Amphibious Or Ambiguous? Is The Corps Caught In The Confluence? AUTHOR Major Alfred E. Burkhard Jr., USA CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS? IS THE CORPS CAUGHT IN THE CONFLUENCE? I. Purpose: To examine the dilemmas facing the Marine Air Ground Task Force concept. II. Problem: The implementation of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM-1 and to implement the MAGTF Master Plan. III. Data: A balance between peacetime and wartime organization begins the conceptual questioning. A function vice mission based structure causes a "mental distancing" among the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. While daily integration of efforts is the first step toward combined arms, the MAGTF is denied such integration until formation. While able to rapidly form a MAGTF, resources and skills will be tested. Command and control systems must be functional. Support systems must also be valid and functional. Finite resources in these two areas point to a need for the establishment of priorities. Equipment requirements will be subject to budgetary restrictions. "Peripheral" issues such as lift and multi- purpose capabilities give rise to further dilemmas. Can the equipment "get to the fight?" What will be the competition for multi-purpose systems? Training is and will continue to be the key to success for any military force. The integration of training is and will be the key to success in combined arms warfare. Yet, the MAGTF does not enjoy the opportunity to integrate the training efforts of its forces. The functional vice mission organization of the Marine Corps has its greatest impact in this arena. IV. Conclusion: The MAGTF concept is not flawed from its inception. Rather, a lack of clear mission focus and priority will hinder its implementation. AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS? IS THE CORPS CAUGHT IN A CONFLUENCE? OUTLINE Thesis Statement. The implementation of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM 1 and implement the MAGTF Master Plan. I. Introduction II. Thesis Development III. The current organization of the Marine Corps sets the stage for "mental distancing" and the conflict with the doctrine of combined arms warfare. A. Organization based upon function B. GCE/ACE/CSSE C. Master Plan IV. The MAGTF concept calls for the rapid formation of a force designed and capable of executing a myriad missions. A. Finite resources B. Command and control C. Support V. The equipment used by the MAGTF will be restricted by lift considerations and born of compromise. A. Procurement B. Equipment C. Lift D. Impact VI. Training the MAGTF will pose a number of significant challenges. A. Integrated effort B. GCE/ACE/CSSE C. How to train D. Priority VII. Conclusion AMPHIBIOUS OR AMBIGUOUS? IS THE CORPS CAUGHT IN THE CONFLUENCE? The purpose of this paper is not to "stir the pot" of interservice rivalry. There is little real argument concerning a need for the Marine Corps, as well as the other services, far into the future. Rather, the intent of this paper is two-fold: first, to examine the dilemmas facing the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept; and second, to provoke a questioning process in the mind of the reader concerning the focus of the Marine Corps of the future. In order to accomplish the intent, this paper will address four areas that impact upon the MAGTF; current organization, formation, equipment, and training. The United States Marine Corps currently suffers from an identity crisis. No longer comfortable with its amphibious role alone, the Marine Corps has adopted the MAGTF concept to disguise this crisis. The recently published FMFM-1, Warfighting, is now the doctrine for the conduct of war by the Marine Corps. The MAGTF is the vehicle for the execution of this doctrine. The MAGTF Master Plan, 1990- 2010 provides the long range focus for the Marine Corps as it moves into the future. Both the doctrine and the long range focus of the Marine Corps are sound and well thought through. Sadly, it is the MAGTF concept that is caught between the two. The implementation of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM-1 and to implement the Master Plan. To begin the examination of the MAGTF concept it is necessary to look at the basic organization of the Marine Corps. Companies through Divisions exist, but it is not this aspect of the organization that requires scrutiny. Rather, it is the organization of the Marine Corps into four elements; command (CE), ground combat (GCE), air combat (ACE), and combat service support (CSSE), that sets the stage for something less than a combined arms environment. This division of elements into functional areas begins the "mental distancing" that will occur between or among elements that do not enjoy a close daily integration of efforts. The introduction of the MAGTF concept does not change this division of units, but rather attempts to downplay this critical area of concern. Further compounding this concern is the stated intent to be able to form a MAGTF at any level, depending on the situation. FMFM-1 addresses clearly the essence of combined arms warfare: In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counter-act one, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma--a no-win situation. (7:75) It would follow that "to the greatest extent practicable, Fleet Marine Forces must be organized for warfighting and then adapted to peacetime rather than vice versa." (7:42-43) Yet, the daily existence of the assets required to prosecute a combined arms effort against an enemy is missing. The GCE contains the direct and indirect fire and maneuver systems. Infantry, armor and artillery belong to the GCE commander. They