Military Reorganization: Challenge And Opportunity AUTHOR Major David D. Dyche, USAF CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MILITARY REORGANIZATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY THESIS: The present military structure of three and one half (the Marine Corps) services, with their many overlapping functions and encroaching roles, no longer reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget. Now is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along functional lines into five separate military services. BACKGROUND: For nearly 150 years the military forces of the United States were divided into the two separate but equal Army and Navy services. Other than the President, there was no centralized control over them to coordinate their activities. New technology and the necessity for joint operations caused military and civilian leaders to consider reorganizing the services in World War II. However, it was not until Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 that the military was restructured to meet the strategic needs and threats of the post-war era. The Key West Agreement of 1948 delineated service roles and missions. PROBLEM: The security environment of the United States has changed significantly since 1948. Additionally, Congress now seems likely to force stiff budget reductions on the military which will result in much smaller force levels. Unfortunately, the military's organization has not kept pace with these realities. Instead, the service alignment has resulted in overlapping missions, unclear or dual chains of command, and an unnecessary growth of headquarters and staff layers. The result has been a "unified" structure with two "armies", two transportation forces, and four "air forces." RECOMMENDATIONS: Rather than dividing the armed forces by medium (land, sea, air), the military should be organized along functional lines. Today's Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps should be eliminated and their assets sent to the new functional services they logically support. A structure with five services formed according to the roles and missions they must perform makes sense operationally and fiscally. The new "Forces" should be Strategic, Naval, Heavy Land, Low Intensity Conflict, and Transportation. In addition, the present unified and specified commands would be replaced by the functional services, Joint Task Forces, and two geographic coordinating commands. This proposal would create a general force structure which provides flexibility, responsiveness, and clear command responsibility. MILITARY REORGANIZATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The present military structure of three and one half (the Marine Corps) services, with their many overlapping functions and encroaching roles, no longer reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget. Now is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along functional lines into five separate military services. I. Origins of the present service structure A. Influence of technology and world leadership B. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider reorganization C. National Security Act of 1947 revamps service organization D. Key West Agreement of 1948 delineates service roles and missions II. A new organization to meet today's realities A. Current structure no longer reflects environment 1. New global political and military situation 2. Congressional pressure to reduce budgets 3. Present services divided into mediums, not missions B. Proposed new structure with five services formed along functional mission lines III. No more Air Force? A. Separate Air Force created for wrong reasons B. Tactical fighters go to their supported commanders IV. The five new services A. Strategic Forces for nuclear and space missions B. Naval Forces for sea control and power projection C. LIC Forces formed from Special Operations, Light Infantry, and Marines to meet today's threat D. Heavy Land Forces put most armor and mechanized infantry into flexible, responsive reserve E. Transportation Forces combine air, sea, and land lift assets to support all services V. The future for unified and specified commands A. Purpose of combatant commands no longer valid B. Replace with functional services, Joint Task Forces, and two geographic coordinating commands MILITARY REORGANIZATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY When Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, it radically altered the military structure of the United States which had existed generally unchanged for nearly 150 years. The Act's creation of a centralized Department of Defense, with its three separate services organized loosely along mission lines, probably fit the nation's strategy and needs in 1947. However, the world has changed a great deal over the past 43 years. Even as early as the 1950s, our leaders recognized the global military situation had shifted and that the structure of the services no longer reflected the current environment. President Eisenhower certainly recognized the blurring of service roles and missions when he said in 1958, "modern weapons and methods of war have scrambled the traditional service functions." (5:246-250) Today, more than ever, events around the world from the Soviet Union to Europe to Central America presage a new and very different security environment for the United States. As we look toward the 1990s and beyond, the rapidly changing nature of the threat, the potential emergence of new foes, and the fiscal realities of drastically reduced defense budgets all demand we reconsider the manner in which the Defense Department is organized. If the United States is to maintain viable armed forces that fit the national strategy, then we must ensure the military is effectively and efficiently organized to meet the realities of today and tomorrow. The present structure of three and one half (the Marine Corps) services, with their many overlapping functions and encroaching roles, no longer reflects the strategic needs of the United States or the fiscally constrained realities of the federal budget. Now is the time to reorganize the Department of Defense along functional lines into five separate military services. However, appreciating the need for, and structure of, such a major change first requires an understanding of how the United States military arrived at its present organization. ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT SERVICE STRUCTURE With the establishment of the United States Navy in 1798, the military forces of the United States were divided into two services under the separate but equal Departments of War (Army) and Navy. Their structure followed generally functional lines and worked reasonably well for 150 years during our country's isolationist infancy and adolescence. However, without any controlling agency between or over them, the two military branches had to rely on the President as their sole arbitrator and coordinator. (7:91-92) In addition, major technological advances and the emergence of the United States as a world power began to meld and blur the roles of the separate services while demonstrating the need for their centralized control. The most significant technological influence was the airplane, first introduced in World War I. The "air forces" were put under Army control since their primary purpose was to support the soldier in land warfare. However, farsighted Navy officers recognized the potential of the airplane as a means to greatly increase their service's combat power. During the 1920s and 1930s the airplane's utility and capabilities were advanced by both services to meet their particular needs and missions, although never as much as the aviators sought. By World War II the Army Air Force and Naval Aviation were vital components of their respective services and critical to the triumph of our war strategy. Navy, Marine, and Army Air Force aircraft all flew missions supporting land as well as sea battles throughout the conflict. This highly successful crossover of roles signified an end to any notion of service claims to a total monopoly on a particular air mission. The airplane was recognized as a very powerful and flexible weapon with enormous value to all the services, but particularly during joint operations when under the centralized control of the supported commander. Besides more effective use of the airplane, World War II also saw our emergence as the allied leader bring about the need for close cooperation between the services (and nations) under centralized control. Joint operations were an absolute requirement to achieve victory against a well organized and experienced enemy. Unity of command dictated one individual be empowered to control all of the forces within a given theater, regardless of service (or nation). The necessity and success of "jointness" caused our senior leaders to consider a reorganization of the military. In May of 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the four-member Special Committee on Reorganization of National Defense to study options for a revised military structure. Nearly a year later, on 11 April 1945, the committee released its recommendations. It proposed eliminating the existing Departments of Navy and War, along with their respective service secretaries and chiefs of staff, and replacing them with a single Department of Defense headed by a Secretary of the Armed Forces. The proposal also called for a single chief of staff commanding a unified service divided into separate Army, Navy, and Air Force components. (3:6) The Navy put up a vigorous defense based upon several factors including its fear of domination by a highly centralized structure dominated by the larger Army and Army Air Force as well as concerns over the future of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. The Navy's counterproposal, known as the Eberstadt Plan, was presented by Navy Secretary James Forrestal and emphasized the successes of past joint operations under the wartime system then in place. It argued for continuing the separate service departments supported by an array of interservice boards and agencies, proposed the creation of a national security council, and encouraged the concept of unity of command for joint operations. (6:23-24) (9:18-19) The often heated debates among and between members of the Congress and the military over these and other plans finally led to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. As is the norm in Congress, the Act was a compromise of many views, both military and civilian, including those of President Truman. The primary elements of the Act were: - the establishment of the Department of Defense (replacing the Navy and War Departments) with each service "semi" subordinate to it - the establishment of a separate Air Force but with an allowance for the Navy to retain its own aviation forces - the retention (under the Navy) of the Marine Corps with its responsibility for amphibious operations The limited subordination of the individual services and their secretaries to the Defense Secretary would later be corrected through additional legislation in the late 1940s and 1950s. (9:24-25) While the National Security Act of 1947 set the new organization of the armed forces, there were still many differences to be worked out concerning the roles of each branch. Just eight months after the Act's passage, the service chiefs met with the new Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, (who ironically had argued against creation of the Defense Department when he was Navy Secretary) to work out their differences on service roles and missions. Their settlement, known as the Key West Agreement of 1948, served as the basis for defining the functional boundaries of each service. (1:114) (9:395-396) The key points of the Key West Agreement were - the Navy retained the Marine Corps (and the Corps' aviation arm for close air support), its own naval air arm to support sea battles, its own aircraft for air transportation, control of