Tryannosaurus NATO Rex? NATO In The 21st Century AUTHOR Major Simon T. Beet, United Kindgom Royal Marines CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Professional Military Education (PME) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title. TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX? NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY THESIS. The pressures at work in the world today mean that the NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all. THE NATO CHARTER. It is a Treaty of Alliance based on the United Nations Charter. Essentially it is a political alliance designed to operate outside the UN forum, which the Soviet veto has made largely impotent. The Treaty has a dual aspect; affirming the importance of economic and social progress on one hand, and the adoption of a defensive policy based on the inherent right of collective self-defence on the other. PRESSURES AT WORK TODAY. The economic and political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, are dramatic, perhaps too dramatic for continued stability. We may find that it will be to revisionism or Russian chauvinism that the regimes will turn. The political and economic development of the EEC continues apace. This has produced friction within the Alliance. The European's desire a greater say in security matters whilst the US is demanding that Europe take on the defensive responsibilities concomitant with its growing status. The Third World is becoming increasingly unstable which may threaten the Alliance's supply of raw materials. Meanwhile the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and the threat of their use may have a direct impact on Alliance security. NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY. There are two unassailable facts. First, Europe will remain of strategic interest of the US. Second, force levels within the Alliance will be markedly reduced. The Alliance is, and will remain, a political instrument, although currently threatened by internal discord. The threat remains from the Soviet Union, more perhaps the result of political unrest. The Third World does not appear to be developing peacefully, which may effect Europe and the United States. Europe currently possesses the machinery to coordinate a defensive posture, in the form of the WEU, to strengthen the "Europeans" pillar of the Alliance. The danger in this is the possible alienation of the United States by the discussion of European security outside NATO. CONCLUSION. The Alliance of the next century must be a stronger political institution in a more global context than at present, in order to forestall any security threat to its members. Its military structure will need considerable revision to take into account the reduction in the direct threat to Europe. It must provide a forum outside the UN in which to coordinate political action on security matters of mutual interest. The NATO Alliance, formed as it is of independent democratic nations possessing such political and economical strength, has as vital a role to play in the next century, as it did on that day in April 1949. TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX? NATO IN THE 21ST CENEEFY OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT: The pressures at work in the world today mean that the NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all. I. Why NATO was established A. Post WWII revolution in the balance of power B. Anxiety about the military might and intentions of the Soviet Union C. The destruction wreaked by two world wars D. Early hopes for the UN dashed by frequent use of veto E. US realization that to deter aggression better than making advance preparations for meeting it II. The Charter. A. Linked in large part to UN Charter B. A defensive arrangement C. Socio-political element III. Pressures at work today and their consequences A. Evolution of Communist Block B. Arms reductions? C. Europe and its development D. Shift in economic power towards the Far East E. Growth and evolution of the Third World IV. NATO in the 21st Century A. Two unassailable facts, l. Europe will continue to be of strategic interest to the US 2. The current military force structure will be reduced B. NATO is a political alliance C. The threat to the Alliance states in the next century l. Russian chauvinism,and expansionism 2. Instability in Eastern Bloc nations 3. Third World regional conflicts with threat of chemical and nuclear exchanges 4. Europe's development and stability D. Thrust of NATO will became political rather than military E. NATO structure 1. WEU will provide "European" voice to strengthen rather than disrupt 2. Political forum to coordinate western response to areas of mutual security interests outside the UN 3. Military structure for defence of North Atlantic area will be revised, becoming more "functional" and geographic TYRANNOSAURUS NATO REX? NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY This is an astonishing moment in the history of the NATO Alliance and perhaps of the world. The events of the past few months in eastern Europe, allied to those occurring within the Soviet Union have called many of our long held beliefs into question, and the old certainties have disappeared. Now something that appeared as a distant dream for many appears to be on the doorstep, finding many unprepared. President Gorbachev has thrown the future into the melting pot, but the shape in which it will emerge remains very uncertain(l). Added to the tumultuous