform for delivering lethal weapons. (5:45-52) One of the important roles of the RPV for commanders on the ground will be its assistance in observing and adjusting supporting arms. The control of supporting arms has been with the forward observer (FO) for artillery and mortars, and with the forward air controller (FAC) for CAS. The problem for these Marines is, that no matter how far forward they are, their visibility is normally severely obscured by terrain, vegetation, smoke and other "fog" on the battlefield, not to mention the fact that they are extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. The RPV will be controlled by an internal pilot somewhere to the rear of frontline units. A FO could monitor the view of the RPV in the battalion rear, read coordinates, and call for and adjust artillery or mortar fire. This is not a bad deal considering the good "look down" visibility of the target by the RPV. The trade-off is obvious though--control will be centralized at least at the battalion level, as opposed to the decentralized control down to the platoon/company level that we are used to. Infantry companies cannot afford to be bogged down more than they already are with electronic equipment and there will not be enough RPVs for every company to have one. If there were, the airspace would be even more cluttered and harder to control. The RPVs have already proven themselves on the battlefield; the Israelis used them effectively in an electronic warfare role against Syrian anti-air defenses in Lebanon in 1983. Reconnaissance drones were used to overfly the Bekaa Valley for months prior to the preemptive invasion to "fingerprint" the surface-to-air radars, an operation that gave Israeli intelligence the necessary frequency documentation for later jamming operations. As the actual invasion got underway, Mastiff mini-RPVs located the missile emplacements (SA-6), while Scouts, a highly sophisticated electronic intelligence (ELINT) version of the RPV, intercepted radar signals and relayed them back to the ground control stations for analysis. The Mastiff's appearance confused the Syrian radar operators, making them think that an advanced unit of fighter or reconnaissance aircraft was approaching. This caused the Syrians to "turn on" the electronic sensors of their weapons systems. Electronic data was intercepted by the ELINT RPV, relayed to the E-2C Hawkeye, and then passed to the Boeing 707 electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft, which effectively jammed Syrian SAMs and ground-based air search radars. (2) Although not proven in battle, another piece of equipment performing missions similar to those of the RPV is the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV). This vehicle will be capable of travelling far forward of front line units with cameras, radios, target acquisition/designation equipment, and even direct fire weapons. (9) Unlike the RPV, these vehicles could be controlled from a company commander's position, but as in the case of the RPV monitor, fighting units must remain light in order to move quickly on the battle field. There are other problems associated with small units controlling such heavy laden gadgets. To begin with, commanders at the company and battalion level are kept busy with maneuvering their units and looking after their Marines. They cannot afford to be inundated with more tasks such as operating complex equipment. Survival is another major concern; electronic countermeasures (ECM) are important security measures the commander must employ. Normally we associate these measures with high tech equipment found at radio battalion, but here, it is simple precautions such as low power radio transmissions and reducing radio communications traffic to a minimum. Operating equipment such as an UGV will increase the electronic signature of the unit operating it unless the UGV's fiber optic cable is used instead of radio/data link. Those operating the equipment in the rear could direct more attention to ECM and free the company commanders up front to fight the battle. Also, in many cases, the UGV will operate out of the company commander's area of influence. The appropriate level for coordinating equipment such as RPVs and UCVs is the MAGTF level. The RPV companies are already part of the surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG), which is a MEF asset, not division. The key reason for this is so that the MEF commanders can retain flexibility in their SRIG assets by keeping them in general support of the MAGTF when necessary. The many uses of the RPVs as discussed above provide support to every element in the MAGTF. What does centralized coordination of new technology have to do with fire support coordination? It means that the level at which equipment is used for controlling indirect fire and air strikes will require the same level or higher to coordinate those supporting arms. Since the coming of the FSCC, commanders have not expected it to be responsible for production besides its coordination and planning responsibilities. This does not need to be changed: Those actually controlling the supporting arms should be located at the lowest level possible. This should not, however, rule out the capability or practice of the FSCC actually putting steel on target if required, even at the MAGTF level. Making the fire support coordination business even more complicated now days are new weapons systems. One is the Light Armored Vehicles (LAV). The Marine Corps now has a Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion to support each division. These battalions are capable of operating independently well forward of main battle units and can function in many different roles. The primary role of this battalion is reconnaissance, but it also can perform screen, guard, cover missions for the division or MAGTF. Its organic firepower includes 25mm chain guns, mortars, TOWs, and will soon add an assault gun and air defense variant. This heavy fire power enables it to become decisively engaged with the enemy. If the LAI battalion is operating as a covering force ten kilometers or more in front of leading regiments, for example, it would more than likely have artillery in direct support. Who coordinates the fire support? As Marine Corps policy has it, and as advocated previously, fire support is controlled and coordinated at the lowest level possible. This