Fighting The MAGTF: A Doctrinal Vacuum AUTHOR Major Leonard A. Blasiol, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM Thesis: The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but the Corps lacks a truly workable body of doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the capability of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast mental resources on this challenge. In the coming era of fiscal austerity, the armed forces will face severe budget cuts. In order to survive this experience intact, the Marine Corps must offer the nation a unique capability. The amphibious mission is losing credibility. Dwindling amphibious lift capability and lack of recent historical evidence for the utility of amphibious forces combine to undermine the Corps' reliance on this once important role as the guarantor of institutional survival. The unique character of the MAGTF is the attribute which can hold a place for the Marine Corps in national defense strategy. Despite the overwhelming importance of the MAGTF, current doctrine for its employment is seriously flawed. A number of specific cases illustrate this point, including: focus on the GCE, rear area security, compositing, and MAGTFs wih multiple GCEs. In some instances, the doctrine fails to address seemingly obvious contradictions; in other cases, doctrinal solutions to pressing problems are impractical or not fully developed. Deficiencies in MAGTF doctrine can be corrected. First, FMF commanders must participate energetically in the development of doctrinal concepts. Second, the vast reservoir of knowledge resident in Marine Corps schools must be pressed into service. Finally, the Marine Corps GAZETTE should encourage an open debate concerning MAGTF warfighting issues. FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM OUTLINE The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but the Marine Corps lacks a truly workable body of doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the capability of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast mental resources on this challenge. I. INTRODUCTION A. Potential effectiveness of the MAGTF B. Weakness of doctrine reduces MAGTF effectiveness II. WHY THE MAGTF? A. Amphibious capability a "dead issue" B. Unique MAGTF capability the Marine Corps' greatest asset III. DOCTRINE A. Definition B. Sources C. MAGTF doctrine development IV. FOCUS ON THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT A. Proper employment of the MAGTF requires non-traditional approach B. Doctrine establishes a focus on the GCE V. REAR AREA SECURITY A. Rear area: the MAGTF's critical vulnerability B. Doctrine requires rear area units to protect themselves C. Rear area units cannot possibly counter the anticipated threat VI. COMPOSITING A. Extended combat missions require a MEF B. MEFs can only deploy by compositing C Compositing doctrine is not workable VII. THE "TWO DIVISION MEF" A. Doctrine does not fully address the question of a "two division MEF" B. Doctrinal schemes for fire support coordination with multiple GCEs are not sound VIII. FINDING THE RIGHT ANSWERS A. Require FMF commanders to participate fully in the review of draft doctrinal publications B. Utilize the knowledge and experience base present in Marine Corps schools C. Fuel a Corps-wide discussion in the Marine Corps GAZETTE IX.CONCLUSIONS A. Unrealistic, unworkable doctrine can be corrected B. "Turn on the brainpower" TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary i Outline ii Table of Contents iv Introduction 1 Why the MAGTF? 2 Doctrine 5 Focus on the Ground Combat Element 7 Rear Area Security 9 Compositing 14 The "Two Division MEF" 17 Finding the Right Answers 20 Conclusion 23 Footnotes 25 Bibliography 27 FIGHTING THE MAGTF: A DOCTRINAL VACUUM Introduction Marine forces are most effective in battle when employed as a strategic mobile combined arms air-ground combat force possessing its own combat service support, all under a single commander. This doctrine is based upon tasking in the National Security Act of 1947. It is the foundation for the structure and operation of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force . . . . -- The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, OH 2 The Marine Corps is heavily committed to fulfilling its national defense responsibilities by employing its fighting power in the form of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Combining aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support units under a single commander with his own staff, the MAGTF theoretically represents a formidable, flexible, self-sufficient fighting organization. Indeed, considering the array of combat capabilities available to the MAGTF commander, this would seem to be the case. Unfortunately, it is not. Combat power is more than a quantity of men, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, trucks, and so forth placed under the leadership of a commander, however competent he might be. To effectively apply the capabilities of men, equipment, and systems against an enemy, a combat organization must have a commonly understood concept of the fashion in which its various elements should integrate their resources to achieve victory. Such a concept is referred to as doctrine. The MAGTF possesses sufficient firepower, sustainment capability, and flexibility to accomplish a variety of missions, but the Marine Corps lacks a truly workable body of doctrine which would enable the MAGTF to fight effectively. It is within the capability of the Corps to develop effective