changes in Europe, we also see a rapid change in the world order established after World War II. The Third World is developing apace, whilst the Far East is rapidly becoming a significant economic power base. NATO was formed in a time very different from that we know today. A Europe emerging from a traumatic and damaging War, the very real threat posed by an expansionist Soviet Union, and finally the emergence of the United States as a Superpower. The world of today is a very different place with socio-political change occurring at an alarming rate, this situation will result in increasing instability unless we reassess our priorities, international relationships and hence treaties. The pressures at work in the world today mean that the NATO of tomorrow will very different, if it is to survive at all. NATO'S FORMATION In order to understand the future form of the NATO Alliance it is important to have a clear understanding of the conditions which led to the Treaty's signature in Washington on April 4, 1949. Nato came into being through the interaction of 5 basic factors. First, World War II brought about a revolution in the international balance of power, with the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as undisputed giants. Eastern and Central Europe, which only a few years before had been the habitat of four of the worlds greatest powers - France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy - had become a power vacuum. For the first time in modern history the area lacked the military might to protect itself from outside aggression. Second, there was in both Western Europe, and the United States a real concern about the military might and behaviour of the Soviet Union. The USSR had supported a communist guerrilla war in Greece, had seized control of countries in Eastern Europe and finally, the year long Berlin Blockade in 1948 and the Communist coup d'etate in Czechoslovakia in the same year supported by Soviet threat of military intervention, merely served to deepen Western anxiety. Third, the enormous destruction produced by two world wars left in most Europeans a deep revulsion against international violence. It also resulted in a profound wish to avoid a repetition of warfare amongst themselves, and that hence forth all Europeans must learn to live together as peaceful neighbours. Fourth, the early hopes that the UN would provide the necessary forum to avoid further wars proved unfounded. The fact that the permanent members of the Security Council had been accorded veto power meant that the UN could only force a peaceful solution with the agreement of the two key members, the United States and the Soviet Union. The recurrent use of the Soviet veto made it clear that such cooperation could not be counted on. Fifth, having twice in fairly rapid succession felt compelled to intervene in bloody European wars the United States was unwilling to become involved in entangling alliances. Instead American leaders now felt that deterrence against a possible conflict was preferable to preparing for it. They realized that only the United States was strong enough to deter the USSR. (2) THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. The text of the Treaty is very short and requires very little explanation. It consists of a preamble and fourteen Articles. As Brig Gen Monroe MacClosky writes: "It is a Treaty of Alliance within the framework of the United Nations Charter (3) for the defense of a way of life, not only by means of essential military measures, but also by co-operation in political, social, cultural and economic fields." (4) The Treaty is in essence a vehicle for continuous joint action in the political, economic and social fields. It took on its current military significance only after the Korean War. Thus the Treaty has a dual aspect; affirming the importance of economic, and social progress on the one hand, and adopting a policy of security based on the inherent right of collective self-defence on the other. (5) The political nature of the Alliance emerges quite clearly from the preamble and many of the operational provisions of the Treaty. The political essence is manifested in the organizational structure in Brussels. The Secretary General and the Permanent Representatives on the Council are civilians as are the personnel of the international staffs. During this past year there have been two NATO Summits (2-3 March and 29-30 May) held in Brussels. The NATO Foreign Ministers, who in any case regularly come together twice a year at the Council meetings - in addition to the Summits - have met some l6 times in the past year. This political aspect is often forgotten by NATO detractors, who instead, concentrate on the more visible and tangible element, namely the necessary costs to ensure the maintenance of the military structure. PRESSURES AT WORK TODAY AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES. As Narcis Serra(6) recently pointed out: "The monolithic edifice, both political and ideological, which has hitherto been represented by the Warsaw Pact is crumbling before the startled eyes of the rest of the world."