Airborne Electronic Warfare AUTHOR Major James R. Brubaker, USMC CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE I. Purpose: A dedicated airborne EW platform within the Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF commander of the future. II. Problem: Given the age of declining budgets, we in the Marine Corps must take a look at our future and anticipate our needs. We will have to justify our budget requests before Congress and must manage our acquisition programs more efficiently. In light of future cutbacks within the DOD, the Marine Corps will have to justify the requirement of such expensive aircraft as the EA-6B. III. Data: As we move into the 21st century, the need for an airborne EW platform is real. However, with peace breaking out all over, the impression held by many is that we in the military no longer require all the high priced weaponry in existence. Although the Soviet Union is now a lesser threat than it was several years ago, the Third World nations are becoming more and more a potential threat. The new weapons and electronic gadgetry on the market today and the ease by which these new weapons systems are acquired should make us even more concerned about the world we live in. The low intensity conflict of the future could potentially find us fighting the weaponry intended for a mid intensity conflict. We must maintain our military power as a deterrent against world aggression. In order to preserve our expensive aircraft, we need an airborne EW platform capable of dealing with the enemy threats into the next century. IV. Conclusion: We in the Marine Corps will be faced with some difficult decisions in the future. In the years ahead, we will be forced to make decisions that just a few years ago were not required. Given a set of circumstances and only a limited amount of funding, we will be required to make some tough decisions in regards to the purchase of weapon systems of the future. We cannot afford to be so narrow minded that we fail to procure airborne EW platforms capable of protecting our expensive aircraft of the future. V. Recommendations: The Navy/Marine Corps team has been together for many years now. In light of future defense cutbacks, it is now more important than ever that we stick together and act as a team. We in the Marine Corps should continue our partnership with the Navy in the procurement of expensive weapons systems such as airborne EW platforms. The astronomical cost of trying to develop our own airborne EW platform in this day and age is ridiculous. Even worse is the idea that we cannot afford an airborne EW platform capable of dealing with the threats of the future. AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. As the next century approaches, the requirement to have a dedicated airborne EW platform within the Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF commander. I. Current EW Situation A. Capabilities B. Budget Limitations C. Airborne EW Requirement II. Marine Concept of VSTOL/STOVL Fleet A. Commonality of Airframes B. Close to FEBA C. Responsive to CMDR III. Marine Air into the 21st Century A. Missions B. Requirement to Support Missions C. Ability to Support Missions IV. Potential Platforms A. EA-6B Prowler B. MV-22 Osprey C. H-60 Blackhawk D. UAV/RPV V. Summary/Conclusion Airborne Electronic Warfare The Marine Corps' current situation as it relates to Electronic Warfare is good. The EA-6B Prowler provides the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander an enormous capability. The EA-6B weapon system is capable of performing a wide variety of Electronic Warfare (EW) missions which can either be active or passive in nature. The limitations of the EA-6B lie in the fact that it is a single mission aircraft, capable of performing a limited type of mission. The overall position of the Marine Corps is, however, to have multi-mission aircraft in the future. With the budget cutbacks within the Department of Defense (DOD) that are forecasted for the next several years, we as military leaders must begin preparing for the future. We must preserve both the assets which currently exist and the programs of the future, and become more judicious in the way in which we buy these items for the DOD. One critical asset which will need to be updated within the next decade is the EA-6B Prowler, currently the Marine Corps' only airborne Electronic Warfare platform capable of passive surveillance of the battlefield. On one hand the MAGTF's airborne EW capabilities (the EA-6B) are a result of requirements articulated by the Fleet CINC's and developed into programs by CNO. Those programs are distinctly "blue" in character and tend to specifically support the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) force in high intensity, naval conflict and the employment of the CVBG in support of maritime strategy. On the other hand, our ground EW capabilities (Radio Battalion) are a result of requirements articulated by Force Commanders directly to the `Marine Corps' developmental organs (MCCDC/MCCRDC) and are distinctly green" in character. . .Clearly, existing USMC airborne and ground based EW capabilities, as distinct in character as they are, don't employ well together to facilitate the development/employment of operational strategies at the MAGTF level...These problems certainly involve the distinct lack of money and national resolve to pursue costly new weapons systems no matter how forcefully we may articulate "need." 1 As the next century approaches, the requirement to have a dedicated airborne EW