Strategic Sealift Shortfall Solutions AUTHOR Major Michael D. Boyd, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Training - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: STRATEGIC SEALIFT SHORTFALL SOLUTIONS THESIS: There exist solutions to remedy the ongoing decline of the American flag fleet that can be executed to provide the strategic sealift necessary to both deploy U. S. forces to contingency areas and to give the American economy the cargo shipping it needs to enhance economic growth. ISSUE: There has been a historical correlation between sealift capability and the ability to deploy forces. Once the greatest fleet in the world, our capacity to sealift is now deficient to meet our current deployment requirements, and is projected to worsen by FY2000. The impact has been felt in the private sector, where the merchant marine and shipyard/repair capabilities are dis- appearing rapidly. The problem has been recognized at the highest levels of both government and private industry, and while the DOD effort has produced a "band aid" fix with mothballed ships of questionable readiness, there needs to be a comprehensive rejuvenation of the American merchant marine flag fleet to provide a long term solution. Four alternatives are proffered: Reliance on foreign flag shipping, airlift augmentation, privatization of the public assets or functions related to providing a sealift capacity from the federal public sector into the private sector (the preferred solution of the author), and the current status quo (doing nothing but talk about it). If there is no prompt and drastic action taken to execute one of the possible alternatives, then our sealift capacity will continue to decrease, while our current partner in peace, the Soviet Union, posssesses the second largest and most militarily-capable fleet in the world, having garnered a large share of our NATO allies imported product transportation market. The problem with executing a solution for the problem is that costs are inextricably intertwined with the common perception of a world in which peace is diminishing the historical threats. CONCLUSION: We no longer possess a valid deterrent posture, based on our sealift capability. If we wait very long to take action to build up our strategic sealift capability, history may be beyond our shaping due to our inability to rapidly deploy our forces. STRATEGIC SEALIFT SHORTFALL SOLUTIONS OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT. There exist solutions to remedy the ongoing decline of the American flag fleet that can be executed to provide the strategic sealift necessary to both deploy U. S. forces to contingency areas and to give the American economy the cargo shipping it needs to enhance economic growth. I. Historical perspective of sealift A. Decline of flag fleet l. Affect on Deployment Capability 2. Projections for the Future 3. Affect on the Marine Corps 4. Economic Repercussions B. Recognition of the Problems II. Solutions A. Reliance on Foreign Flag Shipping 1. Political Reliability Problems 2. Reduction of Allied Flag Fleets B. Airlift Augmentation 1. Difficulty to Attain Strategic Airlift Goals 2. Limited Lift Capability of Airlift Resources C. Privatization 1. Definition and History 2. Types and Methods (a) Contracting out Services (b) Deregulating Statutory Monopolies (c) Denationalizing Publicly Owned Assets (1)CONRAIL Example (2) AMTRAK Example 3. Detractors to Privatization (a) Mismanagement in the Environment Example (b) Corruption in Prisons Example 4. Application of Privatization (a) Denationalization of RRF and NDRF (b) Deregulation and Contracting Out (1) National Sealift Policy Promulgation (2) Enforcement of Jones Act Provisions (3) Enhancement of New Shipbuilding (4) Deregulation of American Flagging Requirements D. Status Quo- the "Do Nothing" Alternative 1. Politically and Fiscally Driven 2. Status of USSR Flag Fleet III. Conclusions A. Difficulties of Industrial Mobilization B. Inevitable Loss of Deterrence Capability STRATEGIC SEALIFT SHORTAGE SOLUTIONS Over 75% of the earth's surface is covered by water. Consequently, maritime projection of combat power has universally confounded commanders. Both Julius Ceas- ar and Adolph Hitler, although 2000 years apart, had to contend with the 18 mile channel between Dover and Calais in their attacks on Britain. Ceasar almost lost his legions due to bad weather and adverse currents prevent- ing the landing of his cavalry in 55 B.C., and Hitler, due to his inability or unwillingness to cross the chan- nel, ensured Britain's survival by enabling America to build and man a vast armada of merchant marine shipping that sustained the two-theater allied war effort with men, equipment, and logistics. (17:27,212) It is this American merchant marine flag fleet that concerns me in meeting the potential deployment require- ments that we embrace in our role as global peacekeeper. Our fleet of 1946 contained over 4000 ships. By 1969, it had dwindled to 1100, (31:44) and