antisubmarine warfare, and the sealift support for the Army - the Army maintained responsibility for operations on land including ground-based air defense but gave up ownership of close air support as well as both strategic and tactical airlift and sealift - the Air Force gained responsibility for the Army's close air support, as well as strategic and tactical airlift, and maintained primary responsibility for strategic aerial warfare and defense of the United States against air attack Although the Agreement clarified the missions and roles of each service, what really emerged was a "unified" Department of Defense with two armies (Army and Marine Corps), two transportation forces (Air Force and Navy), and four air forces (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and, with a soon to be sizeable helicopter force, the Army). Over the years since the Key West Agreement was reached there have been a host of other efforts regarding defense reorganization. Most notable among these were the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act, the Reorganization Acts of 1953 and 1958, and most recently the Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986. However, these pieces of legislation, along with a number of Executive Orders issued by several Presidents, were aimed not at altering the service structure but instead focussed on revising the roles and powers of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commands. (3:37,73,95,221) A NEW ORGANIZATION TO MEET TODAY'S REALITIES What was not given serious consideration was the organization of the services themselves. Perhaps the present structure fit the security requirements of the United States in 1947. Now however, the continuing onrush of events around the world, combined with the potential of major budget reductions, foreshadows a significantly smaller military in the very near future. Indeed, a number of senior Congressional leaders, including the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator James Sasser of Tennessee, have already advocated taking advantage of the so-called "peace dividend" and proposed military budget cutbacks of 10 to 20 billion dollars. Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney is on record saying he would rather have a smaller military than the "hollow shell" forces of the 1970s. (12) No matter how much the armed forces are reduced, this leaner military must still meet our strategic needs of today and tomorrow. Unfortunately, our present service alignment has clearly resulted in duplication of effort, overlapping missions, unclear or dual chains of command, and an unnecessary growth of headquarters and staff layers. (11:139-479) It also no longer meets the global political and military situation. Any revised organization must overcome these problems and yet retain the flexibility to shrink or expand depending upon the changing threat and fiscal constraints. It must also effectively respond to the two most portentous changes in our nation's security environment -- the quickly decreasing threat to NATO and the steadily increasing threat to United States' interests outside of NATO. The solution is a military structure formed more closely along functional lines. The current service structure is roughly divided into land, sea, and air forces. But these roles are not adhered to and besides, these classifications are mediums, not missions. Splitting the armed forces into five services according to the functions and missions they must be prepared to perform makes sense operationally and fiscally. The names of the new services are not important (although old service traditions and loyalties will not die easily). Also, attempting to specifically define the numbers of different forces within each new service at this particular moment in time is next to impossible, especially given the rapidly changing national and international situation. Instead, the proposal outlined below creates a general force structure which provides flexibility, responsiveness, and clear command responsibility: - Strategic Forces -- Strategic Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) -- Strategic Air Forces (Bombers and Tankers) -- Space and Strategic Surveillance Forces -- Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces - Naval Forces -- Surface Combatant Forces (including aviation) -- Submarines (except SLBMs) - Heavy Land Forces -- Armor and Mechanized Forces (large majority) -- Tactical Air Forces (most deep interdiction) - Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Forces -- Special Operations Forces -- Light Infantry Forces -- Army's Light Infantry Divisions -- Marine Divisions -- LIC Air Forces (Special Operations plus most conventional fighter and helicopter assets) - Transportation Forces -- Strategic and Tactical Airlift -- Strategic Sealift (including Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) shipping) -- Amphibious Shipping -- Land Transport (present Army MTMC) NO MORE AIR FORCE? The biggest shake-up under this proposal is obviously the elimination of the current Air Force. The Air Force is the most blatant example of a service formed in an attempt to control a medium or platform rather than to support specific functions or roles. The principle reason behind creating an autonomous Air Force in 1947 was the belief that strategic bombing, in particular long range nuclear bombing, would be the decisive factor in preventing or deciding any future war. During World War II, Army Air Force leaders felt the special requirements of strategic bombing were not understood by Army or Navy leaders and required a separate air commander. (8:356) After the war, these feelings formed the basis of the argument for a separate Air Force service. Unfortunately, history has shown that strategic bombing was not nearly as successful as was first believed, both in World War II and Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the Air Forces' preoccupation with strategic bombers, missiles, and air superiority has led to lapses in other areas