are his from day to day with an established chain of command. The ACE owns and is responsible for the aviation and air defense systems. The CSSE owns and is responsible for the combat support and combat service support personnel and equipment. Within each of these three elements, the working relationships and standard operating procedures differ and are based upon the functions each is to perform. The result is an organization of elements that does not support combined arms warfighting, but rather peacetime operations. The Master Plan calls for the ability of the MAGTF to perform a myriad missions. As each element exists "in its own world," until such time as the MAGTF is formed, the daily interaction of elements is strictly controlled by established procedures. The command element of the MAGTF must be capable of pulling the collective efforts of diverse units together. The command element must eliminate the "mental distancing" that exists between elements. It will be a challenge to change the mind set of the elements in the MAGTF from "function" to "mission." The success of the MAGTF will depend on the ability to focus the functional efforts of many into a common mission focus. The MAGTF concept calls for the rapid design of a force commensurate with an assigned mission. The impact of this ability to organize at any level will be felt across the board. The areas of resources, command and control, and support require comment. Again, FMFM-1 and the Master Plan place the MAGTF concept in an unenviable position. As resources are finite, and each of the elements (GCE, ACE, CSSE) serve as the resource pool from which the MAGTF will be drawn, the resources required by both doctrine and mission may be in great demand and therefore not available. Conflicting priorities may preclude the rapid or complete formation of the MAGTF. To use the GCE as an example, the same marines perform all three types of infantry combat-light, airmobile, and mechanized. If needed for one type of mission, they are unavailable for others. The issue of availability will be key to the rapid formation of one or more MAGTFs. When drawing from the four elements for forces, the issue of unit integrity must be addressed, as this will be the heart of command and control. The command and control of each element within the MAGTF goes beyond mere communications. Command and control denotes not only personnel and equipment, but the systems that support the integrated efforts required of the MAGTF. The collection of command and control systems must come together at the operating level of the MAGTF. The command element of the MAGTF feels the pinch at this point. The diversity and intricacy of systems familiar to the various elements may be foreign to the MAGTF command element. Using the ACE as an example, The Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) deserves discussion as it pertains to the mission of the MAGTF. Necessary for the ACE to execute its functions, the MACCS is, nevertheless, heavily dependent upon communications and coordination. (4:46-47) The challenge is to operate all the command and control centers in support of the MAGTF mission. The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), Anti Air Operations Center (AAOC), and Direct Air Support Center (DASC) functions must be performed. Skill, training, and equipment will be required to operate all these centers. The command and control requirements are extensive and must be integrated with the other elements of the MAGTF. At what level or levels can the ACE rapidly task organize, equip, and deploy its assets? Are the command and control centers flexible enough to cover the mission spectrum? What is the level of training and equipment on hand to facilitate unit integrity in support of the MAGTF? Can unit integrity be ignored without a loss of command and control? The specialization of functions within CSSE units points to the need for unit integrity or command and control elements capable of integration into the MAGTF effort. While FMFRP 1-11, 1990 may address the Brigade Service Support Group Command Element (Nucleus) (3:6-5), it does so with the admission of contingency planning capabilities in light of finite resources. These finite resources point to the possible limitations encountered when forming a MAGTF as a result of varied and possibly conflicting missions and priorities. Finite resources, command and control, and support within a newly formed MAGTF point to a shortfall. What is to be the focus of effort? FMFM -1 calls for a combined arms approach to war and the Master Plan calls for a wide spectrum of mission capabilities. The MAGTF concept must meet the demands of both. The rapid formation of the MAGTF is merely the first step. The integrated efforts required for success must be present if success is to be achieved. Thus far, the discussion has centered around what might be called "conceptual" issues. Some might say they are about as easy to grasp as a hand-full of jello, but they none-the-less deserved attention. Look now at the issue of equipment and its impact on the MAGTF concept. The equipment is "real"- you can put your hands it. But the issue is not the equipment itself as much as it is the manner in which equipment is procured. The procurement system can easily be described as cumbersome and involved. To describe it in detail is beyond that required for this discussion. In summary, equipment is procured after a need has been recognized and funding approved. That need is the result of a review of the threat faced and the design of force capabilities needed to counter the threat. The force capability is a combination of manpower and equipment. While manpower is a critical aspect that cannot