at the present there are less than 300 privately owned American vessels of 1000 tons or more in the active flag commercial fleet, with that number dropping daily as ships are laid up and sold for scrap. (38:4) We have gone from the premier sealift power in the world to number ten overall. (1:4) The President's Commission on the Merchant Marine and Defense in July 1988 reported that we need an additional 155 militarily-useful ships to provide the sealift capa- bility to deploy and sustain a single theater conflict. (9:12) This is compounded by the NATO estimates that 3000 ships would be lost to attrition alone during the first 90 days of Atlantic theater operations. (20:69) The 1984 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) computed the strategic sealift requirements for major deployments at one million short tons of unit equipment and sustainment. (6:172) Despite substantial federal sealift enhancement programs to expand the Ready Reserve Force in the past eight years to the tune of $7.5 billion, the U.S. total sealift capability stands at only 89% of this goal. FY2000 projections indicate that the flag fleet decline will further reduce our capability to 79%. (9:15-6) Lest we think that these figures have no impact on the Marine Corps, consider that Navy amphibious shipping has slipped from 162 ships in 1967 to 63 in 1987. (27:44) adding to the black bottom ship requirements, as the Assault Follow On Echelon (AFOE) ship requirements alone for the amphibious MEF can range as high as 56 cargo ships. (40:C-2) In an era of CINC apportionment and interser- vice role infighting, even the Marine Corps can consti- tute a large deployment footprint, when one considers that this represents over 20% of our total sealift capa- city. The flag fleet decline has produced comcomittant repercussions in commercial industry. As ships have gone out of the inventory, over 76 commercial shipyards have closed in the last five years, leaving only six private sector commercial shipyards capable of conducting major overhauls and drydock work on ships over 400 feet in length in this country. (7:71) Additionally, there has not been a single ship constructed in an American shipyard since 1987. (30:101) Simultaneously, the demise of facilities has been accompanied by a "brain drain" of talent as the personnel who crew, repair, and construct ships are rapidly leaving the maritime occupations for more secure jobs. Employment in the U.S. merchant marine fell from 40,000 in 1970 to approximately 12,000 in 1987. (15:34) The average age of a crewman is well over 50. Added to this picture is that 200,000 pierside industry jobs have been lost in the last five years, 52,500 being ship production workers. (10:89) The criticality of the loss of flag fleet capability can be best underscored by the words of ex-President Reagan in a speech of January 17, 1987: (15:34) ... the continuing decline of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. flag commercial shipping assets is a matter of concern. This problem is com- pounded by the decline of the U.S. flag fleet which results in a reduction of the seagoing workforce to man all our U.S. flag vessels... The lack of merchant mariners in the near term could impede our ability adequately to project and sustain forces by strategic sealift. SOLUTIONS As described above, the current trend of decreasing merchant marine capability is disturbing, and requires drastic action now to reverse this jeopardy to our military capabilities. Four alternatives exist to address our present problems and future shortfalls in power projection. None is without its costs, if not in resources, then in risk, but they are proffered as the personal feeling is that America is already years short and billions late in this realm. FOREIGN FLAG SHIPPING First of all, continued and expanded use of foreign flag shipping appears to be perilously political in nature. Politics in our complex world extend beyond treaties into the private sector boardrooms of shipping companies which may be reluctant to endanger their status in foreign ports by hauling Uncle Sam's car- goes. (1:4) Additionally, there is the difficulty of in- ducing commercial shippers to go into harm's way and risk ships and crews for bulk rate cargo revenues. Personal experience recalls that American shippers refused to haul American Embassy cargo into the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq Conflict; could we expect foreign flag ships to do more for us, given the rapidly-decreasing 600- ship navy, and its demonstrated inability to protect tankers (and itself) from WWI vintage mines destruction? (7:70) Add- itionally, our NATO allies, much more reliant on the high seas for their continued economic sustainment, are experiencing declines to their flag fleets similiar to ours as they have been outpriced priced by the third world shippers and the Soviet Union. (44: 72) They may well not be able to provide the support that they currently