platform within the Marine Corps is of vital importance to the MAGTF commander. The many varied missions which the Marine Corps may be called upon to perform and the uniqueness of the MAGTF make the EA-6B ideally suited to perform a myriad of missions. The ability to deploy such a formidable force which has both an air and a ground element makes the MAGTF unique. The missions to which a MAGTF could be assigned may require anything from a small security element up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) . Of course, the ability to tailor or task organize for a particular mission is not unique to the Marine Corps, but the assets from which the Commander has to choose are. The current platform which the Marine Corps uses to accomplish the EW mission is the EA-6B, but because of a reorganization of the Marine Corps it may not be available to the MAGTF commander in the 21st century. The Marine Corps is currently looking at having primarily Vertical Short Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) or Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft instead. Whether or not this comes to pass, we must start preparing for the future now if we are to keep our combat capability intact. The MAGTF master plan calls for a return to the Navy of all Marine EA-6B aircraft when and if another aircraft fitted with pallets/pods can assume the mission. The question to be answered is whether another suitable aircraft can fill the mission requirements of the Marine Corps as it relates to EW and, if so, whether it will be cost effective. The Marine Corps' desire to have an entire STOVL/VSTOL fleet into the 21st century will provide the Marine Corps with the mobility and support required on tomorrow's battlefield. "As we approach the year 2000, we hope to reduce the number of different aircraft type/model/series (TMS) in the Marine Corps' inventory. The goal is to decrease the number of people required to support our weapon systems and simultaneously increase mission effectiveness in terms of aircrew and aircraft performance." 2 By adopting the idea of a VSTOL fleet, the Marine Corps will be able to take advantage of the possibility that conventional airfields of today will become viable targets for priority destruction in conflicts in the future. We will no longer be linked to a long, highly visible target. Instead, we will be able to take advantage of roads and small landing zones which will not be as vulnerable as our airfields are today. By being able to land in a significantly smaller area which is less conspicuous than a major airfield, aircraft should be able to land closer to the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) . By doing so, they could conceivably have a shorter transit time from forward arming and refueling points (FARPS) and thus become more responsive to the MAGTF commander. The fact that the commander now has a force multiplier close at hand gives him the added flexibility of being in a position to more rapidly shape the battlefield to his advantage. The helicopter certainly fits in the category of being a VSTOL aircraft, as does the AV-8B Harrier. However, the other aircraft currently in the Marine Air Wing are not. Whether we will be able to perform our missions without their use is questionable. But what will be the missions of the Marine Corps in the 21st century? Will we need EW in order to conduct amphibious assaults? Will we be utilized in urban warfare where there may not be a need for an airborne EW platform? Who will electronically screen the battlefield to protect the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) before the Marines are disembarked? Who will protect the assault helicopters on their way to the landing zones? What about the air defense role? Just as there are offensive uses of an EW airplane, there are defensive uses as well. Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD), Surface Search Coordination (SSC) , and Electronic Support Measures (ESM) are all missions currently flown by the EA-6B Prowler. Therefore, as we approach the next century, the mission of Marine Corps EW will have to be redefined, or the Marine Corps will have to come up with another airframe which can perform the same missions. The Navy may have to assume responsibility for ASMD and SSC, but unless there is a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) near by, the ATF may have to perform these missions without the use of carrier based EW aircraft. But even with a CVBG in close proximity, the ATF may have to fend for itself because the carrier EW assets will be required to screen the CVBG and not the ATF. The CVBG may have an entirely different mission during the landing phase. ESM is a mission which allows the MAGTF commander to receive up-to-the-minute information on the enemy's electronic order of battle (EOB) primarily in the form of early warning and target acquisition radar sites which are in the MAGTF commander's area of interest. ESM is a mission performed by the EA-6B in a totally passive manner. Using the aircraft's on-board surveillance system, the information is recorded on magnetic tape. Within minutes of landing, the tape is processed by the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES) and can be incorporated into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield for the MAGTF commander by providing up to minute information of the EOB. The Navy will continue to use its EA-6Bs throughout the next decade to pursue the electromagnetic spectrum both actively and passively. In the 21st