Air Attacks: Making CAS Responsive AUTHOR Major Theodore E. Dailey, Jr., USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE THESIS: Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its technological base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on coordinated and highly developed interactive human performance factors; therefore, future success for the Marine Corps depends on acquiring effective technology, designing functional command and control relationships to support effective CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective between both partners, air and ground, in the successful accomplishment of the mission. ISSUE: The configuration of the Marine air-ground team relies heavily on its airpower to support ground operations. The imperative for consistently responsive close air support is particularly important due to the configuration of the ground forces as light infantry characterized by a paucity of ground based fire support when compared to units of the Army or those of other nations. Since its advent in the 1930's, CAS has become increasingly difficult to prosecute because of three factors. Technological advances in aircraft have established physical and organization distance between ground and aviation units which has resulted in subsequent psychsocial distance at the implementing level. Second, command and control agencies designed to bring air and ground together are increasingly subject to degraded operations which can effectively stifle all air support operations. The command and control agencies also contribute to maintaining psychosocial, cognitive distance between air and ground. Lastly, because of the different environments of air and ground operatives, a common frame of reference is often obscured contributing to dysfunctional CAS employment. Solutions exist to correct these deficient aspects of CAS operations. Quantum leaps in technological application have provided the Marine Corps with unprecedented aviation ordnance delivery capability in the form of the F/A-18 and AV-8B. Forward basing capability and state of the art communications serve to lessen the organizational and physical distance between air and ground units. Simplified command and control techniques such as aviation in direct support also allow CAS to be more responsive. Finally, qualitative increases in information flow between air and ground units will align the purposes of the air and ground units to successful accomplishment of the mission despite differing air and ground environments. CONCLUSION: Solving challenges to responsive CAS in support of the ground commander's plan cannot be solved simply by applications of technology, shorter command and control relationships and improving human performance factors addressed separately. The approach must be holistic and comprehensive. AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its technological base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on coordinated and highly developed interactive human performance factors; therefore, future success for the Marine Corps depends on acquiring effective technology, designing functional command and control relationships to support effective CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective between both partners, air and ground, in the successful accomplishment of the mission. I. Challenges A. Effects of technology 1. High communications requirement 2. Increased aircraft capability/requirements 3. Creation of organization/psychosocial distance between air and ground B. Command and control issues 1. DASC established to effect and coordinate CAS 2 Reinforces organizational distance 3. Vulnerable as a center of gravity C. Ground commander versus flight leader 1. Differing perspectives 2. CAS success depends on highly developed skills of both II. Considerations for success A. Requirements-based procurement B. Unconventional command and control relationships 1. Forward basing 2. Direct support provided by air units 3. Functional, effective lines of support in joint/combined arena C. Improving aviator awareness of the battlefield III. Imperative for success: holistic approach AIR ATTACKS: MAKING CAS RESPONSIVE SITUATION: He was being shaken, rousing him from a brief, delightful and mildly erotic respite from the rigors of his current situation. He craved isolation and security. "WAKE UP!" It took him a few eternities for his fatigued vision to focus, and he finally recognized the Company Commander. "Enemy tanks are two clicks north of us stuck in a minefield. I want MK-20 Rockeye on them before they get loose!" Turning away, the Company Commander dropped the question of life or death for the men of "G" Company in the hands of the Forward Air Controller. Suddenly fully alert, the FAC rose to obtain and direct the close air support that would achieve the Company's defensive mission, and save the lives of the men he had grown fond of in the short time he had been with them. He prayed that the radios would work, the mortars could mark the target and that the mission would be successful. He swallowed hard knowing the odds were against him. It appears to be so easy when one reads the manuals. It's neatly depicted in charts showing the communication network, the control agencies and the machinations required to ensure CAS is consistently responsive to the ground commander's scheme of maneuver. The charts and manuals are deceptive. Factors causing unresponsive CAS are its technological base, its bureaucracy, and its reliance on coordinated and highly developed interactive human