Amphibious Assaults: Obligatory Or Obsolete? AUTHOR LCdr James J. Bird, USN CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS: OBLIGATORY OR OBSOLETE? THESIS: An austere defense budget climate will cause a re-examination of the necessity and feasibility of amphibious warfare. ISSUE: The role and future of amphibious warfare is marked by controversy. Historically this is not a new debate. There are a number of historical examples where individuals have forecasted the demise of amphibious operations due to technological changes. They were subsequently proven wrong. Recent trends point towards a greater reliance upon amphibious capability. Improvements in weapon systems and sensors have made amphibious assaults more difficult. Modern critics point out that the proliferation and lethality of precision guided munitions coupled with its vulnerability to satellite reconnaissance have made amphibious operations obsolete. The Navy and Marine corps have adopted the over-the-horizon concept in order to deal with the increased threat imposed by technological improvements. CONCLUSION: The need for an amphibious assault capability has not diminished. If anything, it has only increased in importance. An over-the-horizon assault capability significantly increases the ability to overcome the threat posed by precision guided munitions. It does not solve all of the problems and introduces some challenges of its own. The techniques, tactics, and equipment have to be further improved. It may not be a question of whether or not amphibious operations are still feasible but rather whether or not the United States can afford not to be able to conduct this uniquely flexible and decisive form of warfare. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS: OBLIGATORY OR OBSOLETE? OUTLINE Thesis Statement: An astere defense budget climate will cause a re-examination of the necessity and feasibility of amphibious warfare. 1. Historical Background A. Review of Gallipoli B. Statements following World War II C. Results of landing at Inchon D. Statements following Korean War E. British experience in the Falklands F. Current Congressional Reports 2. Necessity of an Amphibious Capability A. Development of national security concerns B. Force structure to support national security 1. Declining overseas bases 2. Reducion in forward troop deployment C. Amphibious forces provide necessary flexibility 3. Feasibility when facing a modern threat A. Review of precision guided munitions 1. Mines 2. Cruise missiles B. Limitations of current assault craft C. Limitations of current helicopters D. New and proposed equipment E. Advantages of an 0TH assault 4. Conclusion A. Budget restaints will force tough decisions B. Is there really any choice? AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS: OBLIGATORY OR OBSOLETE? The ability to strike at land from unexpected and/or advantageous direction gives a flexibility which is the greatest strategic asset that a maritime nation can posses'. Without it the utility of maritime power would seem considerably diminished. B.H. Liddell-Hart Discussion of the role and future of amphibious warfare is one marked by controversy. It has been recognized over and over again as being a form of warfare that offers great strategic and operational flexibility. Yet its feasibility is continuously debated. The arguments against it have historically been that the advent of more modern weapon systems and sensors have made it obsolete. The very same argument exists today. Current planners in both the U.S Navy and Marine Corps have proposed and invested in an over-the-horizon (0TH) assault capability in order to overcome the modern threat. The debate over the feasibility of amphibious warfare is not a new one. In light of the dismal British experience at Gallipoli, Capt. W.S. Pye in an article in the Naval Institutes Proceedings in 1926, observed: As a consequence of the greater effectiveness of weapons, modern ships, air scouting, and of radio communications, and of the increase in the size of armies and of the complexity and amount of their equipment, large (amphibious) operations are becoming increasingly difficult... The chances for success of an invasion by forces transported overseas are becoming smaller and smaller. The greater facility of movement of forces on shore by railroad and motors; the rapidity of communication; the increase in power of mobile artillery; the increased efficiency of the submarine and aircraft; and the increase in size and effectiveness of regular armies and navies, have made invasion by sea almost an impossibility, at least until bases near the scene of landing operations have been permanently secured, and command of the sea is permanently secured.(16:256) If a few phrases were deleted, and some more up to date terms such as: cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, satellites, and mines were inserted; then modern day critics would feel comfortable with the exact same argument against amphibious warfare today. Gallipoli is remembered by most as a British failure. Few people realize that the beach-heads were held from 25 April 1915 till August and that it was not a failure of the amphibious aspect of the campaign but rather the slow piecemeal introduction of follow on forces that allowed the enemy to reinforce and drive the British, French, and ANZAC forces off the peninsula. World War II has been considered the renaissance age of amphibious warfare. But, no sooner had it ended when experts such as Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Gen. Omar Bradley, and LtGen Roy S. Geiger, stated in effect that the advent of nuclear weapons would prevent the occurrence of large landings such as those at Normandy and Okinawa, and that they were obsolete. Several years later, Gen. MacArthur proved them all wrong with a classic textbook example of the utility and decisiveness of a large scale amphibious landing at Inchon. The scepticism continued, and in 1975, James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, stated: An amphibious assault force... has not seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for over 2O years, and... would have grave difficulties in accomplishing a mission of over-the-beach and flanking operations in a high threat environment. (16: 199) More telling, in 1966 the British defense minister declared that British armed forces would never again have to face another opposed land, and never again have to operate on their own.