Marine Corps Doctrine: Can The Ace Support It? CSC 1990 SUBJECT AREA Aviation Author Major Lawrence W. Astyk, USMC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE: CAN THE ACE SUPPORT IT? THESIS: Marine aviation must adapt to the current Marine Corps doctrine of warfare by maneuver. The secret to this adaption is real integrated training with the other elements of a MAGTF. BACKGROUND: Marine aviation may be facing its greatest challenge since its inception. It is undergoing a major doctrinal change as far as its employment as part of the Marine air ground team, while at the same time it is potentially facing the largest cuts in its budget and force structure since the Korean War. The issue at hand is whether or not Marine air can support current Marine doctrine and what will be its role in this new doctrine. Some people feel that the complexibility of maneuver warfare will overcome the ability to coordinate the air effort. Some other people also believe that we don't have the equipment required to support such operations, expecially during a time when the budget will continue to shrink. RECOMMENDATIONS: Marine aviation must increase its integrated training with the other elements of the MAGTF if it is to adapt to maneuver warfare. This is especially true at the MEB and MEF level. CONCLUSIONS: The mission of Marine aviation and its six functional areas will hold it in good stead in supporting its ability to conduct warfare by maneuver. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE: CAN THE ACE SUPPORT IT? Thesis: The Marine Corps is undergoing doctrinal changes that effect it from the way it trains to the way it fights. Marine aviation must enhance its integrated training if it is to adapt a doctrine of warfare by maneuver. I. Roles and requirements A. Mission B. Functions II. Supportability A. Fixed-Wing B. Rotary-Wing C. Control of Aircraft and Missiles III. Restrictions A. Budget B. Mindset IV. Solution A. Integrated training Marine Corps Doctrine: Can The Ace Support It? The mission for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander is to employ his Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), with the purpose of reestablishing pre-conflict boarders of an allied North African country. The threat in the MEF's area of responsibility (AOR) consist of two mechanized rifle brigades and one mechanized armored brigade. These ground forces are being supported by a large tactical air force that has a limited capability to conduct night operations. The enemy has pushed itself deep into our allied country's boarders and has established defensive positions. After analyzing the situation, the MAGTF commander and his staff have determined that the enemy's strength lies in his mobility and firepower of his large ground force, along with his potential air power. The enemy's weaknesses are his long lines of communications and his limited ability to project air power during nighttime operations. The MAGTF commander's intent is to shape the battlefield through maneuver warfare. This will allow him to isolate and fix individual enemy elements thus reducing their ability to provide mutual support with their superior mechanized and armored capabilities. The enemy's capability to conduct both offensive and defensive operations must be reduced significantly before the MAGTF commander can commit his ground combat element (GCE) in a major engagement. The MAGTF commander realizes that at this time the enemy has superior tactical mobility on the ground. To counter this advantage of the enemy, the MAGTF commander decides that in phase one of his concept of operations that the air combat element (ACE) will be the focus of effort. The ace is given a mission order designating itself as a maneuver element and the focus of effort of the MEF in phase I. The ace and his staff now start the planning process necessary to accomplish the mission they have been given by the MAGTF commander. The Marine Corps is undergoing doctrinal changes that effect it from the way it trains to the way it fights. A major issue often discussed during this period of change is whether or not Marine aviation can support Marine Corps doctrine, which is today based on warfare by maneuver. One must fully understand Marine aviation as it is today before one can determine or suggest changes to it for future use. The primary mission of Marine Corps aviation is to participate as the supporting air component of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (5:5) Marine Corps aviation is organized, trained, and equipped as a completely expeditionary air arm. This expeditionary aspect sets Marine Corps aviation apart from other aviation organizations. Marine Corps doctrine envisions that Marine Corps aviation will support the landing forces throughout an assault landing and subsequent operations. Marine Corps aviation must be prepared to provide this support by operating tactical aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air groups or from airfields within striking distance of an amphibious objective area. It must be prepared to operate, after rapid establishment ashore, from minimal airfields within the objective area during the assault phase of an amphibious operation. Plans should provide for early seizure of bases for operating aircraft and sites for landing force early warning and air control facilities. As soon as possible, additional Marine Corps air units should be deployed into those airfields within, or contiguous to, the objective area. Marine Corps aircraft operating from such facilities will be utilized through the Marine air Command and Control System (MACCS) to fulfill an increasing amount of the total air support requirements. The Marine Corps has developed an effective aviation combat arm capable of meeting all requirements of a landing force. These requirements call for a flexible, responsive aviation combat element specifically tailored to meet the