means that the LAI battalion may coordinate its own artillery, mortar, and close air support. This will work only if the LAI battalion's FSCC can be as mobile as the rest of the battalion. If the LAI units are operating closer to front line units, then the fire support coordination becomes tricky for the MAGTF. As a screening force, the LAVs are likely to be spread across the battlefield and not concentrated in one area. They also may be in support of the MAGTF as a whole, which may include support of more than the GCE. This being the case, coordination of fire support will need to be handled outside the GCE level. It is obvious that any ground combat element commander will be only concerned with coordination of fires within his own area. That is all he should be expected to coordinate for reasons already discussed. Other weapon systems being added to the Marine Corps inventory include the Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS). MRLS will be employed similar to artillery but will provide more firepower in greater mass. It also will provide greater range and less accuracy. Taking that into consideration, one can only imagine the fire support coordination complexities involved when using this system. It will require more centralized control and a MAGTF FSCC would be instrumental in coordinating this powerful piece in the family of combined arms. To make the MAGTF operate within current Marine Corps doctrine, the MAGTF commander must be able to utilize each element of it as a focus of main effort at the appropriate time and place. One must not view, as in the past, the GCE as the only element that can be the focus. To operate efficiently, the ACE or even the CSSE must be prepared to function as the focus of main effort. As part of that concept, the GCE must be prepared to be a supporting element, something that it is not familiar with. When the ACE is being used as a maneuver element and/or the focus of main effort, it would be awkward and difficult for the GCE to coordinate fire support. The GCE command element will again have its hands full dealing with it's own action on the ground. This is a situation where the MAGTF command element must be directly involved; a MAGTF FSCC should be coordinating the fire support. We normally view the ACE as a supporting arm providing close air support (CAS) or deep interdiction. It makes sense to have the GCE control and coordinate CAS missions since these missions are in support of the GCE. Deep interdiction, or air strikes beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) will not present a coordination problem for the GCE since that is the purpose of the FSCL. Those missions not considered CAS but short or the FSCL, sometimes referred to as BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction), will require fire support coordination. (4) These type of missions may be of direct concern to the GCE commander since he probably will have security forces operating in that area. Yet due to the fluidity on the battlefield with various elements operating in zones, i.e., SRI group, LAI battalion, the MAGTF command element must have a hand in coordinating fire support. Consider the likely scenario of the ACE given the mission of securing the flank of the MAGTF; any supporting fires should be coordinated by the supported unit, in this case the ACE. Since this is not feasible, then the MAGTF FSCC would be an appropriate agency to coordinate these fires as well as assigning priorities to the ACE. With the MAGTF rear area so vulnerable to enemy ground and air attacks, fire support must be coordinated there. Support units or ground units operating in the rear area provide plenty of fire power to be coordinated. The ACE may be employed there, and even artillery. The Rear Area Security Officer may even be assigned helicopter gunships in direct support. The division FSCC cannot feasibly coordinate the fire support in the MAGTF rear area. A MAGTF FSCC would be an appropriate organization to coordinate fire support in the MAGTF rear area since the area is controlled by the MAGTF commander. Also, utilizing a MAGTF FSCC would avoid duplication, since without one, the Rear Area Security Officer would have to somehow coordinate that fire support. During SOLID SHIELD-89, II MEF established a Landing Force FSCC with 2d Force Service Support Group (2d FSSG) Rear Area Security Operation Center (RASOC) monitoring the LFFSC net. When a requirement for fire support was identified, the RAOC, 2d FSSG, would request fire support from the LF/FSCC using the LF/FSC Net. According to the II MEF After Action Report, this structure was adequate for the coordination of fire support in the II MEF Rear Area. The report also recommended that in future exercises when the rear area is designated, that the establishment of a Landing Force FSCC be continued for the allocation of fire support assets for the entire force. (6:83) To allow fire support coordination to operate smoother, the Direct Air Support Coordination Center (DASC) is normally collocated with the senior FSCC. In the case of a one division MEF, the DASC would then be located near the division FSCC. This works fine until one considers the problems that may arise for the GCE FSCC as previously discussed. When these problems for the senior GCE's FSCC do come up, they may apply equally to the DASC. The obvious solution then would be to locate the DASC with the MAGTF FSCC. This also would alleviate the problem of the DASC moving too slow to keep up with the GCE. So far, examples of fire support coordination problems have been examined primarily on the MEF level. Law requires the Marine Corps to be able to fight with a MEF, yet realistically, our Corps will more than likely be fighting as a MEB. Consider the threat to our nation today. Central and eastern European countries are now holding free elections. The Soviet Union is having so many internal problems, it is not likely to attack any country in the near or perhaps distant future. If the Marine Corps is going to prepare to fight, it should prepare to fight in a low intensity conflict (LIC). The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated this long ago and it rings true each day. The point is, a MAGTF FSCC would operate even more efficiently at a MEB level. This is true since the MEB will likely be formed from compositing several commands. It's GCE could