doctrine by focusing its vast mental resources on this challenge. Why the MAGTF? The world is changing. Communist regimes are toppling in Eastern Europe and Central America, the Germans are dismantling the Berlin Wall, and Soviet republics are unilaterally declaring their independence from their former Kremlin masters. The "threat," it would seem, is disappearing. In response to the suddenly diminished risk of war, U.S. legislators have already begun the process of dramatically paring down defense spending. The armed forces face personnel reductions on a dramatic scale, as well as the outright loss of programs for the upgrade and modernization of equipment and fighting capabilities. It is a Darwinian environment of competition for scarce resources and adaptation to change, and only the truly "capable" will survive. Any of the services found wanting will go the way of the dodo bird and the Tasmanian wolf. It is not surprising that the Marine Corps has often been a favorite target of budget cutters. In a nation which already maintains a large army, a second major land combat force seems redundant. The Corps has answered this type of criticism in the past by touting the two capabilities which make it unique among the armed forces of the United States: the ability to forcibly enter enemy-held territory through amphibious assault and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organization, with its special warfighting characteristics. Of these two arguments, the first is rapidly losing credibility. Since the 1st Marine Division's landing at Inchon in 1950, Marine Corps units have conducted only a few minor amphibious assaults under combat conditions (or conditions which could even remotely be considered to approximate the threat of combat), and then only by the smallest of the MAGTFs, Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs).1 Conversely, the U.S. Army has participated in a number of intervention actions using airborne and air-landed units of brigade and division size. Recent history indicates that, in situations which can probably be resolved by a battalion-sized force augmented by helicopters, the Marines might get the call. In circumstances likely to involve serious combat, the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne Division, Rangers, or light infantry units will probably respond, with or without Marines.2 Marines argue that an amphibious force can remain offshore in a threatening posture almost indefinitely, placing at risk a large stretch of an adversary's coastline. While this is true, it is a fact unlikely to imbue U.S. legislators with the inspiration to dedicate major resources toward the maintenance of a force whose sole virtue is the ability to conduct amphibious operations. While amphibious capability has merit, the Corps must offer the nation something more if it expects to survive the budget-cutter's axe. The Corps does indeed have "something more" to offer: the MAGTF. The uniqueness of the MAGTF in the armed forces of the United States is guaranteed by the National Security Act of 1947, which requires the Marine Corps to maintain divisions and aircraft wings. Alone among the services in this regard, the Marine Corps can thus organize forces capable of employing air and ground combat power under a single headquarters. It is not amphibious capability, but the unique character of the MAGTF that makes the Marine Corps valuable to the nation. Experience indicates that legislators are not swayed by such esoteric qualities as an outstanding combat record (although they are quickly roused to take action against the perpetrators of combat failure). Instead, they demand evidence of warfighting capabilities of use to the nation in the forseeable future. The MAGTF is the embodiment of such a capability. It is the key to the salvation of the Corps in the coming era of fiscal austerity. Doctrine In the military, doctrine is supremely important. In the confusion of battle, those who understand it have a frame of reference and a vocabulary with which they can effectively judge the situation, think about it, effect coordination, and issue orders. -- Guide to Doctrinal Publications. OH 0 Doctrine is a general form of guidance for employing units and weapons. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub. 1 tells us that doctrine is "authoritative but requires judgment in application." The Marine Corps' philosophy on warfighting is faithful to this concept.3 There are two types of Marine Corps doctrinal publications: Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs) and developmental publications (also known as Operational Handbooks, or OHs).4 Taken together, these publications document the Marine Corps' theoretical point of departure for the conduct of war. Warfighting doctrine can evolve either from historical experience (in combat or in exercises) or from "brainstorming." Marine Corps combat experience with the MAGTF in Vietnam holds few lessons of relevance to our current expectations. Other MAGTF combat operations -- the Dominican Republic (1962), Lebanon and Grenada (1983)-- were of such small scale as to be of little use for the development of doctrine applicable to MAGTF warfighting. Similarly, exercises involving larger versions of the MAGTF -- the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and the Marine Expedltionary Force (MEF) -- are few and infrequent. MAGTF doctrine, then, is mainly the product of intellectual exercise on the part of a few inspired officers in Washington and Quantico whose duties require them to grapple with