Amphibious Warfare Procedures And Assets Must Be Improved AUTHOR LCdr. Garrat E. Cooper, USN CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED THESIS: The current philosophy in the Marine Corps is to deploy as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, the Navy's priorities are not the same as the Marine Corps' and as a result amphibious warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved to support the Marines. ISSUE: As the Defense Budget decreases, the number of amphibious assets dwindles, although a significant number of real world Marine/Navy conflicts involved the use of amphibious platforms. The amphibious fleet is aging, has had little improvements, and is still secondary to aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. While research and development funds continue to pour into Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare, and Anti-Surface Warfare, Amphibious Warfare seems to remain in the doldrums. To ease the situation, the Navy and Marine Corps have looked at options like Maritime Prepositioning Shipping and Over-The-Horizon concepts of operation. These options, while valid, do have some problems and do not correct the current shortfall in sealift and airlift requirements. It is imperative that research and development in the area of Amphibious Warfare be given higher priority by the Navy and Marine Corps. CONCLUSION: Our Navy leaders must place more emphasis in the amphibious community. If America is to maintain naval supremacy and actively use Marines in Low Intensity Conflicts, amphibious warfare ships and associated assets must be improved. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. The current philosophy in the Marine Corps is to deploy as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, the Navy's priorities are not the same as the Marine Corps' and as a result, amphibious warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved to support the Marines. I. WHAT IS THE MARINE CORPS' CURRENT PHILOSOPHY A. CRITICAL VULNERABILITY B. COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS TO THE REST OF THE FLEET C. STATE OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FLEET II. THE AREA OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS A. PROCEDURES WITHIN THE AOA B. THE OVER THE HORIZON CONCEPT C. IMPROVEMENTS WITH THE LCAC III. THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS A. STRATEGIC AND AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS B. WHY NAVY LEADERS SHOULD PRIORITIZE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE C. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW LHD D. A CLOSE LOOK AT AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE PROCEDURES AND ASSETS MUST BE IMPROVED. Today, Marines place great emphasis on fighting as a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The current philosophy is to deploy as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and fight as a unified Marine Expeditionary Force (Pugh & Linn 1989). A great deal of effort has been put into every aspect of this concept by the Marines, but alas, the Navy is way behind. Unfortunately, amphibious warfare procedures and assets have not been adequately improved. Movement of forces from the port of embarkation to the Amphibious Objective Area is an area of critical vulnerability, one that can lose a campaign before a single Marine hits the beach. As the defense budget decreases, the number of ships in the U.S. Fleet dwindles. Although over 75% of the Marine/Navy real world conflicts involved the use of amphibious ships, only 12% of the fleet is dedicated towards amphibious platforms (Sharpe 1989). Aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers still continue to enjoy the spotlight while amphibious platforms remain in the doldrums. Most amphibious platforms have already served almost 20 of their planned 25 years of commissioned service as illustrated in Table #1 (Morison & Rowe 1983, 111). They are slow -maximum speed 20-22 knots - and are not capable of significant self-defense. Most of these platforms are equipped with manual guns and depend on line of sight targets to be effective (Polman 1985). They are not the safest platforms into which Marines should embark with their supporting arms and equipment. Click here to view image There are those who would argue that a great deal of emphasis must be placed on aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers because they are the fighting ships that ensure the protection of the amphibious and auxiliary fleet. Amphibious platforms, they argue, are merely troop carriers in the grand scheme of naval warfare. They do not take into account that major amphibious platforms get as close as two thousand yards to the beach in order to discharge their precious cargo. It is, therefore, imperative that more attention be given to amphibious ships. Safe transportation of our fighting force is of vital importance. The way the Navy practices with the amphibious fleet is probably the way in which they will deploy during conflicts, without protective escorts. In practice the cruisers and destroyers' primary concern is the high value unit, "the aircraft carrier" not the amphibious fleet. Once in the Amphibious Objective Area, the main objective of getting the Marines ashore is at hand. It must be noted, however, that this involves procedures developed during World War II. Currently, amphibious ships do not conduct landing operations from over the horizon (Mack 1983, 442). The primary troop