(7) For the past year the media has been full of the events within the Soviet Union and her satellite states. Peristrioka and Glasnost have led to a reawakening of nationalism in Eastern Europe as, one by one, the Warsaw Pact nations have moved away in varying degrees from Soviet domination, resulting in a de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. This has led to a somewhat euphoric response from large sections of the western press and electorates. Thus western governments have been placed under increasing domestic pressure to reduce defence spending in the light of the perceived reduced threat. Peristrioka continues to change the face of the Soviet government. After a rancorous debate, the 249 member Central Committee of the Communist Party approved a platform that will in effect end the Party's seven-decade-long monopoly on political and economic life, and requiring the revision of Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, in which is enshrined the Communist Party's leading role. Furthermore it proposed an overhaul of its ruling Politburo and the creation of a Presidential system of government, putting extensive power into Gorbachev's hands and granting him, at least on paper, more power than any other leader in Soviet history, but seemingly without the checks and balances provided by a lower legislative assembly. This overhaul has not been undertaken without opposition, Yegor Ligachev recently said, "regrettably, we are beginning to discard everything old with ease, including those things that could have been of use today." Some others fear for the future, Vladimir Brovkikov, the Soviet Ambassador to Poland said after the 12-14 February meeting, "We have brought the Motherland to an awful state, turning it from an Empire admired throughout the World to a State with an inglorious present and indefinite future."(8) On 14th March 1990, President Gorbachev was elected by the Congress of Peoples Deputies for a five year term, with presidential elections turned over to the people in 1995. He was however, not granted the powers he sought. As President Gorbachev attempts to overhaul the Soviet political system, and shift power away from the Communist Party, he is also faced with the seemingly intractable ethnic discord in the southern republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, (9) and political discord provided by the independence movements in the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania.The not too distant future will see a dramatic reduction in the Communist Party's influence within the Soviet Government, but bearing in mind the political and ethnic unrest currently besetting the nation, what is there to replace it? Lord Belof writes: It has been a constant of Soviet foreign policy that what matters is the ability to exploit political weakness wherever it occurs.... this policy has been left where Lenin left it... In time of crisis and a change in the Soviet political structure it is more likely that it will be to Russian Chauvinism rather than western ideals that the regime would turn to for help. (10) The two world wars took a terrible toll on Soviet Russia, in both human and economic terms. This has left the Soviet Union with a profound fear for its security. This sense of insecurity is difficult for western nations to understand, and as a result it is often overlooked or ignored. It is tempting to believe that there is a place within the western Alliance and EEC for the former Soviet satellite states, indeed Hungary has already voiced a desire to join the EEC. This view is somewhat idealistic and does not take into account legitimate Soviet security fears. Poland for example views the future unification of Germany with profound disquiet. This has been dramatically demonstrated by their reaction to Mr Kohl's discussion of the East German border issue. This has firmly driven Poland back under Soviet military influence, in spite of its non Communist Government. I think that it might be true to say that the Eastern European states political development may produce a representative style of government, but perhaps misguided to believe that these will be anything but, very socialist. It might be argued that the arms reductions undertaken by the Soviets to date have merely been a means to restructure and modernize their forces, and that the combat power remains, as does the ability to project political power by military force (11). Therefore in the short term a NATO military force structure will still be required until such time as real and effective reductions of Soviet combat power are achieved, to ensure that the west in general, and Europe in particular maintains the ability to resist any applied pressure wherever it might fall. The emphasis must therefore remain in the short term to maintain the military deterrence, but in the long term the solution must lie in the provision of stable economic and political alliances rather than purely military ones. Europe, and in particular the European Economic Community (EEC) is developing apace. The dissolution of the tariff barriers in 1992 is but the beginnings of perhaps a total economic and hence political union. The implications of the German unification are as yet unclear, but without doubt it will have a major impact on the future of Europe. The former Soviet satellite states are rapidly removing themselves from the charge of their former master, and seeking to restructure their economies, and to an extent, politics. Thus in both Eastern and Western Europe today dramatic developments unfold. There is however a profound difference. On the one hand there is the continuing development of a well structured and sound politic-economic base, whilst on the other there is the struggle to reconstruct a fundamentally flawed politic-economic system. The economic infrastructure of Eastern Europe has suffered