promise. (12:54) AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION For some of the same reasons, increased reliance on air freight is fraught with peril. The CMMS set the defense goal for airlift capability at 66 million ton- miles per day of strategic (long range) cargo airlift. DOD has been struggling ever since to meet this require- ment, and are approximately at 70% of that goal. (14:47) Current projections of meeting this goal by FY 2000 rests on the willingness of Congress to appropriate funds for the new short-airfield capable cargo aircraft (C17) that will cost $117 million per copy for a total of $35.7 billion. (5:30) This project is in jeopardy, according to the Transcom managers, and stretchout of the acquisition process is already in motion amongst the Congressional budget crunchers. (41:405) The crux of the matter with airlift is that, without even considering the maintenance, crew rest problems, and susceptibility to attrition from enemy actions, the airlift resources are but drops in the proverbial power projection bucket. One merchant ship can carry the equivalent of 600 C141 loads of equipment or supplies. (14:52) One army division would require over 2500 C5 and C141 sorties. (14:49) The bottom line is that 95% of all cargo would still require sealift movement. (5:31) PRIVATIZATION This author considers the solution of choice to turn about the decline of the flag fleet and provide an ade- quate sealift capability for war as well as commerce to lie in "privatization". Privatization is a relatively new concept in this country, as Webster's has no listing, and it is best defined as "turning over government businesses to pri- vate enterprise". (11:281) Historically, privatization was known, although by other terms, as early as the 1400s when the Tudor Accession to the throne of England led to privatization of England's monasteries, and plots of common land. (3:2) Accordingly, as befits history, Britain has been the world leader in the privatization movement. After the postwar nationalization of British industry in the 1940s, the election of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1977 led to a widespread divesting effort to sell off state-owned enterprises to the private sector, to include sealift shipping. (26:15) Pointing out the benefits reaped by government through privatization in increased private sector employment and corporate tax base, and lowered government bureaucratic overhead, the sales of British Petrol, Gas, and Airports in 1986 enabled the British Government to lower the basic income tax from 28% to 25%. (3:47) Buoyed by these and similar unprecedented suc- cesses, countries as diverse as Portugal, India, Japan, France, and Sr Lanka have joined in the privatization game. Even Cuba allowed citizens to own their own homes for the first tame since 1959. (l8:4) To understand how privatization may aid the flag fleet, one must first look at its types and methods. There are three basic types of privatization open to government: contracting out public services, deregulating statuatory barriers that hinder private firms from competing with the public sectors and denationalizing publicly owned assets. (3:14) Contracting out public services to private sector companies makes it possible for the government to pay potentially reduced rates for services through competitive bidding. A good example close to home in the military has been the civilianization of many maintenance and housekeeping functions formerly performed by military members. The latest talk is to privatize the commissaries and post exchanges. (20:144) Deregulating statutory monopolies and licensing barriers that hinder private sector firms and essentially negate their ability to compete with public sector organizations makes it possible for the private sector to compete with public services. The British deregulation was found to actually improve the stability of public functions by providing private sector competi- tion. By causing public sector organizations to become more efficient, they were able to lower their cost over- heads, if in fact they were not privatized. (3:127) Denationalization involves directly selling publicly owned assets or firms into the private sector. (3:29) As previously mentioned, deregulation can be used to make public enterprises more attractive, but must be combined with a comprehensive program by the government to create an environment wherein the sale becomes possible. A good example of a public relations effort providing the ambience to ensure successful privatization is the mad rush to buy shares of British Telcom in 1984 when it was put on the market. Its pre- vious reputation of slow and poor service had been count- ered by intensive P.R. (24:12) Another example closer to home was the public stock offering sale of Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). Formed out of the ruins of the old Penn Central Railroad in 1976, it was upgraded and by 1981, it was making a tidy profit when ex-President Reagan proposed