carriers, such as the LST, LPD, LSD, and LCU will be within 12 nautical miles of the shore line. At designated points between the ships and shore are boat waiting circles, wave forming circles, departure lines, and other various collection and departure points that are visible from the beach. Like the amphibious landings of World War II, the amphibious platforms will traverse courses as close as two thousand yards parallel to the beach to launch LVTs and the like. These ships are also expected to remain in the area to recover boats, LCACs, LCUs, and the like, the majority of which can attain a maximum speed of 9 knots. Needless to say, getting the Marines ashore is time consuming, which offers the enemy an excellent opportunity to exploit a critical vulnerability. An argument could be made that the preceding is not entirely correct. True, one could argue that today's amphibious fleet has improved with such additions as the LCAC that are faster, have a greater cargo capacity, and can be deployed from over the horizon. That is correct. However, upon close examination, the following must be considered. Our first generation LCACs are noisy, labor intensive, and very rarely perform to design standards. Significant improvements must be realized in order to make them a viable force. The sole LHD also has its shortcomings aside from being the only one in commission. The fact remains that our current amphibious posture, in conjunction with dwindling funds, dictates reliance on World War II methods to deliver Marines to the beach. Another major flaw in current thinking is that amphibious ships can fight and accomplish their primary mission simultaneously. That is a false pretext. Most amphibious ships cannot go to DEFCON ONE while accomplishing special amphibious tasks. General Quarters requires every soul aboard ship to be in a prescribed billet in order to attain a credible battle posture. Since ships are rarely at 100% manning, billets are routinely gapped. Additionally, there are no relief personnel when the ship is at General Quarters, so this already compromised battle posture is usually limited to no more than four hours. Consequently, it is difficult for any ship to engage in special operations such as, flight operations, refueling, and troop embarkation/debarkation while maintaining a credible battle posture. As a result, ships do not practice amphibious operations while at General Quarters. It is usually one or the other. This lack of manpower forces the amphibious fleet to rely on accompanying combatants for protection. This unfortunately causes another dilemma. In practice exercises, combatants do not accompany amphibious platforms. Once the requirement for gunfire support is fulfilled, these escorts usually screen the aircraft carrier, not the amphibious fleet. In order to enjoy freedom of maneuver for favorable winds to launch and recover aircraft it is imperative that the CV operate several miles off-shore and often at speeds close to 30 knots. Thus escorts maneuver to screen the CV and in essence abandon the amphibious ships. In light of the preceding, the Commanding Officer of an amphibious platform must make a delicate decision during a hostile amphibious landing. Should he risk his ship to accomplish the amphibious mission (place Marines and equipment on the beach) or fight as a surface warfare warrior because the safety of his ship is paramount (Van Creveld 1985, 272). He is forced to choose one or the other. Napoleon once said that armed forces must change tactics every decade in order to surprise the enemy and overcome his customary attacking methods (Moore 1989). The Navy must accept this concept because weapons are consistently being improved. Our dated concept of operations is almost 20 years old. Let's face it, there is nothing more fatal than blind acceptance of ideas once accepted without contemplating whether they are still valid or merely endorsed by habit. Today we fight in a highly technical environment. The Navy must recognize the full power of modern weapons and the importance of credible defense systems on amphibious platforms. The operation and tactical procedures employed by General McArthur can no longer be relied upon to achieve decisive success. Modern portable weapons can be unleashed upon amphibious ships by two or three man teams ashore, with devastating results. We've come a long way since the 1950's, unfortunately, developments in amphibious warfare have not. Most Marines are aware that strategic airlift and sealift are severely limited, particularly for amphibious operation. Quite often, these limitations, rather than operational imperatives, drive the task organization of the landing force. Even with the Maritime Pre-positioning Program, Marines need an Air Force commodity that may not always be available, particularly if they must compete with Army forces to get to the battlefield. These strategic limitations determine the type of battle an expeditionary Marine Force will fight. Not only must the Marine be able to achieve decisive results rapidly for strategic and political reasons, he must do it without the forces or the logistics buildup necessary to achieve overwhelming numerical superiority. The Marine must be able to out-fight his opponent, be it a mechanized desert army or a jungle-bound insurgency. The extent to which Marines apply the principles of maneuver warfare may well determine their success (USNI 1985, 94). In light of this, considerable thought must be being devoted to modernizing amphibious assets because: It is apparent as we launch the 1990s that the most likely use of U.S. military forces will be in some yet-undefined third world situation. The turmoil there is unending; since 1945, more than 16 million people have died as a result of conflict in the third world. And since the end of World War II, the Navy and Marine Corps have engaged in every type of modern naval warfare save nuclear strike and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in protecting U.S. interest. (USNI 1985, 94) Our naval leaders must appreciate this fact and re-orient priorities. We cannot afford continually to pour scarce dollars into the world's best Anti-Submarine Warfare systems. ASW is important and already enjoys space age technology. On the other hand we put minimal funds into research and development of our amphibious capability and settle for the marginal improvements that are attained in Service-life Extension Programs. Space age technology must also be incorporated into the amphibious community. Unfortunately, smaller defense budgets along with steady commitment dictates maximum operational units with functional dated hardware. In an attempt to improve the situation, the Chief of Naval Operations has compromised and accepted the following proposed improvements: Twelve new Amphibious Assault Dock ships (LHDs), are projected replacements for the seven Iwo Jima class LPHs that were commissioned between 1961 and 1970. The first five or six units will be used to augment the Navy's existing capabilities, while the remainder will replace the Iwo Jimas beginning in the 1990s. These ships will provide improved command, control, and communications spaces placed within the hull of the ship in addition to a 600 bed hospital and six operating rooms. The major advantage of this class of ship, is that it is designed to be convertible into a V/STOL carrier in 24 hours. New Whidby Island Dock Landing ships (LSD41 class) have been designed to replace the Thomas ton class LSDs commissioned between 1954 and 1957. With the addition of these ships the Navy's lift capability should be doubled in the 1990s. There is some concern by both the Marines and Navy about this platform because its design was based on the Anchorage (LSD-36) class commissioned in 1969. (Sharpe 1989) Improvements in amphibious warfare craft have also been realized. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) is designed to move 60 tons of troops and/or equipment. Its primary role will be to provide landing support to the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) during the initial amphibious assault. Its secondary role is the prime mover of logistics material during the general off-load phase. LCACs will eventually replace such landing craft as the LCUs and some smaller craft now in the Navy inventory: the last LCU built was completed in 1976. Little improvements have been realized in the Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM) and Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) crafts. While their construction varies (some are aluminum vice steel), their maximum speed is only 9 knots. No real improvements have been realized in the following active amphibious ships: Click here to view image In light of modern weapons and the vulnerability of major amphibious platforms within 12 nautical miles of the beach, an Over-The-Horizon (OTH) concept has been proposed as the next direction amphibious warfare should take. The concept involves the conduct of an amphibious operation more than 12 miles off-shore. There are advantages to this concept from the Navy viewpoint: - Increased time available for the ship to react to air-launched cruise missiles - Reduced ship vulnerability to deep and shallow water mines - Reduced ship vulnerability to shore-based direct and indirect fire weapons - Increased capability to conduct feints The Marine assault force will enjoy increased benefits: - Ability to attack at the time and place of their own choosing - Shorter window of vulnerability while crossing the beach - Widely dispersed enemy defensive posture - Access to more of the littoral due to increased stand-off range. While there are numerous advantages to the OTH concept, there are also several factors that will limit our capability to mount an OTH assault. These factors include the operation's duration, insufficient amphibious shipping capable of carrying the LCAC, and LCAC navigation problems. Due to the distance assault craft with a maximum speed of 9 knots must travel , the operation will be of long duration. This is especially true if the ATF stays over the horizon once the general off-load phase of the operation begins. Another limitation is the lack of adequate shipping required to carry the 24 LCACs required for a notional MEB to hit the beach. Current estimates indicate that 25 amphibious ships will be required to support this task. Table 3 provides a listing of the amphibious shipping capable of carrying the LCAC and the number of LCACs that may be embarked aboard each. This table clearly shows the Navy's LCAC carrying capacity is only about 50% of what is needed. Click here to view image While the LCAC is considered the primary breakthrough for the OTH concept is should be noted that it will only be part of the assets required for a MEB landing. The remainder of the landing force will have to be carried by aviation assets. Presently the CH-46 helicopter is the primary means of air-lifting assault forces ashore. Here also, we are using a 20 year old airframe with 1950s' technology. A