century the EA-6B will probably be replaced by a variant of the A-12, currently on the drawing board. But the Marine Corps is not scheduled to get the A-12, which creates a dilemma for the Marines. Due to other priorities, the Marines are not scheduled to receive the aircraft which will eventually replace the EA-6B because it is too expensive. In all likelihood the Marines will not be able to afford to develop an EW aircraft suited specifically for their mission. The cost of developing a unique airplane is prohibitive; therefore, we must get smarter in the way we procure aircraft. We must either use current airframes with their already existing systems or develop some new combination of aircraft/systems short of creating a new airframe just for EW. There are many possibilities. The best solution overall for the Marine Corps is to retain our ties with the Navy and follow on their coat tails in future enhancements to the EA-6B and any follow on type of aircraft. By doing so, we will continue to be on the leading edge of technology by maintaining our ties with our counterparts in the naval service and jointly come out with a quality product. The EW community in the Navy as a whole is very small when compared with other communities. We need each other's strength to continue to exist as a community in this age of high technology. The EA-6B Advanced Capability (ADVCAP) and the companion Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System Communications Workstation scheduled for FMF introduction in 1995 represents a tremendous C2 warfare capability. By eliminating it, we risk starting over the requirement to build a credible capability to wage C2 warfare that is available and funded in the Prowler. The costs involved in such a "start up" undertaking for the Marine Corps oriented toward bringing a C2 warfare capability to the FMF in a VSTOL/STOVL package replicating what will be available in the Prowler would be astronomical.3 One obvious advantage of retaining the EA-6B is that its onboard system has state of the art electronics which has been combat proven on numerous occasions. Its speed allows it to rapidly reposition itself in the fluid battlefield of today so that critical geometry requirements can be maintained and that repositioning, if required, can be accomplished in quick fashion. The cost of keeping the Marine Corps supplied with EA-6B advanced capabilities (ADVCAP) aircraft is a hard figure to pin down. According to sources at the Pentagon, the current FY-9O recurring flyaway cost of one Prowler without pods, based on 12 aircraft per year, is between $25-38 million per copy.4 If the Marine Corps elects to go their own way in the search for a new EW platform, then one possible solution is to utilize a variant of the MV-22 Osprey with an EW module which could be incorporated in the MV-22 airframe. But the future of the MV-22 is questionable at best, so it might not be a viable alternative. Secretary of Defense Cheney has cancelled funding for the MV-22 and the subject is now being looked at by Congress as to whether it constitutes re-instatement. The Marine Corps desperately needs a replacement for its aging fleet of H-46 medium lift helicopter. If in fact the MV-22 is the ultimate replacement, then a variant would certainly be worth looking into. The already existing ALQ-99 system developed for the EA-6B and EF-111 could potentially be modified to be utilized in the MV-22. The MV-22 has more than enough cabin space to allow the incorporation of the numerous boxes which make up the ALQ-99 system. The other advantage of the MV-22 is that it is capable of enough airspeed to allow operation of the ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming Pod which requires 220 knots to operate both transmitters contained within the pod. Bell/Boeing has done studies on the feasibility of modifying the MV-22 to an EW variant and have concluded that it would be feasible. Moreover, if the MV-22 is developed further, its VSTOL and multi-mission capabilities would make it the best aircraft for the Marine Corps. The MV-22 would have the speed and maneuverability to cover the majority of Marine Corps assets should it be selected as the ultimate replacement for the H-46; however, it would not be able to rapidly reposition itself if it was required in the support of fast attack aircraft, namely the F/A-18 or the AV-8B. The cost of the MV-22 is approximately $26 million per copy.5 Another suitable platform might be the H-60 Blackhawk. Granted, it is not in the Marine Corps inventory with the exception of HMX-l, but if we do not get the MV-22, then the Marine Corps may have to use the H-60 to replace the H-46 helicopters currently in use. In this case a currently existing platform could be utilized to be incorporated with an already existing EW computer system, the ALQ-99. There would have to be many things worked out in regards to compatibility and the marrying up of the two systems, but we would not have to develop an entirely new aircraft system. The Army has conducted studies as to the feasibility of integrating the ALQ-99 system into a UH-1H Airborne Radar Jammer (ARJ).6 The H-60 would obviously require some modifications to incorporate not only the onboard system, but the tactical jamming system as well. The major obstacle would be in generating sufficient electrical energy to operate the ALQ-99 pods without the use of ram air turbines capable of producing the amount of power required to utilize the integrated system. The H-60 option would limit or degrade the capability of