anticipated tactical situation. Air component tasks include seeking out and destroying enemy forces and supporting installations, gaining and maintaining air superiority, preventing movement of enemy forces along routes of communication and to provide direct air support to the ground combat element. Over the years the different tasks required of Marine aviation have been divided into six functional areas. The six functions consist of air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare and control of aircraft and missiles. A brief description of the individual functions will lay down the ground work for how Marine aviation is structured as we stand today. Air reconnaissance is the acquisition of intelligence information employing visual observation and/or sensors in air vehicles. These capabilities include the employment of photographic, electronic and visual reconnaissance/surveillance. Included in the visual category is the use of aircraft to provide tactical air observers, artillery and naval gunfire spotters, and ground unit personnel conducting visual battlefield surveillance. Antiair warfare is that action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, and destruction of the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. assault support are those actions required for the airlift of personnel, supplies, and equipment into or within the battle area by helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. Vertical assault airlift is the use of assault aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistic support required by ground combat elements. Air delivery is the use of fixed wing tactical transports to move high priority cargo and personnel within the immediate area of operations. Inflight refueling and air evacuation also come under assault support. Offensive air support (OAS) are those air operations that deliver firepower against enemy ground forces for the destruction or neutralization of installations, equipment and personnel. OAS missions are classified according to the degree of coordination required with ground elements. Close air support (CAS) are air actions against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Deep air support (DAS) are air actions at such distances from friendly units as to require no coordination with the fire and movement of those units. The term DOS connotes delivery of firepower beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Electronic Warfare (EW) are military actions involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. EW includes identification and location of electromagnetic energy, electronic jamming and electronic deception. Control of aircraft and missiles is a synthesis of a multitude of tasks which integrates the other five functions of Marine aviation and allows them to be conducted simultaneously. It also provides the command and control interface with the other elements of the MAGTF. Now that we have determined the mission and functions of Marine aviation, let's look at the status of the equipment presently in the Marine Corps to support those requirements. We will divide our equipment into five categories, fixed-wing aviation, rotary-wing aviation, reserve aviation, Marine air Command and Control Systems and ground-based air defense. Under fixed-wing aviation we will start with AV-8B Harrier. The "B" version of the Harrier ensures a state of the art aircraft for our light attack community into the 21st century. We will have an all AV-8B light attack active force by 1992. Besides the tremendous flexibility the Harrier provides with its vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) capabilities the Marine Corps now has its first operational night attack capable Harrier Squadron. This capability along with its ability to operate off our amphibious assault ships will insure that the MAGTF commander has that required fire support necessary throughout every phase of the operation. The present multiyear procurement contract--24 aircraft per year for 3 years--will bring our total procurement to 276 aircraft. (3:59) The F/A-l8 Hornet is another fixed wing aircraft that the Marine Corps is still procuring. The Hornet is an excellent multi-mission, force multiplier aircraft that fulfills both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The Marine Corps now has 12 single seat operational squadrons in the active force and is in the process of standing up its first two seat night attack Hornet squadron. The plan is to procure 4 to 6 squadrons worth of the F/A-l8D variant to conduct night attack, reconnaissance, tactical air coordinator airborne (TACA), forward air controller airborne (FACA), and all the other air-to-air and air-to-ground missions that the aircraft is capable of performing. The Marine Corps all weather bomber, the A-6E Intruder, is being phased out and being replaced by the F/A-1BD. This transition is due to be completed between 1992 and 1994 depending on the Navy's requirement for the aircraft. With the loss of the Intruder, the corps will lose its only all weather close air support aircraft. The plan right now is to upgrade the radar in the F/A-18D to give it a radar beacon forward air controller (RABFAC) capability similar to the A-6E. The EA-6B is the fixed-winged platform used in Marine aviation to conduct electronic warfare. It is used to detect, locate, classify, record, and jam electronic radiations. The Prowler's primary mission is to support strike aircraft and ground troops by suppressing enemy electronic activity and to obtain tactical electronic intelligence. Marine Corps EA-6B's are scheduled to receive further enhancements that will allow it to retain its title as the worlds premier electronic warfare platform well into the 21st century. The RF-4B is currently utilized to conduct multisensor reconnaissance. Its capabilities include forward and down-looking cameras, including a panoramic model with moving lens