of its responsibility. Close air support had to be learned and relearned in World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam. Meanwhile, the airlift of Army and Marine forces, both strategic and tactical, has been relegated to a tertiary priority at best. Perhaps the most telling argument supporting the need to divide up the air forces along functional lines is that the only Air Force generals who head unified or specified commands oversee functional not geographic commands. The three are CINCs of Strategic Air, Space, and Transportation. The first two would be combined into a separate service and the third would itself become a new service, with all gaining some additional forces from other services. The only major remaining piece of the Air Force is tactical fighter air. Close air support, interdiction, and air superiority are missions merely extend the land or sea battle into a third dimension and should come under the authority of the supported land or naval commander. The Navy successfully used this argument to retain its aviation arm in 1947 and 1948. (2:2-3) Certainly the Marine Corps demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of this unity of command, both in Korea and Viet Nam, especially relative to the far less responsive coordination between Army ground units and Air Force close air support forces. Along those lines, tactical fighter (and helicopter) forces should be parcel led out to the land or naval forces they support. The majority of close air support (CAS) and assault support aircraft should go to the LIC Forces. Mission success and survival of these air forces is much more likely in a LIC environment than over the high tech battlefields of a large scale mechanized war, such as that to be expected in NATO. Still, some fighter aircraft, especially those designed for deep interdiction and stealth, should go to the Heavy Land Forces. These forces will need such aircraft in a conflict where the depth and technology requirements of the battlefield would most likely be far greater than in a LIC scenario. THE FIVE NEW SERVICES The new Strategic Forces must control all strategic nuclear and space forces in order to provide unity of command and responsible prioritization in the development and support of the different weapons systems. Our military's strategic deterrence mission has been invested in the so-called "Triad" so it only makes sense to place all three pieces under one service and commander, especially for effective command and control. Choosing the proper type and mix of manned bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs will certainly be more fiscally and operationally realistic when one commander is directly responsible for all three. Meanwhile, space and surveillance forces are already commingled, are inherently strategic in nature, and support nuclear deterrence along with other critical missions. In fact, most Air Force space and surveillance assets were at one time under the Strategic Air Command. Air and missile defense of the United States also logically comes under the Strategic Forces function since such defense depends upon early warning provided by the detection assets of the space and surveillance forces. The revamped Naval Forces could now concentrate on the primary missions of sea control and power projection, unencumbered by ancillary ties to ballistic missile submarines, sealift, and amphibious shipping. Additionally, the Marine Corps' poor stepchild affiliation with the Navy can be ended, to the advantage of both services. It is time the Marine Corps was recognized for what it is -- light infantry with excellent organic air support and a very limited capability for mechanized and amphibious operations. While maintaining some capability is worthwhile, the need for major amphibious forces is questionable. The last large scale beach invasion against any meaningful opposition was during World War II (enemy defenses at Inchon were almost nonexistent). During the war our forces normally enjoyed near total air and sea supremacy as well as overwhelming superiority of land combatants and yet there was never a guarantee of success. Even the huge force that attacked Normandy might well have been defeated had the enemy made faster and better decisions. Meanwhile, the worldwide spread of today's very lethal, easily concealable, and highly mobile weapons systems makes even a brigade-sized amphibious operation against a reasonably well equipped Third World country a very dubious proposition at best. Still, the Marines and their limited amphibious capability do have a place in the new military structure as an integral part of the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Forces, the land forces designed to meet the future threat. The primary danger to the global concerns of the United States is surely shifting away from a Soviet attack on NATO. Our new challenge comes from those Third World countries who are unfriendly to the United States and, perhaps more importantly, from those governments now friendly to us but who could be overthrown by hostile forces, either foreign sponsored or indigenous. Several of the former, including Libya, Iran, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Viet Nam, and Cuba, all lie along vital sea lines of communication and could threaten our economic vitality in peacetime and military responsiveness in wartime. Meanwhile, economic hardship and political discontent in countries such as the Philippines could well turn old friends into new foes. (10:155-156) If United States military forces are committed to conflicts in these or similar countries, our forces must possess the flexibility and capability to respond quickly and effectively throughout the world. The combination of units proposed for the LIC Forces is quite similar to that which was so successful in Grenada and Panama. Special operations, airborne, light infantry (including the Marines), and close air support forces all learned a great deal from Grenada. Two major lessons were that effective