be made up of an infantry regiment, one or more infantry battalions, two regiments, or many other combinations. Often the MEB will be participating in a combined action. The latest Team Work exercise consisted of participants from Norway and other allied countries, some of which were elements of the 4th MEB's GCE. The MEB used a MAGTF FSCC so that it could efficiently coordinate the combined arms of the total force. (1) The fact is, that when the Marine Corps fights with a MEB, it is likely to have multiple commands in it's GCE as well as a large and complex composite squadron as it's ACE. As already pointed out, one of the more important reasons for having a MAGTF FSCC, is to resolve conflicts with two or more commands. In the joint arena, liaison personnel will be required in higher headquarters to coordinate operations. The language barrier and gaps formed by different operational procedures will have to be bridged. These liaison personnel will be as valuable to fire support coordination as to any other agency in the combined force structure. It may not be feasible to have liaison personnel at every FSCC, so the appropriate location would be at the MAGTF level. This is the hub of the wheel and the key to making the concept of an air ground task force work. A MAGTF FSCC will not operate efficiently without first addressing some inherent problems. One that is obvious is the manpower and equipment shortage. Everyone knows that Marine units rarely have the personnel authorized by their T/O. But it is much more difficult forming any organization without the Marines authorized for it regardless whether they are already part of an organization or not. For this reason there should be a T/O created for a MAGTF FSCC. Like anytime a unit is created or enlarged, another unit must be decreased in size or eliminated. In the case of the MAGTF headquarters, however, a unit is not being created and some personnel are already in place to perform duties in the FSCC. The fire support officer, his assistant, the target information officer, and the air officer is a good start. A few more enlisted would be necessary for operating radios. As proven on recent combined exercises, liaison personnel from our allies may be of great assistance in bridging the communication gap and filling the shortages. Additional equipment would also be required, mostly communications. Like personnel, some of it is already in the MAGTF command element. During TEAMWORK 90, as previously mentioned, the 4th MEB command element planned for a MEB FSCC. Although the FSCC never went ashore, personnel and equipment requirements were filled and operated efficiently. Besides the Marines already on the 4th MEB staff, major subordinate commands augmented the FSCC with a NGF Liaison Officer, Target Information Officer, and clerks. 8th Comm Battalion provided additional radio operators and nets. (1) Had there have been a T/O in existence, the augmentees for the FSCC would have been identified in advance. Once personnel are in place and nets are operating, the actual communicating will be another challenge the MAGTF FSCC will be meeting. Operating in the rear will probably require more reliance on radio relay, especially for VHF communication nets. Hopefully, this problem is already being worked out; if not, how have MAGTF commanders been communicating with their subordinate commanders? Communication problems with the DASC have been solved by putting it airborne when required. Perhaps this same concept would work with a MAGTF FSCC. It would not require additional aircraft since it could be collocated with the airborne DASC. Radio relay is not a primary function of a FSCC but Marines are taught that there is always someone out there that can be reached by radio. Alternate nets should be stressed as a means of communicating between units and an airborne FSCC could certainly perform that extra function when required. A MAGTF FSCC may appear to be a duplication of effort, overlapping already existing FSCCs. This could serve as another good reason for having one. Everyone is aware of how vulnerable command and control centers are and FSCCs fit into that category. So, redundancy built into the system could be very beneficial. Certain situations may not require a permanent FSCC at the MAGTF level, and one of the last things the Marine Corps needs is another bureaucracy that stifles operations. The plan for establishing one and having trained personnel identified to man one, however, is a necessity. The FSCCs in existence at all levels today are not permanent staffs, but are made up of personnel that may perform other functions when the FSCC is not functioning; the organization could be similar for the MAGTF staff. Some MEF and MEB commanders have experimented with MAGTF FSCCs successfully and have recognized their benefit. The MAGTF FSCC should be further tested, studied, and considered for adoption into Marine Corps doctrine. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. BARTCH, R. O., Capt. USMC, Assistant Fire Support Officer, 4th MEB H.Q., personal interview about 4th MEB fire support coordination during TEAMWORK 90, 15 March 1990. 2. CUBILLO, Francis X., Capt. USMC, and WATTERS, Stephen L., USMC, "C3CM... A Warfighting Strategy Whose Time Has Arrived", Marine Corps Gazette, 73(September 1989), 71-75. 3. DOKOS, C. G., Maj., USMC, "Fire Support Coordination for a Marine Expeditionary Force", Individual Research Project, AY 1967-70, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Education Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. 4. DONNELLL, Steven B., Maj., USMC, "The ACE as a Maneuver Element", Marine Corps Gazette, 73(August, 1989), 64-66. 5. KARCH, Lawrence G., Col., USMC, "CAS, SEAD, and UAVs", Marine Corps Gazette, 7(February 1990), 45-52. 6. II MEF After Action Report for FTX SOLID SHIELD- 89, conducted by USCINCLANT on 19 May 1989. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, (MCLLS), number 80151-17023 7. PIRHALLA, Paul P., Maj. USMC, "Single Landing Force/Division FSCC", Individual Research Project, AY 1966-67, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Remotely Piloted Vehicle Employment, OH 2-2. Quantico, Virginia, April 1987. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Required Operational Capability (ROC) for an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) System. Quantico, Virginia, undated.