filaments for horizon-to-horizon pictures, along with side-looking radar and an infrared sensor and recorder. The RF-4B is presently being replaced by the F/A-1BD. The F/A-18D will be equipped with an all-weather, electro-optic/infrared imagery system with the capability for near real-time data link of the information to a ground station. (3:23) The OV-10 Bronco is a two place, twin engine aircraft whose primary mission is observation and reconnaissance. It also serves as a vehicle for artillery or naval gunfire spotters and air controllers. The OV-1OD is able to conduct these missions during both day and night utilizing its infrared observation system. This system is capable of designating for laser capable munitions. Some alternate missions for the OV-1O include helicopter escort, close in fire support and a paradrop capability of both troops and cargo. The OV-1O is currently undergoing upgrades to extend its service life into the 21st century. The KC-13O is a four-engine, turboprop assault aerial refueler and transport aircraft. Its primary mission is tactical aerial refueling. Some alternate missions include, air delivery of cargo and troops, providing a rapid refueling capability for both helos and AV-8B's at a forward arming and refueling point (FARP), and delivering flares for target illumination. By installing a UYQ-3A van the KC-13O can act as a direct air support center airborne (DASC(A)). Its ability to operate out of short unimproved airfields day or night make it a tremendous intratheater asset. Rotary-wing aviation in the Marine Corps consist of four helicopters. These four helicopters are the UH-1, AH-1, CH-46 and CH-53. The UH-1N, provides the necessary utility support to the landing force. The Huey provides an airborne command and control platform when the AN/ASC-26 communications package is installed. The UH-1N is also capable of providing armed escort, CIFS, MEDEVAC and troop transport. The Marine Corps' attack helo is the AH-1 Cobra. The Cobra provides armed escort, landing zone (LZ) fire suppression, CIFS, destruction of enemy armor and defense against enemy attack helicopters. All AH-1 helos will be of the AH-1W variant in the near future. The ongoing modification program that converts AH-1Ts to AH-1Ws and our previous procurement of 78 aircraft will bring our active force total to 115 aircraft. (3:59) The medium assault aircraft for Marine aviation is the CH-46. The mission of the CH-46 is to provide assault transport of combat troops, supplies and equipment. Troop assault is the primary function of the CH-46. The CH-46 is an old aircraft approaching the end of its service life. The Marine Corps was planning to replace the CH-46 with the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. Due to budgetary constraints the replacement of the CH-46 may be a CH-53/UH-60 mixture. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is assessing how this mixture and other options can alleviate our medium assault support shortfall. The Marine Corps' heavy-lift helicopter is the CH-53. Its primary mission is to provide assault helicopter transport of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies. A secondary mission is the movement of combat troops. The latest version of this helicopter, the CH-53E, will be able to lift 93 percent of all division equipment. This capability to carry a 16 ton external load gives the ground commander the operational flexibility he needs to reposition artillery and light armored vehicles (LAVs). The CH-53E can carry up to 55 combat troops. Procurement planned through FY 90 will bring a total of 125 aircraft operating well into the 21st century. Marine Reserve aviation exists to augment and reinforce the active aviation forces in the event of mobilization and to serve as the nucleus of a fourth Marine aircraft Wing. (3:58). We are in the process of replacing our reserve F-4 squadrons with F/A-18s, and continue to receive new KC-13OTs for our reserve KC-13O squadrons. The goal for our Reserve aircraft is commonality with our active forces. Due to budget constraints this goal will not be achieved as quickly as we had anticipated. The Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MATCALS) is a tactical air traffic control program designed to replace the precision/surveillance radars and operating shelters of the Marine air traffic control squadrons. The first of l7 systems was delivered to the Fleet in 1986 and initial operational capability is scheduled for 1990. (3:60) The Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM) is a transportable, modularized, software-intensive, automated air command and control system. It is taking the place of the bulky Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC). The TAOM is capable of controlling and coordinating the employment of a full range of air defense weapons, interceptors and surface-to-air missiles in support of the MAGTF. Ground-based air defense is provided to the Fleet by the HAWK and the Stinger antiair missile systems. These two systems provide a balance of close-in and medium-range firepower for all levels of the MAGTF composition. The ultimate goal is three active Hawk battalions of two "square" batteries each. After analyzing the mission, functions and supportability of Marine aviation, one more area needs to be looked at before any serious recommendations relating to maneuver warfare can be made. That area of concern is the influence of present and future budgeting restraints relating to Marine aviation. Today the six functions of Marine aviation are very supportable with assets already in the inventory. On the whole, Marine aviation is standing in good stead looking forward to the 21st century. The most serious area of concern relating to the ability of Marine aviation to conduct maneuver warfare lies in our rotary-wing capability. Two specific problems arise in this area. The first is the aging of our medium lift aircraft, the