performance factors; therefore, future success for the Marine Corps depends on acquiring effective technology, designing functional command and control relationships to support effective CAS, and fostering a common sense of objective between both partners, air and ground, in the successful accomplishment of the mission. One of the hardest tasks faced at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) is integrating air and ground operations. As the United States' force in readiness and only integrated air-ground team, Marines, as light infantry, depend on close air support to accommodate shortfalls in weapon systems found in traditional, heavier land armies. CAS must be consistently responsive. CAS, viewed as a system based on technology, depends almost solely on the connectivity the communications system provides. From the time an air support request is made and a mission reports to the FAC for employment, at a minimum, seven communication interfaces are made. A communication breakdown anywhere in the system does not simply degrade the mission, it effectively cancels the sortie and scores a "mission kill" for the enemy; he lives and friendly forces remain vulnerable. Technological advances in aviation have been a blessing and an anathema for conducting CAS. Since CAS was pioneered in Nicaragua in the 1920's, aircraft have become bigger, therefore allowing more payload, faster, and more lethal due to increased weapons system accuracy. The disadvantages, viewed objectively, can outweigh aviation advantages. The bigger, faster, and accurate jets of today require, in a secure area, complex applications of technical skills to maintain availability as a viable tool in the prosecution of military objectives. No longer does the Jenny biplane land next to the company commander's command post for a brief and a chat. This technological imperative creates both physical and organizational distance between the operative commanders in the application of CAS. The speed of current aircraft can allow CAS to be responsive to the needs of the ground commander; however, speed also degrades the pilot's ability to acquire the target much less allow him to gain a real time appreciation for the friendly and enemy situation along the FEBA. Technological advances are not singularly the domain of CAS aircraft; systems designed to eliminate aircraft from the skies have similarly advanced over the last 60 years. A plethora of diverse systems are arrayed against the performance of CAS or, for that matter, any other aviation mission in the vicinity of the FEBA. A spectrum of weapons, from light machine guns to heavy anti-aircraft artillery, and complex strategic surface-to-air missiles to individually issued hand-held, heat-seeking missiles, has been designed with the interference of an air-ground synergy in mind. Technology has assuredly advanced the capabilities of air systems to have great effect on the battlefield, but it has also increased organizational friction and adversarial friction in the conduct of CAS. Methods to employ CAS aircraft, largely resulting from technological imperatives, have evolved to effectively and efficiently apply airpower in support of the ground commander. The principle in mind is sacred in doctrine: centralized command, decentralized control. Translated for the uninitiated, this principle means air assets are held by a supporting commander until requested by the commander desiring support. The weakness in this principle is glaring. It assumes dependable communications are available to make the request, and that assets are plentiful allowing routine aircraft assignment. Both are fallacious. In recognition of this problem, a bureaucratic solution was devised in that the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was constituted to shorten communication links, consolidate requests, and coordinate ground fires with aviation operations. Inspired as its creation may have been, the DASC does not substitute for close relationships between air and ground as compared to infantry and direct support artillery. It creates organizational distance between air and ground functional operatives (flight leader and company commander) and, therefore, friction. Additionally, even though communication links established by any one unit were shorter with the establishment of the DASC, it can be a liability because no alternative means of communication exists between air and ground commanders. A DASC casualty functionally stops all air support, by doctrine. Finally, CAS depends on positive, coordinated, and interactive human performance factors, without which, CAS cannot be responsive. These factors are the performance of tactical skills and the intuitive appreciation for the requirements of both the air and ground operative for each other. The requisite technical and tactical skills are apparent: the ground commander must know how to request air (implying tactical communication skills), to designate targets (implying weapons employment skill), and a knowledge of ground to air communications; the flight commander must know how to aviate, navigate, communicate, and employ his aircraft as a total weapons system. Less apparent is the intuitive awareness about the needs of each other held by the flight leader and ground commander that adjusts the air-ground interface when techniques or technical systems fail. A technically proficient pilot will deliver ordnance on target on time. A technically proficient pilot who understands the ground situation will not only deliver ordnance on target, on time, but also