legions of unanswered questions. However talented and experienced these officers might be, many MAGTF issues are so unique that few, if any, of those involved in writing doctrine have ever encountered them before. In such cases, a resort to the imagination is the only possible approach. The resulting untested concepts carry the grave danger of being found inadequate at the worst possible moment: in the heat of battle. Some questions are so significant that doctrinal failure could reduce the MAGTF to a disjointed force of limited combat capability. Several cases will serve to illustrate this danger. Focus on the Ground Combat Element A MAGTF is an integrated, balanced air-ground combined arms force organized for combat, with its own combat service support element (CSSE). . . . MAGTFs are employed to apply ground combat power supported by the MAGTF's own aviation combat element and CSSE. -- The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2 The major subordinate elements of the MAGTF represent diverse forms of fighting power and sustainment capability which can be fused into a combat organization of extraordinary strength and flexibility. Realization of the MAGTF's full combat potential requires bold, imaginative, and unorthodox employment of its elements. Consider the possibility of using the aviation combat element (ACE) as a maneuver element. Although Marine aircraft cannot physically occupy terrain, they can control it. Better still, aviation combat units are fully capable of operating in a maneuver warfare environment by focusing on the enemy and carrying out appropriate mission-type orders to fulfill the MAGTF commander's intent. The ACE is a highly flexible source of great combat power which allows the MAGTF commander to influence the battle in a dimension not readily available to other tactical commanders. Unfortunately, years of tradition have sustained the narrow-minded notion that the ACE exists primarily to support the needs of the ground combat element (GCE). While MAGTF warfighting doctrine should establish a pattern for radical departure from traditional relationships between ground combat and aviation combat forces, this is not the case. Doctrine clearly establishes a focus on the GCE. One source of MAGTF warfighting doctrine emphasizes this point clearly, stating that: MAGTFs are employed to apply ground combat power, supported by the MAGTF's own aviation and combat service support elements. Only ground forces possess the power to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its people. Land power can make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.5 Other publications persist in referring to the ACE as "a supporting commander," who is responsible for merely providing air support to all MAGTF elements. Likewise, we read that "the GCE commander is given an area of operations appropriate to accomplishing the MAGTF/GCE mission [Italics added]."6 The MAGTF staff planning process further establishes the primacy of the GCE. According to the prescribed sequence, the GCE commander studies the MAGTF mission and develops ground courses of action for the MAGTF commander's approval. The ACE and CSSE commanders then prepare "concepts of employment" for support of the GCE courses of action. In the final step, the GCE commander presents a recommendation to the MAGTF commander.7 This process perpetuates the idea that the purpose of the ACE is not to carry out appropriate missions assigned by the MAGTF commander, but simply to support the GCE. Rear Area Security Any major disruption in the functions of friendly rear area support will adversely affect combat operations . . . . The key to success on the battlefield lies in the generation of combat power. If organizations such as the combat service support element or the aviation combat element cannot adequately defend themselves, then combat power will be degraded and this will contribute to defeat. -- MAGTF Rear Area Security, OH 2-6 According to doctrine, the MAGTF's rear area is "that area extending rearward from the rear boundary of the ground combat element to the MAGTF rear boundary."8 Included in the MAGTF's rear area are the vital facilities of the ACE and the CSSE, as well as portions of the lines of communication leading from these facilities to the units of the GCE. The lack of proper arrangements for the security of the rear area will often represent the MAGTF's critical vulnerability, especially in independent operations which require the MAGTF to protect its own facilities while simultaneously undertaking ventures which extend its lines of communication. Doctrine for rear area security operations follows a fundamental principle of minimum reliance upon the GCE. Only in an emergency, when the rear area is threatened by large enemy ground formations, and "the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission has become jeopardized" does doctrine call for the MAGTF commander to task the GCE with rear area security operations. Under normal circumstances, the mission is to be assigned to either the ACE commander or the CSSE commander (usually the latter), who is designated the "rear area security coordinator (RASC)."9 While the RASC is responsible to the MAGTF commander for security of the entire MAGTF rear area, his only power over units outside his own command is the almost useless "coordinating authority," defined in JCS Pub. 1 as "the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved. . . but not. . . to compel agreement." This somewhat weak command relationship seriously degrades the RASC's ability