CH-46. This airframe has to be replaced before the 21st century or Marine aviation will be critically restricted in its ability to conduct maneuver warfare or any other type of warfare. The second area of concern is the ability of our helicopter community to conduct tactical night operations. Our helicopter cockpits were designed 20-30 years ago and they still lack heads-up-displays and navigation aids required to make up a full night capable system. Cancellation of the MV-22 Ospry hurt the Corps' plans to upgrade cockpit aids for pilots (1:11). "What you need for all these helicopters, if they're going to survive in a night tactical environment, is a precise navigation system, a FLIR, and a night vision capability all in one," said Lt. Gen. Charles H. Pitman, head of Marine Corps aviation, in an interview with armed Forces Journal International last August. Marine aviation can conduct night assault operations at this time, but its ability to perform this function is reduced due to the workload being so high on the aircrews flying our present day helicopters. Even with present and future budgetary restraints, I think it is quite obvious that Marine aviation has the ability to adapt to the concept of maneuver warfare without changing its mission or functional areas. There are two matters that have to be considered though when addressing the concern of Marine aviation adapting to maneuver warfare. The first matter is that of the mindset of the Marine Corps as a whole relating to maneuver warfare. For the Ace to partake in maneuver warfare and act as a maneuver element two things need to be accomplished. The first thing is that the maneuver warfare concept must be adopted by the MAGTF commander and his three subordinate supporting element commanders. This step can be considered as being implemented at every MAGTF throughout the Corps. The second part of this mindset must be the requirement to increase the exposure between the different elements of the MAGTF. There has to be a continuing effort by every Marine to learn as much as he can as to how the other elements in the MAGTF can and cannot perform their missions. This leads us to the concern of whether or not the Ace can support maneuver warfare. To conduct maneuver warfare the MAGTF commander is going to have to ensure that his element commanders and himself know the capabilities and limitations of each element in its ability to accomplish the mission. There is only one way to achieve this level of expertise and that is through integrated training. Maneuver warfare is going to increase the demand for the ace to become intimately familiar with the GCE's scheme of maneuver and vice versa. The CSSE's involvement in the planning of operations will be more critical than ever. "Much has been written about the operations component of maneuver warfare. But maneuver warfare operations, like all modern types of warfare, will succeed or fail depending on the adequacy of logistics support." (2:10) The first challenge for an ace in maneuver warfare may well be the analyzing of that mission type order he receives. As a maneuver element conducting the main attack the main input as to how he conducts that attack may well come from information derived from the expertise of the GCE. Only Marine aviation is organized where this sort of interplay can be taken advantage of on a daily basis from the lowest to the highest level of the operation. We must demand that this rapport continues to grow throughout the Corps. The hardest facet facing the ace in maneuver warfare will still be the ability to locate and identify both friendly and enemy forces and conducting that coordination required for CAS operations. The chances are greater than ever in maneuver warfare that there will be friendly forces established well beyond the forward edge of the battle field (FEBA). This will make the coordination effort twice as difficult but it can be accomplished if we integrate our training and conduct our training like the way we are going to fight. In the scenario at the start of this paper it has been decided that combined antitank teams (CAT) will be utilized well behind enemy lines to help reduce the enemy s armored and mechanized capability. The CAT teams will be used to try to get the enemy to commit himself in isolated areas. The individual teams will be supported by the ace with preplanned scheduled and on call CAS. The CAT teams will consist of light assault vehicles (LAV) equipped with antitank TOW missiles. The logistical support for these CAT teams will be provided by assault support helicopters during the night because the resupply will have to take place behind enemy lines. It is very obvious to see that a tremendous amount of coordination and support will have to go into the planning of this operation. This planning will have to be conducted by utilizing the ability to integrate all the elements who will be involved. It is also obvious that this sort of integrated planning must be conducted and executed in a training environment before it can be expected to be utilized in a real world scenario. In conclusion I believe that Marine aviation can support and be an integral part of the Marine Corps all ground team. I also feel that the mission of Marine aviation and its six functional areas will enable it to conduct maneuver warfare if we conduct true integrated training and practice the same way we plan to fight. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Donovan, Elizabeth P., "Seeing the Light" Navy Times (26 March, 1990). 2. Gray, General A.M., "Comments on Logistics," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1989). 3. Pitman, Lt. Gen. C.H., "Aviation Posture Statement" Marine Corps Gazette, (July, 1989). 4. U.S. Marine CORPS, Fleet Marine Force Organization -1990. FMFMRP 1-ll, Quantico, Virginia, 1989. 5. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine aviation FMFM 5-1 Quantico, Virginia, 1979.
