Ironies Of Maneuver Warfare AUTHOR Major Douglas C. Duncan, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy Executive Summary Title: Ironies of Maneuver Warfare Thesis: If we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we had better be aware of the larger contradictions and implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend to militate against our success. Issue: Although maneuver warfare is indeed a philosophy for fighting smart, adopting the philosophy is going to be problematical. Additionally, it may not be a smart philosophy for all levels of warfare. Many forces both in our society and from personalities in our own institution may prevent successful implementation while economic forces may render adoption of the philosophy untimely at this juncture. Conclusion: We need to be aware of these problems and recognize that there are contradictory aspects to this new philosophy which must be addressed in the implementation process. Ironies of Maneuver Warfare OUTLINE Thesis Statement. If we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we had better be aware of the larger contradictions and implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend to militate against our success. I. Adoption of maneuver warfare philosophy A. Impact of FMFM-1 B. Difficult concept C. Concept raises ironies which may militate against successful adoption II. Polarization of styles (Attrition vs Maneuver) A. Not a totally useful concept B. Clouds objectivity C. Effects on decision making III. Levels of conflict and maneuver warfare A. Maneuver approach smart by definition B. Attrition may be appropriate response C. Effect on deterrence IV. Danger of public avowal of maneuver warfare philosophy A. Philosophy implementation / entrenched oppositon B. Impact of attritionist society C. Time constraints D. Force of economic problems V. Need for awareness of the potential problems Ironies of Maneuver Warfare It is a very rare occurrence in the course of human or institutional events when a point of demarcation both occurs and, is at the same time, recognized for it's obvious significance. The publishing of FMFM-1 Warfightlng represents just such a transformational watershed for the Marine Corps as an institution and, more importantly, for the individual Marines who comprise our rapidly evolving organization. Following over a decade of widespread and healthy, though at times contentious debate, the Marine Corps has elected to adopt a significantly different conceptual framework for the conduct of war. the new conceptual construct is maneuver warfare, the galvanizing catalyst was the long term debate bubbling up from within the Marine Corps as well as externally from critics and reformers. The reagent of change is FMFM-1 which bears the Commandant's imprimatur and stamp of credibility as well as authority. As widely reviewed and as hotly debated as the previous, long term argumentation which precede and gave rise to it, FMFM-1 is surely the most widely read and reread manual in our glut of operational directives. The wide appeal or, in any case, the wide interest that this eminently readable manual generates offers considerable hope that this "new" style of warfare addressed there will ultimately be adopted. It is ironic that our earlier doctrinal manuals are replete with specifics, techniques, details and clear procedures yet generally lack a unifying or underpinning theme or coherent vision. They do however, lend themselves to easy, if unimaginative, implementation. By way of contrast, the conceptual framework for maneuver warfare described in FMFM-1 is a coherent if not easy or totally clear, vision which is utterly devoid of constraining specifics for implementation. An artful construct yet, seen through a glass darkly, the maneuver war concept requires concerted effort and deep thought in application, orders of magnitude beyond our previous method. Irony and subtle contradictions coexisting in a state of tension abound in this new style of warfare making it both interesting as well as problematical and vitally necessary to master for future success as well as inherently dangerous to us as incipient practitioners. If we mandate a requirement to adopt maneuver warfare as the doctrinal basis for fighting wars then we had better be aware of the larger contradictions and implicit ramifications which confront us and will tend to militate against our success. Maneuver warfare with it's analytical focus on the enemy and it's emphasis on attacking cohesion and moral factors is not new. What is new is that it has been exhaustively scrutinized and organized into an organic, visionary but implicitly unconfining whole and described with economic clarity. Central to the transition process in adopting this new style as a practicing principle is a requirement to recognize differentiation. Specifically, one must distinguish between two antithetically ( as described in FMFM-1 ) defined styles of conflict, that of maneuver warfare on the one hand and that of attrition warfare on the other. Looking further, neither style is new. The history of conflict abounds with clear examples of each. Trench warfare and massed infantry assaults in World War I epitomize attrition warfare while inspired coups to unhinge the enemy such as MacArthur's surprise Inchon landing or the surprise Egyptian cross canal assault in the Yom Kippur war well characterize the best of maneuver warfare. What is new as well as potentially dangerous which arises from our new ideological construct is the polarization of views on a formal basis. In spite of the fact that much of even the most successful of wars has involved a combination and succession of styles in tension, our polarization now tends to obscure objective assessment in analytical interpretation and forces a focus on the maneuver aspects while submerging anything but the