be ignored, the equipment aspect of force capability will now be the point of discussion. The Marine Corps faces the same equipment obsolescence problems enjoyed by the other services. Unique to the Marine Corps, however, is its inclusion in the Department of the Navy. (1:10) The result is a Marine Corps budget that is a subset of that of the Navy. Additionally, the Marine Corps enjoys the requirement to work with the Army concerning the development of doctrine and equipment common to both services as it pertains to common functions. (1:11) This situation causes the Marine Corps, and ultimately, the MAGTF, to have equipment that is unique to the Corps as well as common to other services. The M-1 main battle tank, the A-6 Intruder, and the F/A-18 Hornet are three examples of equipment common to multiple services. These are weapon systems born of comprise. The tank and the two aircraft are chosen for discussion for they highlight the restrictions the MAGTF will encounter as the doctrine in FMFM-1 and the focus of the Master Plan are examined. The M-1 tank has been adopted as this nation's main battle tank. The M-1 offers mobility, firepower, and survivability against an increased armor threat on the modern battlefield. The MAGTF will enjoy the advantages of the M-1 while at the same time suffering from questions of supportability. The issue of strategic and tactical lift must be addressed. Size, weight, and fuel consumption are of vital concern. Additionally, the quantity and doctrinal employment of armor within the force pose significant concerns. The Master Plan calls for the ability to fight in a mechanized environment and the doctrine for such warfare exists. However, the issue may be "what can we get to the fight?", not "what do we need for the fight?" Primary considerations are strategic and tactical lift-the Marine Corps' reliance on Navy shipping for strategic mobility and on helicopters and vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft for tactical mobility from ship to shore and during operations ashore. (7:52) The plan to replace the aging A-6 Intruder with the F/A-18 Hornet is another example of equipment compromise that may hinder the MAGTF. The replacement of a strike aircraft with an aircraft capable of multiple roles should be viewed with concern. The concern should not stem from the ability of the aircraft to perform multiple types of missions, but rather from the budgetary restrictions that force the adoption of such equipment. The passing of the "Reagan years" marks the end of the military spending spree that all services enjoyed. Commonality of purpose/function has become a critical aspect of systems procurement. This in turn drives an examination of need and the prioritization of missions. As the replacement of the A-6 Intruder with the F/A-18 Hornet will likely not be on a one-for-one basis, the competition for resources will, again, be an issue. Carrier based, fighter capable, and common to both the Navy and the Marine Corps, the F/A-18 Hornet will be a system in demand. The M-1 and the F/A-18 both meet the needs of the MAGTF. Both allow the MAGTF to meet the doctrinal imperatives of FMFM-1. Both provide capabilities that support the needs outlined in the Master Plan. Yet, both are systems that fall victim to the "peripheral" issues that plague the MAGTF concept. Lift, both strategic and tactical, and multi-purpose capability have a hidden impact. Available dollars limit the procurement process. Available equipment will limit the capabilities of the MAGTF. The MAGTF concept cannot serve two masters given the reality of the procurement process. Prioritization of focus must be addressed. Not withstanding problems in organization, formation, and equipment, the most disconcerting aspect of the MAGTF concept is that of training. The training that is so critical to mission success is the training that must occur for planners, combatants, and support personnel alike. Given the wide spectrum of missions addressed in the Master Plan and the sense of urgency depicted by FMFM-1: During times of peace the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. As the nation's rapid deployment force, the Marine Corps must maintain itself ready for immediate employment in any clime and place and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level if training, flexi- bility in organization and equipment, qualified professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine. (7:41) the MAGTF will certainly have a "full plate." It is at this point the MAGTF concept suffers its greatest short- fall. Who, what, when, where, how and why will this training take place? While task organization, command and control, equipment, and support structure questions may all be answered with the formation of a MAGTF, the most critical issue has been overlooked. The ability to quickly form and deploy a MAGTF falls far short in ensuring mission success. The forces that comprise the MAGTF will be drawn from the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. With the possible exception of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MFU) deployed or afloat for an extensive period of time, the MAGTF will suffer from a lack of unity in effort as a result of a lack of integration in training. The GCE, ACE, and CSSE are placed in a quandary. Each must maintain proficiency in their respective areas yet provide The MAGTF with forces capable of operating across a wide spectrum of missions at various force levels while at all times adhering to doctrine. The GCE must be prepared for operations in three basic modes; light, airmobile, and mechanized, or a combination of all three. Each of these is demanding and require a considerable