it for sale. However, even after Congressional authorization, it took five years to complete the sale, as lobbyists from rail corporations, public spending coalitions and congressmen from the affected region bickered over the need to keep the system intact after its sale. (23:41) On the other hand, inability in this process has rendered the government virtually helpless to economize the services provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK.). Created by the 1970 Rail Passenger Service Act, $11 billion has been spent to keep it operating to date. Despite attempts to cutback services by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, intensive lobbying efforts have kept every line operationg, while the tax- payer subsidizes 60% of the cost of every ticket. (18:166) It is theorized that AMTRAK will never be done away with or privatized until the political lobbyists are overwhelmed by the government's ability to make this "great white elephant train" profitable. (21:14) There are numerous detractors to the ideas and practice of privatization, and their rationale, although simplistic and narrowly scoped, requires mention. On the environmental side of privatization, the potential sale of government lands by the Reagan administration was severely criticized. The short-term nature of private sector managers as exemplified by over-grazing, deforestation and overfarming that resulted in sucn tragedies as the Dust Bowl of the 1930's were cited as indications that land resource management must be entrusted to the government. (22:20) Probably the most powerful detractor is the potent- ial for corruption in conjunction with privatizing ef- forts. Case studies have demonstrated that the shift of functions from private to public is often spurred by exposure of corruption, as in the movement to federalize prisons in 1891. It took almost 100 years for the public as well as the government to consider privatizing the penal function, even considering the vast federal drain on taxes and administration, due to the corruption that became public shame in the 19th century. (18:149) APPLICATION OF PRIVATIZATION Having illustrated some of the successes, potental gains, and frustrations and dangers along the road to privatization, one may well ask what is there to priva- tize and what role would privatization play in enhancing our flag fleet? Simply stated, it is this author's opinion that the $7.5 billion that has been spent by the Reagan administration in building and maintaining public assets, the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), fully government owned and maintained, could be better spent in enhancing the U.S. flag fleet through privatizing these assets and/or the functions they provide. This effort will require a combi- nation of denationalization, deregulation, and contract- ing out services to accomplish our goal of providing both the strategic sealift lift for wartime and peacetime economic development. Denationalization. The RRF ships, 92 at present, when added to the NDRF ships, 131 Liberty Class ships of WWII vintage, represent a sizable "band-aid approach" to enhancing U.S. strategic sealift capacity, as the moth- balled shipping provides few jobs and little work for U.S. shipyards and shipbuilders. (5:31) By selling off these resources to American shipping companies and providing Operational Differential Subsidies (ODS) to make them competitive with foreign shipping, we would have the ships on hand as well for peacetime aswell as wartime. Vice depending on laid-up, mothballed ships to go to underworked, understaffed shipyards for massive over- hauls, the ships would be underway instantaneously, as diverted from their commercial routes. Would there be costs involved in this option? Absolutely, but current costs ($1 million per ship/per year) (33:101) would be exchanged with increased GNP that would offset the potential outlays by the increased tax revenues generated by a rejuvenated maritime industry. It is estimated that the government would get back $1.25 n tax revenues from every dollar invested in this effort. (7:72) More import- antly, the generation of a highly trained cadre of seamen and shipbuilders and repairers that this country needs to maintain both peacetime and wartime sealift capacity. Deregulation and Contracting Out. Recognizing the implications of the continuing decline of our sealift capacity on national defense, Congress enacted Public Law 98-525 which established the Commission on Merchant Mar- ine and Defense, charged with the responsibility to make recommendations for legislation and actions by both the executive branch and the private sector "to foster and maintain a U.S. merchant marine capable of meeting national security requirements". (30:39) In the four years that the Commission was in existence, the yearly reports to the President gradually took a trend, not towards denationalizing the RRF or NDRF, but towards enhancing the private sector operations by maximizing the