Marine Aviation - Time For Change AUTHOR Major Thomas M. Davis, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MARINE AVIATION - TIME FOR CHANGE THESIS: The aviation combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force should be reorganized and trained in peacetime as it is ex- expected to fight in time of war. ISSUE: Our Marine Aircraft Wings are currently organized by func- tional area into seperate Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG). The attack squadrons are assigned to one MAG while the fighter squadrons are assigned to another. A major problem exists when an aviation corn- bat element (ACE) is formed to support a Marine Expeditionary Bri- gade (MEB). The combat ef fectiveness of the ACE is questionable when the squadrons and the group staff do not train together on a permanent basis. There is a definite lack of continuity in our aviation force structure when the composition of a fixed-wing ACE has to come from five seperate Marine Aircraft Groups and four different airbases. In todays force structure the squadrons, who would be tasked to operate as an integrated team, have not worked together on a personal, logistical, or tactical basis. The ACE commander does not know the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinates nor has he trained the group staff as a continuum. The Navy carrier Airwing is a good example of a well trained and effective aircraft group. Their focus of effort is to train as an integrated Airwing so that they can be a dominating force on the battlefield. The Marine Aircraft Group should be reorganized to reflect a similar type of force structure. The opportunity to en- hance the strategic mobility of our TACAIR assets could be improved if Marines would deploy their composite FW Aircraft Group on air- craft carriers. This author believes the historical lessons of WW II and the Korean War should be reviewed. In order to guarantee Marine air support, the deployment of Marine Aircraft Groups aboard escort carriers would be a beneficial concept. CONCLUSION: It is time for Marine aviation to change. A new re- organization of the existing aircraft groups would assign one permanent composite aircraft group to support each of our six MEBs. This would include the relocation of several squadrons to a single airbase so that the ACE commander could conduct integrat- ed training with his entire aircraft group. "MARINE AVIATION - TIME FOR CHANGE" Thesis: The aviation combat element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force should be reorganized and trained in peacetime as it is ex- pected to fight in time of war. I. National Security Act of 1947 (with 1952 amendment) A. Division/Regiment Cohesion B. Wing/Aircraft Group Fallacy C. Lack of Strategic Lift D. Future Marine War - MEB Structure as Foundation II. Current Marine Aircraft Wing Organization A. Structure Based on Functional area B. ACE Employment Concept - Composite Force 1. MEU - One Helo Squadron 2. MEB - Two Aircraft Groups (FW and Rotary Wing) 3. MEB ACE Composition - FW Example 4. Lack of Continuity III. Disadvantages to Current Aircraft Wing Organization A. Training/Integrated Exercises B. Maintenance/Logistic Support C. ACE Staff D. Requirement to Surge Air Early in Operation IV. Navy Carrier Air Wing A. Effective Example of Composite Air Group B. Composition C. Focus of Effort - Training as Unit D. Battle Staff V. New Marine Aircraft Organization A. One Composite Aircraft Group per MEB B. Acceptable Transition C. Emphasis on Training D. Focus of FW - Largest Gap in Combat Readiness VI. New Opportunity A. Marine Aircraft Group - Deploy on CV B. Escort Carrier History 1. WW II 2. Korea C. Realistic Missions/Training Tradeoffs The U. S. Marine Corps prides itself in the synergism of the air - ground team. The Marine on the ground always feels better when he sees Marine aircraft flying overhead. This comes from a long history of Marine pilots understanding the realities of ground combat. Even today many leaders in our Corps are thinking of using our Aviation Combat Element (ACE) as a seperate maneuver element to support the commander's in- tent on the battlefield. But I believe there is a serious misconception on the effectiveness of our ACE if a Marine Ex- peditionary Brigade (MEB) is employed on short notice. The ACE is one of the three combat elements that make up the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).1 The ACE is not a permanent organization. It is formed by tasking unfamiliar squadrons, from different Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs), to make up a composite Aircraft Group. The MEB ACE will consist of one fixed wing (FW) and one rotary wing (RW) Aircraft Group. The newly formed composite Aircraft Group has its current assets based at airfields all over the country. The ACE staff is not manned on a permanent basis and it does not have repre- sentatives assigned to its organization from each aircraft type within the Group. The FW squadrons will flight ferry their air- craft via Air Force strategic tanking to conflict areas of oper- ation. The RW squadrons and Marine Aircraft Control Group (MACG) assets will embark on Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft and marry up with their FW counterparts in theatre. The key problem to understand is that the personnel who belong to these aviation units have not trained together as a fighting aircraft