unity of command and proper force integration were found lacking and resulted in numerous lapses on the battlefield. Congress noticed the shortcomings and, against the service's parochial dissent, created the unified Special Operations Command. The problem is that Congress did not go far enough, particularly with the types of troops it put into the command. The LIC Forces will fill the gaps in the present Special Operations Command by providing more proficient and flexible air, light infantry, and Marine units (including their associated armor, mechanized, air defense, and artillery units) to work with the special operations forces. The result will be a fully integrated team capable of conducting operations over a broader spectrum of conflict than is currently possible. The obvious question now is where does the creation of the LIC Forces leave today's Army? The loss of their light infantry and special operations units, along with a majority of their helicopter assets, leaves only the heavy armor and mechanized divisions which were built to fight the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. With the increasing unlikelihood of such a conflict occurring in the foreseeable future, the need to maintain these large and expensive forces appears rather doubtful. However, we must not be too quick to dismantle all of these units for their deterrent effect alone has made possible many of the changes in Europe. Additionally, they can serve as a stabilizing influence between countries, especially in Europe. On the other hand, these forces can certainly be reduced and should remain concentrated in one service, the Heavy Land Forces. Many, perhaps most, of these units can revert to reserve status with a flexible readiness posture in order to remain responsive to any change in the threat. Meanwhile, the remaining active units will maintain a vital cadre of experience and be ready to provide augmentation to the LIC Forces should the need arise. The creation of the Heavy Land Forces truly reflects today's realities. Large amounts of money will be saved, active duty forces will be cut significantly, and the service will still be fully capable of responding to the changing threat. Having the LIC and Heavy Land Forces available does not do much good if they can not be quickly dispatched in significant numbers to a troubled region anywhere around the globe. When the unified Transportation Command was formed several years ago, its creators recognized the absolute necessity for centralized command and control of all service strategic and operational level transportation assets in order to expeditiously carry our forces to battlefields far from our shores. Unfortunately, the forces assigned are not very glamorous and so have often been given the budget leftovers from their respective services. The result has been three components who are marginally capable of supporting anything more than a small scale operation such as Panama and are in danger of deteriorating even further. In the past we have met our power projection commitments mostly through the use of forward basing. However, our force levels abroad will soon drop to levels that will only exacerbate the need for rapid reinforcement from stateside units in the event of a crisis. Airlift and sealift, as well the CONUS land transportation infrastructure to the get personnel and equipment to their departure points, will only continue to increase in value and necessity. Rather than count on a unified command made up of service "second thoughts," our nation's future strategy requires an entire service capable of expediently moving large forces, along with their equipment and supplies, to any spot in the world. To achieve this goal, we must embark upon a program to greatly expand our transportation assets. A proper mix of aircraft and ships should be procured and maintained including the C-17 as well as more Fast Sealift and Maritime Prepositioning Ships. The limited amphibious capability must also be protected and modernized. Experience has shown that a unified command is not able to accomplish such a task. Only a separate service, the Transportation Forces, can adequately prioritize, acquire, maintain, and control the resources necessary to meet the increasing transportation needs of the armed forces. The creation of these five services would obviously necessitate a reorganization of the nation's reserve forces as well. Quite simply, these units would be transferred to the new service they functionally support, just as their active duty counterparts were allocated. National Guard units would still belong to their states but would also report to their appropriate functional services if called up during a national crisis. THE FUTURE FOR UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS The creation of the five services and the resultant elimination of the two specified as well as the three functional unified commands also affords the excellent opportunity to revamp the present combatant command structure. The history of these commands dates back to World War II although they were not formally mandated until passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Their purpose was "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces," for "their operation under unified control," and for "their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces." (4:42) Unfortunately, these commands have evolved into a separate military structure unto themselves, tasked with conducting the actual warfighting but not given all the means to do so. Meanwhile, the services have been relegated to personnel, equipment, and logistic support agencies. Yet the service chiefs, not the combatant CINCs, sit as members of the JCS and make the major policy and budgetary decisions under which the CINCs must operate. This fragmentation of effort and command has only increased the parochial nature of the military since most forces now must deal with two separate chains of command. We must also recognize that today's regional CINCs do