total of 624 CH/UH-46 Sea Knights were delivered to the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy in the 1964-1971 period. With a view to modernizing the fleet of CH-46s, two were modified by Boeing Helicopters in 1975 and the U.S. Marine Corps subsequently updated 273 CH-46s to CH-46E configuration ... In December 1980, the Naval Air systems command awarded Boeing Helicopters the first of a series of contracts for a multi-year U.S. Navy/Marine Corps helicopter improvement programme known as the Safety, Reliability, and Maintainability (SR&M) Programme. this is aimed at reducing the operating costs of HH-46A, CH-46D, and CH-46E helicopters beyond the end of this century. (Taylor, 1989, 385) Clearly, this is another Service-life Extension Program to keep outdated technology around vice modernizing. An OTH assault launch from 50 nautical miles or more, however, will push current helicopter assets to the limit. The MV-22 Osprey should be capable of flying at speeds in excess of 250 knots and able to make 4 complete 50 mile runs to the beach before refueling. A third limitation is the problem of LCAC navigation. LCACs will need radar navigation support from the ATF to get to the beach successfully, under positive control. This requirement will essentially void any emission control (EM CON) conditions set by the commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF), making the LCAC and ATF vulnerable to enemy detection efforts. The position location reporting system (PLRS), and the NAVSTAR global positioning system (GPS) are expected to solve this problem by 1992. (O"Neil, Hartway & Roe, March 1989) I once read that a good military leader doesn't have to have overwhelming combat power and superiority in numbers to be victorious, if he can create the perception that his troops are better and that he is more competent than his enemy. Now that peace seems to be the major focus among the superpowers and access to information seems readily available, perceptions are giving way to reality. The U.S. military must now modernize its amphibious assets and procedures in order to keep the advantage. Unfortunately for the U.S. military, a careful review of Jane's Military Review and other unclassified military periodicals clearly shows the material assets of the U.S. Navy. We can no longer rely on pure perception to keep our enemies and allies in check. Our amphibious assets and procedures must be improved if we are to maintain our image of being ten feet tall. The United States has been characterized by innovation, determination, and guts. We have been on the leading edge of technology and have always prospered even when the odds were not in our favor. We must now incorporate state of the art technology into our amphibious fleet and associated assets. The time to change is now. Patriotism and the unwillingness of the American public to accept lengthy armed conflicts can be a critical vulnerability as revealed in our recent past. This coupled with outdated technology are ingredients for failure. Most seafaring nations use missile bearing patrol boats to protect their shores. They can deliver potent missiles with accuracy and attain speeds in excess of 40 knots. Needless to say these boats present a significant threat to any amphibious operation. In these days of reduced budgets and equipment Service-Life Extensions, real improvements in the amphibious community is slow. While aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers continue to receive priority in modernization, amphibious platforms are subject to marginal improvements. If America is to maintain naval supremacy and actively use Marines in low intensity conflicts, amphibious warfare ships and associated assets must be improved. REFERENCES Mack, Vice Admiral William P., US Navy (ret.) with Paulsen, Captain Thomas D., US Navy, The Naval Officer's Guide, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland 1983, pp. 442-443, 448-450. Moore, Major R. Scott, USMC, "The Art of MAGTF Warfare", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1989. Morison, Samuel L. and Rowe, John S., Warships of the U.S. Navy, Jane's Publishing Company Limited, London, England 1983, pp 111-125. O'Neil, Captain Michael S., USMC; Hartway, Captain Gordon E., USMC; and Roe, Captain Michael W., USMC, "Communications for the Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Assault", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1989. Polman, Norman, The U.S. Navy Today, Volume 1, Arms and Armour Press Limited, London, England, 1985. Pugh, LtCol. Paul F., USMC, and Linn, Major Thomas C., USMC, "Rediscovering the Force-in-Readiness", Armed Forces Journal International, August 1989. Sharpe, Captain Richard, RN, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships 1989-1990, Jane's Information Group, Ninety-second edition, 1989. Taylor, John W. R., editor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1989-1990, Jane's Information Group, Eightieth Anniversary Edition, Sentinel House, Surrey CR32NX, U.K. 1989, p.385. U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, Volume 116/1/1,043, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, January 1985, p. 94. Van Creveld, Marten, Command In War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1985, p.272. STYLE REFERENCES Strunk, William and White, E. B., The Elements of Style, Macmillan Publishing Co., In., New York, 1979. The University of Chicago, The Chicago Manual of Style, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1982.