Group. Additionally, they have not been tasked or lead by the ACE staff on a daily basis. The aviation Combat Element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) should be organized and trained in peacetime as it is expected to fight in time of war. The National Security act of 1947, as amended in 1952, spe- cified the organization of the Marine Corps: " The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land, combat, aviation and other services as may- be organic therein. "2 Congress statutorily mandated the minimum force level of the Corps, but it did not decide on the actual makeup of each fighting component.3 I believe the internal or- ganization of the "combat division", that is the infantry division, is effective. All of it's units are garrisoned on the same base. The division is made up of three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, one amphibious assault vehicle battalion, one tank battalion, and other combat service support units. The division is the foundation of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).4 The MEF is a very powerful combat force with over 50,000 personnel and requires an enormous amount of dedicated air Force and Navy assets to transport it into a conflict area. Our Navy barely has the amphibious shipping required to embark one MEB (15-25 ships) in each major fleet command (CINC- LANT or CINCPAC). The Air Force is hard pressed to give us the 247 dedicated MAC sorties required to lift the Maritime Preposi- tioned Force (MPF). The MPF is also a MEB size unit. Therefore, I believe the Marine Corps is most likely going to fight our next battle as a MEB. I also believe our next battle will be in the low to mid intensity conflict spectrum. The GCE of the MEB is a rein- forced infantry regiment. The ACE of the MEB is a composite air- craft group. The regiment is made up of three infantry battalions. It will usually be reinforced with one tank company, one artillery battalion, one LAI company, and one amphibious assualt vehicle company when task organized to carry out the mission of the GCE.5 All of these combat units are located at the same base and there- fore have more opportunities to train together. The regimental commander knows the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinate commanders. The regimental staff functions well together during many field exercises. The regiment can deploy on a moments notice and have full confidence that it can operate tactically as an integrated unit. It is organized in peacetime as it is expected to fight in war. This is not the case for the ACE. Each Marine Air Wing is organized by functional area into a variety of Air Groups. For example, MAG-32 at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, N.C., is made up of five AV-8B attack squadrons.6 The weekly training is controlled and monitored by the MAG-32 Group comman- der and his staff (all AV-8B pilots). But in time of conflict, a squadron of AV-8Bs will be transferred into a composite air Group and will have to function within a new fighting organization. These AV-8B pilots will have no prior experience planning with or flying with the other squadrons in the ACE. All personnel inter- relationships, supply readjustments, maintenance complexities, and tactical synergism must be developed from ground zero. Since each MAG is organized by functional specialty and not by the composite force structure, the MEB commander lacks a har- monious fighting machine which can carry out his intent on the battlefield. In FMFM-1, the Commandant wants all of us to under- stand maneuver warfare. Trust tactics,mission type orders, focus of effort, and decentralized control can help us be combat effec- tive on the battlefield.7 But all of these concepts are based on the ability of our units to train together on a daily basis. The following illustrates the lack of continuity of our FW aviation assets as currently organized:8 Click here to view image A MAG can become very proficient in its own functional area but this does not mean that each tactical squadron can mesh together into a composite Air Group as well. The closest we get to training our ACE as a true composite fighting unit is at the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level of the MAGTF. This fighting force has a reinforced infantry battalion acting as the GCE. The entire MEU is employed on three to five amphibious ships. The ACE is embarked on either a LHA or a LPH and it is a true composite helicopter squadron.9 Occasionally, the ACE will be augmented by a detachment of six Av8B VSTOL jets. This organization is very effective because the squadron stabilizes six to ten months prior to their six month deployment. The squadron has plenty of time to train directly with the specific battalion it is going to support. The MEU will only be used on very small scale operations because it does not have the sustainability or the firepower to handle a major enemy threat in todays low to mid intensity con- flict arena. It can be used in advance force operations in the amphibious Operating Area (AOA) in order to augment the deploy- ment of the MEB in a large scale operation. However, our FW aircraft are not organized to support the deploying MEUs. Our Marines have to rely on Navy carrier aviation to fly the close air support and to provide the local air superiority during the amphibious landing of the MEU. Navy carrier aviation's primary