to carry out his responsibilities, thereby rendering the vital MAGTF rear area even more vulnerable.10 In keeping with the principle of "minimum reliance on the GCE," doctrine charges the RASC with organizing ad hoc units for the conduct of rear area security operations. Typical organizations to be fielded from a Force Service Support Group (FSSG) include a Rear Area Operations Center, up to two Provisional Mobile Security Platoons of 1 officer and 38 enlisted Marines each, and a Provisional Helicopterborne Security Company containing 5 officers and 183 enlisted Marines. These units are intended to augment local security efforts of ACE and CSSE units, working in conjunction with the Military Police Company, which also has rear area security responsibilities. The Marines who are to man these organizations come from different units and are, by military occupational specialty, drivers, mechanics, heavy equipment operators, and the like.11 Doctrinally, these units are supposed to be capable of "finding, fixing (depriving the enemy of freedom of movement), and destroying an enemy company-sized unit (100-150 personnel) without GCE assistance. . . . [and of] finding and fixing an enemy battalion-sized unit (500-600 personnel) while awaiting GCE assistance."12 Considering the small size of the rear area security forces in question, the minimal infantry training of their personnel, and the ad hoc nature of their organization, the demands levied upon them by doctrine are quite fantastic. To blithely state that these provisional units, comprising a total strength of 266 Marines, will fix in position a battalion of trained enemy infantry conducting a determined attack (probably with the aid of fire support) is simply ludicrous. The rear area security units, operating independently over a wide area in search of the enemy, would be unable to concentrate quickly, in many cases. Even if they could join forces before engaging the enemy, their paltry combat power would present little more in the way of an obstacle to enemy movement than a "speed bump." Doctrine recognizes the possibility of aiding rear area security units with fire support from the GCE or the ACE. indeed, the organization of the Rear Area Operations Center includes several fire support representatives in a sort of "mini-fire support cooordination center." Unfortunately, this simple expedient does not solve the many problems with rear area fire support. For example, the provisional security units have no communications access to the would-be supporting units (artillery, naval gunfire, close air support). Further, even if the communications means were available, the rear area security personnel do not have the training required to call for and adjust these fires effectively. A few periods of instruction, even when a modicum of practical application is included, will not qualify a refrigerator repairman to adjust an artillery marking round for a close air support mission against enemy units in close contact with friendly forces. To make matters still worse, it is difficult to imagine a set of fire support coordination measures established to cover any possible eventuality in the MAGTF rear area. Such a plan would be so ponderous as to defy practical use. In any event, GCE assets may be out of range, and certainly may be otherwise engaged when a threat arises in the rear area, forcing the MAGTF commander to make a difficult assessment of priorities at a moment of crisis. This is exactly the type of opportunity a clever enemy might seek in an effort to unhinge the fighting power of the MAGTF. Rear area security doctrine is simply an attempt to "wish away" a difficult problem which exposes an embarrassing weakness in MAGTF warfighting capability. Clearly, there are severe limitations to the "self defense" capabilities of the ACE and CSSE. Doctrine must realistically assess those limitations and their impact on the MAGTF's ability to pursue certain types of combat operations. Compositing Emphasis is directed to the fact that Marine air-ground task forces are flexible organizations capable of smooth transition into a larger force if required. -- Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine FMFM 0-1 The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the most capable form of MAGTF. Its large size gives it more firepower, mobility, and combat service support capability than smaller forms of the MAGTF, as well as the flexibility provided by a wider array of functions in each of its subordinate elements. Combat missions requiring participation by Marine Corps forces on other than a temporary basis will necessitate the introduction of a MEF. While the U.S. Navy possesses the amphibious shipping to lift an entire MEF in a single echelon, it is unlikely that this could occur on short notice. The shipping requirement is approximately 50 ships. The 62 ships of the Navy's amphibious fleet are divided roughly equally between the two coasts, creating a shortfall of about 35 percent when attempting to move a MEF from either coast on such short notice as to preclude redeploying ships. On the other hand, sufficient shipping would be available to move a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).13 Possibly the only realistic means of deploying a MEF is to do so incrementally, using the process of "compositing," in which smaller MAGTFs arrive in the area of operations first, and are joined later by other elements, until an entire MEF is ashore. A compositing operation could include elements of different MEFs, some arriving as part of a forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), others as part of a Maritime Prepositioning Force, still others in a "fly-in echelon" or on board additional amphibious or merchant ships.14 Compositing holds many pitfalls. First, the units which join together to form a MEF may be from many different parent organizations, each with its own Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). Individuals who have never worked or trained together before (and who may very well have never even seen one another before) would be required to quickly establish rapport, a common understanding of how the organization will fight, report formats and procedures, and a litany of other details, any one of which could turn out to be the "nail" for want of which the kingdom was lost. Furthermore, the Marine Corps' official study on the compositing concept provides for certain MAGTF headquarters units to assume new roles and designations which they do not have a real capability to fulfill. In some cases, for instance, a MEB headquarters is to temporarily become a division headquarters, until an actual division headquarters arrives. The MEB headquarters does not have many of the facilities or communications assets it needs to carry out this new mission. Consider the difficulty of attempting to accomplish fire support coordination for a division composed of two regiments from different parent divisions, each of which has battalions from different parent regiments, and which is supported by an artillery regiment (which also has a new, skeleton, ad hoc headquarters) made up of two battalions from different parent regiments! The prospect is staggering. The MEB's supporting arms special staff is not organized, trained, or equipped to undertake this task. Even after the follow-on headquarters units arrive to save the day, the composite MEF is left with the original problem of a lack of common training and procedures.15 There are numerous other potential compositing problems. For example, communications equipment or procedures from different units could be incompatible. Also, the MEF could face a shortage of test sets, tools, technicians, or repair parts for equipment peculiar to one of the compositing units.16 While the general concept of deploying a MEF in piecemeal fashion is, perhaps, a valid solution to the problem of inadequate strategic lift, current compositing doctrine does not adequately address many important issues. Like some other elements of MAGTF doctrine, current compositing schemes are workable on paper, but lack validity in the real world. To accomplish the difficult, demanding, and challenging tasks the Marine Corps expects a MEF to face in combat, compositing doctrine must carefully and realistically address the many potential weaknesses inherent in such a system. It would be criminal to attempt to fight a war in the same manner as we would play a "pick-up" game of basketball. The Two Division MEF Doctrine provides for the possibility of forming additional ground combat, aviation combat, or combat service support elements within a MAGTF. In fact, this was accomplished during the Vietnam War. III Marine Amphibious Force, the senior Marine operational headquarters to participate in the war, included, during one period, two heavily reinforced Marine Divisions, a U.S. Army corps of three divisions, a Marine Aircraft Wing, and a Force Service Support Group.17 In cases involving MAGTFs smaller than a MEF, the doctrinally prescribed process of adding additional elements is relatively straightforward. A MEU which absorbs another Battalion Landing Team, for example, forms a Regimental Landing Team headquarters to control the GCE. When a second Marine Aircraft Group joins a MEB, a small Marine Aircraft Wing headquarters must be established. In some cases, the resulting organization should be redesignated as the next larger form of MAGTF.18 The simple system described above cannot be applied to the case of a MEF with more than one division, wing, or FSSG. There is no already-established tactical organization in the Marine Corps which can be used as a model for the headquarters of a multi-division or multi-wing combat formation. MAGTF doctrine is mute on this point, failing to address the problem at all.19 Once again, a paper solution which only partially considers the issue appears in a doctrinal publication in the guise of practical warfighting guidance. To compound the problem, doctrine specifically addresses the question of fire support coordination in a muti-GCE MAGTF, but again comes up short of the mark. Three options are provided. First, the fire support coordination center (FSCC) of one of the GCEs can serve as the FSCC for the MAGTF while simultaneously performing its normal functions for its own headquarters. The conflict of interest involved in such a situation should serve to eliminate this idea from serious consideration. A second procedure described calls for the use of a higher headquarters FSCC common to both GCEs. This is the only one of the three doctrinal approaches listed which is compatible with the previously explained procedure prescribed for command and control of multiple GCEs. As before, however, it must be noted that this method cannot be applied to the case of a MEF through the use of any currently existing FSCC organizational structure. The final method calls for using the MAGTF supporting arms special staff (SASS) to accomplish fire support coordination. The SASS can perform this mission with the proper augmentation, and can actually allow the MAGTF commander to "fight