from almost 50 years of uninspired direction, hence it is old fashioned, labour intensive and uneconomic. It will have to be radically restructured if it is to compete in the free market place. This restructuring may be traumatic, with wholesale unemployment, and a dramatic reduction in the general standard of living. It is a moot point as whether the populations of these countries will be prepared to accept this lack of fulfillment of the free democratic socio-political ideal. This may result in civil unrest, a massive exodus to the west, or perhaps the adoption of revisionist policies. Added to this factor one must not forget the historical enmities which exist in the area, particularly in the Balkans. Thus the Europe of the future may not live up to the expectations of the populations of its Eastern states. The resulting instability or revisionism may have a profound effect on European stability, particularly if one considers the Soviet Union's traditional sense of insecurity. The growth of the EEC has provided a new twist to NATO's internal political harmony in two main areas. Firstly, the desire by the EEC to have some say in security matters. Although specifically barred from defence issues by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) is not. Jacques Delors(Secretary General of the EEC) last summer formed a staff to study the potential impact on European security of the lowering of tariff barriers in 1992. In a recent interview Giovanni Jannuzzi (Secretary General of the European Political Cooperation Secretariat) indicated the EEC's desire to use the forthcoming CSCE Summit to address "European" security issues with the EEC taking a leading role (12). The EUROGROUP and IEPG meanwhile, are facets of Europe's continuing desire to take a more active role in NATO. This "Europeanism" has upset the United States as it appears to reduce the effectiveness of the current arms negotiation process by increasing the number of players. Secondly, all of the countries within NATO are facing considerable difficulty in justifying defence expenditure in the face of recent events, and all of NATO is looking to a reduction of force levels (13), especially since these were established in the early 1950's. Added to this, the United States considers that concomitant with Europe's increasing wealth and political power must come greater responsibility for its own defence. Similarly the United States must realize as Jeanne Kirkpatrick recently pointed out, "that the Europeans do not consider her a European power, and do not take kindly to suggestions made recently by Mr Baker for a new Europe based on a new Atlanticism." (14) The United States will have to come to terms with growing European economic and political power. The burden sharing issue and Europeanism are not new,but are gaining force with increased pressure on military budgets. Thus the Alliance is facing increasing pressure from within, which might conceivably result in its dissolution, as the unifying threat(from the Soviet Union) decreases. The two oil shocks of the 1970's reminded the west that almost all of Europe, Japan, and many other countries are largely dependent on oil coming from the Persian Gulf. For that reason alone, it is of the utmost strategic importance to maintain peace in the region. (15) To date this has been very much the preserve of the United States which by virtue of very considerable economic assistance has provided a measure of peace between Egypt and Israel, but not the remainder of the region. It seems unlikely that the United States or the West could bring about a solution to this problem that could achieve a stabilized peace. Only a Utopian idealist could suppose that this is possible... The truth is that no one in the world could defend the Persian Gulf. If some madman or terrorist group choose to, it could set fire to and blow up the oil fields around the Gulf. Nor can any one defend the world against the consequences of such an event. (16) It must be pointed out however, that this region is as important to the Soviets as it is to the West, for the results of any war in the Middle East would be as incalculable for them as it would be for the West. By the same token they will seek to expand their influence in the area step by step, which makes containment as well as restraint, necessary on the western side. The recent allied military activity in the Gulf provides us with a fine example of cohesive political accord resulting in an effective military response. The United States, United Kingdom and France has been providing armed escorts for their tankers through the Gulf for some time. With an increase in the mine threat a need was established to provide the necessary mine counter measures which the United States could not. The European response from the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands was coordinated by the Western European Union(WEU) (17). Other notable successes achieved by the WEU were the provision by France, UK and Italy in 1983 of peace keeping contingents to Beirut, and in 1984 the same countries with the Netherlands deployed mine counter measures vessels to clear the Gulf of Suez of terrorist mines. The Third World today suffers from accumulated debt and economic mismanagement, extremist religious fundamentalism and growing demands for political participation all of which accentuates its chronic instability. (18) The papers are continually filled with minor national and domestic conflicts around the world