not, and will not, fight any actual conflicts short of a theater-wide war. Instead, Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are formed both from forces belonging to the regional CINC who has responsibility for the conflict area and from those "owned" by other CINCs, both area and functional. Grenada and Panama are excellent examples where the "supported CINC" did not fight the battle but actually became just another "supporting CINC" who supplied forces to the JTF Commander. The way to end these problems is to take advantage of the functionally integrated nature of the reorganized services. The JCS staff should be expanded and made responsible for developing the individual theater and regional OPLANS and OPORDS. The geographic unified commands can be eliminated and replaced by two Coordinating Commands (COORDCOMs), Pacific and Atlantic, with new roles and missions. Given today's immediate, responsive, and worldwide command and control capabilities, the COORDCOMs would not actually command forces. They would instead act as direct extensions of the JCS, primarily to serve as skeletal structures for actual and exercise operations in their areas, and secondarily to coordinate service forces within their regions. Forces would now come directly under their respective services, except when assigned to a JTF for a joint operation. Thus, the primary fighting organizations will remain what they are today, the JTFs, with their commanders designated by the JCS. The JTFs can either be permanent or temporary but would be charged with conduct of joint operations, both actual and exercise. In lieu of our present system where a "supported CINC" has to coordinate his service components as well as the forces from other "supporting CINCs," we can now have a "supported service" be the primary warf ighter through a JTF with additional forces from the other "supporting services" as needed. The only exceptions to this scheme would be in the cases of NATO and Korea where the United States has major treaty commitments to combined forces. The affected sub-unified commands in these regions should become permanent JTFs until such time as the threat no longer requires their continued existence. CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY Why must we reorganize the United States Armed Forces at this time? Because, a nation develops its military to support its national security objectives and the armed forces must be structured to effectively and efficiently achieve those objectives, both in peace and in war. When the organization of the United States military was revamped in 1947 it may well have reflected the needs of that day. However, the world's political and military framework has undergone a substantial transformation over the past 43 years. Yet, the organization of the military services has not been updated to reflect the times, in particular the changing level and nature of the threat. Meanwhile, the fiscal realities of dramatically reduced defense budgets in the coming years portend a much leaner military that must become more efficient. Eliminating redundant staffs and the overlap in service missions will reduce the loss of combat power in the field and must be paramount in our planning. The answer to the dilemmas of changing threat and less money is a flexible military structure formed along functional lines. Reorganizing the armed forces into five new services, each with the distinct roles and missions as proposed in this paper, best suits the needs of the United States at this time to respond quickly and effectively to a crisis anywhere in the world. It does not eliminate the need for "jointness." Instead, it makes prosecuting joint operations far simpler and more effective since each service will have most, if not all, of the necessary joint forces organic to it in order to meets its assigned mission. In his 1958 proposal to revise the National Security Act of 1947, President Eisenhower argued, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements. as one single concentrated effort." (11:277) The best way to concentrate our efforts is to restructure our armed services so that each branch has all the elements necessary to fight its assigned missions. If we fail to properly reorganize now to meet the peacetime challenges of today, we may not have the opportunity should war breakout tomorrow. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Blechman, Barry M. and William J. Lynn, eds. Toward a More Effective Defense. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985. 2. Byron, John L. Reorginization of the US Armed Forces. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1987 3. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study: Roles and Functions of the JCS, a Chronology. Washington, DC, 1987. 4. Department of Defense. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1988, AFSC Pub l. Washington, DC, 1988. 5. Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Waging Peace. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. 6. Hooper, Edwin B. The Navy Department: Evolution and Fragmentation. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Press, 1978. 7. Kaufman, Daniel J. "National Security: Organizing the Armed Forces." Armed Forces and Society, 14, (Fall 1987), 85-112. 8. Potter, E. B. Nimitz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 9. Reardon, Steven L. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume l, The Formative Years. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. 10. Record, Jeffrey. "Implications of a Global Strategy for US Forces," in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis. Eds. Asa A. Clark IV, et al. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 11. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985 12. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. The FY 1991 President's Budget Proposal for the Department of Defense. Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services by the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990.