report his observations of the battlefield or prosecute missions under flight leader control beyond the FEBA if he cannot communicate with the ground commander. He can do this because he understands the scheme of maneuver and knows all friendly positions, including security forces. A proficient, technical pilot would return to base without dropping his ordnance because he could not communicate with the ground commander. An intuitively knowledgeable ground commander, in a degraded communications situation, would ensure fires in support of the air attack would be prosecuted and know the aircraft ingress and egress routes. Consistently supportive air attacks can be realized only when the challenges presented by technology, bureaucratic systems, and human performance factors are accommodated in a complementary and integrated manner in order to effectively employ the Marine Corps weapon of choice: the air-ground team. These challenges are surmountable and, in fact, many steps have already been taken to solve the CAS responsiveness problem. During the 1980's, unprecedented technological advances were realized. For the first time in recent memory, requirements stipulated by the military departments dictated the equipment configuration for the armed forces to the year 2000 and beyond. Prior to this modernization, the defense industry proffered equipment that could fulfill defense needs but did not necessarily meet mission requirements. As a case in point, the F-4 Phantom was a mind child of McDonnell Aircraft Co. The initial aircraft was designed as a single-seat, supersonic attack aircraft. Responding to Navy inquiries but no funding, the McDonnell company reconfigured the aircraft to accommodate an air-to-air radar and semi-active missiles with a mission of fleet air defense. In the end, the Department of the Navy, and eventually the Air Force, procured the F-4 as a fighter, fleet air defense interceptor, and tactical bomber. The admirable fact that this aircraft was designed and flown as a prototype at the expense of McDonnell Aircraft is offset by the fact that, as a "jack of all trades" aircraft, the F-4 did not truly meet the Marine Corps needs of the day even though it had set many records for speed and payload. The Marine Corps received the F-4 at the behest of the Navy. Its lack of a flexible and reliable communications suite often proved to be the undoing of an air-to-ground mission flown by an aircraft that had sufficient accuracy and payload to carry the day for the forces on the ground. In contrast, the F/A-18 was designed out of the Phantom experience. Coupled with 35 years of technological advances and inputs from thousands of aircrews who flew the F-4, the F/A-18 was largely an aircraft for Marine pilots designed by Marine pilots. To this day, the F/A-18 enjoys the best circular error probable of all air to ground aircraft in the free world. Additionally, its air-to-air weapons system, in many regards, is similarly unsurpassed. The communications capability of the F/A-18, its design based on the failings of the F-4 single UHF radio, allows a flexible capability to communicate over different frequency bands allowing the pilot unprecedented capability to communicate with tactical control agencies. Requirements-based procurement has been, is and will continue to be key to solving the technological aspect of the CAS equation. Largely as a result of increased technological capability, the bureaucracy of CAS can be modified to accommodate more responsive methods of employment. Based on the communications connectivity provided by technological advances of both airborne and ground-based systems, novel approaches to requesting and satisfying CAS requests can be entertained. The concept of aircraft in direct support of ground maneuver units can now be accommodated. Although largely conceived as a method of employment that optimizes the capability of the AV-8B deployed in a forward base, this concept can be easily adapted to more conventional aircraft types. Direct communication between the ground unit air liaison officer and the air unit operations duty officer is the only requirement to fulfill CAS requests and effect fire support coordination. Direct support relationships, such as those enjoyed by infantry and artillery units, between ground and air units could be practiced in garrison contributing to recognitional relationships that would serve to accomplish the mission during high intensity, fluid and dynamic operations. Intuitive communication, shared experience, and trust tactics could well determine the success or failure of CAS operations when traditional control agencies may not be able to function. The challenge for Marine commanders, particularly in joint and/or combined operations, is to design and maintain the shortest support relationships possible between MAGTF air and ground units. Technology and streamlined command and control relationships contribute to more responsive CAS. However, the consummate responsibility for successful application of CAS depends on the skill, knowledge and experience of the ground commander and the flight leader. In this equation, aviators could do a great deal more to contribute to CAS mission success. The Marine Corps trumpets the fact that it is the only service that truly trains its aviators from the ground up. In fact, the Marine Corps insists each new officer serve his or her first five months at The Basic School where, it could be said, the young officer qualifies as a basically trained infantry platoon commander. This is the last time the