degree of skill and training. When examined in the context of some of the mission capabilities listed in the Master Plan; counter-terrorism, non-combatant evacuation operations, hostage rescue, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics, (5:5-4,6) the training "challenge" is apparent. The challenge is particularly demanding for the planners and leaders. What is the priority? At what level should this training occur. Is training integrated (combined arms) or independent? How will resources be allocated? What resources exist? The ACE is tasked with performing the six functions of of Marine aviation; air recce, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. (4:6-8) As a resource element from which the MAGTF will draw, the ACE also enjoys the training "challenge." Are the training requirements for Marine aviation so specialized that training cannot be integrated? Can the focus of combined arms warfare be met if the training is not integrated? The CSSE is not immune to the problem. It is charged with the combat service support of the MAGTF. As its functions are varied, so must be its training. The dilemma facing the MAGTF at this point is that of "how to train". Training programs should reflect practical, challenging and progressive goals beginning with individual and small unit skills and culminating in a fully combined arms MAGTF (7:47) At first glance, this approach to training would seem to be valid. However, the resources required for training are finite. To say that training should be practical, challenging and progressive is not enough. There must be a focus for training-there must be a mission. To be prepared to fight anywhere in any climate is a tall order to handle when planning training. Each of the elements (CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE) are blessed with an abundance of manuals and operational handbooks. Commanders at various levels are provided with guides and references that cover the planning spectrum in preparation for mission accomplishment. Yet, there does not exist a "capstone manual" on the subject of training within the MAGTF concept. Without such a thought process for training, the various references available tend to focus the forces involved on the functions to be performed, not the training of units destined to fight in a combined arms environment. If "Training is the key to combat effectiveness and therefore the focus of a peacetime military" (7:46) and the maximization of combat power rests in the best use of available resources (7:75) then the MAGTF must have the opportunity to train as it will fight. FMFM-1 provides the doctrine for the conduct of combined arms warfare and the Master Plan lists the capabilities that the MAGTF must possess and train toward. Yet, OH-2 The Marine Air Ground Task Force manual, the source document for the MAGTF concept, provides only one paragraph to address training. Missing in the development of the MAGTF concept is a Mission Essential Task List (METL) (2:2-1) or a prioritization of training effort based upon missions and limited resources. The MAGTF concept is caught in the void of focus and priority. The questions of who?, what?, when?, how?, and why? are not answered. Without the guidance needed to answer these questions, the training cannot be expected to support the combined arms approach to war. Without an established priority of effort, there can be no guidance concerning the use of valuable training resources. The issues addressed have covered four areas of concern when examining the MAGTF and the MAGTF concept. Each has an impact on the "vehicle" to be used by the Marine Corps as it moves into the future. The concept is not flawed from inception, but rather a victim of the clash between an emerging doctrine and the desire to perform a myriad wide ranging missions. A balance between organization for war vice organization during peacetime begins the conceptual questioning. A function based vice mission based structure causes a "mental distancing." Daily integration of all efforts begins the combined arms approach to war, yet this is denied the MAGTF by virtue of current organization and structure. Rapid formation of a MAGTF to "meet the need" is not impossible. But the mere task organization of a force for a mission fails to address the resources and skills required for success. Resources are finite and competition will occur. Command and control is a resource intensive, skill dependent aspect of any task organized force. The integration of different systems for command and control will not be with- out difficulty. Supporting a rapidly formed organization for a myriad possible missions is not a task to be taken lightly. The reality of equipment on hand vice equipment required must be addressed. Strategic and tactical lift capabilities may limit the MAGTF to a far greater degree than anticipated. The adoption of multi-purpose/role systems is indicative of shrinking resources and the competition for these systems that is sure to follow. The ability to organize, equip, and deploy rapidly is for naught if the force has not been properly trained. This training must include the planners, leaders, combatants, and support personnel alike. Without training, the success of the mission will hinge on luck or the incompetence of the opponent. Neither of these variables can be relied upon to guarantee success. The doctrine and a plan for movement into the future both exist, yet there is a shortfall. The implementation of the MAGTF concept must undergo severe scrutiny and requires a prioritization of mission focus if it is to be the vehicle used by the Marine Corps to comply with the doctrine set forth in FMFM-1 and implement the MAGTF Master Plan.