largely fueled by traditional international or domestic enmities. These conflicts vary from conventional warfare through to terrorist campaigns, some of which spill over into the NATO area. An important facet of this instability is its possible effect on the supply of raw materials on which both European and the United States industries depend. This together with economic malaise, constitutes a rather nebulous, but never the less important threat to the Alliance. It is therefore in its interest to foster greater stability,and the easiest way of achieving this is by economic assistance. This must take two forms, the direct and the indirect. Firstly, economic aid must be provided. A fine example of which is the Lome Convention which governs the assistance provided, most notably to the former French African colonies, from the EEC. Military aid may provide a short term solution, in bolstering up a weak government, but in the long run often only serves to exacerbate the instability, by encouraging opposing assistance, causing greater political polarization, and the destruction of the economic framework by warfare. A good example of what needs to be done is provided by the situation in Mozambique where military assistance is only provided (by the British) in the form of training teams with substantial economic aid and assistance being provided from the EEC. This effort, linked with political pressure on South Africa looks to a future economic solution rather than a short term military one. 1989 saw European countries provide $16 billion in official development aid, more than half as much again as the United States. Secondly, the west must seek to provide a stable market for the Third World's produce. This is without doubt the most difficult to achieve in the free market place. Third World economies are often limited to one or two major items which, if the price falls, or a cheaper synthetic substitute discovered, often has a catastrophic effect on the economy. The nature of the free market place cannot allow prices to remain at an artificial high. Perhaps a more effective solution might be to provide these countries with the industrial or economic knowhow to diversify their economies. Another form of indirect aid might be in assistance in resolving debt problems with the major Banks. This is particularly important to the South American States which have no option but to continue rescheduling these debts, as their economies fail to develop. Thus the west's responsibilities are not military per se, but economic and political with the use of the military force as only a last resort to help resurrect or establish a viable economic base, and a political system, not necessarily based on western ideals, but those needed by the ethic and sociological systems of the nations concerned. Some nations within the Third World are becoming militarily powerful. India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa are believed to possess nuclear weapons or the capacity to produce them. The technology to produce chemical weapons is now widely available whilst they require little sophistication in terms of modern technology to produce. We have seen their use in recent years by Iraq, not only in its war with Iran but against its own Kurdish population, and by Libya in its war with Chad. There are 16 Third World nations currently believed to either possess chemical weapons or the ability to produce them. (19) This provides Third World instability and traditional enmities with truly terrifying possibilities. THE NATO IN THE 21ST CENTNY. There are two unassailable facts. The first, Europe is, and will continue to be, of strategic interest to the United States both economically and politically. The second, the current military force structure will be considerably reduced by the start of the next century. "The political alliance embodied in the NATO Treaty is the only one of its kind in the world, uniting on the two sides of the Atlantic the major democratic industrialized countries with similar traditions of civilization and culture, and the same concept of moral values." (20) As time passes the political nature of the Alliance becomes more active, but is currently being threatened by internal discord across the Atlantic. NATO will without doubt have a vital role to play in the next century, the difficulty lies in its definition. One must commence by attempting to define that threat. The Soviet Union will remain a superpower. It has by tradition, even in Tsarist times, been expansionist. Thus instead of Communism as we see it today we may be faced with the chauvinistic style which characterized Russia's foreign policy up to the revolution in 1917. This can only be exacerbated by an economic revival or continuing domestic political and ethnic unrest. The current Eastern Bloc nations are set for a period of perhaps considerable instability, as nationalism and economic development take place, and their societies evolve. On the World scene there remains the prospect of regional conflict which may have a profound effect on both sea routes and the supply of raw materials to the west, added to which any such conflict in the future now has the prospect of nuclear or chemical exchanges, which the western nations must be in a position to deter by both political and military means. The World of the next century will be beset with uncertainty and instability. Europe, on the other hand appears to be entering a time of economic, and as a result political unity, as