the MAGTF," (or at least to coordinate its fires). While this procedure is an admirable step in the right direction, it cannot be reconciled with the doctrinally prescribed method for command and control of multiple GCEs.20 In the case of fire support coordination, MAGTF doctrine is both confusing and contradictory. There are sensible approaches which conflict with other doctrine, and methods which appear to be consistent with doctrine, but are not cogent. Such a paradox serves only to perplex those who look to doctrine for guidance. Finding the Right Answers MAGTF doctrine is so significant to the future success of the Corps that its development, testing, evaluation, and refinement should be of the most urgent priority. While the reasonable leader does not expect to find all of his questions answered in doctrinal publications, he likewise hardly expects to be confounded, bewildered, and led astray. The MAGTF is a complex and unusual combat organization which can operate to its maximum potential only when its key leaders are guided by a cable body of commonly understood guidance. The capacity to rectify the problems with MAGTF doctrine is resident in the Corps today. Basically, the answer lies in eschewing the previously used system of excessive reliance on a tiny "sacred brain trust" and broadening the base of knowledge which is used to develop the doctrine. This can be partially accomplished within the existing procedures for reviewing doctrinal concepts, but the process must also be expanded to employ a number of Marine Corps institutions which currently lie fallow. First, within the current system, the review of doctrinal publications must be taken seriously by all Marines. When newly published Operational Handbooks are distributed to the Fleet Marine Force for review and comment, commanders must ensure that this important work receives the attention it deserves. It is easy to make the excuse that other priorities take precedence over the dull work of studying and analyzing doctrinal publications. The usual result is a "negative response." Senior commanders should not accept such an approach from their subordinates. FMF units can test concepts in field exercises or command post exercises. Senior officers can meet with their staffs and immediate subordinates to examine new concepts and to provide the benefit of their knowledge and experience to the valuable work of developing a workable body of doctrine. Marine Corps schools can also provide valuable service in this effort. At the Command and Staff College alone, the students, faculty, and staff dispose of approximately 2,000 years of Marine Corps experience.21 In the process of attempting to understand MAGTF doctrine, the students regularly encounter its inconsistencies, and often informally discuss corrective action. The practical exercises conducted at the Command and Staff College (especially the "force-on-force" wargames using the Tactical Warfare Simulation Evaluation and Analysis System) could serve as an initial test for some of these student proposals. Those ideas which appear to have merit could be further analyzed by students and faculty, then passed on to the Warfighting Center, or directly to the FMF, for further serious consideration. Marine Corps schools represent a collection of experienced, thinking officers who are capable of contributing to the process of improving the MAGTF's warfighting capability. Unlike officers in the FMF, those at Marine Corps schools are not isolated from those in other military occupational specialties. Indeed, they study and interact professionally on a daily basis with other officers of every conceivable type of training, background, and experience. This unique situation is conducive to a fruitful exchange of ideas which is unlike that which might be found anywhere else in the Marine Corps. Another institution to which Marines can turn for the exchange of ideas concerning MAGTF doctrine is the Marine Corps GAZETTE. As a professional journal, the GAZETTE reaches virtually all Marine Corps officers and many staff noncommissioned officers. It is a ready forum for the frank and open discussion of issues pertinent to the Marine Corps and it can certainly play a major role in an effort to correct the deficiencies in MAGTF doctrine, just as it led the way in the controversial introduction of maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps several years ago. Unfortunately, MAGTF warfighting is not a subject which has received much exposure in the GAZETTE. During the entire decade of the 1980s, 37 articles purporting to concern the MAGTF appeared in the GAZETTE. Only about half of these could reasonably be considered to actually address issues related to MAGTF warfighting. These pertinent articles totalled about 77 pages of text . . . the rough equivalent of 1 full issue of the GAZETTE. Considering that 120 issues appeared during this period, it is apparent that MAGTF warfighting has not been a subject of great interest to GAZETTE readers.22 The senior leadership of the Marine Corps should address this matter to the editorial board of the Marine Corps GAZETTE and should seek their assistance in tapping the mental resources of Marines. Conclusion Existing MAGTF doctrine simple does not provide a realistic basis for common understanding among the Marines who will fight as part of a MAGTF. Some difficult questions have been answered with weak, obviously unworkable "paper" solutions, while others have gone completely unrecognized. To fulfill its obligations to the nation -- and possibly to ensure