negative aspects of attrition efforts. This lack of balance when attrition is held in odium while the maneuver style is viewed as the epitome of rectitude will prove problematical in the future where analysis will tend to be in the light of our new and well received doctrine rather than objective examination of an issue on the basis of intrinsic merit. A doctrine which clearly calls for an analytical and objective approach but which tends to impel a skewed perspective is ironic indeed. More to the point, it is a dangerous aspect against which we must guard. It is ironic that the very manual which describes the nature of conflict as fluid and disorganized {1} can so neatly polarize styles of dealing with the chaos of war. More to the point, there are some implicit dangers in so neat a split. Paul of Tarsus wrote in the Bible ( Romans, Chapter 5, verse 13 ) "for until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law". Our new doctrinal Gospel which exerts considerable force, produces a disturbing parallel because now, with the adoption of maneuver warfare as our chosen doctrine, we have defined rectitude of method in war as uniquely the maneuver style and defined any attritionist tendencies as rank heresy. With no previous requirement for differentiation, success was the yardstick for measurement in conflict. Now, with the authority of a doctrine which emphasizes the maneuver approach, success is less likely to be the final arbiter in even the most rapid and economical success. The degree to which maneuver warfare is practiced and attrition warfare avoided will be a crucial and daunting concern. Especially so given the increasingly analytical bent impelled by our new doctrine. Analyzing the requirements to achieve victory was never an easy task, yet now, with a new doctrine which purports to both free the imagination and avoid formula, we have injected the additional requirement to achieve victory by thinking through stylistic constraints which many comprehend only dimly and many find alien. The likely ramification appears to be that, until well inculcated within our military, our leaders are likely to experience considerable hesitation in the decision making process as they agonize over whether their approach will lead to success and adhere to maneuverist precepts. Those who do not comprehend the philosophy will seek to formulize the more comprehensible aspects and will boldly misapply it. A weak argument at first glance, consideration regarding how distressingly doctrinaire rather than thoughtful and willing to act imaginatively on our own initiative we have become combines with the fact that our FMFM-1 doctrine is actually widely read and is being haltingly implemented combines to give one pause. That this new manual is being seized upon avidly, and in the virtual absence of any other definitive, authoritative doctrinal material for implementing a new, controversial and easy to misconstrue doctrine should raise some concern. That many previously doctrinaire attritionists are attempting a similar doctrinaire approach to implementing maneuver warfare should send off alarm bells somewhere. It is somewhat amusing to reflect that although the FMFM-1 was written in a non prescriptive fashion in order to maximize and encourage creative latitude, the inference strongly hints that a lack of military creativity was what caused production of the manual in the first place. Ironically, the confusion, hesitation and potentially formulistic misapplication of the philosophy which will likely arise as our non-creative pragmatists dutifully attempt to cope is the antithesis of the bold, audacious but calculated approach mandated by our new doctrine. {2}. Is maneuver warfare applicable at every level in the spectrum of conflict? It would appear that applying the philosophy of maneuver warfare is certainly possible at every level of both war and conflict or competition short of war, but, whether it is smart to do so may be a more germane question. With compelling logic FMFM-1 convincingly leads one to the final, conclusive sentence stating that In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to oneselves-- a philosophy for "fighting smart"." {3}. The conclusion here is inescapable, maneuver warfare is smart therefore, attrition warfare, by extension, is not smart. This invidious breakout between methods of warfare is curiously limiting for a philosophy which ultimately seeks to free the imagination from constraining doctrinal fetters. More to the point, it may be smart to apply attrition warfare at one level of war where a maneuver approach may be ineffectual. Defining maneuver warfare as smart may preclude an appropriate,scenario dependent attritionist response because the respondent will not want to be viewed as in the wrong doctrinal camp. Our contest against Japan in World War II certainly provides evidence of the different styles coexisting in harmony. FMFM-1 alludes to this example but merely indicates that the styles coexist while strongly implying that attrition warfare is always not smart. {4}. A grinding, methodical attrition applied at the strategic level combined well with an opportunistic and bold series of advanced base seizing coups to which the enemy could not effectively respond at the operational level. Local circumstances combined to render the tactical level predominantly attritionist. Arguably, one could make a case that we could have been smarter (ie. more maneuverist ) at every level, but it is hard to conceive of the relevance of a maneuverist approach to the tactical level requirements for seizing a Tarawa or an Iwo Jima once the operational level decision to take it was made. At the strategic level, reliance on a maneuver warfare orientation in lieu of a healthy emphasis on the deterrent value of overwhelming attritionist capacity may be not only a disadvantage, but also an