(2:429) Yet the summer of 1982 found the British Royal Navy and Royal Marine Commandoes successfully operating 8,000 miles from their home coast against a determined foe, equipped with modern weapons, in what closely resembled one of the many World War II pacific island campaigns. It should be noted however, that had the Argentinians waited an additional year prior to invading the Falklands then the British would have been much more restricted in their options. The scheduled decommissioning of her two major amphibious ships, "Fearless" and "Intrepid", as well as the scheduled sale of the aircraft carrier "Invincible", would have in effect left the British without a viable amphibious assault capability. An often repeated quote from the British in the Falkland Campaign was that, "We re-learned a lot of old lessons."(4:322) Prior to the War, the British Defense establishment was one that primarily focused on it's NATO role and had not paid much attention to responding to national interests outside of NATO. Before the Falklands War, the British Defense establishment viewed the amphibious warfare capability of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines as a collection of skills and expensive equipment of questionable utility and diminished priority.(13:5) The situation the British found themselves in April, May, and June of 1982 seems reminiscent of the period in 1944 prior to the cross channel invasion at Normandy when Winston Churchill was quoted, "the destinies of two great empires... seem to be tied up in some Goddamned things called LSTs." (1:283) In a report by the Congressional Budget Office titled "Moving the Marine Corps by Sea in the 1990's"; a section presenting arguments against maintaining an amphibious assault capability states: . . .the United States should not devote its scarce defense resources to maintaining the capability to conduct amphibious assaults because changes in technology have made assaults against defended beaches impossible to carry out successfully(12:6) The report is not one sided. It does present both sides of the issue but fails to answer any questions. Are amphibious assaults obsolete? Generalized statements of obsolescence can be dangerous. There is a tendency of attempting to make a black-and-white issue out of one that is not so easily categorized. Amphibious warfare should be assessed on the basis of military necessity and utility. If the concept proves desirable and necessary then the question of feasibility should be examined. The necessity of an amphibious assault capability has not diminished. If anything the importance of this capability as a means of conducting and winning wars has increased. Yet, in order to be successful it may have to emerge in an alternate form. Necessity of an Amphibious Capability The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to battle he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few. Sun Tzu The wisdom of the writings of Sun Tzu is timeless. Unfortunately the development of a clear, coherent national security strategy is not. The concept, design, acquisition, and introduction of modern weapon systems may take up to twenty years. The events occurring in a single week can have a profound impact on the basis of the employment and application of these systems. Unfortunately the focus of our national security concerns and defense budget appears to be more concerned with the headlines of the previous day's newspaper. No matter what the current world situation or national security threat; one can count on the fact that it is going to change. There are however, certain facts that will not change. The United States is a world power with a globally dependent economy. It is also a maritime nation with worldwide maritime interests. Accepting these global interests requires a national security strategy and policy that it is able to promote and protect them. What is not obvious is what type of armed forces is necessary in order to protect these interests? Given the current state of change in world affairs it would seem prudent to design a force structure that is flexible enough to respond to these changes and not one centered exclusively on a single threat or region. For many years it was argued that if you designed a force that was able to meet and beat opponent forces in a worst case scenario then it should follow that you would have sufficient capability to meet any reduced threat. This theory did not pan out with the American experience in Vietnam where an Army designed and trained to fight a Warsaw pact scenario was found initially, inadequate for the situation in Vietnam. How then to prepare for the near infinite possibilities of the employment of armed forces?; especially when one considers and plans for change? The future demands more flexible and mobile forces that are adequately trained and equipped to deal with any number of threats. The trend of reduced overseas bases and reduction in forward deployed troops only increases the need for forces that can be effectively employed without relying on foreign based facilities. Amphibious forces provide not only the strategic mobility that is somewhat independent of overseas bases but also offers a strategic flexibility that is difficult to match when comparing any other realistic options. The essential usefulness of the amphibious operation stems from its ability and flexibility, that is, the ability to concentrate balanced forces and to strike with a great strength at a selected point in the hostile defense system.