revitalization through government protections and subsid- ies designed to make private sector more attractive to use than government owned assets, and more competitive against foreign sealift sources. (15:34) Summarized below are some of the recommendations to the President published in the Commission's fourth report, many of which contain the aspects of deregulation and contracting out that privatization espouses. Establish a National Sealift policy which would commit the government meeting both national defense and economic sealift requirements through both (DOD) and private sector capabilities. This policy was signed last October and represents the first effort by both private add government officials to cooperative- ly seek solutions to our sealift shortfalls. (46:89) Revitalize the U.S. flag fleet in foreign trade in direct competition with foreign shipping sources. (9:31) The "Jones Act", Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, requires that all cargo moved between U.S. ports be done by U.S. flagged ships. However, as has been pointed out, even government agencies (required to use U.S. flagged ships by law) have been found to use foreign shipping to move the majority of their cargo. (16:28) The obvious solutions to either enforce the existing regulations or to increase the ODS to make our shipping assets competi- tive have yet to be applied. Another suggestion calls upon the government to encourage American shippers to upgrade all obsolete and outdated shipping (which includes the bulk of our RRF and NDRF, and engage in a government-subsidized building project to provide shipping that will be competitive technologically as well as cost-wise from the reductions of crews and maintenance that are possible from using existing technology upgrades to forge a new flag fleet. (9:57) Included in this program would be low-cost loans, federal1y guaranteed, to subsidize the sizeable costs to build a ship in America, almost three times as much as in Japan or the Far East. (44:28) Deregulation of the American flagging requirements has been suggested to enable American shipping to become competitive. The exodus of American shipping companies to flag their ships under Panamian or Liberian Flags of Convenience (FCC) was due to the severe safety regulations imposed on American Flag shipping. Consequently, although owned and operated by American companies, these ships, known as Effective U.S. Contro1led (EUSC) shipping, can not be counted upon for strategic sealift in the same way as American Flag ship- ping, and there is considerable debate as to the degree to which they would be provided in contingency response. (14:69) These ships, 367 in all, contain all but three passenger ships operating in the U.S. littoral waters, and sizeable numbers of new and efficient cargo ships. Just as an example, it cost approximate1y $20 million per ship to reflag three commercial Roll-On-Roll-Off (RORO) ships bought from Norwegian companies and moth- balled into th RRF in 1986. If American shipping compa- nies could be lured into reflagging their ships into American flags through either economic inducement or regulation relaxation, the sealift shortfalls could be substantially reduced without any further action. (7:72) STATUS QUO The fourth alternative is that we do nothing in the face of our current strategic sealift shortfall. Unfor- tunately, given the current politics of peace and detente, and the euphoria that will surely drive America's leader- ship to reduce and eliminate her active military strength, there seems to be little incentive to build and maintain merchant ships and enhance the ability to rapid- ly deploy combat forces, based on an ill-definable and uncertain threat of the present and future. Unfortunately, our former adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building a merchant marine that far out- strips our own. From the ruins of WWII, they now have built a fleet of more than 2500 ocean-going cargo and cruise ships, capable of military use as demonstrated by their ongoing military export to both client states and arms buying third world nations. (13:74) They were able to build and maintain this huge flag fleet by significantly undercutting sealift cargo tariff rates worldwide during the 1970s, and continue to build new ships with the funds generated therein. (10:78) As an indication of their progress, they now haul over 80% of France's oil imports. (13:74). Currently number two in Frances oil imports. (13:74). Currently number two in the merchant fleet world, (5:31) the "Evil Empire" is now more capable than both we and our NATO allies to provide us with strategic sealift for the next major crisis. CONCLUSIONS America has had the national will and industrial might to come from greater power projection shortages in past conflicts, ala WWI and II. Our mobilization of industry has been unmatched, our touted ability to rise from catastrophe is something legendary. 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