invitation to disaster. This is certainly the core thought on which nuclear deterrence concepts hinge. Of more relevance to our maneuverist exclusive aspiring Marine Corps, it is also central to the rationale behind the conventional force build up response to the massive Soviet build up of conventional arms which arose, in part from our earlier skewed reliance on a single, nuclear only, philosophy of defense in the late 1950's early 1960's. It would appear logical that a country or a military organization that possesses the resources and willingness to fight large scale attrition warfare at every level of war and in both the conventional and nuclear arenas, reaps a considerable degree of deterrence. While attritionist in concept, a concomitant and resultant maintenance of peace is a worthy dividend and probably, quite smart in spite of a heretical, non maneuverist origin. As a related matter, a country or an organization that possesses the resources for successful attrition warfare can be made to make the ideological leap to practice maneuver warfare. In fact, it can do so with diminished risk of failure. The converse, where a force or country which has deemphasized the value of material resources in war, and therefore probably does not possess them, finds itself in a position where it must wage a campaign of attrition or a war of material will initially, find itself hard pressed to respond. Of topical interest is the current debate raging over just what combination of forces unhinged the Soviet Union and Nicaragua and caused an obvious start towards withdrawal from the arms race on the one hand and an orderly hand over of power on the other. It is ironic at a time when the Marine Corps is transitioning to a maneuver emphasis that an entrenched, attritionist style, singularly unprecedented arms build up by this country is attributed by some commentators as the reason. Specifically, President Reagan's obstinate willingness to match or approximate Soviet defense expenditures and his determined support of the Contras in their obvious if, low scale war of attrition seems to be the key to success where other, more maneuverist approaches failed. If true, it would appear that this willingness to stubbornly pursue an attrition, resource oriented strategy was smartness of a high order at the strategic level. Sophistry and tortured argumentation aside, the maneuver philosophy espoused in FMFM-1 is, in fact, a smart ethos with which to fight a war even if it may do little to prevent one. While it may be smart for a warrior to internalize the philosophy and it is probably right for the Marine Corps to institutionalize the style within it's ranks, publicly codifying the philosophy especially at this juncture generates problems that a more informal approach would have avoided. By boldly proclaiming our new philosophy in the best maneuverist style, we may create some of the very problems we wish to obviate. An obvious danger in this regard was briefly alluded to earlier. That is that the unimaginative and more doctrine confined of us are implementing the new metaphysics. This will require the concerted, hard, mental effort of all participants, for if nothing else, the maneuver style places great demand on individual initiative and effort. It appears significant that the very professionals who are to convert to the initiative and thinking intensive style and, who are, more importantly, to lead it to creative new directions so widely lacked the curiosity and interest in their own profession that they were directed to immerse themselves in a professional reading program. The necessity of bootstrapping a professional ethos in a self proclaimed military elite is frighteningly ironic. Especially so in the complex technologically, ideologically and highly politicized world of today. The real danger is not that we won't commit to the change (ossified die-hards aside ) due to the intellectual effort involved but, that we will get it woefully wrong by default. James William Gibson describes with clarity the relationship between practicing efficient attrition warfare and it's beneficial effect on officer career advancement in the attrition oriented Vietnam war. {5}. With further elaboration he quotes from an Army War College study: The fact alone that the leaders of the future are those who survived and excelled within the rules of the present system militates in part against any self--starting incremental return toward practical application of ideal values.(6). In effect, at our mid and upper leadership echelons we have a host of influential people who were well socialized in a style of war largely opposite to what we seek to achieve. Subtle and perhaps unintentional entrenchment from this sphere may spoil the new wine to come but will definitely render the decanting harder. In addition to the personal animus of those inappropriately socialized to carry the new banner, we have significant societal pressure contending against success. Gabriel Kolko pointed out the impact of society at large on military society in his Vietnam war study: An Army's internal world reflects the social and class system from which it emerges. The functions, actions, and values of officers and soldiers are the inevitable consequences of the kinds of societies they are seeking to create or to defend... Strategy mirrors this reality and in turn weighs strongly on the balance of forces.. . {7}. If anything, our society reflects an overweening emphasis on the material and physical aspects of reality. The focus on wealth and quantifiable things characterize much of what is most significant in our make up and, as a world view, inevitably had much to do with developing our previous attrition style. By extension, one could describe American society as attritionist and therefore largely but inherently inimical to a maneuverist approach on the part