the EEC develops. As the political and economic power of Europe increases transatlantic political harmony can only become of greater importance to the United States, it cannot afford either political, or more importantly, economic isolationism. Thus the political structure provided by NATO will become as important to the United States in the next century as is her military contribution to the Alliance today is to Europe. The challenge therefore that faces the NATO Alliance in the next century is not only the preservation of stability in a world of increasing instability, but also a reordering of the political structure which will be as difficult for Europe as it will be for the United States. Since the threat to western security in the next century will have a greater global context this will need to be countered, in the main by political cooperation, with military action designed to deter any aggression which might effect alliance members in general. I do not propose a force structure to encompass a global police role. The deployment of forces outside the NATO area must remain the remit of individual governments as an instrument of their national power, particularly since Europe, and the United States often do not view global problems in the same context. NATO can never the less provide the political forum to discuss an appropriate western response. Since the Soviet military threat to Western Europe will be very considerably reduced the need for substantial international forces committed to its defence will decrease, thus the importance of the military alliance per se, will similarly decrease. The current NATO structure is essentially political one, whilst Europe in the form of the WEU has the forum to accommodate military cooperation, not as an institution in itself, but as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. One must however be careful when-traveling down this European defence ideal, for the European nations jealously guard their military as an instrument of national policy, whilst political unity is some considerable way off. Furthermore, if this is handled badly it will only serve to alienate the United States, the bastion on which the western defensive alliance of NATO is based. This latter fact is well understood by the European nations of NATO. The danger lies in European security issues being discussed outside the NATO forum as the economic and political strength of the EEC increases. The Alliance of the next century may see few military forces deployed forward in defence of Western Europe if the Soviet Union makes appropriate reductions in its combat power, and significant progress is made at the CSCE Summit. The military structure will be reduced to regional responsibilities with the political backing of member states, and will thus perhaps require significant revision. The WEU will become the main forum for coordination of "European" defence issues. The United States, France and the United Kingdom will provide the nuclear umbrella to a Western Alliance, not just in a European context but perhaps a more global one, to deter the use of unconventional weapons, not only by the Soviet Union, but by Third World states as well. The political nature of the Alliance will become paramount as a vehicle for coordinating political action on security matters of consequence to its members outside the United Nations forum, and will remain the guarantor of Alliance security. Any alliance must seek to evolve with the threat and hence its raison d'etre might change in emphasis. NATO is no exception. The threat will without doubt change, and will change in such a way to require greater political cooperation to counter. Having said that it is apparent that the transatlantic schism is growing as the EEC develops. Only time will tell whether a NATO unity born of a common political and ethnic heritage will remain strong enough to ensure its continued existence in the face of a changing threat. CONCLUSION The North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique of the December 1989 meeting provides us with a look ahead: The Alliance will increasingly be called upon to carry out its political function. Recalling the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty as a political alliance built upon common fundamental values, our leaders affirmed at the May 1989 Summit that the Alliance must reintensify its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe. In doing so, it must take up new challenges...in the pursuit of political change within stability. Our political approach in support for positive change must be multifacetted, seeking to encourage cooperative action in dealing with common problems. (21) Those of us alive today are privileged to be the audience, or indeed participants in a global game, the rules of which constantly change, and which can have no victor or vanquished. Never before in recorded history has such profound change occurred with such speed, or with such dire consequences of failure, on such a scale. The NATO Alliance, formed as it is of independent democratic nations possessing such political and economical strength, has as vital a role to play in the next century as it did on that day in April 1949. END NOTES l. Sir Micheal Howard,"Military Grammar and Political Logic: can NATO survive if Cold War won?" NATO Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 7-12. 2. Klaus Knorr, "NATO: Past, Present, Prospect." Headline Series, No. 198, December 1969, p. 3-5. 