its own survival -- the Corps must seek to develop credible MAGTF doctrine by focusing its considerable mental resources on this vital challenge. The institutions and procedures for accomplishing this objective are available today: the Marines of the FMF, the vast experience resident in Marine Corps schools, and the Marine Corps GAZETTE with its capability to encourage and focus intellectual exchange between Marines of all ranks and experience levels throughout the Corps. Upon assuming office as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. M. Gray asked his Marines to "turn on the brainpower," and while this has clearly occurred, it has been a somewhat unguided effort. Marines have responded with thoughts and solutions concerning a diverse range of problems. Some of these problems have been matters of importance to the Marine Corps as an institution; others have been simply small nuisances considered bothersome to isolated groups of Marines. It is time to direct the mental energies of Marines toward finding truly workable doctrinal answers to the many questions inherent in fighting the MAGTF. The Corps has reached a culminating point; it is time to commit the reserve. FOOTNOTES 1While the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) embarked on board amphibious shipping during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it did not conduct an amphibious assault. See J. Robert Moskin, The Story of the U.S. Marine Corps (New York: Paddington Press, 1979), p. 595, hereafter Moskin. 2Moskin, pp. 598, 604, 611, 688-689; Caleb Barker, "Army, Marines Spar Over Roles in Future Third World Conflicts," Defense News 19Mar90, p. 30; Robert J. Ropelewski, "Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama Successes," Armed Forces Journal International. Feb90, pp. 26-32; Elizabeth P. Donovan, "By air or sea is question in Marine-Army role,"Navy Times. 26Mar90, pp. 25-26. 3HQ, USMC, Warfiqhtinq, FMFM 1 (Washington, 1989), Foreword; JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1987), p. 118, hereafter JCS Pub. 1. 4MCDEC, USMC, Guide to Doctrinal Publications. OH 0 (Quantico, 1986), pp. 2-2, 2-6, hereafter OH 0. 5MCDEC, USMC, Ground Combat Operations, OH 6- 1 (Quantico, 1988), p. 1-3, hereafter OH 6-1. 6MCDEC, USMC, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2 (Quantico, 1987), pp. 3-5, 6-6, hereafter OH 2. 7Ibid., pp. 3-3, 3-4; HQ, USMC, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine. FMFM 0-1 (Washington, 1979), p. 3-6. 8MCCDC, USMC, MAGTF Rear Area Security. OH 2-6 (Quantico, 1989), p. 1-1. 9Ibid., p. 1-2; OH 2, p. 5-15. 10Ibid.,p. 1-4;JCSPub. 1.p.91. 11Ibid, pp. 3-1 through 3-6. 12Ibid.,p. 1-3. 13Capt Richard Sharpe, RN, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships. 1989-1990 (Surrey, UK: Jane's Defence Data, 1989), pp. 740-748. 14OH 2, p. 2-8. 15Advanced Amphibious Study Group, HQ, USMC, Guidelines for Forming a Composite MAGTF (Washington, 1985), p. I-3; OH 2, p. 5-9. 16Ibid., p. XI-1. 17BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968" in U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review 1970 (Annapolis, 1970). p. 293. 18OH 2 p. 2-6. 19lbid. 20Ibid., p. 5-14. 21Figure based on 120 USMC students with an average of 14 years of service each; 3 USMC colonels (staff) with an average of 23 years of service each; 11 USMC lieutenant colonels (faculty/staff) with an average of 20 years of service each; 6 USMC majors (faculty/staff) with an average of 15 years of service each; 1 USMC captain (faculty) with 8 years of service. 22Figures based on a survey of all Marine Corps GAZETTE issues from Jan80 through Dec89. For purposes of this study, articles which addressed issues of concern to a MAGTF commander at MEB or MEF level were considered to be of substantive interest. BIBLIOGRAPHY PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS Advanced Amphibious Study Group. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Guidelines for Forming a Composite MAGTF. Washington, 1985. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine FMFM 0-1. Washington, 1979. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM 1. Washington, 1989. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub. 1. Washington, 1987. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. United States Marine Corps. MAGTF Rear Area Security, OH 2-6. Quantico, 1989. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine Corps. Ground Combat Operations. OH 6-1. Quontico, 1988. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine Corps. Guide to Doctrinal Publications OH 0. Quantico, 1986. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. United States Marine Corps. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. OH 2. Quantico, 1987. PUBLISHED BOOKS AND PERIODICALS Caleb Barker. "Army, Marines Spar Over Roles in Future Third World Conflicts." Defense News. 19Mar90, p. 30. Elizabeth P. Donovan. "By air or sea is question in Marine-Army role." Navy Times. 26Mar90, pp. 25-26. Marine Corps GAZETTE Jan80 through Dec89. J. Robert Moskin. The Story of the U.S. Marine Corns. New York: Paddington Press, 1979. Robert J. Ropelewski. "Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama Successes." Armed Forces Journal International. Feb90, pp. 26-32. Captain Richard Sharpe, RN, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships. 1989-1990. Surrey, UK: Jane's Defence Data, 1989. Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC. "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968." U.S. Naval Institute Naval Review 1970 p. 293.