future aviator has to deal with ground issues until he reports, if assigned, for a ground tour later in his career. Somewhere between TBS and full MOS qualification in his aircraft, the aviator effaces the lessons learned at TBS. There is good reason for this. For up to two years after TBS, the first tour pilot is learning techniques and developing skills that require numerous sorties to learn. Add to these demands on his talents and intellect his ground and leadership duties as an officer of Marines, one may find the aviator's mind distracted from the situation faced by his ground counterpart. The fact remains, and is manifest at every CAX, that many aircrews fly CAS missions with incomplete information on friendly and enemy dispositions and can not articulate even a rough idea of the FEBA's trace as they leave the ready room. This is a sad indictment of the state of the Marine air-ground team. What is more difficult to understand is when aviators do inquire as to the friendly situation as some of them do, squadron, group, and/or ACE S-2 or S-3 sections do not have the information. No amount of technological gain or bureaucratic dissolution will ameliorate CAS responsiveness without effective information flow. In fact, the common theme in solving the challenges of increased CAS responsiveness revolves around solving information requirements. Information from the ground unit transmitted by high technology means between shorter organizational distances to operatives who understand and appreciate the ground situation combine to bring success to any CAS effort. Clearly, the closer air-ground operatives are (organizationally, through stipulated command relationships) increases the quality of information and lessens dependence on a transmission-receiver system. Accepting the fact that ground and aviation units will not likely enjoy collocation as often as is desired, the requirement for understanding friendly and enemy dispositions remains key for successful CAS. The information must be provided in a form that provides the greatest utility for the aviator yet is easily prepared and distributed by the supported agencies. For example, the FSCC or ground unit receiving support would periodically transmit an overlay (refer to Figure 1) to each aircraft group depicting areas in which aircraft could prosecute attacks without any coordination or control requirements. Armed with this permissive overlay, aircrews could not only plan their CAS mission, but also anticipate follow-on missions as may become apparent during the conduct of the flight. The overlay would further orient the aircrew to friendly dispositions allowing for greater troop safety in air deliveries and assist the crew in identifying egress routes. Additionally, no fire areas could be depicted on this overlay indicating reconnaissance or screening units including those that may be in advance of the FSCL. These areas could be annotated with callsign and frequency of the unit allowing the aviators the ability to contact those forward units as may be deemed necessary in the course of the mission. The overlay and the information depicted on it provides a great deal of information to the aircrews which will allow them to understand the tactical situation on the ground above and beyond the CAS brief. This information would provide the flight leader a modicum of awareness such that he may elect to prosecute air attacks with Click here to view image confidence in the event positive control agencies on the FEBA become degraded. The utility of an overlay such as Figure 1 can be measured in that it displays the tactical situation and provides command and control information consolidated on one sheet that may be affixed to an aviator's kneeboard; a single source of pertinent mission data. No matter the format of the information, its importance lies in its utility in orienting the aircrew thereby enabling them to make a greater contribution to the ground effort. For too long, CAS responsiveness has been a significant problem in the employment of the Marine air-ground team due largely to the organizational and cognitive distance between the air and ground elements. It had been hoped that technological advances alone would solve the challenges to the conduct of CAS in an uncertain environment. However, command and control relationships as well as the relationship between the ground commander and the flight leader have significant impact on the ability to bring CAS to bear in any given scenario. Indeed, an eclectic union of technological, bureaucratic, and psychosocial accommodations must be entertained to effectively employ the Marine Corps' weapon of choice: the air-ground team. By employment of these techniques, the Marine Corps can effectively return to the 1930's where air and ground conferred under the same banana tree to provide the support necessary to accomplish the mission. BIBLIOGRAPHY Gunston, Bill and Spick, Mike. Modern Air Combat. New York: Crescent, 1983. Mason, Francis K. Phantom: A Legend In Its Own Time. Osceola: Motor books, 1984. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, OH 1-100. Quantico, 1989. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation. Quantico, 1982. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Offensive Air Support, FMFM 5-4. Quantico, 1979. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Control of Aircraft and Missiles OH 5-8. Quantico, 1988. U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Marine Air Command and Control System Operational Concept (MACCS 2000), FMFRP 14-5. Quantico, 1989.