mission, though, is to defend the carrier battlegroup not the Marines fighting ashore. The aircraft, personnel and support equipment required to man a typical FW Air Group of an ACE can come from five dif- ferent MAGs and four different airbases. The following il- lustrates the FW composition of the ACE for the 4th MEB:10 Click here to view image As one can plainly see, there is no continuity of the way in which our MAGs are presently organized to train. The concept of properly using the ACE is to focus the capabilities of an in- tegrated air package over the MEB's area of influence. If this tactical integration can occur, then a force multiplier will be created which far surpasses the individual capability of a single squadron. On the MEB level there are a number of training exer- cises which give our aviators exposure to operating as a composite ACE. Solid Shield, Northern Wedding and the Combined arms Ex- ercises at 29 Palms are prime examples. Unfortunately there are different squadrons making up the ACE each time there is one of these exercises. Does the same ACE conduct any training or planning with the same squadrons after the exercise is complete? No. Individual squadrons go back to their own training plan and the intent of working together as permanent fighting ACE disap- pears. The current process required to create a composite Air Group is a complicated process. Our highly technical aircraft require specific maintenance and logistical support. The personnel, air- craft and spare parts from each unit must arrive simultaneously in theatre to support flight operations. Each garrison MAG has its own complement of maintenance and supply departments. This nucleus is used to integrate the ACE's logistical support package Each garrison MEG has it's own intermediate maintenance activity (IMA).11 In order to deploy effectively, each squadron must deploy with certain complements of it's own IMA. Under the ex- isting doctrine, "a deployment contingency support package (CSP) must be provided to the ACE from each aircrafts parent MAG."12 In other words, our tactical aircraft are currently designed to be maintained and supported from a logistical system which func- tions specifically by aircraft type. When an ACE is formed, all of these assets and support person- nel must come together and are expected to function smoothly. I do not feel that this is the most efficient way to get the most out of our aircraft and personnel. The lack of the composite group structure prevents our avi- ators from integrating their capabilities. After more than ten years of flying tactical Marine aircraft, I believe the emphasis on Marine aviation is at the squadron level. This is necessary up to a point but we do not know how to fight as a combined air package. There is integrated training accomplished on the lower level if squadron S-3s are aggressive and follow up a tactical training schedule. But this usually is done only to meet a short term training goal. It is not done at the integrated group level where all types of FW aircraft focus their main effort of training on supporting a group mission. The greatest dis- advantage to our current organization is the following: If tonight a warning order was issued to employ a MEB, different squadrons from various MAGs would be thrown together to meet the call to arms. These units have not worked together, planned to- gether or flown together. In aviation this can lead to mission degradation, including safety hazards as well as lack of support for the ground fighting units. Additionally, the MEB commander needs the ACE capable of surging his air early during a campaign. The ACE may be the focus of main effort in phase one of the MEB's concept of operations ashore. This is not the time for squadron commanders to be making decisions based on the intent of an ACE commander who they just met upon arrival in theater. A very successful model of a composite airgroup is the Navy carrier Airwing. This Airwing is made up of eighty to ninety air- craft and deploys aboard one of the Navy's fourteen aircraft car- riers. The Airwing has a mixture of tactical aircraft: F14 fight- er squadrons, A6 and F18 attack squadrons, an antisubmarine squad- ron of S3s, an electronic warfare squadron of EA6Bs, an early warn- ing and C2 detachment of E2s and a SAR or antisubmarine helo de- tachment of H3s.13 This Airwing is created twelve months prior to the carrier's scheduled deployment. The intent is to gradually mold the capabilities of each squadron into a single fighting air- wing. For example, the Airwing begins it's training during a three week long heavy weapons deployment to Fallon, Nevada. The squadrons fly together in sections (two planes) and eventually strike packages may be flown with twenty-five to forty aircraft. This deployment is followed by intense workups on the carrier. Each workup period has a detailed objective to accomplish. The advanced phase workup stresses flight operations around the carrier which is then followed by the Battlegroup phase This includes flight operations of the carrier as well as it's sup- port of ten to twenty ships. During these workups the personnel learn to work together as a team. Maintenance practices, logistical support and tactical procedures for the aircrew are standardized. The Airwing staff is tactically oriented and they fly with all of the squadrons. There is continuous planning by the