the Marine Corps to conduct electronic countermeasures in support of fixed wing aviation because of the limited speed of the H-60 (approximately 180 knots). It would not be impossible, but it would require greater numbers of assets to accomplish the task. Again this option is viable only if the Marine Corps elects to use the H-60 as its replacement for the aging CH-46. Otherwise its cost is prohibitive. The off-the-shelf cost for a combat- capable H-60 is approximately $18 million per copy. Another option for an airborne EW platform is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV). The major advantage of the RPV is the relatively low cost and minimal radar cross section. Tactical aircraft have a survivability problem over the modern battlefield that will steadily worsen due to the growing capabilities of ground-based air defenses. . .It would be a cheap and thus expendable asset and would free manned EW systems to pursue more difficult tasks. Taking the "integrated" out of enemy air defenses is a SEAD option that can be and should be pursued in addition to physical destruction. The television camera or infrared package of the RPV would have to be replaced by some sort of EW system but yet is a much more financially affordable package than having to create a new fixed- wing variant. The RPV fits the category of a VSTOL aircraft and for a fraction of the cost of an EA-6B could possibly perform some limited EW functions for the MAGTF commander in his electronic surveillance and prosecution of the battlefield. There are a couple of disadvantages to the RPV. The first is its lack of speed which means it would have to be pre- positioned in the place of intended use. The second disadvantage is its lack or absence of a human element to rapidly adjust to changing situations in a wartime mode of operation. Because of the size of the RPV and its associated onboard package, it would obviously have to be placed closer to the systems it would be working against in order to have sufficient effort. But yet again its small radar cross section would make it harder to detect as well. As we move into the 21st century, the need for an airborne EW platform is real. Regardless of what we eventually wind up with, it will probably be what we can afford to pay the lowest bidder. The prices of the platforms discussed above have varying degrees of EW capability and obvious differences in cost. Should we go with the Prowler or go with another platform and incorporate our already existing technology into another platform? Or will we decide to incorporate a totally new EW package into an already existing platform? In the long run, I believe we are better off retaining our ties with the EA-6B Prowler. We cannot afford to let that capability go. The Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) of the future could potentially find us fighting against the weaponry intended for Mid Intensity Conflict (MIC). Colonel L. G. Karch summed this up well when he noted (Proceedings November l988) that "the most likely level of conflict will be LIC, but the most likely combat will be MIC." The fact that LIC will most likely occur in the Third World does not mean that MIC or even High Intensity Conflict (HIC) will not occur in the Third World. We must therefore prepare ourselves. Even with the stealth aircraft of the future and the projected use of low observables, the requirement for EW is real. The use of an EW platform is even more effective when used to protect low observables of the future. Any of the above platforms would require significant technological studies to determine the amount of modification necessary in order to make them suitable replacements. They all have limitations either in the form of speed, capabilities, endurance or the lack of a manned crew, etc.; but when faced with the need to develop an alternative to the EA-6B, some concessions must be made. The requirement to have an active and passive EW platform for the future is real. The MAGTF commander in the future should go to combat with the knowledge that he has the technology, weapons, and people he needs. He can decide, based on the situation at hand, not to employ all his assets, but he should not be limited as to what he could use if required. The MAGTF commander of the future will not be able to choose his war; it will be chosen for him. If the politicians fail in their quest for world peace, then it will be young soldiers, not politicians, that carry out military operations to defend U. S. interests. In this day of electronic gadgetry, we cannot afford to send our people to war without the tools to gain the advantage or survive the war. ENDNOTES l.LTCOL J. D. Buchanan, "The Winning Combat Edge" unpublished manuscript, 1989. 2.LTGEN Charles H. Pitman, "Aviation Posture Statement," Marine Corps Gazette, (July 1989), 58. 3.LTCOL J. D. Buchanan, "The Winning Combat Edge" unpublished manuscript, 1989. 4.LTCOL N. D. Schmidt, CNO/OP-501, interview about EA-6B, Washington, D. C. , March 1990. 5.COL Schaefer, NAVAIR PMA-275, briefing on V-22, Washington, D.C., February l99O. 6.ARJS, Airborne Radar Jamming System, (Electronic Warfare Marketing, Grumman Aerospace Corporation) 7.MAJ McCormick, CNO/OP-504F, phone conversation about H-60, Washington, D. C., March 1990. 8.COL L. G. Karch, "CAS, SEAD and UAVs", Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1990) 47,52. BIBLIOGRAPHY ARJS, Airborne Radar Jamming System. Grumman Aerospace Cooperation: Electronic Warfare Marketing. 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