3. This is particularly true of Article l which is an almost literal reproduction of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UN Charter, and governs nations international relations in the avoidance of war. Similarly Article 2 which follows Article l of the UN Charter which defines the aims of UNO: preservation of peace, the development of relations among nations and the achievement of international co-operation in solving problems of an economic and social character. 4. Brig Gen Monroe MacClosky, USAF(ret.), North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Guardian of Peace and Security, Richards Rosen Press, Inc., New York, 1966, p. 24-25. 5. ibid.,p. 24. 6. Snr Narcis Serra is the Spanish Minister of Defence and the Chairman of EURGROUP. EUROGROUP is an informal grouping of European members of NATO, which was established in 1968 to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence is as strong, cohesive and as effective as possible. Its most prominent element is the Independent European Programme Group(IEPG) which is the principle institution through which the European members of NATO seek greater cooperation in armaments procurement. 7. Narcis Serra, "The Atlantic Alliance: facing a challenging new era," NATO Review, No. 6, December 1989, p. 5-7. 8. John Kohan, "Let the Parties Begin", Time, February 19, 1990, p. 32-35. 9. Mr Ligachev, one of the Soviet Union's leading conservatives recently asked during a central committee conference on peristrioka, when talking about the security situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. "How people could support a government that was unable to ensure that they slept peacefully in their beds at night," and went on to express mounting fears about the potential breakup of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union itself. Both of these possibilities are looking increasingly possible. John Rettie, "The Decline and Fall of the Russian Empire?" The Manchester Guardian, Vol. 142, No. 3, January 21, 1990, p. 7. 10. Max Belof, "A Farwell to Arms: A Rejoiner," International Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Butterworths Ltd., London, Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 419. 11. Since the start of 1986 tank production has increased 5% and is currently running at 3,500 per year. The Soviets have recently fielded the very capable MIG 29 fighter and the MIG 31 interceptor. On the Naval front building continues at about 150,000 standard tons per year. The first of the Tbilisi-class aircraft carriers has joined the Northern Fleet, whilst hull 2 is fitting out and hull 3 will shortly be launched from the Nikolayef shipyard. Strategic weapon production has increased, in the case of submarine launched missiles by a factor of three. Soviet Military Power 1989, Department of Defence, United States of America, p. 34-35. 12. An interview with Giovanni Jannuzzi, the Secretary General of the European Cooperation Secretariat, and quoted in; "EC Eager to Play Defense Role in Arms Security Policy," Theressa Hitchens and Alessandro Politi, Defense News, March 15, 1990, p. l. 13. Apart from the well publicized reduction of US forces to 195,000, the Belgian Defence Minister Mr Guy Coeme announced on 25 Jan 89 that plans were under consideration to remove all of his country's 25,000 troops (the forth largest national contingent) from Germany. In the light of this it is likely that both the Dutch, and the Danes will follow Belgium's lead. The Defence Chiefs in the UK have become reconciled to a reduction in the British Army of the Rhine(BAOR) from its current 60,000, by a restructuring of the force from three Divisions to two. 14. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War", Foreign Affairs, The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Vol. 69, No. l, 1990, p. 16. 15. Helmut Schmit, A Grand strategy for the West, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985, p. 86. 16. Ibid. p. 94-95. 17. The Western European Union was formed in 1954 with the aim of furthering European integration through increased cooperation between the seven member nations(France, UK, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Holland). It is not within the EEC framework, since the Treaty of Rome specifically excludes defence issues. The WEU became dormant until 1983/4 when the French President Msr Mitterrand initiated the WEU as a forum to express a common European response to President Reagan's launch of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the military intervention in Grenada and the decision behind the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. The WEU's 30th anniversary Rome declaration of 27 Oct 84 commited it to reactivate the WEU Council at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers, as a means of strengthening the European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance, and recalled that, "that it had preserved peace on the continent for 35 years. . .The Ministers are convinced that a better utilization of the WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe. . .and greater solidarity amongst its members." Ian Gambles, "Prospect for West European Security Cooperation," Adelphi Paper, No. 244, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989, p. 29. 18. Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., Alliances in US Foreign Policy, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988, p, 108. 19. 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