Airwing for real world contingencies. The end result is a very effective fighting unit. They are so effective that they can be the domina- ting force in their theater of operations. This type of organ- ization and training is what the MEB ACE should have in order to properly support the MAGTF commander. Upon occassion, one of our Marine FW squadrons has been assigned to a carrier airwing to augment one of the Navy carrier battlegroups. Unfortunately, once this is done, the Marine squadron comes under command of the Navy airwing and again the primary mission is to defend the Naval carrier group and not the Marines fighting on the ground. The current structure of the Marine Aircraft Wing should be reorganized into a specific number of composite airgroups. Each airgroup will be assigned to support one of the designated six MEBs.14 The ACE staff will be a unit with representation from each squadron working at the group level. The CSP of the com- posite airgroup will be task organized so that the ACE could be deployed on short notice. The group commander would be better prepared to lead his ACE because he knows their true capabilities. The aircrews will be able to quickly respond to changes on the battlefield because they have flown together many times before. The key idea is adapt- ability and flexibility. There will come a time when a flight of Marine jets will have to change their plan while airborne. The flight leader will be able to give a precise mission type order to his flight with only a few key words of instruction. They will understand his intent and carry out their newly assigned mission to perfection. This sixth sense of how to perform under pressure only comes from knowing your men and your men knowing you. It comes from hours of training together and having the opportunity to learn from your mistakes Many will say it will cost too much money to relocate ex- isting squadrons. If you look at the future inventory of our FW community, the transition could be done without too much cost. The F18D is currently replacing three older Marine air- craft (A6E, OA4, and RF4B) in the early 1990's. Our FW aircraft primarily will be made up of the FI8C/D, AV8B, and C130. The single EA6B squadron of twenty aircraft stationed at Cherry Point could easily be split up to support all three Marine Air- wings. If you look at the west coast as an example, the following reorganization could be introduced: Click here to view image This would be the basic nucleus of each FW Group making up the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The idea of redistributing our EA6B aircraft from one base into multiple air bases is being seriously considered at this time. The concept of creating a mini squadron of six aircraft instead of a standard squadron of twenty aircraft has been implemented by the Navy. In order to meet their commitments to support fourteen aircraft carriers, the Naval EA6B squadrons have been organized as they will deploy. This creates more leadership opportunities for their aviators and it supports my basic concept of training as an integrated unit. The newly formed composite air group would focus their an- nual training schedule on supporting their designated MEB Ground Combat Element (GCE). The helo composite air group could also focus their training on supporting the GCE and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The same reorganization could be introduced with the Brigade in Hawaii and with MAG-12 in Iwakuni, Japan. In fact, MAG-12 is currently made up of two F18C squadrons, one AV8B squadron, one A6E squadron, and one EA6B detachment. All of these units deploy to Iwakuni on the six month Unit Deployment Program. With a few modifications, MAG-12 could be the first Marine air group to fully implement my composite doctrine. I have focused my attention on the FW community because I feel this is where the largest gap in combat readiness exists. Most of our helo units are located on the same base as at MCAS New River, N.C. although many of these squadrons deploy as a member of a com- posite squadron with the MEU, the helo community still needs to sharpen their skills in fighting as a composite helo group. If our FW squadrons are reorganized into the permanent force structure needed to support our six MEBs, then another unique opportunity is created which would give the MAGTF com- mander a force multiplier on the battlefield. This composite FW air group could be employed on an aircraft carrier. It could be tasked to directly support the amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore. This concept was practiced in World War II and in the Korean War by Marine squadrons flying off of escort carriers. The escort carrier augmented the fast attack carrier by providing air support for the Marines during and after the amphibious landing. This capability allowed the fast attack carriers the opportunity to prosecute the rest of their missions at an earlier time. In both wars some of our most decorated and innovated lead- ers wanted Marines flying from dedicated aircraft carriers. In the aftermath of the bloody landing at Tarawa and again after the battle on Guam, General Holland Smith saw a specific need for pilots who were better trained in close air support. Smith stated that "sufficient air groups be designated and trained as direct support groups and be assigned to escort carriers."15 In the book