(14:I-2) To strike at the most opportune time, the most opportune place, and to leave the enemy having to guess and defend everywhere along his coast. A good example of what an adversary would have to contend with is that an amphibious task force steaming 400 miles off an enemy's coast would be able to launch an amphibious assault against any point along more than 1,000 miles of coastline within 24 hours. (12:10) Given enough time and money any section of a coastline could be prepared strong enough to make it virtually impenetrable. The dilemma the defender faces is that he can not prepare everywhere, for if he does... FEASIBILITY The unresisting progress causes continual change in the weapons, and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting. Alfred Thayer Mahan It is easy to present arguments that espouse the unique advantages and flexibility that amphibious operations give the National Command Authority. The strategic flexibility it offers planners almost seems too good to be true. Strategically mobile forces that are self-sustaining and that can pick the time and place of battle would be any military theorist's ideal. Yet, any good plan must pass a test of feasibility, and herein lies the problem. The advent of relatively inexpensive, long range, and lethal precision guided munitions as well as satellite reconnaissance can pose unacceptable risks to the amphibious task force. In order to fully appreciate the threat that improved technology poses to the amphibious task force it is necessary to review the threat. Mines: Recent experience in the Persian Gulf region have highlighted the U.S Navy's shortcomings in its ability to effectively counter the threat from mines. Even if this capability were to be significantly strengthened so as to reduce the United States' reliance upon NATO assets to perform minesweeping operations there is still a problem with time. In order to effectively sweep an area clear of mines requires a significant amount of time. Current amphibious doctrine requires that the Amphibious Operation Area (AOA) be swept prior to the arrival of the task force. Depending upon the size of the area and the nature of the mines employed this could take up to several days to complete. It would be near impossible to conceal the location of the AOA if minesweepers and their protective escorts were operating off an enemy coastline for several days. Compounding the problem is the fact that the very threat of the presence of mines is almost as effective as their actual emplacement. As in most aspects of warfare the best way to neutralize a threat is to avoid it as much as possible. One of the key limitations of mines is that they can not be effectively employed in waters where the depth exceeds 100 fathoms. If the task force can conduct its operations outside the 100 fathom curve then the task force can avoid the threat. Ships transiting from this area closer to shore as well as landing craft and assault amphibian craft will then have to traverse through restricted swept channels, which can be swept much faster than having to clear the entire AOA. Another significant threat is the one posed by shallow water mines. Current clearance capability is also limited. Conventional underwater demolition and clearance performed by Navy SEAL teams is very manpower intensive, as well as time consuming. This is an acknowledged deficiency with no real proposed solution. It is interesting to note that in the previously mentioned report by the Congressional Budget Office; "Moving the Marine Corps by Sea in the 1990's", when discussing shallow water mines the report references press reports and not military sources. Almost every other section references military sources. There is ongoing research and development in new systems to overcome this shortfall but any future amphibious operations in the near term will have to rely upon traditional pre-assault intelligence gathering and underwater demolition operations. One factor that is oftentimes overlooked when reviewing the mine warfare threat is that nations that posses a significant coastline are normally economically dependent upon the seaways for their own trade and fishing industries. Mines can be effectively employed as a control measure to limit access but they can not be used everywhere. Precision Guided Munitions: Precision guided munitions are missiles and other weapon systems that are guided to their targets by radar, lasers, heat, or a video link between the weapon and its shooter.(12:6) The attack upon the USS Stark in May 1987, as well as the loss of the 3 British ships to Exocet missiles during the Falkands War in 1982 have raised many questions about a surface ship's ability to defend itself from this type of threat. Cruise missiles pose a particular problem because they can be launched from almost any type of platform. While cruise missiles can be launched from aircraft, submarines, ships and from land, the land launched version is the one that poses a unique threat to the amphibious planner. There are a number of various countries that manufacture and export them. The following table lists some of the major coastal defense systems that could be encountered: Click here to view image Note: The above table is by no means an all inclusive list. Versions of the older Soviet Samlet system are still held by a number of countries. The Chinese version of the Styx, known as the Silkworm has been exported to the Iranians, and as the Argentinians proved during the Falkland War that versions of cruise missiles designed to be launched from alternate platforms can be easily converted to a coastal defense mode. (9:27-29) The best defense against cruise missiles is to attack the firing platform first before he can get a shot at you. Amphibious doctrine presupposes that the task force will have local superiority of the sea and air. This means that cruise missile firing platforms will have to be neutralized prior to conducting the operation. This problem is exacerbated by land based air with long stand-off cruise missiles and mobile shore based launchers. During the amphibious operation ships are going to have to close the coast and would be within range of many of these systems. The fact that they can be easily concealed and are mobile makes them very difficult to locate and target. The assault landing craft and helicopters are also vulnerable to a number of very portable and effective precision guided munitions. Shoulder fired anti-armor, and anti-air weapons similar to United States' TOW and Stinger systems are now