of one of it's integral constituents. While ideas can form a powerful impetus for positive change, societal pressure usually offers a powerful drogue when the positive idea fights the tide. It must be numbing to be the Commandant striving to lobby for a concept which eschews format, material emphasis and bean counting when ostensible supporters mouth encouraging platitudes while inventing ever newer methods for legume quantification. Relegating a start on developing maneuver warfare to the too hard category because of the uphill battle involved is obviously not an answer for it is the smart philosophy to adopt. Absolutely, we had to start somewhere in time to make an appropriate transition but, time is what is critical here. Had we the time, we could develop the requisite mind set and analytical approach in a more calculated and effective fashion by starting much lower down the leadership chain and win success through force of numbers, broad understanding and by a force of institutionalized socialization that favors implementation. Through this approach, the forces of entrenchment could gracefully fade into obscurity as the new philosophy matures into fruition. Instead, the largely top down approach calls for implementation by many who subtally oppose it. Closely related to time is continuity. As opposed to the lengthy periods of continuity offered by luminaries such as Scharnhorst, Moltke and Seekt {8} in their continuous labors to nurture excellence in a consistent and methodical fashion, we have one forceful visionary (ie. the Commandant ) attempting in a meager four year period to accomplish similar ends. While an informal bottom up approach applied with well thought out method by thoroughly conversant practitioners would have been better and offered greater continuity following a change of venue, time constraints can, ironically delay or defeat the philosophy's orderly fruition when left to the continuance of the uncommitted who remain in service. We are at a crucial juncture in time also from an economic aspect. The facts that our defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese through our adherence to an attrition style of warfare, even though we earmarked over a trillion dollars in that effort {9} or that the additional trillion dollar Reagan defense build up is forcing exceptional scrutiny and unusually adversarial proceedings in defense expenditure debates are well understood. More to the point, these facts are integral to the rationale which both refined and supports the maneuver warfare movement. Central to the philosophy is avoiding reliance on things, striving for quick decisions and employment of small, cohesive forces. FMFM-1 states as a lead in to maneuver warfare: It requires a concept with which we can succeed against a numerically superior foe, because we can no longer presume a numerical advantage. And, especially in expeditionary situations in which public support for military actions may be tepid and short--lived, it requires a concept with which we can win quickly against a larger foe on his home soil, with minimal casualties and limited external support. (10) A laudable goal and one which manfully seizes the moral high ground in this period of fiscal peril to the military but, are we not offering a clear and untimely target by grasping at the mantle of self sacrificing efficiency? Is it perhaps not a bit premature to publicly proclaim this philosophy in the midst of a severe budgetary crisis which is likely to draw down on essentially minimal equipment levels but is certainly going to draw down on Marines--many of whom would have been the seed corn for effectively socializing the philosophy we want? The attendant disruption posed by this aspect of public avowal of our new credo will inevitably tend to submerge the creed itself. Ceding budget cutting ammunition to the unsympathetic in both congress and to the other services will surely cause more disruption than we may have had to experience had we been more informal and circumspect. Ironically, instead of unhinging an enemy and making him irrelevant with small forces and light equipment through intelligent application of our doctrine, our doctrine now has the ability to render us unhinged and irrelevant due to the economic constraints we will be forced to accommodate. We have been boldly launched on a visionary new course. The direction is only generally defined and the destination largely uncharted. While offering considerable hope for future success in combat, the uncharted aspects may preclude or divert us from following the smart course. As an institution and, more importantly, as individuals, we are going to have to develope the insight to spot the ironic and potentially dangerous ramifications implicit in adopting maneuver warfare and we must be smart enough to circumvent the problems. End Notes 1. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico, l989 2. Ibid. P. 70 5. Ibid. P. 77 4. Ibid. P. 28 5. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books. New York. 1986, P. 225 5. Ibid. P. 442 7. Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War. Pantheon Press, 1985, P. 225 8. Dupuy, T. N., A Genius for War. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1977 9. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books. New York. 1986, P. 17 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico, 1989. P. 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Dupuy, T. N., A Genius for War. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice--Hall Inc. (1977) 2. Gibson, James William, The Perfect War. Vintage Books. New York. (l986) 3. Goerlitz, Walter, History of the German General Staff. Praeger Inc., New York (1953) 4. Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War. Pantheon Press (1985) 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM-1. Quantico, (1989)