U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl focused on the prosecution of a successful amphibious oper- ation: Marine officers from the commandant down had repeatedly recommended the assignment of escort carriers for the ex- clusive use of Marine aviation. Only thus, they maintained, could their ground troops be guaranteed uninterrupted and efficient close air support during the assualt phase of their amphibious operations. Not until the very end of the war, and then too late for active employment, did the Navy designate escort carriers for the sole use of Marine avia- tion.16 In the Korean War Marine F4U Corsairs were deployed aboard the escort carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily in order to provide air support for the First Provisional Marine Brigade within the Pusan perimeter. These two squadrons, VMF-323 and VMF-214, were also instrumental in the amphibious landing at Inchon.17 The concept of the escort carrier disappeared at the end of the the Korean War. Although Marine FW squadrons have flown effec- tively off of aircraft carriers, they were not employed as a com- posite air group. In our present inventory of amphibious shipping the LHA, LPH, and the new LHD could be classified as escort car- riers. The only problem is that they were designed specifically for helicopter and VSTOL capable aircraft utilization. These platforms lack the arresting gear, catapults, and deck length required to support normal FW carrier operations. If the Marine Aircraft Wing was reorganized to reflect the permanent composite air group concept, maybe the Navy would be willing to employ a "Marine Carrier Airwing" on several of their carriers. The Coral Sea and the Midway were recently retired from the active carrier fleet. These two platforms could be recommis- sioned and/or sent through the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).18 The strategic mobility of our ACE could be greatly improved if the Marine Corps could deploy from dedicated FW escort carriers. Our Marines on the ground deserve the best air support our pilots can bring to bear on the enemy. In the future, the Marine Air Ground Task Force commander will need highly trained Marine aviators who can quickly adapt to changing situations. Our avia- tors can be flexible and responsive once they have trained to- gether in a permanent composite air group. The time has come to reorganize our Marine Airwing so that our aviators can train in peacetime as they are expected to fight in time of war. ENDNOTES 1 Saxman, John B. Maj USAF, "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1989), p. 59 2 National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253,as amend- ed through September 30, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- ing Office 1973), p. 16-17 3 Keiser, Gordan W., The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Uni- fication 1944-1947, (Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National De- fense University Press, 1982), p. 129 4 Marine Corps Development and Education Command, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Division, FMFM 6-1 (Quantico, 1978), p. 176 5 FMFM 6-1, p. 6 6 Junette, Timothy E. Capt USMC, "Reorganizing Marine Corps Aviation", Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1988), p. 18 7 Marine Corps Development and Education Command, U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM-1 (Quantico,1989), p. 63, 70, 72 8 Junette, p. 18 9 FMFM 6-1, p. 9 10 Junette, p. 18 11 Junette, p. 19 12 Junette, p. 19 13 Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices - The Washington Papers, Vol VI, No 52, (The Center for Strategic and International Studies: Georgetown Univ, 1978), p. 24-32 14 Junette, p. 20 15 Crowl, Philip and Isely, J.A., U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1951), p. 385 16 Crowl and Isely, p. 586 17 Mersky, Peter B., U.S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to Present, (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Com- pany of America,1983), p. 130-L33 18 Geiger, Charles R. Lt Col USMC, Marine Corps Tacair and Strategic Mobility, (The Naval War College for Advanced Research, March 1983), p. 6, 14 Bibliography Crowl, Philip and Isely, J.A. U.S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Geiger, Charles R. LtCol USMC Marine Corps Tacair and Strategic Mobility. Newport: The Naval War College for Advanced Re- search, 1983. Junette, Timothy E. Capt USMC "Reorganizing Marine Corps Avia- tion", Marine Corps Gazette, October 1988, 18-20. Keiser, Gordan W. The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification. 1944-1947. Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982. Lehman, John Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices - The Washing- ton Papers. Vol VI, No. 52. Georgetown University: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978. Mersky, Peter B. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to Present. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983. Saxman, John B. Maj USAF "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneu- ver Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, August 1989, 58-63. National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253 as amended through September 30, 1973. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico, 1989. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Division. FMFM 6-1. Quantico, 1978.