in the inventories of almost every nation that maintains armed forces. If properly emplaced and alerted that operations were about to commence, they could be very effective in opposing an amphibious landing. One of the many lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was that with the advent of improved modern weapon systems; if you could be seen you could be hit and if you were hit you would be killed. In order to overcome the threat imposed by precision guided munitions the Navy and Marine Corps have adopted the strategy of developing an over-the-horizon launch capability. Operating ships over the horizon reduces the enemy's ability to locate and target the ships as well as allowing the ships adequate time and space to utilize all defensive weapon systems to defend against the cruise missile threat. The concept of an over-horizon amphibious assault capability plans for the launch of high speed(40 knot+) LCACs and heliborne forces to their assigned objectives and to seize a beachhead. The capability to conduct a true amphibious assault does not currently exist. While LCACs are now operational, the actual number of craft is very limited. A capability to conduct amphibious raids and demonstrations over the horizon is viable with current equipment but the ability to conduct an 0TH assault, that is, a forcible entry against a defended beach is dependent upon the development and acquisition of additional systems. This would include the replacement of the aging fleet of assault helicopters with a more capable version that is better able to operate in today's high threat environment as well as a faster more capable assault amphibian vehicle (AAV). Programs for both improvements exist. The MV-22 Osprey helicopter is probably the most widely publicized, controversial weapons acquisition program in many years. It promises a quantum improvement in the capability of the helicopter but with the current defense budget climate it poses more of a question of affordability than of desirability. Nevertheless, the aging helicopters that are currently in the Navy-Marine Corps inventory are going to have to be replaced in order to maintain any semblance of an amphibious assault capability. Another limitation of the current amphibious 0TH assault capability is the assault amphibian vehicle (AAV). The slow speed and subsequent long transit times of the current design require ships to close to within several thousand yards of the beach. This places the ships within range of almost every direct and indirect weapon system at the defender's disposal. New programs such as the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) are under development and like the Osprey offer significant improvements in speed and range and thus survivability. Satellites: Amphibious warfare requires the rapid buildup of combat power faster than the defender can organize a counterattack of sufficient strength to repel the attacking forces. In order to achieve and maintain the momentum of the increasing buildup of combat power requires an element of surprise. The advent of satellite reconnaissance and other sophisticated information collection systems reduces the element of surprise. The counter-argument is that while many nations posses precision guided munitions, few have satellite technology. The information is also perishable in that even if a defender were to be provided with information of the location of the amphibious task force 24 hours prior to an assault it does solve his dilemma as to where along the coast an attack might occur.(12:8-10) Conclusion Amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have. General Douglas MacArthur Sweeping changes in Eastern Europe as well as an increased concern for domestic fiscal responsibility have promoted an open forum for debate concerning the size and composition of the United States Armed Forces. This is not the first time in our history that this has occurred and it will not be the last. After each draw-down of forces there have been fierce debates and in each case there have been many similar issues. The issue of the feasibility of amphibious warfare is one that seems to continuously repeat itself. Yet, in each of these situations there have been those that have argued vehemently for retaining this capability. The most glaring example is the well known formulation of tactics and techniques by the US Marine Corps during the 1920's that laid the foundation for future successes in World War II. Today we are in very much the same dilemma. During what has called an "unprecedented military buildup" during the 1980's the Navy and Marine Corps expended significant resources to revitalize our amphibious warfare capability. During the forthcoming era of reduced defense budgets there are going to be some tough decisions to be made. Realistically many programs and concepts currently under development are going to have be revisited. Amphibious warfare has been called the most complex of all military operations. Adoption of an over-the-horizon assault capability makes it even more complex. The complexity of the operation coupled with the inherent risk due the nature of the threat and the number of prerequisites for success makes it very risky. The over-the-horizon amphibious assault reduces many of the threats posed by improved weapon systems. It is a step in the right direction and there are still a number of further refinements in techniques, tactics,and equipment that are necessary. Conducting an amphibious assault against a well defended beach, defended by precision guided munitions and being continuously provided with real-time satellite reconnaissance is probably impossible. Just as an Allied cross channel invasion would have been 50 years ago at the most heavily defended positions along the French coast. The position the United States found itself during World War II was not whether or not amphibious operations were desirable but that they were absolutely necessary. As stated previously, recent trends in reduction of overseas bases and reduction of forward troop deployments point at needing more strategically flexible and mobile forces. 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